Orissa High Court

Rameswar Poddar vs Republic Of India ... Opp. Party on 19 March, 2025

Author: Sashikanta Mishra

Bench: Sashikanta Mishra

           IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK

                      BLAPL NO. 11073 OF 2024

      In the matter of an application under Section 439 of the
      Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
                                   ---------------

      Rameswar Poddar                                ...     Petitioner

                           - Versus -

      Republic of India                              ...   Opp. Party

      Advocate(s) appeared in this case:-
      ___________________________________________________________

         For Petitioner    :        Mr. S.R. Mulia, Advocate.

         For Opp. Party        :Mr. Sarthak Nayak,
                                Special P.P.-cum-Retainer
                                Counsel, CBI
      ___________________________________________________________
      CORAM:
           JUSTICE SASHIKANTA MISHRA
                                    ORDER

19.03.2025

SASHIKANTA MISHRA, J.

This is the third application filed by the

petitioner seeking bail, his earlier applications being BLAPL

No.1802 of 2019 and BLAPL No.6375 of 2023, both of which

were rejected by this Court.

2. The petitioner is in custody since 03.04.2017 in

connection with CBI/SCB/SIT, Kol. P.S.Case No.R.C.

No.42/S/2014-Kol. corresponding to SPE No.37/2014

pending in the Court of learned Special CJM (CBI),

Bhubaneswar. The above FIR was lodged on 05.06.2014 by

Superintendent of Police, CBI: SPE: SCB : Kolkata. Pursuant

to order dated 09.05.2014 passed by the Supreme Court of

India in W.P.(C) No.401 of 2013 and W.P.(C) No.413 of 2013

filed by Subrata Chattoraj and Alok Jena respectively, the

cases registered against 44 companies were transferred from

the State Police agency to the CBI for investigation. M/s.

Ramel Industries Ltd. was one amongst such companies of

which the petitioner was an officer. Three FIRs had earlier

been lodged before different police stations in Odisha

against the officials of the Company. Said FIRs relate to (i)

Kumbharapara P.S. Case No. 414 dated 06.02.2013 under

Section 420/34 IPC; (ii) Sonepur P.S. Case No.46 dated

10.05.2013 under Section 120-B/420 IPC and Sections 4, 5

and 6 of Prize Chits and Money Circulation Schemes

(Banning) Act, 1978; and (3) Kalimela PS Case No. 64 dated

09.10.2013 under Sections 420/120-B/421/423/406/34 of

IPC read with sections 4, 5 & 6 of the Prize Chits & Money

Circulation Schemes (Banning) Act, 1978. All the three

cases were clubbed together in the FIR filed by the SP, CBI.

The allegations are that the officers of the company duped

the general public by enticing them to deposit money in the

company under different schemes by making false promises

of higher returns. As such huge amount of money was

collected fraudulently.

3. The petitioner was arrested during investigation

on 03.04.2017 and is in custody since then.

4. Heard Shri S.R. Mulia, learned counsel appearing

for the petitioner and Shri Sarthak Nayak, learned counsel

appearing for the CBI.

5. Shri Mulia would argue that the prosecution has

cited as many as 84 witnesses in the charge-sheet to be

examined by it during trial, which is in progress. But so far,

only 61 witnesses have been examined. In the meantime,

the petitioner has spent seven years and eleven months in

custody. This has affected not only his right to speedy trial

but also amounts to pre-trial punishment. Mr. Mulia further

submits that the trial being held by the Court of Chief

Judicial Magistrate, who is authorized to impose a sentence

of imprisonment of only seven years, the petitioner has

already served the said period in jail. Mr. Mulia has relied

upon some judgments which will be referred to later.

6. Mr. Sarthak Nayak opposes the prayer for bail

by submitting that there is clear evidence of involvement of

the petitioner in the alleged offence. Since the trial is in

progress, if the petitioner is released, he may influence the

remaining witnesses to be examined. He further submits

that the delay, if any in conclusion of the trial cannot be

attributed to the CBI/prosecution.

7. I have given my anxious consideration to the

facts of the case as well as the rival contentions advanced

by learned counsel for the parties. Admittedly, the

petitioner has been in custody for more than seven years

and eleven months i.e., nearly eight years. Out of 84

witnesses scheduled to be examined, 61 have been

examined so far leaving 23 witnesses to be examined.

Nothing has been placed on record as to when the trial is

likely to conclude. This Court does not find any reason to

attribute the delay to the CBI. It also does not find any

reason to attribute the delay to the petitioner either.

8. In the case of Manish Sishodia Vs. Directorate

of Enforcement, (2023) 15 SCR 480 the Supreme Court

observed as follows:

"28. Detention or jail before being pronounced guilty of an offence should not become punishment without trial. If the trial gets protracted despite assurances of the prosecution, and it is clear that case will not be decided within a foreseeable time, the prayer for bail may be meritorious. While the prosecution may pertain to an economic offence, yet it may not be proper to equate these cases with those punishable with death, imprisonment for life, ten years or more like offences under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, murder, cases of rape, dacoity, kidnaping for ransom, mass violence, etc. Neither is this a case where 100/1000s of depositors have been defrauded. The allegations have to be established and proven. The right to bail in cases of delay, coupled with incarceration for a long period, depending on the nature of the allegations, should be read into Section 439 of the Code and Section 45 of the PML Act. The reason is that the constitutional mandate is the higher law, and it is the basic right of the person charged of an offence and not convicted, that he be ensured and given a speedy trial. When the trial is not proceeding for reasons not attributable to the accused, the court, unless there are good reasons, may well be guided to exercise the power to grant bail. This would be truer where the trial would take years."

9. In the case of Union of India Vs. K.A. Najeeb,

AIR 2021 SC 712 the Supreme Court emphasized on the

right to liberty guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution

of India and held that the same would also include speedy

trial. The following observations of the Supreme Court are

noteworthy.

"11. Gross delay in disposal of such cases would justify the invocation of Article 21 of the Constitution and consequential necessity to release the undertrial on bail. No one can justify gross delay in disposal of cases when undertrials perforce remain in jail, giving rise to possible situations that may justify invocation of Article 21."

"15. Liberty guaranteed by Part-III of Constitution would cover within its protective ambit not only due procedure and fairness but also access to justice and a speedy trial. Undertrials cannot be indefinitely be detained pending trial. Ideally, no person ought to suffer adverse consequences of his acts unless the same is established before a neutral arbiter. However, owing to the practicalities of real life where to secure an effective trial and to ameliorate the risk to society in case a potential criminal is left at large pending trial, the Courts are tasked with deciding whether an individual ought to be released pending trial or not. Once it is obvious that timely trial would not be possible and the accused has suffered incarceration for a significant period of time, the Courts would ordinarily be obligated to enlarge them on bail."

10. The question of protracted delay in conclusion of trial vis-à-vis the right of the accused to speedy trial as well as prolonged incarceration was again considered by the Supreme Court recently in the case of Javed Gulamnabi

Shaikh Vs. State of Maharashtra and Anr wherein, the following was observed:

"18.We may hasten to add that the petitioner is still an accused; not a convict. The over-arching postulate of criminal jurisprudence that an accused is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty cannot be brushed aside lightly, howsoever stringent the penal law may be."

"19. We are convinced that the manner in which the prosecuting agency as well as the Court have proceeded, the right of the accused to have a speedy trial could be said to have been infringed thereby violating Article 21 of the Constitution."

11. Coming to the case at hand, as already stated,

this is a case where the petitioner has been in custody for

an inordinately long period i.e. nearly eight years during

the trial itself, and there is no guarantee or acceptable

possibility that the trial would conclude at any time soon.

In view of the ratio decided in the above cited cases, this

Court is persuaded to hold that further detention of the

petitioner in custody would result in grave injustice,

notwithstanding the seriousness of the allegations leveled

against him. This is, therefore, a fit case for directing

release of the petitioner on bail.

12. The Bail application is therefore, allowed. Let the petitioner be released on bail on such terms and conditions