Mayurbhanj Central Cooperative Bank vs Employees Provident Fund Organisation
2025 Latest Caselaw 6255 Ori

Orissa High Court

Mayurbhanj Central Cooperative Bank vs Employees Provident Fund Organisation on 25 June, 2025

Author: Murahari Sri Raman

Bench: Murahari Sri Raman

       IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
                      W.A. Nos.582 and 583 of 2025

 In W.A. No.582 of 2025
 Mayurbhanj Central Cooperative Bank          ....            Appellant
 Ltd.
                            -Versus-

 Employees Provident Fund Organisation, ....                Respondents
 Keonjhar and others



 In W.A. No.583 of 2025
 Mayurbhanj Central Cooperative Bank          ....            Appellant
 Ltd.
                            -Versus-

 Employees Provident Fund Organisation, ....                Respondents
 Keonjhar and others



 Advocates appeared in these cases:

 For Appellant           : Mr. Narendra Kishore Mishra,
                           Senior Advocate
                           Mr. N.K. Mishra,
                           Advocate
                           Mr. A.K. Roy,
                           Advocate

 For Respondents         : Mr. Radheshyam Chimanka,
                           Advocate

 CORAM:
              HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
                          AND
        HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MURAHARI SRI RAMAN

W.A. Nos.582 and 583 of 2025                               Page 1 of 18
                                  JUDGMENT

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Date of hearing and judgment: 25th June, 2025

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- HARISH TANDON, CJ.

1. The aforementioned two appeals are at the behest of the

appellant, the Mayurbhanj Central Co-operative Bank Limited assailing

the common judgment and order dated 8th January, 2025 by which two

writ petitions, namely, W.P.(C) No.2948 of 2017 and W.P.(C) No.

21974 of 2013 were disposed of with the following directions:

"16. In light of the foregoing, the Writ Petition i.e. W.P.(C) No.2948 of 2017 is allowed. Considering the prayer of the Cooperative Society Bank in W.P.(C) No. 21974 of 2013, this Court refrains from delving into the technical intricacies of the case. Instead, the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner (RPFC) is directed to calculate and determine the accurate amount of EPF and other dues owed to the petitioner and similarly placed employees within two months from the date of presentation of this judgment. The Cooperative Society Bank shall thereafter disburse the calculated amounts to the petitioner and all concerned employees without fail. Compliance with this directive is mandatory and shall not be delayed under any pretext."

2. The facts emerge from the aforementioned writ petitions are

more or less identical or similar and, therefore, are adumbrated

hereinafter. The petitioner of W.P.(C) No.2948 of 2017 was employed

in a Large-sized Agricultural Multipurpose Cooperative Society

(LAMPCS) on 13th November, 1975 after undergoing the process of

selection and was appointed as a Cadre Employee in Mayurbhanj

District with effect from 13th November, 1975. The said LAMPCS

being a primary Cooperative Society was affiliated to the appellant

herein having borne in the cadre thereof as Junior Supervisor with

effect from 20th February, 2003. After successful and satisfactory

services having rendered with the appellant, he retired from service

with effect from 31st August, 2011.

2.1 The petitioner in W.P.(C) No.2948 of 2017 was availing the

benefit under the Employees' Provident Fund (EPF) Scheme, 1952 and

a requisite amount towards his contribution was deducted from his

monthly salary and was deposited with the Regional Provident Fund

Commissioner with effect from the date when he has been integrated in

the cadre of the appellant i.e., 20th February, 2003. At the time of

demitting his Office, the retirement notice No.1935 dated 25th July,

2011 issued by the appellant did not include the amount of the

provident fund. Since there was a dispute on the liability of the

appellant on the entitlement of the employees who were subsequently

integrated into the cadre of the appellant, a proceeding was initiated

under Section 26-B of the Employees' Provident Funds and

Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as "the

Act") against the appellant and the Regional Provident Fund

Commissioner, Sub-Regional Office, Keonjhar passed an order that the

cadre employees of LAMPCS, who joined the establishment as a Junior

Supervisor are entitled to EPF membership with effect from 20th

February, 2003 or their respective date of joining whichever is later

with further stipulation that the dues towards the contribution and other

financial liabilities of the employer side shall be assessed in a separate

quasi-judicial proceeding under Section 7-A of the Act. Instead of

depositing the employee's contribution, the letter was issued by the

appellant on 9th February, 2013 to all the Managing Directors of the

LAMPCS in the respective Districts calling upon them to remit the

provident fund contribution in respect of their respective LAMPCS

towards the Provident Fund of concerned employees worked therein

and the list in this regard was also appended thereto.

2.2 In the interregnum, a proceeding under Section 7A of the Act

was initiated which culminated into an order dated 16th May, 2012

determining and/or making an assessment towards the liability of the

appellant for the period from February, 2003 to August, 2011. The

appellant filed an application for review under Section 7-B of the said

Act primarily on two grounds firstly there is an error apparent on the

face of the record; secondly, the discovery of new and important

matters which despite due diligence was not within the knowledge of

the appellant. The said application for review was rejected upholding

the assessment made under Section 7-A of the said Act with further

direction to deposit the same within fortnight. The order rejecting the

review is assailed by the appellant in W.P.(C) No.21974 of 2013.

2.3 It emerges from record that after the assessment of the liability

having ascertained in a proceeding under Section 7-A of the said Act,

the steps for recovery of the said amount were taken by the authority

and in fact, the said amount was recovered by issuing an order of

attachment from the Bank account of the appellant. An interim order

was passed in the said writ petition challenging the order rejecting an

application for review to reverse the said amount into the Bank account

of the appellant which has been duly complied with.

2.4 Subsequently, the employee filed another writ petition being

W.P.(C) No.2948 of 2017 for a direction upon the Regional Provident

Fund Commissioner as well as the appellant to release the EPF

deposited money belonging to the said employee with effect from 20th

February, 2003 till the date of retirement together with an interest and

also to issue the pension benefits as admissible.

3. Both the writ petitions were tagged together as the common

questions, both on facts and law, are involved and disposed of by a

common judgment impugned in the instant appeals.

4. It is ardently submitted on behalf of the appellant that respondent

No.1 committed error in rejecting an application under Section 7-B of

the Act, 1952 without taking into consideration the discovery of new

and important documents and, therefore, has acted contrary to the spirit

of the said Section. It is submitted that the single Bench has

misconstrued the case made out by the appellant and arrived at the

finding which is per se erroneous. It is further submitted that the order

passed under Section 7-A of the Act is vague and ambiguous and even

an order rejecting the review application did not take into consideration

the evident irregularities which can be perceived with reasonable

precision on the bare look thereof.

5. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondents submits that

there is no illegality and/or infirmity in an order rejecting the

application for review filed by the appellant under Section 7-B of the

said Act. It is fervently submitted that the authorities did not commit

any error in rejecting an application for review as it does not come

within the purview of the eventualities contemplated therein. It is lastly

submitted that the order passed by the single Bench does not suffer

from any infirmity and/or illegality and, therefore, no interference is

warranted in the instant case.

6. On the conspectus of the aforesaid facts as discerned from the

records and the submissions advanced by the respective counsel, the

seminal point involved in the instant appeals is whether the authority

exercising power under Section 7-B of the said Act committed any error

of law in rejecting the application filed by the appellant.

7. Both the parties have relied upon the provisions contained under

Sections 7-A and 7-B of the Act and sought to assign their respective

interpretation to the language employed therein. Before we proceed to

determine the legality of the submissions, it would be apposite and

profitable to quote the aforementioned relevant provisions which run

thus:

"7-A. Determination of moneys due from employers.--

(1) The Central Provident Fund Commissioner, any Additional Central Provident Fund Commissioner, any

Deputy Provident Fund Commissioner, any Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, or any Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner may, by order,--

(a) in a case where a dispute arises regarding the applicability of this Act to an establishment, decide such dispute; and

(b) determine the amount due from any employer under any provision of this Act, the Scheme or the Pension Scheme or the Insurance Scheme, as the case may be,

and for any of the aforesaid purposes may conduct such inquiry as he may deem necessary;

(2) The officer conducting the inquiry under sub-section (1) shall, for the purposes of such inquiry, have the same powers as are vested in a court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), for trying a suit in respect of the following matters, namely:--

(a) enforcing the attendance of any person or examining him on oath;

(b) requiring the discovery and production of documents;

(c) receiving evidence on affidavit;

(d) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses;

and any such inquiry shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of sections 193 and 228,

and for the purpose of section 196, of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).

(3) No order shall be made under sub-section (1), unless the employer concerned is given a reasonable opportunity of representing his case.

(3-A) Where the employer, employee or any other person required to attend the inquiry under sub-section (1) fails to attend such inquiry without assigning any valid reason or fails to produce any document or to file any report or return when called upon to do so, the officer conducting the inquiry may decide the applicability of the Act or determine the amount due from any employer, as the case may be, on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and other documents available on record.

(4) Where an order under sub-section (1) is passed against an employer ex parte, he may, within three months from the date of communication of such order, apply to the officer for setting aside such order and if he satisfies the officer that the show cause notice was not duly served or that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing when the inquiry was held, the officer shall make an order setting aside his earlier order and shall appoint a date for proceeding with the inquiry:

Provided that no such order shall be set aside merely on the ground that there has been an irregularity in the service of the show cause notice if the officer is satisfied

that the employer had notice of the date of hearing and had sufficient time to appear before the officer.

Explanation.--Where an appeal has been preferred under this Act against an order passed ex parte and such appeal has been disposed of otherwise than on the ground that the appellant has withdrawn the appeal, no application shall lie under this sub-section for setting aside the ex parte order.

(5) No order passed under this section shall be set aside on any application under sub-section (4) unless notice thereof has been served on the opposite party.

7-B. Review of orders passed under section 7-A.--(1) Any person aggrieved by an order made under sub-

section (1) of section 7A, but from which no appeal has been preferred under this Act, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of such order may apply for a review of that order to the officer who passed the order:

Provided that such officer may also on his own motion review his order if he is satisfied that it is necessary so to do on any such ground.

(2) Every application for review under sub-section (1) shall be filed in such form and manner and within such time as may be specified in the Scheme.

(3) Where it appears to the officer receiving an application for review that there is no sufficient ground for a review, he shall reject the application.

(4) Where the officer is of opinion that the application for review should be granted, he shall grant the same:

Provided that,--

(a) no such application shall be granted without previous notice to all the parties before him to enable them to appear and be heard in support of the order in respect of which a review is applied for, and

(b) no such application shall be granted on the ground of discovery of new matter or evidence which the applicant alleges was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him when the order was made, without proof of such allegation.

(5) No appeal shall lie against the order of the officer rejecting an application for review, but an appeal under this Act shall lie against an order passed under review as if the order passed under review were the original order passed by him under section 7-A."

8. It is beyond scintilla of doubt that the said Act is enacted as a

welfare piece of legislation to introduce a new social security scheme

by providing an insurance cover to the beneficiaries thereof. It involves

the contributory obligations both of an employee and employer so that

the purpose and object underlying the incorporation thereof is achieved.

9. Keeping in mind the interpretative tools in activating the

provisions of such welfare legislation, the Courts of the country have

adopted an interpretation which would further the avowed object and

avoided such interpretation which would render such beneficial piece of

legislation redundant. Section 7-A is a repository of the powers

conferred upon the authority to determine the dispute arising on the

applicability of the Act to such establishment and determines the

amount due from any employer and in pursuit thereof has to conduct

the inquiry as may deem necessary. Sub-Section (3) of Section 7-A

contains a note of caution in exercise of the powers conferred under

sub-Section (1) thereof that the authority must afford an opportunity of

hearing to the employee.

10. A conjoint reading of the sub-Sections embodied in Section 7-A

of the said Act leaves no ambiguity in the mind that the power is vested

upon the authority to determine the dispute and assess the amount due

from the employer after giving a reasonable opportunity of hearing to

the employer. Although Section 7-I of the Act provides a remedy by

way of an appeal against any order passed under sub-Section (1) of

Section 7-A, but an additional remedy by way of a review is also

provided under Section 7-B of the Act which in fact has been exhausted

by the appellant.

11. The power of review exercised by the authority under Section 7-

B of the said Act is not unfettered, but imbibes within the folds of the

eventuality contemplated therein meaning thereby the authority can

review its order, if there is an error apparent on the face of the record,

discovery of new and important matter or evidence which after exercise

of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced

at the time when the order was made or for any other sufficient reasons.

12. It is no longer res integra that the power of review to be

exercised by the authority within the strict parameters of the

eventualities/conditions incorporated therein. The authorities cannot

review its order perceiving the same to have been inhered and/or

ingrained in it unless the statute confers such power and, therefore, in

this regard, it is well known that the power of review must emanate

from the statutory provisions. A clear and apparent distinction is well

known between an exercise of powers as an appellate authority and the

power exercised by the authority while reviewing its own order. The

power of review is not to be confused with the appellate power which

enables an appellate court to correct all manners of errors committed by

the subordinate authority, but should travel on the peripheral of such

power enshrined in the said provision.

13. The apex Court in M/s. Northern India Caterers (India) Limited

v. Lt. Governor of Delhi, (1980) 2 SCC 167 have made a note of

caution that a party should not be permitted to seek a review of a

judgment/order merely for the purpose of rehearing or to invite a fresh

decision as opposed to the normal principles that once the

judgment/order is pronounced, it assumes a final character and a

departure therefrom is only justified when the circumstances is of such

substantial and compelling character that it makes it necessary to do so.

14. In a subsequent judgment rendered by the apex Court in case of

Parsion Devi v Sumitri Devi, (1997) 8 SCC 715, the apex Court in

categorical terms held that the review jurisdiction exercised by the

authority is never intended for the purpose of rehearing and revisitation

of the case even it appears that the decision is erroneous which is

amenable to be corrected by the appellate forum. Ergo, a clear

distinction must be borne in mind between an erroneous decision and

the decision containing an error apparent on the face of the record.

15. The exercise of power of review should not eclipse the power of

appeal as both the powers exercised by the authorities are distinct and

different and any attempt to blurred the apparent line of distinction

would frustrate the core object and the purpose of conferment of the

distinct and separate powers to be exercised in a specified field. The

review jurisdiction can never be assumed an unbridled power, nor the

character thereof should be changed. It would be incongruous to

suggest that the power of review is in effect an appeal in disguise. It is

no longer res integra that the expression "the error apparent on the face

of the record" cannot be construed to include within itself all kind of

errors. The Court should avoid in exercising the review jurisdiction if

the errors are to be found out and/or gathered upon hovering around the

voluminous documents and arriving at the decision what can be

logically deduced therefrom. The error must be patent on the face of the

record and not to be found out from the voluminous document.

16. There is another facet of review permissible under Section 7B of

the said Act on the discovery of new or important matter which was not

within the knowledge of the person despite due diligence or could not

be produced at the time of passing the order. Mere discovery of new or

important matter does not ipso facto renders the judgment and order

susceptible to be reviewed unless the party applying for review satisfies

the authority/Court that the same was not within his knowledge despite

due diligence. The expression "due diligence" is required to be

construed in a more pragmatic manner and depends upon the quality of

the pleadings made in this regard. It is within the powers of the

authority to satisfy its conscience that the conduct of the party was bona

fide and all reasonable steps expected from a person were undertaken.

The meaningful reading of the expression so used in the said Section

conveys a clear message that the new and important matter must be in

existence before the orders sought to be reviewed was passed and when

the authority found that it does not come within the folds of those

expressions, there is no fetter on the part of the authority in rejecting an

application for review.

17. The apex Court in the case of State of West Bengal v. Kamal

Sengupta, (2008) 8 SCC 612 fortified the above principles in the

following:

"21. At this stage it is apposite to observe that where a review is sought on the ground of discovery of new matter or evidence, such matter or evidence must be relevant

and must be of such a character that if the same had been produced, it might have altered the judgment. In other words, mere discovery of new or important matter or evidence is not sufficient ground for review ex debito justitiae. Not only this, the party seeking review has also to show that such additional matter or evidence was not within its knowledge and even after the exercise of due diligence, the same could not be produced before the court earlier."

18. In a recent judgment delivered by the apex Court in case of Shri

Ram Sahu v. Vinod Kumar Rawat, (2021) 13 SCC 1, it has been held

that the application for review should be restricted on the definite limits

mentioned in the relevant provisions and cannot be exercised as an

inherent power nor as an appellate power.

19. In view of the law enunciated hereinabove on the scope of a

review, the shelter under the new and important matters having

discovered subsequently has been rightly rejected by the authority as no

pleadings touching upon the another important facet pertaining to due

diligence was eminently present in the application. The scope under

power of judicial review exercised by the constitutional Court in

relation to a challenge made to a decision of an authority is to be

exercised within the well known principles enunciated in the catena of

decisions rendered by the Courts of the country. The writ jurisdiction

exercised by the High Court is not to find fault to the decision of the

authority, but can certainly be invoked, if the process by which such

decision is taken appears to be faulty or not in consonance with the well

settled legal parameters. In other words, it is not a decision, but a

decision making process which invites an interference in exercise of

power of judicial review.

20. On the discussions made hereinabove on the powers of the

authority exercising the review jurisdiction under Section 7-B of the

said Act, we do not find any infirmity and/or illegality in rejecting the

same.

21. The single Bench has taken into consideration the respective

stands of the parties which cannot be said to be infirmed or illegal

warranting any interference in the instant appeals.

22. Accordingly, both the appeals fail. No order as to costs.

                                                                                 (Harish Tandon)
                                                                                   Chief Justice



Reason: Authentication                                                              (M.S. Raman)
Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
Date: 18-Jul-2025 11:15:24                                                             Judge
                         S.K. Guin/PA