Orissa High Court
Ramesh Chandra Patra vs Special L.A.O on 5 May, 2025
Author: M.S. Sahoo
Bench: M.S. Sahoo
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA, CUTTACK
LAA No. 33 of 2014
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An appeal under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
Ramesh Chandra Patra
and others ... ... Appellants
-Versus-
Special L.A.O., Angul-Duburi-
Sukinda Road, New Broad
Gauge Rail Link Project ... ... Respondent
For Appellants : Mr. Niranjan Panda-1, Advocate
For Respondent : Mr. Sanjib Swain, AGA
Mr. S. K. Dash, Sr. Advocate
along with Mr. P. Dash, Advocate
(for Intervenor)
P R E S E N T:
THE HONOURABLE SHRI JUSTICE M.S. SAHOO
Dates of hearing : 21.04.2025 and 05.05.2025
Date of judgment : 05.05.2025
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M.S.SAHOO, J.
Present LAA is listed and taken up along with LAA
Nos.34 and 35 of 2014. All the parties to the respective
appeals are represented by the same learned counsel. The
facts of the appeals are identical. They arise from one land
acquisition process, that is for construction of Angul-
Duburi-Sukinda Road, New Broad Gauge Railway Line.
Issues are also similar and identical. The question of law
is also the same to be decided by this Court. LAA No.33
of 2014 was heard as the lead case. For effective
utilization of available time all the appeals were taken up
and heard together. The learned counsel for the parties
who represented the parties in all the cases were heard at
length. This appeal is disposed of by noting the
contentions and arguments urged in all the appeals taken
together.
1. The appeal U/s.54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
has been filed by the appellants challenging judgment
dated 04.07.2014 passed by learned Civil Judge (Sr.
Division), Kamakshyanagar in L.A. Misc. Case No. 126 of
2013. Appellants were claimant-petitioners before the
Court below in a reference that was made by the Special
Land Acquisition Officer U/s.18 of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894, as dispute arose regarding the actual market
price of the acquired land for determination of
compensation. The Court, learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division),
Kamakshyanagar answered the reference by judgment
dated 04.07.2014.
2. The land acquisition proceeding was pursuant to
notification dated 07.07.2010 published in the Gazette on
05.08.2011. Land of the appellants of an area Ac. 0.55
decimals, pertaining to Plot No.1893 of 'Sarada-I kisam'
Mouza-Kamakshyanagar, District- Dhenkanal was acquired
for the Angul-Duburi-Sukinda Road, New Broad Gauge
(B.G.) Rail Link Project, Dhenkanal. The Land Acquisition
Officer determined the compensation amount at
₹25,00,000/- per acre i.e. ₹25,000/- per decimal.
3. Before the referral Court the awarded compensation
amount ₹22,30,966/- as intimated to the appellants by
notice U/s. 12(2) of L.A. Act was disputed by the appellants
stating that their land should be valued at a higher rate.
The appellants had objected before the L.A. Collector by
written objection and they received with protest
compensation amount. Their written objection was
forwarded by the Special Land Acquisition Officer leading to
adjudication by the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division). The
referral Court enhanced the compensation amount, to be
determined at Rs.56,41,905/- (Rupees fiftysix lakh fortyone
thousand nine hundred five) per acre. The appellants still
dissatisfied have approached this Court in the present
appeal.
4. It is noticed by this Court that the proceeding u/s.18
of the Act before the Court of the learned Civil Judge
(Senior Division) has some peculiar features as far as
impletion of parties. Certified copy of the judgment has
been enclosed and is also available in the lower court
records which indicates that the Special LAO, Angul-
Duburi-Sukinda Road, New B.G. Rail Link Project
forwarded the claim of appellants and was the only opposite
party to answer the claim of enhancement of compensation
amount. What is more peculiar is that the learned Civil
Judge (Sr. Division) has neither framed any issue nor
answered as to who were the Project Proponents, who had
deposited/paid the amount of compensation as determined
by the LA Collector in the first instance and would
pay/deposit the enhanced amount as directed by the
learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division). The learned Court has
not at all gone to the issue how the enhanced amount
awarded will be satisfied i.e. whether opp. Party in the lis is
to pay the amount or any one else will pay it.
5. The issues framed by the learned court below is
reflected in paragraph-5 of the judgment which is
reproduced below :
"5. The point that needs for determination is :
Whether the petitioners are entitled to have an
amount of higher compensation than the amount
settled by the O.P. ?"
6. The "order" of the learned Civil Judge(Sr. Division)
indicates the following :
"The reference U/s.18 of L.A. Act is answered
as follows:-
The market price of acquired land is
determined at Rs.56,41,905/- (fifty six lacs forty one
thousand nine hundred and five) per acre, as on the
date of notification. The petitioners are entitled to get
compensation at such higher rate for the acquired
land. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, Angul-
Duburi-Sukinda Road New B.G. Rail Link Project,
Dhenkanal is directed to re-assess the compensation
at such higher rate for the acquired land measuring
Ac.0.55 dec bearing plot no. 1893 under khata
no.375/81 and to pay the same to the petitioners
after deducting the amount which has already been
paid to him. The petitioners are also entitled to all
the statutory benefits on such enhanced
compensation as admissible under the L.A. Act. The
petitioners are also at liberty to put-forth their
grievance for proper rehabilitation and resettlement
before the competent authority as per the provisions
of Orissa Resettlement and Rehabilitation Policy,
2006."
7. By the above order the amount of compensation
awarded in the L.A. proceeding, ₹22,30,966/- (Rupees
twenty two lakh thirty thousand nine hundred sixty six)
was enhanced by the learned court to be calculated at
₹56,41,905/-(Rupees fifty six lakh forty-one thousand nine
hundred five) per acre as on the date of notification. The
Special LAO, Angul-Duburi-Sukinda Road, New B.G. Rail
link Project was directed to re-assess and pay the same to
the petitioners after deducting the amount which has
already been paid to him.
8. Somehow, the judgment in its ordering portion or any
of its paragraphs does not refer to who will deposit the
enhanced amount before the LAO Collector. The list of
witnesses examined on behalf of petitioners indicates that
no witness was examined on behalf of opposite parties
Special LAO nor any written statement was filed on behalf
of the Special LAO. Working sheet of the acquired land was
produced on behalf of Opp. Paty-L.A. Collector marked as
Ext.A. Apparently, contest to the enhanced amount claimed
or any contest to the basis of determination of enhanced
amount has not been disclosed in the judgment.
9. Being dissatisfied by the determination of the
compensation amount ₹56,41,905/- per acre of land on the
date of notification as held by the referral Court the
appellants have challenged the same by filing the present
appeal for further enhancement. By order dated 29.06.2015
payment of court fee was exempted in Misc. Case No.185 of
2013. The matter was then referred to the National Lok
Adalat held by this Court. By order dated 09.12.2017 it is
observed by the learned Judge, Lok Adalat that "It is
submitted by learned counsel for the appellant that in view
of the dispute involved in this case, this matter cannot be
settle in the Lok Adalat."
10. As indicated above Misc. Case No.139 of 2016 has
been filed by the Company for intervention. The said I.A.
has been contested to the hilt as the matter is kept pending
before this Court. The I.A. is contested by the appellant
without any further progress in the adjudication of appeal.
The respondent, Special LAO represented in the present
appeal through the learned AGA also objects the
intervention application. On consent of the parties the
matter is taken up for hearing and disposal. The Misc.
Case seeking inervention is also taken up and disposed of
by the order recorded below along with the judgment.
11. Petitioner Angul-Sukinda Railway Company has filed
the application under sub-section (2) of Section 50 of the
LA Act, 1894 read with Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 for intervention. It is contended that no
notice was issued either to the East Coast Railway (Project
Proponent) on whose behalf the land was acquired or to the
intending-intervenor Company by entering into a
concession agreement with the Govt. of India, Ministry of
Railways, has undertaken the liability to pay the
compensation amount in respect of the land acquired for
the project. Though the award has not been challenged
separately in any connected land acquisition appeal but it
is contended in the I.A. that in absence of statutory notice
to East Coast Railway or the intervenor-Company the
award has to be held as a nullity as it suffers from gross
violation of the principle of natural justice, i.e. the affected
party must be heard by the adjudicating Court.
12. In the background facts as noted above and in view
of the procedure adopted in the proceedings before the
Special LAO as well as in the reference U/s.18 that was
decided by the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division),
Kamakshyanagar, the contention that neither the East
Coast Railway nor the Company were made parties or were
heard remains unrebutted.
Further, no material is brought to the notice of this
Court by appellants or the respondent-opposite party LAO
to show that East Coast Railway and the Company were
made parties or were heard in the proceeding u/s.18 of the
Act before the Court below. It is also neither pleaded nor
demonstrated before this Court if impletion of East Coast
Railway and/or the intending intervenor Company in the
proceeding u/s18 would have prejudiced the appellants or
the O.P.-Spl. Land Acquisition Officer in any manner. The
Special Land Acquisition Officer opposing the intervention
by the intervener company is rather baffling as the Special
LAO is not an affected party who would pay the
compensation if it is enhanced.
13. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants Mr.
Panda was heard at length. There is serious opposition on
behalf of the appellants to the intervention application but
on the face of the records it is fairly conceded that neither
the East Coast Railway nor the intervenor-Company were
made parties or heard before the referral Court. Obviously
there is no reference to any written statement or any other
response from Railways or the intending intervenor in the
LA case before the referral Court.
14. Order dated 21.04.2025 was passed earlier after
hearing the learned counsel for appellants. Said order is
reproduced herein :
"1. The matter has been listed for orders.
I.A. has been filed for intervention by the
intending intervener-petitioner stating at Paragraphs-
2 and 3 the following.
"2. That it transpires from the impugned Award
that no notice was issued to either the East Coast
Railways, on whose behalf the land was acquired or
the Intervener-Company who has undertaken the
liability to pay the compensation amount in respect
of the land acquired for the project, by virtue of an
agreement or MoU with the Ministry of Railways. It
is submitted that in absence of the statutory notice
as aforesaid, the Award has always been held as a
nullity.
3. That due to want of notice, the Intervenor-
Company did not have any opportunity to adduce
evidence before the Court and that the
compensation amount has been enhanced by the
Court at the instance of the appellants alone. There
has been a clear-cut violation of the principles of
natural justice. Intervener- Company is likely to be
saddled with the liability to pay the compensation
amount at a higher rate without an opportunity of
hearing. Therefore, the impugned Award cannot be
allowed to stand."
2. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the
appellants-opposite parties have filed objection to the
petition for intervention.
3. Learned counsel for the appellants on being asked
whether the appellants have stated in the objection that
the intending intervener is neither a necessary nor a
proper party for adjudication of the matter, submits that
in absence of his learned senior the matter may be
adjourned.
4. Perusal of the objection filed by the land oustee-
appellants does not show any response to the specific
averments made in paragraphs-2 and 3 of the petition as
indicated above.
5. As prayed for, list on 05.05.2025.
Liberty to mention for listing before the assigned
Bench.
6. List on 05.05.2025."
15. Learned counsel Mr. Niranjan Panda appearing on
behalf of appellants in response to the above order dated
21.4.2025 makes his submissions :
In response to observations made in paragraphs 3 & 4
of the order he submits that the objection dated 30 th
September, 2022 filed by the appellants through the
appellant no.3 paragraph-2 is the answer to the issues
raised in paragraphs 3 and 4. Paragraphs-2 and10 of the
objection are relied upon and are quoted herein :
"2. That the Misc. Case is not tenable in the eyes of
law and fact as the intervener is neither a necessary
nor a proper party. The land in question was
acquired for East Coast Railway on requisition for
public purpose u/section-4(1) of L.A. Act, 1894. The
land in question was never acquired for Company-
ASR Ltd for which the Intervener never appeared in
below.
10. That the law is well settled that only the
beneficiary/person interested for whose purpose the
land is required may be heard under Section 50(2) of
L.A. Act if the beneficiary so likes. In the present case
at the time of reference, the copy of reference
application has been forwarded to the East Coast
Railway as is available in the case record. But the
petitioner is in no way concerned in the matter in the
garb of agreement with Railway Department for
Execution of the project work under PPP mode."
16. Having gone through the paragraphs 2 & 10 of the
objection, it was pointed out to the learned counsel that the
appellants admit that the acquisition was as per requisition
of the Ministry of Railways who have entered into
concession agreement with the intending-intervener
company. Learned counsel does not dispute that the East
Coast Railway has not been arrayed as party in the
petition. The authority i.e. Special Land Acquisition Officer,
Angul-Duburi-Sukinda Road, New B.G. Rail Link Project
has been made the only opposite party who was neither
authorized in his official capacity nor he could have
represented East Coast Railway/Ministry of Railway Union
of India/Company.
17. It is noticed that the judgment in the opening
paragraph refers to the Special LAO referring the matter
u/s. 18 as indicated herein :
"This is a reference U/s.18 of the Land Acquisition
Act made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer,
Angul-Duburi-Sukinda Road New B.G. Rail Link
Project, Dhenkanal for determination of the actual
market price of the acquired land."
Further, it is submitted by learned counsel for the
appellants that the decretal dues have been paid by the
East Coast Railway though they are not parties in the
reference i.e. LA Misc. Case No. 126 of 2013.
The affidavit of the appellants dated 30.09.2022
(objection to the intervention) does not state whether any
amount was deposited/paid towards enhancement. The
affidavit does not disclose the reasons for an authority who
is not a party to a reference u/s. 18 of the Land Acquisition
Act would satisfy the decree. No indication is there when
the amount, if any, was deposited. The direction of the
learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division) was to the Special Land
Acquisition Officer to reassess the compensation, as such
there is no direction to any other entity to deposit and/or
for payment of such compensation so that the Special Land
Acquisition Officer can release the enhanced amount in
favour of the appellants.
18. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that
though not made party the referral court issued notice to
the East Coast Railway. On being asked by which order the
said notice was issued by the learned Civil Judge (Senior
Division), Kamakshyanagar in L.A. Misc. Case No.126 of
2013, the learned counsel submits that the Special LAO
while referring the matter under section 18 of the Land
Acquisition Act, by letter intimated the East Coast Railway.
Such submission is also contrary to the materials on
record i.e. the record of the lower Court (LCR). The
judgment as well as the reference on the face of it does not
indicate that the requisitioning authority-East Coast
Railway was ever made a party much less noticed by the
learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Kamakhyanagar as is
being suggested by the learned counsel for the Appellants.
19. Assuming that the opposite party in the L.A. case,
Spl. LAO issued letter to another authority which is not
made party, proposition that such letter has to be treated
as notice issued by the court is beyond scope of law. When
the Special LAO himself was the opposite party in the
adjudication he could not have issued letter to another
authority to be treated as notice to appear before the Court.
The LAO was not competent in his official capacity to place
before the referral Court the version of the Railways or the
Company.
20. Relying on the decisions rendered by the Supreme
Court in Satish Kumar Gupta and others v. State of
Haryana and others: (2017) 4 SCC 760 and Gregory
Patrao v. Mangalore Refinery and Petrochemicals Ltd.:
(2022) 10 SCC 461, it is submitted by the learned
counsel, Mr. Panda for the appellants that the intending
intervenors are neither necessary nor proper parties to be
impleaded before the LA referral court and they have no
locus standi in view of the notification dated 07.07.2010
issued under S.4(1) of the LA Act, annexed to the objection
marked as Annexure-1/1. It is further submitted that
Ministry of Railways is not a necessary party.
Such submission of the learned counsel is on the face
of the fact that the requisitioning authority is Union of
India through Ministry of Railways as per the orders of the
Excellency the President of India under Article 256(1) of the
Constitution of India.
21. Mr. Swain, learned Additional Government Advocate
referring to the judgment in Satish Kumar Gupta (supra)
and Gregory Patrao (supra) submits that in view of the
MoU having been subsequently executed between the
Ministry of Railways and the Special Purpose Vehicle
Angul-Sukinda Railways Company Limited (ASRL Ltd.),
they are not necessary or proper parties in the proceeding
before the LAO or the referral Court U/s.18 of the LA Act.
But the learned AGA again submits that the East Coast
Railway, the Project Proponent was not made a party or
heard in any manner in the reference. He submits that if
the matter is restored back to the referral Court, East Coast
Railway should be made a party and heard.
22. Learned Senior Counsel for the intending intervenor
Mr. S.K. Dash appearing along with Mr. P. Dash, learned
counsel, to substantiate his arguments relies on the
decision rendered by the Constitution Bench of Supreme
Court in U.P. Awas Evam Vikash Parishad v. Gyan Devi:
AIR 1995 SC 724: (1995) 2 SCC 326 particularly
paragraphs 48 to 56 of SCC where the Supreme Court has
given its conclusions.
It is submitted that the facts and the issue involved
in Gregory Patrao (supra) and Satish Kumar Sharma
(supra) are different and distinguishable as far as their
applicability to the present case is concerned. In those
cases the subsequent purchaser/beneficiary of the land
acquisition wanted to be parties in the LA proceeding or the
reference before the Civil Court. Answering that question it
was held in Satish Kumar Sharma (supra) and in
Gregory Patrao (supra) that post acquisition beneficiaries
are not necessary or required to be made party in the LA
proceeding or the reference.
23. The learned Senior Counsel relies on the decision of
this Court rendered by a coordinate Bench in Pitambar
Sahoo v. Angul-Sukinda Railway Limited : 2016(II) ILR-
CUTT 212 : 2016(II) OLR 27 (Manupatra print). Referring
to the said decision it is submitted that after the
authoritative determination by this Court in Pitambar
Sahoo(supra) it is no more res integra that Angul-Sukinda
Railway Company Limited, a Company incorporated under
the Companies Act is a person interested as defined
U/s.3(b) of the Act and appeal/petition for intervention filed
by the said Company U/s.54 of the Act or petition U/s.
50(2) of the Act read with Order I Rule 10 of the CPC is
maintainable.
Learned Senior Counsel relies on paragraphs-11 and
12 of Pitamber Sahoo (supra), which are quoted herein:
"11. From a conjoint reading of the aforesaid terms
and conditions of the agreement it is manifest that
the compensation for land acquisition has to be
paid by the opposite party. Neither the Ministry of
Railways nor the East Coast Railways for whose
benefit the land has been acquired has shouldered
any liability for the same. In view of the above, the
submission of Mr. Panda to the effect that the
opposite party was only a lessee under the lease
agreement and has no say in the matter of
determination of the compensation, cannot be
accepted. The lease agreement was executed
between the parties to work out the terms and
conditions of the Concession Agreement. Thus, the
opposite party has a right more than that of a
lessee or a contractor as alleged by Mr. Panda. In
view of te above, it necessitates the Court to have a
close reading of the case of P.H. Harijan (supra). In
the said case, the land was acquired under the
poriviions of KIAD Act. The land was acquired by
the State Government at the instance of KIADB
under Section 28(1) of the Act, 1966. The said
provision is pari materia to Section 4(1) of the L.A.
Act. Section 30 of the said Act provides that the
provision of L.A. Act shall mutatis mutandis apply
in respect of holding enquiry and to pass award
determining the compensation for acquisition of
land by the Deputy Commissioner. In paragraph-33
of the P.H. Harijan (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court
held as under:
"33..... In view of the above statutory
provisions of the KIAD Act, the provisions of
Sections 11, 18 and 30 of the LA Act are
applicable for the purpose of determination
of just and reasonable compensation of the
acquired land payable to the landowners
either by the Deputy Commissioner or
Reference Court."
12. ... ... Thus, the status of the opposite party in
the instant case cannot be equated with that of the
lessee (M/s. Rajshree Cement) as the opposite
party is under obligation liable to raise funds,
execute the project work, pay the compensation to
the land owners and to execute all other things as
agreed upon by it in the Concession Agreement..."
[Underlined to supply emphasis]
24. Having heard in detail the learned counsel and in view
of the above discussions and by applying the law laid down
by the Supreme Court and this High Court as noted above,
the petition seeking leave to intervene is allowed and
disposed of.
Leave granted.
The petitioners shall be heard in the appeal.
LAA No. 33 of 2014.
25. The LAA has been kept pending for the last 11 years.
After issuance of notice, application for intervention was
filed in the year 2016, which has been allowed by the above
order. The intervention application was contested all
through without delving into the merits of the appeal.
26. Heard learned counsel Mr. Niranjan Panda for the
appellants, learned Additional Government Advocate Mr.
Swain for the respondents and Mr. Dash, learned Senior
Counsel for the intervenor.
The learned counsel reiterate their respective
submissions as noted above.
27. Learned AGA further submits that the present
respondent i.e. Special LAO has limited role. As the Land
Acquisition Act provides he is an authority under the
statute which undertakes the process of acquisition, at the
most he can facilitate deposit and disbursal of such
compensation as determined under the statute and also
any amount awarded by the referral court. The
compensation/enhanced amount has to be deposited by
the project proponent/beneficiary with the LA authority to
be disbursed to the appellants-claimants.
28. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
intervenor submits that as far as the prayer for
enhancement is concerned the order passed by the
referral Court shows that the contentions of the project
proponent-Railway or the Special Purpose Vehicle which
entered into MoU/concession agreement with Ministry of
Railways were not considered as they were not made
parties. After the pronouncement in Pitambar Sahoo
(supra) the SPV is a person interested under Section 3(b)
of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The referral court has
to hear the railway and/or the SPV for arriving at a
decision whether to enhance the award.
29. In U.P. Awas Evam Vikash Parishad v. Gyan
Devi: AIR 1995 SC 724: (1995) 2 SCC 326, Constitution
Bench of five Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court held as
quoted herein (at paragraphs-48 to 56 of SCC) :
"48. Section 50(2) of the L.A. Act confers on a local
authority for whom land is being acquired a right to
appear in the acquisition proceedings before the
Collector and the reference court and adduce evidence
for the purpose of determining the amount of
compensation.
49. The said right carries with it the right to be given
adequate notice by the Collector as well as the
reference court before whom acquisition proceedings
are pending on the date on which the matter of
determination of compensation will be taken up.
50. The proviso to Section 50(2) only precludes a local
authority from seeking a reference but it does not
deprive the local authority which feels aggrieved by the
determination of the amount of compensation by the
Collector or by the reference court to invoke the remedy
under Article 226 of the Constitution as well as the
remedies available under the L.A. Act.
51. In the event of denial of the right conferred by
Section 50(2) on account of failure of the Collector to
serve notice of the acquisition proceedings the local
authority can invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution.
52. Even when notice has been served on the local
authority the remedy under Article 226 of the
Constitution would be available to the local authority on
grounds on which judicial review is permissible under
Article 226.
53. The local authority is a proper party in the
proceedings before the reference court and is entitled to
be impleaded as a party in those proceedings wherein
it can defend the determination of the amount of
compensation by the Collector and oppose
enhancement of the said amount and also adduce
evidence in that regard.
54. In the event of enhancement of the amount of
compensation by the reference court if the Government
does not file an appeal the local authority can file an
appeal against the award in the High Court after
obtaining leave of the court.
55. In an appeal by the person having an interest in
land seeking enhancement of the amount of
compensation awarded by the reference court the local
authority should be impleaded as a party and is
entitled to be served notice of the said appeal. This
would apply to an appeal in the High Court as well as
in this Court.
56. Since a company for whom land is being acquired
has the same right as a local authority under Section
50(2), whatever has been said with regard to a local
authority would apply to a company too."
[Underlined to supply emphasis]
30. In Neyvely Lignite Corporation Ltd. v. Special
Tahsildar (Land Acquisition), Neyvely : (1995) 1 SCC
221 : AIR 1995 SC 1004 a Bench of three Hon'ble
Judges of the Supreme Court had the occasion to decide
and lay down who can be 'persons interested' in terms of
section 3(b) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and also in
the context of the sections 18, 26, 50(2) and 54 of the
Act. Upon discussing the law as laid down in the earlier
decisions rendered by the Supreme Court it was held
(SCC-paragraphs 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15) :
"11. Shri Sanghi placed a strong reliance on Santosh
Kumar v. Central Warehousing Corpn. [(1986) 2 SCC
343 : (1986) 1 SCR 603] The facts therein were that
the award made under Section 11 was challenged in
the writ petition contending that the Corporation is
the affected person by determination of the
compensation and without impleading it, the award
made was illegal. The High Court exercising its
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution
reduced the compensation. On an appeal, this Court
had held that when the acquisition was made on
behalf of the Corporation, the Collector had acted as
an agent on behalf of the Government. The award is
only an offer. When the Government itself cannot
seek a reference under Section 18, the beneficiary
also cannot seek a reference. In those circumstances,
it was held that the award made by the Collector
could not be questioned except when the award was
vitiated by fraud, corruption or collusion. The ratio is
clearly consistent with the view taken by this Court
in Harish Chandra v. Dy. Land Acquisition
Officer [(1962) 1 SCR 676 : AIR 1961 SC 1500] . It is
well settled law laid in Ezra v. Secretary of State for
India in Council [ILR 32 Cal 605 : 32 IA 93 (PC)] and
catena of precedents that the award made by the
Collector is only an offer made on behalf of the State
and that, therefore, the State is bound by the offer
made by the Collector. If the owner accepts it without
protest no further proceedings were required to be
pursued. But if the owner received it under protest
and made a valid application for reference, the
amount determined by the civil court under Section
26 binds the parties and concludes the proceedings
subject to appeal. In that view, there is no
inconsistency with the view taken in Himalayan Tiles
case [(1980) 3 SCC 223 : (1980) 3 SCR 235] with the
view in Santosh Kumar case [(1986) 2 SCC 343 :
(1986) 1 SCR 603] . The facts therein do not touch the
controversy now in this case. Under these
circumstances, the ratio in Santosh Kumar
case [(1986) 2 SCC 343 : (1986) 1 SCR 603] renders
little assistance to the respondents. However,
the Ahmedabad Municipal Corpn. case [(1971) 3 SCC
821] is not a good law. In this view it is hardly
necessary to burden the order with copious citations
of contra view in plethora of precedents of the High
Courts.
12. It is true that Section 50(2) of the Act gives to the
local authority or the company right to adduce
evidence before the Collector or in the reference under
Section 18 as it was specifically stated that in any
proceedings held before the Collector or the Court, the
local authority or the company may appear and
adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the
amount of compensation. However, it has no right to
seek reference. Based thereon, the contention is that
the limited right of adduction of evidence for the
purpose of determining the compensation does not
carry with it the right to participate in the proceedings
or right to be heard or to file an appeal under Section
54. We cannot limit the operation of Section 3(b) in
conjunction with sub-section (2) of Section 50 of the
Act within a narrow compass. The right given under
sub-section (2) of Section 50 is in addition to and not
in substitution of or in derogation to all the incidental,
logical and consequential rights flowing from the
concept of fair and just procedure consistent with the
principles of natural justice. The consistent thread
that runs through all the decisions of this Court
starting from Himalayan Tiles case [(1980) 3 SCC
223 : (1980) 3 SCR 235] is that the beneficiary, i.e.,
local authority or company, a cooperative society
registered under the relevant State law, or statutory
authority is a person interested to determine just and
proper compensation for the acquired land and is an
aggrieved person. It flows from it that the beneficiary
has the right to be heard by the Collector or the Court.
If the compensation is enhanced it is entitled to
canvass its correctness by filing an appeal or defend
the award of the Collector. If it is not made a party, it
is entitled to seek leave of the court and file the
appeal against the enhanced award and decree of
the Civil Court under Section 26 or of the judgment
and decree under Section 54 or is entitled to
xxx xxx xxx
Moreover in the language of Order 1 Rule 10 CPC, in
the absence of the beneficiary who ultimately is to
bear the higher compensation, no complete and
effectual determination of binding just and proper
compensation to the acquired land would be made.
So it is concomitantly a proper party if not a
necessary party to the proceedings under Order 1
Rule 10 CPC. The denial of the right to a person
interested is in negation of fair and just procedure
offending Article 14 of the Constitution.
13. The reasons are not far to seek. It is notorious
that though the stakes involved are heavy, the
Government plead or the instructing officer do not
generally adduce, much less proper and relevant,
evidence to rebut the claims for higher compensation.
Even the cross-examination will be formal, halting
and ineffective. Generally, if not invariably the
governmental agencies involved in the process take
their own time and many a time in collusion, file the
appeals after abnormal or inordinate delay. They
remain insensitive even if the States (sic Stakes)
involved run into several crores of public money. The
courts insist upon proper explanation of every day's
delay. In this attitudinal situation it would be difficult
to meet strict standards to fill the unbridgeable gaps
of the delay in filing the appeals and generally
entails dismissal of the appeals at the threshold
without adverting to the merits of the hike in the
compensation. On other hand if the notice is issued to
the local authority etc. it/they would participate in
the award proceedings under Sections 11 and 18,
adduce necessary and relevant evidence and be
heard before the Collector and the court before
determining compensation. For instance that without
considering the evidence in the proper perspective,
the court determined the compensation.
14. If there is no right of hearing or appeal given to
the beneficiary and if the State does not file the
appeal or if filed with delay and it was dismissed, is
it not the beneficiary who undoubtedly bears the
burden of the compensation, who would be the
affected person? Is it not interested to see that the
appellate court would reassess the evidence and fix
the proper and just compensation as per law? For
instance the reference court determined market value
at Rs 1,00,000 while the prevailing market value of
the land is only Rs 10,000. Who is to bear the
burden? Suppose State appeal was dismissed due to
refusal to condone the delay, is it not an unjust and
illegal award? Many an instance can be multiplied.
But suffice it to state that when the beneficiary for
whose benefit the land is acquired is served with the
notice and brought on record at the stage of enquiry
by the Collector and reference court under Section 18
or in an appeal under Section 54, it/they would be
interested to defend the award under Section 11 or
Section 26 or would file an appeal independently
under Section 54 etc. against the enhanced
compensation. As a necessary or proper party
affected by the determination of higher compensation,
the beneficiary must have a right to challenge the
correctness of the award made by the reference court
under Section 18 or in appeal under Section 54 etc.
Considered from this perspective we are of the
considered view that the appellant-Company is an
interested person within the meaning of Section 3(b)
of the Act and is also a proper party, if not a
necessary party under Order 1 Rule 10 of the CPC.
The High Court had committed manifest error of law
in holding that the appellant is not a person
interested. The orders of the High Court are
accordingly set aside.
15. Since the writ petitions filed by the appellants
were dismissed, we set aside the orders and direct
the High Court to treat them as appeals properly filed
under Section 54 of the Act and be dealt with along
with the appeals filed by the State pending disposal
in the High Court. In the pending references under
Section 18, in the Court of the Subordinate Judge,
Cuddalore, it is directed to order impleading the
appellant as a party-respondent and would give
reasonable opportunity to cross-examine the witness
examined by the claimants and to examine witnesses
on its behalf to rebut the evidence for higher
compensation, the appellant is entitled to be heard in
support of the determination of just and proper
compensation. In this view, the need to implead the
appellant as a party-respondent in the pending
appeals in the High Court does not arise."
[Underlined to supply emphasis]
31. The principles enunciated in Nevely Lignite (supra)
have been reiterated in the subsequent decisions as
would be indicated herein.
In Union of India v. Special Tehsildar (ZA)
: 1996(2) SCC 332 the Supreme Court allowed the
prayer of the beneficiary to be impleaded as a party in the
regular First Appeals pending before the High Court
following U.P. Awas Evam Vikash Parishad (supra) (paras 10
and 11 of the SCC).
"10. It is an admitted case that the appeals are
pending against the order passed by the
subordinate court on reference having been made
under Section 18 of the Act. The appellants wanted
to be impleaded as a party in the said appeals. The
proper and the only course which should have been
adopted was to have applied to the appellate court
for being impleaded as a party. Instead of doing
this, writ petitions for writs of certiorari under Article
226 of the Constitution of India were filed.
Presumably, it must have been contended that the
appellants should have been impleaded as
respondents as they were interested parties
because the acquisition was being effected at their
expenses and for their benefits. Further, no effective
relief could, possibly, have been sought by the
appellants against the respondents. What was, in
fact, desired by the appellants was an order of the
Court for being impleaded in the appeals which
were pending before the High Court. The collateral
proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India could not have been instituted and as already
observed, the only remedy which was available to
the appellants was to apply, in the pending appeals,
to be impleaded as a party by moving an
appropriate interim application. The High Court
unnecessarily entertained writ petitions and gave a
detailed judgment on the question which, in fact, it
could not consider when dealing with a petition
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. This
question should have been considered only if the
proper application was filed in the pending appeals
for being impleaded as a party. We may here
observe that while dealing with merits of the case,
the High Court did not have the benefit of the
judgment of this Court in U.P. Awas Evam Vikas
Parishad case [(1995) 2 SCC 326] and the other
judgments referred to therein.
11. For the reason that the writ petition for being
impleaded as a party in regular first appeals, which
were pending, was not a proper remedy, the said
writ petitions filed by the appellants have to be
dismissed. Such dismissal will not be regarded as
affecting the rights of the appellants in applying to
the High Court by moving proper applications in the
pending appeals for being impleaded as a party.
Such applications may, if the appellants desire, be
filed within two months and in case, the same are
filed, they will be considered and disposed of by the
High Court in accordance with law, keeping in view
the law laid down by this Court in U.P. Awas Evam
Vikas Parishad case [(1995) 2 SCC 326] and the
other decisions which had been relied upon therein."
[Underlined to supply emphasis]
32. In Delhi Development Authority vs. Bhola Nath
Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. and others : (2011) 2 SCC 54 :
AIR 2011 SC 428 both U.P. Awas Evam Vikash
Parishad (supra) and Nevely (supra) were followed and
applied holding that Delhi Development Authority was a
person interested within meaning of S.3(b) therefore,
entitled to participate in proceedings before Land
Acquisition Collector as well as before High Court in the
subsequent appellate proceeding when the High Court
enhanced the compensation at the instance of land
owners. It was observed that the High Court erred in
enhancing compensation without directing the land
owners to implead Delhi Development Authority to enable
it to contest the case, (Paragraphs 25, 29, 32 and 42 to
44 of SCC) :
"25. The definition of the expressions "local
authority" and "person interested" are inclusive and
not exhaustive. The difference between exhaustive
and inclusive definitions has been explained in P.
Kasilingam v. P.S.G. College of Technology [1995
Supp (2) SCC 348] in the following words : (SCC p.
356, para 19)
"19. ... A particular expression is often defined by
the legislature by using the word 'means' or the
word 'includes'. Sometimes the words 'means and
includes' are used. The use of the word 'means'
indicates that 'definition is a hard-and-fast
definition, and no other meaning can be assigned
to the expression than is put down in definition'.
(See Gough v. Gough [(1891) 2 QB 665 (CA)] ;
Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corpn.
Ltd. v. Labour Court [(1990) 3 SCC 682 : 1991 SCC
(L&S) 71] , SCC p. 717, para 72.) The word
'includes' when used, enlarges the meaning of the
expression defined so as to comprehend not only
such things as they signify according to their
natural import but also those things which the
clause declares that they shall include. The words
'means and includes', on the other hand, indicate
'an exhaustive explanation of the meaning which,
for the purposes of the Act, must invariably be
attached to these words or expressions'. [See
Dilworth v. Commr. of Stamps [1899 AC 99 : (1895-
99) All ER Rep Ext 1576] (Lord Watson);
Mahalakshmi Oil Mills v. State of A.P. [(1989) 1
SCC 164 : 1989 SCC (Tax) 56] , SCC p. 170, para
11.] The use of the words 'means and includes' in
Rule 2(b) would, therefore, suggest that the
definition of 'college' is intended to be exhaustive
and not extensive and would cover only the
educational institutions falling in the categories
specified in Rule 2(b) and other educational
institutions are not comprehended. Insofar as
engineering colleges are concerned, their exclusion
may be for the reason that the opening and running
of the private engineering colleges are controlled
through the Board of Technical Education and
Training and the Director of Technical Education in
accordance with the directions issued by the AICTE
from time to time."
xxx xxx xxx
29. Undisputedly, DDA is an authority constituted
under Section 3 of the 1957 Act for promoting and
securing development of Delhi according to plan and
for this purpose it has the power to acquire, hold,
manage and dispose of land and other property, to
carry out building, engineering, mining and other
operations, to execute works in connection with
supply of water and electricity, disposal of sewage,
etc. Therefore, it is clearly covered by the definition
of the expression "local authority".
xxx xxx xxx
32. Section 50(2) represents statutory embodiment
of one of the facets of the rules of natural justice.
The object underlying this section is to afford an
opportunity to the local authority or company to
participate in the proceedings held before the
Collector or the court for determining the amount of
compensation and to show that claim made by the
landowner for payment of compensation is legally
untenable or unjustified. This is possible only if the
Collector or the court concerned gives notice to the
local authority or the company concerned. If notice is
not given, the local authority or the company cannot
avail the opportunity envisaged in Section 50(2) to
adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the
amount of compensation. Therefore, even though the
plain language of that section does not, in terms,
cast a duty on the Collector or the court to issue
notice to the local authority or the company to
appear and adduce evidence, the said requirement
has to be read as implicit in the provision, else the
same will become illusory.
xx xx xx
42. In view of the above discussion, we hold that:
(i) DDA falls within the definition of the expressions
"local authority" [Section 3(aa)] and "person
interested" [Section 3(b)] of the Act;
(ii) DDA was entitled to participate in the
proceedings held before the Land Acquisition
Collector;
(iii) the failure of the Land Acquisition Collector to
issue notice to DDA and give an opportunity to it to
adduce evidence for the purpose of determining
the amount of compensation payable to the
landowners was fatal to the award passed by
him;
(iv) DDA was entitled to notice and opportunity to
adduce evidence before the Reference Court could
enhance market value of the acquired land
entitling the respondents to claim higher
compensation and, as no notice or opportunity
was given to DDA by the Reference Court, the
judgments rendered by it are liable to be treated
as nullity;
(v) the Division Bench of the High Court also
committed serious error by further enhancing the
amount of compensation payable to the contesting
respondents without requiring them to implead
DDA as party-respondent so as to enable it to
contest their prayer for grant of higher
compensation.
43. In the result, the appeals are allowed. The
impugned judgment of the Division Bench of the
High Court as also the judgments of the Reference
Court are set aside and the matters are remitted to
the Reference Court for deciding the two references
afresh after giving opportunity of hearing to the
parties, which shall necessarily include opportunity
to adduce evidence for the purpose of determining
the amount of compensation. The Reference Court
shall decide the matter without being influenced by
the observations contained in the judgment of the
High Court and this judgment.
44. In view of the above conclusions, the cross-
objections filed on behalf of the Union of India and
the Land Acquisition Collector in CAs Nos. 6564 and
6565 of 2001 are disposed of as infructuous.
However, as the judgments of the Reference Court
and the High Court have been set aside and a
direction has been given for fresh determination of
the amount of compensation payable to the
respondents, the Union of India and the Land
Acquisition Collector shall be free to participate in
the proceedings before the Reference Court."
[Underlined to supply emphasis]
33. In Vidarbha Irrigation Development Corporation
v. Santosh Janba Warghane and another : (2019)12
SCC 650, the principles laid down in Nevely Lignite
(supra) were reiterated and were applied to hold that the
petitioner Vidarbha Irrigation Development Corporation
being beneficiary of land acquisition is a necessary party
and could file an appeal against award passed by
reference court. The contrary decision of the High Court
was reversed as the High Court had refused to grant
leave to appeal to the Corporation against the award
passed by the reference court.
34. The principles emanating from the judgments
rendered by the Supreme Court indicated and discussed
above can be summed up as follows :
(i) The right conferred by Section 50(2) of the L.A. Act,
1894 carries with it the right to be given adequate notice
by the L.A. Collector as well as the reference Court before
whom the acquisition proceedings are pending.
(ii) The proviso to Section 50(2) only precludes a local
authority from seeking a reference but it does not deprive
the local authority which feels aggrieved by the
determination of the amount of compensation by the L.A.
Collector or by the reference Court to invoke the remedy
under Article 226 of the Constitution as well as the
remedies available under the L.A. Act.
(iii) Even when notice has been served on the local
authority the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution
would be available to the local authority on grounds on
which judicial review is permissible under Article 226.
(iv) The local authority is entitled to be impleaded as a
party in those proceedings wherein it can defend the
determination of the amount of compensation by the L.A.
Collector and oppose enhancement of the said amount
and also adduce evidence in that regard.
(v) In the event of enhancement of amount of
compensation by the reference Court if the Government
does not file an appeal the local authority can file an
appeal, against the award in the High Court after
obtaining leave of the Court.
(vi) In an appeal in the High Court as well as in the
Supreme Court filed by a person having an interest in land
seeking enhancement of the amount of compensation
awarded by the reference Court the local authority should
be impleaded as a party and is entitled to be served notice
of the said appeal.
(vii) A Company for whom land is being acquired has the
same right as a local authority under Section 50(2) the
principles applicable to a local authority as noted above
would also apply to a Company.
(viii) The operation of Section 3(b) in conjunction with
sub-section(2) of Section 50 of the L.A. Act cannot be
limited within a narrow compass. The right given under
sub-section (2) of Section 50 is in addition to and not in
substitution of or in derogation to all the incidental, logical
and consequential rights flowing from the concept of fair
and just procedure consistent with the principles of
natural justice.
(ix) The beneficiary who undoubtedly bears the burden of
compensation is an interested person within the meaning
of Section 3(b) of the Act and is also a proper party if not a
necessary party under Order 1 Rule 10 of CPC.
It would be error of law if it is held that a beneficiary
Company is not a person interested.
(x) The definition of expression "local authority" and
"person interested" are inclusive and not exhaustive.
Inclusive definition used in a statute enlarge the meaning
of the expression defined so as to comprehend not only
such things as they signify according to their natural
import but also those things which the clause declares
they shall include.
(xi) Denial of the right to be impleaded as a party and to
be heard as a person interested is in negation of fair and
just procedure offending Article 14 of the Constitution of
India.
(xii) Section 50(2) represents statutory embodiment of
one of the facets of the rules of natural justice. The object
underlying this section is to afford an opportunity to the
local authority or company to participate in the
proceedings held before the L.A. Collector or the court for
determining the amount of compensation and to show that
claim made by the landowner for payment of
compensation is legally untenable or unjustified.
35. The intervenors rely on the decision rendered by a
coordinate Bench in Pitambar Sahoo v. Angul-Sukinda
Railway Limited : 2016 (2) ILR Cut. 212, 2016(II)
OLR 27, wherein the coordinate Bench has dealt with the
memorandum of understanding/concession agreement in
extenso to hold that by the agreement entered between the
East coast Railway and the intervenors was liable to
indemnify all actions, suits, claims, demands and
proceedings.
It was held that the one who is under obligation or
liable to indemnify against all actions, suits, claims,
demands and proceedings has a right to be heard in it
which has become more expedient when neither Ministry
of Railway, Govt. of India nor the East coast Railways have
been impleaded as a party to the reference. The decision
of the coordinate Bench has attained finality as it has not
been challenged/altered by any subsequent decision.
Therefore, this Court is not required to go again into
the said issues as in the elaborate order the coordinate
Bench considered the MoU/concession agreement entered
into between the Railways and the petitioner-Company the
scope and interpretation of various clauses of the
MoU/concession agreement. The fact remains that
Pitambar Sahoo (supra) has dealt with the self-same land
acquisition process i.e. the notification for acquisition of
land U/s.4(1) of the LA. Act, 1894 vide Notification
No.26720 dated 07.07.2010 for acquisition of land of the
Angul-Duburi-Sukinda New B.G. Rail Link Project for East
Coast Railways.
36. The reliance of the appellants on Gregory Patrao v.
Mangalore Refinery and Petrochemicals Ltd.: (2022)
10 SCC 461 is of no avail. In Gregory Patrao (supra) it
was held that the allottee of land by the beneficiary for
whom the land was acquired cannot be a person
interested. In the case at hand Eastcoast Railway and/or
the Angul-Sukinda Railway Company are themselves the
beneficiaries/project proponents. They are not
subsequent allottees of the land that was acquired.
37. In the present case East coast Railway and/or the
Angul-Sukinda Railway Company are the project
proponents/beneficiary. To oppose the participation of the
Company in the proceeding before the referral Court the
only argument made by the appellant is that Angul-
Sukinda Railway Company entered into a memorandum of
understanding with the East coast Railway regarding
execution of the project. It is not the case of the
appellants that Angul-Sukinda Railway Company and/or
East Coast Railway are post-acquisition allottee of land to
apply the principle of Gregory Patrao (supra).
38. In considered view of this Court the argument of the
appellants to apply Gregory Patrao (supra) or Satish
Kumar Gupta and others v. State of Haryana and
others: (2017) 4 SCC 760 fails in view of the fact that
East coast Railway and/or Angul-Sukinda Railway
Company are not post acquisition allottees of land. They
are the immediate beneficiaries of land acquisition, they
are the project proponents/requisitioning authority.
Significantly, it has also to be noted that the learned
counsel for the appellants and the learned AGA for the
Special LAO did not point out how by impleading the
project proponent East Coast Railway and/or the S.A. Rly
Company (ASLR Ltd) the appellants-land losers or the
Special Land Acquisition Officer would have been
prejudiced/will be prejudiced in any manner in the
proceeding before the Court below.
The stand taken by the State representing the Special
LAO opposing participation by the Railway/S.A. Rly.
Company defies logic, as a Special LAO can not have any
interest apart from disbursing the amount of
compensation determined or enhanced to be paid as
compensation.
39. It has to be noticed that U.P. Awas Evam Vikash
Parishad (supra) is a constitution Bench decision
rendered by five Hon'ble Judges and Neyvely Lignite
Corporation Ltd. (supra) rendered by three Hon'ble
Judges, still hold the field. The decisions in Gregory
Patrao and Satish Kumar Gupta (supra) rendered by
Bench of two Hon'ble Judges did not differ from earlier
decisions of the constitution Bench or three Judge Bench
and only held that earlier decisions are not applicable to
post acquisition allottees.
It has also to be noticed that the coordinate Bench in
Pitambar Sahoo (supra) has applied the principles laid in
U.P. Awas Evam Vikash Parishad (supra), Neyvely
Lignite Corporation Ltd. (supra) and also considered
Gregory Patrao(supra) and Satish Kumar Gupta
(supra).
Learned AGA though argued regarding applicability
of Gregory Patrao(supra) but it was also not disputed
that East coast Railway being the beneficiary/project
proponent/requisitioning authority was not made a party
before the referral court under section 18 of the L.A. Act.
40. As a result of the above discussions the award
dated 04.07.2014 in L.A. Misc. Case No.126 of 2013
decided by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division),
Kamakhyanagar is set aside and quashed. The L.A. Misc.
Case No. 126 of 2013 is restored to file for adjudication
afresh. The parties in the present case i.e. the appellants
and the intervenors shall appear before the learned court
of jurisdiction i.e. the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division),
Kamakhyanagar or any other court that could be assigned
the matter. The learned Court shall act upon production of
the website copy of this order.
41. The intervenors shall file application for impletion as
necessary party before the learned court that would be in
seisin of the matter. The learned Court shall allow
application to enable the intervener to participate in the
proceeding. The appellants can appear through their
learned counsel immediately on restoration.
As the matter is remanded to the learned referral
court for adjudication afresh the Court shall afford an
opportunity to the intervenor and/or the railways to file
their written statement regarding enhancement of the
award and shall also allow them to adduce evidence and
produce witness in accordance with law.
42. The learned court shall also issue notice to the
present appellants if they do not appear. The learned
Senior Counsel for intervener refers to the Order 41 Rule
23-A of CPC to submit that date may be fixed before the
learned court below.
It is directed the parties shall appear before the
court on 01.07.2025. The court shall fix a date for further
hearing of the matter. The matter shall proceed on each
date without granting any unnecessary adjournments. It is
also directed that all the parties i.e. appellants,
intervenors, SPV and Railway shall cooperate in the
proceeding in achieving an early disposal.
43. It is submitted by Mr. Panda that the amount as
directed to be enhanced in the judgment dated 04.07.2014
has been deposited by the railways on 29.06.2015.
Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the intervenors
disputes the same. He brings to the notice of this Court
that the said fact is not on record as part of the pleadings
in the appeal nor indicated in the affidavit dated
30.09.2022 filed by the appellants.
In such view of the matter it can not be held that
the Railways have deposited any amount towards the
enhancement of award. However, as alleged, if at all any
amount towards enhanced compensation has been
deposited, the necessary legal consequences shall follow.
In such scenario the learned of Civil Judge (Senior
Division), Kamakhyanagar/the learned Court that would
take up the matter on restoration would do the needful in
accordance with law and as would be expedient, just and
proper restoration.
44. It is further clarified that no part of this judgment
and order remanding the matter for adjudication upon
participation of all the parties shall be treated in any
manner to be expression of any opinion on the merits of
the respective claims and contentions of the parties.
45. The appeal is disposed of accordingly with the
aforesaid directions. In the facts and circumstances of the
case there shall be no order as to costs.
(M.S. Sahoo)
Judge
Orissa High Court, Cuttack
The 5th May, 2025/dutta
