Orissa High Court
Bijay Sukla & Ors vs State Of Odisha & Ors. .... Opposite ... on 6 May, 2025
Author: Biraja Prasanna Satapathy
Bench: Biraja Prasanna Satapathy
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
W.P.(C) No. 10553 of 2025
In the matter of an application under Articles 226 & 227 of the
Constitution of India.
..................
Bijay Sukla & Ors. .... Petitioners
-versus-
State of Odisha & Ors. .... Opposite Parties
For Petitioners : Mr. M. Mishra, Sr. Advocate
along with
Mr. Senapati, Advocate
For Opp. Parties : Mr. A. Tripathy,
Addl. Govt. Advocate
PRESENT:
THE HON'BLE JUSTICE BIRAJA PRASANNA SATAPATHY
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Date of Hearing: 06.05.2025 & Date of Judgment: 06.05.2025
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Biraja Prasanna Satapathy, J.
1. This matter is taken up through hybrid mode.
2. Heard Mr. M. Mishra, learned Sr. Counsel appearing for the
Petitioners along with Mr. S. Senapati, learned counsel, Mr. A.
Tripathy, learned Addl. Govt. Advocate appearing for the State-Opp.
// 2 //
Parties, Mr. S.S. Tripathy and Mr. A. Satapathy, learned counsels
appearing for Private Opp. Parties.
3. The present writ petition has been filed inter alia with the following
prayer:-
"It is, therefore, humbly prayed that this Hon'ble Court
may graciously be pleased to issue Rule Nisi calling upon the
Opp. Parties to show cause (1) as to why the impugned
letter/notice dtd.04.04.2025 issued by the Sub-Collector/Opp.
Party No.2 under Annexure-4 in postponing the special meeting
in connection with no confidence shall not be declared illegal;
(2) as to why the special meeting of no confidence against the
Chairman, Mahakalpada Panchayat Samiti, Smt. Kalpana Rout
shall not be annulled and no further meeting is maintainable in
view of the Section-46-B(2)(g) and Section-46-B(3) of Odisha
Panchayat Samiti Act, 1959 and quash the impugned
notice/letter dtd.21.04.2025 under Annexure-5 and (3) further
be pleased to direct the authorities/Opp. Parties to enquire into
the matter as per the allegation/grievance petition under
Annexure-2 Series within a stipulated time and on perusal of
causes shown if any or upon insufficient causes shown make the
said rule absolute and may pass such other order/orders as
deemed just and proper.
And for this act of kindness, the petitioner shall as in duty
bound, ever pray."
4. It is the case of the Petitioners that basing on the requisition and
resolution made by the members of Mahakalapada Panchayat Samiti
// 3 //
(in short Samiti)-Opp. Party No. 2 vide notice dtd.28.03.2025 under
Annexure-1 series fixed the vote of no confidence to be taken up
against the Chairman of the Samiti by fixing the date to 05.04.2025.
4.1. It is further contended that alleging illegalities and irregularities
with regard to submission of the requisition and the resolution by the
members of the Samiti though complaints were made before Opp.
Party Nos. 1 & 3 under Annexure-2 series as well as 3 series, but no
action was taken on such complaints made by the Chairperson of the
Samiti (Petitioner No. 14) as well as some of the Samiti Members. It
is contended that the Requisition dt.21.03.2025 was never submitted
before Opp. Party No. 2 on 21.03.2025 and it was only submitted on
27.03.2025.
4.2. It is contended that even though vide notice dtd.28.03.2025 so
issued under Annexure-1 series, vote of no confidence was fixed to
05.04.2025, but vide another notice issued on 04.04.2025 under
Annexure-4, Opp. Party No. 2 deferred the meeting inter alia on the
ground that some of the Samiti members on the ground of their health
problem have requested not to hold the vote of no confidence on
05.04.2025. The present writ petition was initially filed challenging
// 4 //
such action of Opp. Party No. 2 in adjourning the vote of no
confidence vide notice dt.04.04.2025 under Annexure-4.
4.3. It is contended that during pendency of the matter, when vide
notice dtd.21.04.2025 under Annexure-5, Opp. Party No. 2 fixed the
vote of no confidence to 29.04.2025, the same was also assailed by the
Petitioners by making necessary application and this Court vide order
dtd.25.04.2025 stayed the operation of notice dtd.21.04.2025.
4.4. It is the main contention of the learned Sr. Counsel appearing for
the Petitioners that once in terms of the notice dtd.28.03.2025 so
issued under Annexure-1 series, vote of no confidence fixed to
05.04.2025 was adjourned in terms of the notice dtd.04.04.2025 so
issued under Annexure-4 by the self-same Opp. Party No. 2, no fresh
notice can be issued to take up the vote of no confidence with issuance
of notice dtd.21.04.2025 under Annexure-5, in view of the provisions
contained under Sec. 46-B(2)(f) of the Odisha Panchayat Samiti Act,
1959 ( in short Act). Sec. 46-B(2)(f) of the Act reads as follows:-
"(f) no such meeting shall stand adjourned to a subsequent date
and no item of business other than the resolution for recording
want of confidence in the Chairman or the Vice-Chairman shall
be taken up for consideration at the meeting;"
// 5 //
4.5. Placing reliance on the aforesaid provisions, it is vehemently
contended that once the meeting in terms of Annexure-1 notice
dtd.28.03.2025, so fixed to 05.04.2025, was adjourned with issuance
of the notice dtd.04.04.2025 under Annexure-4, no fresh notice could
not have been issued vide notice dt.21.04.2025 under Annexure-5.
4.6. It is also contended that once the proceeding was adjourned with
issuance of the notice dtd.04.04.2025 under Annexure-4, no further
notice can be issued by fixing the date to 29.04.2025, so issued by
Opp. Party No. 2 vide the impugned notice dtd.21.04.2025 under
Annexure-5.
4.7. It is contended that once the meeting in terms of Annexure-1
dtd.28.03.2025 was not held and adjourned in terms of notice
dt.04.04.2025, neither the said meeting could have been adjourned nor
Opp. Party No. 2 is permitted to fix another date vide notice
dtd.21.04.2025 under Annexure-5, in view of the bar contained under
Sec. 46-B (2)(f) of the Act.
4.8. It is also contended that since challenging the requisition and
resolution complaints were made before Opp. Party No. 3 as well as
Opp. Party No. 1 inter alia with the allegation that signatures of two of
the Panchayat Samiti members have been forged and the requisition
// 6 //
was never submitted on 21.03.2025, it requires a consideration by
Opp. Party No. 3 and prior to such consideration, the vote of no
confidence cannot take place in terms of the impugned notice issued
on 21.04.2025 under Annexure-5. Making all these submissions,
learned Sr. Counsel appearing for the Petitioners contended that the
impugned notice dtd.04.04.2025 and 21.04.2025 so issued by Opp.
Party No. 2 under Annexure-4 & 5 are not sustainable in the eye of
law and requires interference of this Court.
5. Mr. A. Tripathy, learned Addl. Govt. Advocate on the other hand
basing on the materials available on record contended that after receipt
of the requisition and resolution from the Samiti members on
21.03.2025, vide notice dtd.28.03.2025 under Annexure-1 series,
though the vote of no confidence was fixed to 05.04.2025, but prior to
taking up the vote of no confidence on 05.04.2025 since vide notice
dtd.04.04.2025 under Annexure-4, the vote of no confidence was kept
in kept abeyance, there is no bar to issue a fresh notice on 21.04.2025
by fixing the date to 29.04.2025 under Annexure-5.
5.1. It is contended that since in terms of Annexure-1 notice, no
meeting was held to take up the vote of no confidence on 05.04.2025,
provisions contained under Sec. 46-B(2)(f) of the Act` is not a bar to
// 7 //
fix another date with issuance of the notice dtd.21.04.2025 under
Annexure-5.
5.2. It is contended that since no meeting was held on 05.04.2025 nor
it was adjourned on the said date, provisions contained under Sec. 46-
B(2)(f) of the Act cannot be treated as a bar to issue a fresh notice as
has been done in the present case by Opp. Party No. 2.
5.3. In support of his aforesaid submission, reliance was placed to a
decision of this Court passed in the case of Balmiki Pradhan Vs.
State of Odisha & Ors. Reported in 2006 SCC OnLine Ori 179. This
Court in Para 7, 9 & 10 of the said order has held as follows:-
"7. Learned AddI Government Advocate submitted that the
meeting having hot been held on 15.1.2005, the question of
adjourning the meeting did not arise and, as a matter of fact,
the meeting scheduled to be held on 15.1.2005 having not been
able to be held due to exigency beyond the control of the Sub
Collector, the action of the Sub-Collector in issuing notice
under Annexure-2 to hold the meeting on 2.2.2005 is neither
illegal nor contrary to the above provision of the Act.
xxx xxx xxx
9. According to the Concise Oxford English Dictionary (10th
Edition), the word 'adjourn' means brake off (a meeting) with
the intention of resuming it later and the word 'defer' means
put off to a later time; postpone.
// 8 //
10. In common parlance also, we are of the opinion that there
is certain difference between an adjournment and a deferment.
Adjournment always means any proceeding taken up and is
shifted to a future date but deferring a proceeding to a future
date is on account of inability to hold the proceeding/meeting
on the scheduled date. It is also clear from the above provision
of the Act that the bar imposed under Section 24(2)(h) of the
Act is a bar for adjourning the meeting of "Vote of No
Confidence". It is specifically provided that such a meeting
cannot be adjourned. There is no bar for holding such a
meeting on a subsequent date if the same has not been held at
all on the date when it was scheduled to be held."
5.4. Reliance was also placed to another decision of this Court in the
case of Govinda Chandra Pradhan Vs. S.D.O. Sadar & Ors. (AIR
1965 Ori 94). This Court in Para 6 & 7 of the said Judgment has held
as follows:-
"6. It will be noticed that the opening words of the sub-section
are "In convening a meeting under sub-sec. (1) and in the
conduct of business at such meeting". Clauses (a), (b) and (c)
deal with matters which fall legitimately within the scope of
"convening" a meeting: whereas clauses (d,) (e), (f), (g) and (h)
deal with matters that relate to 'conduct of the business' of the
meeting. A scrutiny of clause (d) shows that the meeting
commences when the Sub-Divisional Officer or any other
competent authority presides over the meeting and he conducts
the proceedings of that meeting. All actions taken by him prior
to his presiding over the meeting which are dealt with in clauses
(a), (b) and (c) must be held to relate to the 'convening' of such
meeting. Clause (c) says that the competent officer on receipt of
// 9 //
requisition, shall fix the date, hour and place of the meeting.
This statutory power to fix a date for the purpose of holding a
meeting must necessarily include the power to alter that date, by
virtue of Section 22 of the Orissa General Clauses Act. Hence,
though in the first Instance, the Sub-Divisional Officer, Sadar
might have given notice to the affect that the meeting will be
held on a particular date and time he has the statutory authority
to alter the date if the exigencies of the situation require it. It is
true that once he commences the proceeding by presiding over
the meeting, the stage of convening the meeting is closed and the
stage of conducting the business of the meeting is reached. It is
at the latter stage that clause (f) quoted above begins to operate
and he has no jurisdiction to adjourn the meeting.
7. Apart from the language of the provisions of section 46-B the
aforesaid view is based on the well known principles dealing
with law of meetings, referred to at page 74 of the Manual on
the Law of Meetings by Sebag Shaw and H.A.R.J. Wilson (1947
Edition) in the following terms:
"The adjournment of a meeting is to be distinguished from the
postponement. An adjournment denotes the suspension of debate
or of the entire proceedings and, therefore, assumes that the
proceedings have once commenced. Postponement, on the other
hand, is used to indicate that the commencement of a meeting is
itself deferred"."
5.5. Learned Addl. Govt. Advocate accordingly contended that since
no meeting was held on 05.04.2025 in terms of the initial notice issued
by Opp. Party No. 2 on 28.03.2025 under Annexure-1, there is no bar
to issue a fresh notice on 21.04.2025, by fixing the date of vote of no
// 10 //
confidence to 29.04.2025. It is accordingly contended that no illegality
or irregularity can be found with the action of the Opp. Party No. 2
either in issuing notice dtd.04.04.2025 under Annexure-4 and so also
notice dtd.21.04.2025 under Annexure-5.
5.6. It is however contended that, since in view of the interim order
passed by this Court, vote of no confidence has not taken place on
29.04.2025, Opp. Party No. 2 be permitted to issue a fresh notice by
fixing the vote of no confidence to another date.
6. Mr. S.S. Tripathy and Mr. A. Satapathy, learned counsels appearing
for the Private Opp. Parties also made similar submissions as like the
submissions made by the learned addl. Govt. Advocate. It is
contended that pursuant to the requisition and resolution submitted by
the Samiti Members before Opp. Party No. 2 on 21.04.2025, Opp.
Party No. 2 initially issued the notice on 28.03.2025 under Annexure-
1 series by fixing the date of vote of no confidence to 05.04.2025.
6.1. It is contended that out of 64 members of the Samiti, the
requisition was made by 41 members and even if as contended by the
learned Sr. Counsel appearing for the Petitioners, signatures of two of
the requisitionists have been manipulated, but since more than 1/3rd of
the total members of the Samiti have signed the requisition, in
// 11 //
accordance with the provisions contained under Sec. 46-B(2)(a) of the
Act, the same is a valid requisition in the eye of law. Rule 46-B(2)(a)
of the Act reads as follows:-
"(a) no such meeting shall be convened except on a
requisition signed by at least one-third of the members
with a right to vote, along with a copy of the resolution
proposed to be moved at the meeting."
6.2. It is also contended that the stand taken by the Petitioners that
such a requisition was not submitted on 21.03.2025 and it was only
submitted on 27.03.2025, since are disputed question of fact, it cannot
be adjudicated in a writ petition filed under Art. 226 of the
Constitution of India. Reliance was placed to a decision of the
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Chairman, Grid Corporation of
Orissa Ltd. (GRIDCO) & Ors. Vs. Sukamani Das (Smt) & Anr.
reported in (1999) 7 SCC 298. Hon'ble Apex Court in Para 6 of the
Judgment has held as follows to the following effect:-
"It is the settled legal position that where disputed questions of
facts are involved a petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution is not a proper remedy. The High Court has not
and could not have held that the disputes in these cases were
raised for the sake of raising them and that there was no
substance therein. The High Court should have directed the writ
petitioners to approach the civil court as it was done in OJC No.
5229 of 1995."
// 12 //
6.3. Reliance was also placed to a decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court
in the case of M/s A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation Vs. The
Tahasildar & ors. Etc. (Civil Appeal Nos. 4526-4527 of 2024).
Hon'ble Apex Court in Para 48 of the Judgment has held as follows to
the following effect:-
"Normally, the disputed question of fact are not
investigated or adjudicated by a writ court while
exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India."
6.4. Reliance was also placed to a decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court
in the case of Shubhas Jain Vs. Rajeshwari Shivam & Ors. Reported
in (2021) 20 SCC 454. Hon'ble Apex Court in Para 25 of the said
Judgment has held as follows:-
"25. It is well settled that the High Court exercising its
extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, does not adjudicate hotly disputed
questions of facts. It is not for the High Court to make a
comparative assessment of conflicting technical reports and
decide which one is acceptable."
6.5. Reliance was also placed to a decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court
in the case of State of Kerala & Ors. Vs. M.K. Jose reported in (2015)
9 SCC 433. Hon'ble Apex Court in Para 13, 14, 18 & 19 of the said
Judgment has held as follows:-
// 13 //
"13. A writ court should ordinarily not entertain a writ
petition, if there is a breach of contract involving disputed
questions of fact. The present case clerly indicates that the
factual disputes are involved.
14. In State of Bihar v. Jain Plastics and Chemicals
Ltd. [(2002) 1 SCC 216] , a two-Judge Bench reiterating the
exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution in
respect of enforcement of contractual obligations has stated:
(SCC p. 217, para 3)
"3. ... It is to be reiterated that writ petition under Article
226 is not the proper proceedings for adjudicating such
disputes. Under the law, it was open to the respondent to
approach the court of competent jurisdiction for appropriate
relief for breach of contract. It is settled law that when an
alternative and equally efficacious remedy is open to the
litigant, he should be required to pursue that remedy and not
invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. Equally, the
existence of alternative remedy does not affect the jurisdiction of
the court to issue writ, but ordinarily that would be a good
ground in refusing to exercise the discretion under Article 226."
In the said case, it has been further observed: (SCC p. 218, para
7)
"7. ... It is true that many matters could be decided after
referring to the contentions raised in the affidavits and counter-
affidavits, but that would hardly be a ground for exercise of
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution
in case of alleged breach of contract. Whether the alleged non-
supply of road permits by the appellants would justify breach of
contract by the respondent would depend upon facts and
evidence and is not required to be decided or dealt with in a writ
petition. Such seriously disputed questions or rival claims of the
parties with regard to breach of contract are to be investigated
and determined on the basis of evidence which may be led by the
parties in a properly instituted civil suit rather than by a court
exercising prerogative of issuing writs."
// 14 //
18. It is appropriate to state here that in the said case, the
Court granted the relief as the facts were absolutely clear from
the documentary evidence brought which pertain to
interpretation of certain clauses of contract of insurance. In that
context, the Court opined: (ABL International Ltd. case [(2004)
3 SCC 553] , SCC p. 578, para 51)
"51. ... The terms of the insurance contract which were
agreed between the parties were after the terms of the contract
between the exporter and the importer were executed which
included the addendum, therefore, without hesitation we must
proceed on the basis that the first respondent issued the
insurance policy knowing very well that there was more than
one mode of payment of consideration and it had insured failure
of all the modes of payment of consideration. From the
correspondence as well as from the terms of the policy, it is
noticed that existence of only two conditions has been made as a
condition precedent for making the first respondent Corporation
liable to pay for the insured risk, that is: (i) there should be a
default on the part of the Kazak Corporation to pay for the
goods received; and (ii) there should be a failure on the part of
the Kazakhstan Government to fulfil their guarantee."
And it eventually held: (SCC pp. 578-79, para 51)
"51. ... We have come to the conclusion that the amended
Clause 6 of the agreement between the exporter and the
importer on the face of it does not give room for a second or
another construction than the one already accepted by us. We
have also noted that reliance placed on sub-clause (d) of the
proviso to the insurance contract by the Appellate Bench is also
misplaced which is clear from the language of the said clause
itself. Therefore, in our opinion, it does not require any external
aid, much less any oral evidence to interpret the above clause.
Merely because the first respondent wants to dispute this fact, in
our opinion, it does not become a disputed fact. If such objection
as to disputed questions or interpretations is raised in a writ
petition, in our opinion, the courts can very well go into the
// 15 //
same and decide that objection if facts permit the same as in this
case."
19. In this regard, a reference to Noble Resources
Ltd. v. State of Orissa [(2006) 10 SCC 236] would be seemly.
The two-Judge Bench referred to ABL International [(2004) 3
SCC 553] , Dwarkadas Marfatia & Sons v. Port of
Bombay [(1989) 3 SCC 293] , Mahabir Auto Stores v. Indian
Oil Corpn. [(1990) 3 SCC 752] and Jamshed Hormusji
Wadia v. Port of Mumbai [(2004) 3 SCC 214] and opined thus:
(Noble Resources case [(2006) 10 SCC 236] , SCC p. 246, para
29)
"29. Although the scope of judicial review or the
development of law in this field has been noticed hereinbefore
particularly in the light of the decision of this Court in ABL
International Ltd. [(2004) 3 SCC 553] each case, however, must
be decided on its own facts. Public interest as noticed
hereinbefore, may be one of the factors to exercise the power of
judicial review. In a case where a public law element is
involved, judicial review may be permissible. (See Binny
Ltd. v. V. Sadasivan [(2005) 6 SCC 657 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 881]
and G.B. Mahajan v. Jalgaon Municipal Council [(1991) 3 SCC
91] .)"
Thereafter, the Court in Noble Resources case [(2006) 10 SCC
236] , proceeded to analyse the facts and came to hold that
certain serious disputed questions of facts have arisen for
determination and such disputes ordinarily could not have been
entertained by the High Court in exercise of its power of judicial
review and ultimately the appeal was dismissed.
6.6. It is also contended that since admittedly the requisition was made
by 41 Panchayat Samiti members out of the total 64 members,
expressing their no confidence on the Chair Person of the Samiti along
// 16 //
with the resolution, it is in conformity with the provisions contained
under Sec. 46-B(2)(a) of the Act.
6.7. It is further contended that since in terms of notice dtd.28.03.2025
no meeting was held on 05.04.2025, and prior to such conduct of the
meeting, the meeting was deferred vide notice dtd.04.04.2025 under
Annexure-4, it cannot be held that the meeting was adjourned, as
contended by the Petitioners in the writ petition. Since no meeting was
held on 05.04.2025 in terms of notice dtd.28.03.2025, provisions
contained under Sec. 46-B(2)(f) of the Act has got no applicability to
the facts of the present case.
6.8. It is also contended that since in terms of the interim order passed
by this Court, the vote of no confidence in terms of notice
dtd.21.04.2025 under Annexure-5 was not held on 29.04.2025, Opp.
Party No. 2 be permitted to fix another date by issuing a fresh notice.
6.9. In support of the submission, reliance was also placed to a
decision of this Court in the case of Nimain Charan Mohanty Vs.
State of Odisha & Ors. Reported in 1994 SCC OnLine Ori 96. This
Court in para 6 & 7 of the said judgment has held as follows:-
"6. We have fully reproduced above the Statement of Objects
and Reasons since it was repeatedly read out to us and has
// 17 //
been heavily relied upon. The principal object in bringing
about this amendment seems to be to enhance the time limit
of 30 days specified in clause (a) of S. 46-B(3) to one year
with a view to bring it at par with the period prescribed in the
old clause (b), so that the Chairman or the Vice-Chairman
can work in peace for at least one year once in the special
meeting held in pursuance of sub-sec. (2) for recording want
of confidence, either the motion is defeated or the number of
members present at the meeting is less than a majority of
two-thirds of the members having a right to vote or the
resolution is not passed at the meeting supported by a
majority of two-thirds of members having a right to vote. It is
patent that in each case the starting point for computing the
period of bar for fresh requisition for the meeting is and was
the date of the special meeting actually held in pursuance of
a requisition as per law. By the amendment, no change has
been brought about in the starting point; the change in only
in the period. This is amply clear from the plain language of
the amended provision, so also the stated object behind it. No
special meeting having been held in pursuance of the earlier
requisition, there is no question of a bar for the second
requisition within the alleged prohibited period. The
submission that the real intention of the Legislature was to
create a bar against a second requisition within one year
despite absence of a special meeting in pursuance of the first
requisition does not warrant acceptance. To do so would be
to go against the object and also to re-write the sub-section
by judicial interpretation. This is impermissible under the
canons of interpretation. The first point must, therefore, fall.
7. Section 46-B(2) contemplates a requisition to be signed by
at Jeast one-third of the members with a right to vote and
// 18 //
nothing more. That requirement is fulfilled. Thirteen out of
the twenty-four members with a right to vote have put their
hand on the requisition. Seventeen more, who may not have a
right to vote, have also put their hand. But that would make
no difference. At the most, it is a surplusage which can be
just ignored. That the number of surplusage is larger will
have no impact on the legality of the requisition. The second
point is also equally meritless."
7. I have heard Mr. M. Mishra, learned Sr. Counsel appearing for the
Petitioners along with Mr. S. Senapati, learned counsel Mr. A.
Tripathy, learned Addl. Govt. Advocate appearing for the State-Opp.
Parties and Mr. S.S. Tripathy, learned counsel along with Mr. A.
Satapathy, learned counsel appearing for the Private-Opp. Parties. On
the consent of the learned counsel appearing for the Parties and with
due exchange of the pleadings, the matter was heard at the stage of
admission and disposed of by the present order.
8. Having heard learned counsel appearing for the Parties, considering
the submissions made and after going through the materials available
on record, this Court finds that basing on the requisition and resolution
submitted by 41 members out of the total 64 Samiti members of
Mahakalapada Panchayat Samiti before Opp. Party No. 2 on
21.03.2025, notice dtd.28.03.2025 under Annexure-1 series was
// 19 //
issued to the members as well as the Chairperson of the Samiti, by
fixing the vote of no confidence to 05.04.2025.
8.1. Prior to holding of the meeting on 05.04.2025 in terms of
Annexure-1 notice dtd.28.03.2025, the same was deferred on the
ground indicated in the notice dtd.04.04.2025 under Annexure-4. The
present writ petition was filed initially challenging such action of Opp.
Party No. 2 in deferring the meeting vide notice dt.04.04.2025.
8.2. However, subsequently vide notice dtd.21.04.2025 under
Annexure-5, when the vote of no confidence was fixed to 29.04.2025,
the same was brought on record by way of amendment and enclosed
as Annexure-5 to the writ petition. Considering the grounds taken in
the writ petition, this Court vide order dtd.25.04.2025 passed an
interim order by staying the operation of notice dtd.21.04.2025 and
accordingly vote of no confidence was not held on 29.04.2025.
8.3. Taking into account the provisions contained under Sec. 46-
B(2)(f) of the Act and placing reliance on the decisions as cited
(supra), it is the view of this Court that since in terms of notice
dtd.28.03.2025, no meeting was held on 05.04.2025, it cannot be held
that the meeting was adjourned on the date fixed and thereby
attracting the provisions contained under Sec. 46-B(2)(f) of the Act.
// 20 //
Since no meeting in terms of the notice dtd.28.03.2025 was held on
05.04.2025, it cannot be held that the meeting was adjourned on the
said date.
8.4. In view of the aforesaid analysis, this Court neither finds any
illegality or irregularity in deferring the meeting with issuance of the
notice dtd.04.04.2025 under Annexure-4 and so also notice
dtd.21.04.2025 under Annexure-5 fixing the vote of no confidence to
29.04.2025. This Court accordingly is not inclined to interfere with
the notices dtd.04.04.2025 and 21.04.2025 so issued by Opp. Party
No. 2 under Annexure-4 & 5 and dismiss the writ petition so far as the
challenge made to the said two notices.
8.5. With regard to the stand taken by the Petitioner that the
requisition was not submitted on 21.03.2025 and it was submitted on
27.03.2025, since is not supported by any authentic pleadings, save
and except the complaints made in that regard vide Annexure-2 series
& 3 series, this Court is unable to accept such contention raised by the
Petitioner in the writ petition. Not only that the allegation that the
requisition dt.21.03.2025 was not submitted on 21.03.2025 and
submitted only on 27.03.2025 being disputed question of fact, the
same cannot be looked into by this Court while exercising the power
// 21 //
under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, in view of the decision in
the case of Sukamani Das, M/s. A.P. Electrical Equipment
Corporation, Shubhas Jain as well as M.K. Jose as cited (supra).
8.6. Similarly, on the face of the requisition being made by 41
members out of the total 64 members of the Samiti, the allegation that
signature of 2 (two) of the members have been forged or they have not
signed the requisition has got no significance as the requisition even
made by 39 members being more than 1/3rd of the total members of
the Samiti, it is in accordance with the provision contained under Sec.
46-B(2)(a) of the Act.
8.7. Therefore, this Court on any count does not find any merit in the
writ petition and dismiss the writ petition accordingly. However, in
view of the interim order passed by this Court on 25.04.2025, since
the vote of no confidence was not held on 29.04.2025 in terms of
notice dtd.21.04.2025, it is open for Opp. Party No. 2 to issue a fresh
notice in that regard.
(BIRAJA PRASANNA SATAPATHY)
Judge
Orissa High Court, Cuttack
Dated
Signed by: SNEHANJALI the 6th May, 2025/Sneha
PARIDA
Reason: Authentication
Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
Date: 12-May-2025 17:59:27
