Constitution Of India vs Mahanadi Coalfields Limited & .... ...
2025 Latest Caselaw 6088 Ori

Orissa High Court

Constitution Of India vs Mahanadi Coalfields Limited & .... ... on 20 June, 2025

Author: S.K. Panigrahi

Bench: S.K. Panigrahi

                                                                Signature Not Verified
                                                                Digitally Signed
                                                                Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
                                                                Reason: Authentication
                                                                Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
                                                                Date: 24-Jun-2025 16:53:36




                 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK

                              W.P.(C) No. 12707 of 2024

       (In the matter of an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the
       Constitution of India, 1950).
       M/S. GSCO (Gurmeet Singh and                ....                     Petitioner(s)
       Company)Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd.

                                        -versus-

       Mahanadi Coalfields Limited &               ....        Opposite Party (s)
       Ors.

     Advocates appeared in the case throughHybrid Mode:

       For Petitioner(s)            :                     Mr.Avijit Patnaik, Adv.



       For Opposite Party (s)       :                   Mr. Rakesh Sharma, Adv.


                 CORAM:
                 DR. JUSTICE S.K. PANIGRAHI

                      DATE OF HEARING:-24.04.2025
                     DATE OF JUDGMENT:-20.06.2025
     Dr. S.K. Panigrahi, J.

1. The present Writ Petition has been filed invoking the extraordinary

jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution

assailing the legality and sustainability of the order dated 06.03.2024

passed by the Learned District and Sessions Judge, Sundargarh in

Arbitration Case No. 05 of 2021. Vide the said order, the court below

Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK

dismissed the petitioner's application dated 27.09.2022 which had

prayed for the dismissal of the Section 34 petition filed by Mahanadi

Coalfields Limited (MCL) on the ground of territorial incompetence

and bar of limitation.

2. The principal contention raised in the Writ Petition is that the Learned

District Judge, Sundargarh lacked the jurisdiction to entertain the

Section 34 application filed by MCL, in view of the overriding

mandate of Section 42 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

read with the provisions of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. The

petitioner asserts that the Court at Cuttack, being the seat of

arbitration and the court which appointed the Arbitrator under

Section 11 of the A&C Act, alone has the requisite jurisdiction to

entertain post-award challenges under Part I of the Act.

I. FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE CASE:

3. The brief facts of the caseare asfollows:

(i) The dispute arises out of a contract awarded to the petitioner

pursuant to e-Tender Notice No. CL/SBP/GM/(CMC)/NIT-

088/2012/2986 dated 07.11.2012 for "Hiring of HEMM (Shovel, Drill,

Dozer etc.) for transfer & transportation of materials in various strata

including drilling, excavation, dumping, spreading, dozing and other

allied works" at Kulda OCP, Basundhara-Garjanbahal Area under

Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. (MCL). The petitioner, M/s GSCO

Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd., was the successful bidder, and the agreement

was duly executed between the parties.

Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK

(ii) The work was carried out and ultimately completed to the satisfaction

of MCL. A Completion Certificate dated 03.07.2016 was issued by

Opposite Party No.4 (Project Officer, Kulda OCP) acknowledging that

the petitioner had completed the assigned scope of work on

29.06.2016.

(iii) Thereafter, disputes arose in relation to alleged wrongful deduction of

amounts, withholding of security deposits, non-refund of

performance guarantees, and imposition of penalties. Aggrieved

thereby, the petitioner approached this Court in W.P.(C) Nos.

19909/2016, 473/2017, and 474/2017.

(iv) These were disposed of by a common order dated 25.03.2019,

whereby this Court was pleased to appoint Hon'bleMr. Justice M.M.

Das (Retd.) as the Sole Arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to adjudicate all disputes.

(v) In pursuance of the said order, three connected arbitration

proceedings, Arbitration Case Nos. 1, 2, and 3 of 2020, were initiated

and conducted. The entire arbitration proceedings, including

hearings, submissions, and evidence, were held at Cuttack, which was

also the designated seat of arbitration.

(vi) After due adjudication, the learned Sole Arbitrator passed a common

arbitral award dated 25.10.2021, allowing several claims of the present

petitioner. The relevant extract of the operative part of the award is as

follows:

a. MCL was directed to refund ₹3,35,72,511.85 to the claimant

(present petitioner) towards various withheld dues.

Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK

b. MCL was further directed to return all Bank Guarantees

deposited by the claimant, which had been withheld in violation

of the contractual terms.

c. Interest at the rate of 12% per annum was awarded on the above

amount from the date of award till actual payment.

(vii) Despite receipt of the award, the respondent-MCL did not comply

with the directions therein. Instead, on 24.11.2021, it filed three

separate petitions under Section 34 of the A&C Act before the District

Judge, Sundargarh, being Arbitration Case Nos. 05, 06, and 07 of 2021,

seeking to set aside the said award.

(viii) In response, the present petitioner filed an application under Section

151 CPC dated 27.09.2022 before the same Court, raising a preliminary

objection to the maintainability of the proceedings on two counts:

a. That the Section 34 petitions were barred by limitation under

Section 34(3) of the Act, having been filed beyond the statutory

period.

b. That the District Judge, Sundargarh lacked territorial

jurisdiction to entertain the petitions, in view of Section 42 of the

A&C Act and the seat of arbitration being at Cuttack.

(ix) By order dated 06.03.2024, the learned District Judge, Sundargarh

rejected the petitioner's application and held that the Section 34

petitions were maintainable before it. Aggrieved thereby, the

petitioner has approached this Court in the present writ petition.

Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK

II. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:

4. Learned counsel for the Petitioner earnestly made the following

submissions in support of his contentions:

(i) The primary argument canvassed by the petitioner is that the Court at

Cuttack alone has jurisdiction to entertain any application under Part I

of the A&C Act since the appointment of the arbitrator was made by

this Court, the arbitration proceedings were conducted entirely at

Cuttack, and the award was rendered from Cuttack. Therefore, in

terms of Section 42 of the Act, no other Court can assume jurisdiction

in respect of the said arbitration agreement.

(ii) It is further submitted that the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 mandates

that commercial disputes of a specified value must be adjudicated

exclusively by designated Commercial Courts. Section 10(3) read with

the Government of Odisha's Notification dated 13.11.2020 establishes

the Commercial Court at Sambalpur with jurisdiction over the

Judgeships of Sambalpur, Bargarh, Deogarh, and Jharsuguda.

Notably, Sundargarh district is not included therein.

(iii) In the absence of any designated Commercial Court for Sundargarh

and in light of the seat of arbitration being at Cuttack, it is contended

that only the Commercial Court at Cuttack or Sambalpur (if

jurisdictionally competent) could have entertained the Section 34

petition. It is further argued that since Section 11 proceedings were

instituted and concluded at Cuttack and the award itself was

delivered at Cuttack, the principle of exclusive jurisdiction under

Section 42 squarely applies.

Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK

(iv) Reliance is placed on authoritative precedents including BGS SGS

Soma JV v. NHPC Ltd1., and State of West Bengal v. Associated

Contractors2, to buttress the proposition that once a Court is

approached under Part I of the Act, all future proceedings must be

confined to that Court alone. The petitioner also invokes M.G.

Mohanty v. State of Odisha3to establish that the Commercial Courts

Act is not inconsistent with the Arbitration Act and does not dilute the

application of Section 42.

III. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE OPPOSITE PARTIES:

5. The Learned Counsel for the Opposite Parties earnestly made the

following submissions in support of his contentions:

(i) The opposite parties, on the other hand, submit that the jurisdiction to

entertain the Section 34 application rightly vests with the District

Judge, Sundargarh. This is based on the specific contractual

stipulation in Clause 40 of the General Terms and Conditions of

Contract which stipulates that all disputes arising from the contract

shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the District Court where the work

is executed i.e. Sundargarh.

(ii) It is argued that the seat of arbitration or the place where the award

was rendered is not determinative of jurisdiction under Section 34

when there exists a contractual clause conferring territorial

jurisdiction. It is also asserted that Section 2(1)(e) of the A&C Act,

which defines "Court", when read with Section 42, emphasizes that

(2020) 4 SCC 234.

(2015) 1 SCC 32.

W.P.(C) Nos. 3523, 5491 & 5494 of 2022 and W.P.(C) Nos. 28644 & 30554 of 2021.

Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK

the principal civil court of original jurisdiction within whose local

limits the cause of action arises has jurisdiction, therefore, Sundargarh

Court is competent.

(iii) The opposite parties further argue that Sundargarh not falling within

the territorial jurisdiction of the notified Commercial Courts (as per

the 2020 Notification) reinforces that the regular District Court at

Sundargarh alone is empowered to entertain the Section 34 petition.

(iv) Lastly, it is submitted that the arbitration clause does not override the

explicit jurisdiction clause within the contract and that the mere

conduct of arbitration proceedings at Cuttack or appointment of

arbitrator by the High Court does not confer exclusive jurisdiction on

the Commercial Court at Cuttack.

IV.     ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION:

(i)     Whether the District Judge, Sundargarh lacked territorial jurisdiction

to entertain the petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration and

Conciliation Act, 1996, in view of the seat of arbitration being at

Cuttack and the prior invocation of jurisdiction by this Court under

Section 11?

(ii) Whether the bar under Section 42 of the Arbitration and Conciliation

Act, 1996 operates to oust the jurisdiction of any Court other than the

one which was first approached under Part I of the Act, namely, the

High Court of Orissa at Cuttack?

(iii) Whether in view of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and the

Government of Odisha Notification dated 13.11.2020, which

designates the jurisdiction of Commercial Courts over specific

Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK

Judgeships, the District Judge, Sundargarh could have exercised

jurisdiction in respect of the arbitration award in question?

(iv) Whether the application under Section 34 filed before the District

Judge, Sundargarh is hit by the bar of limitation under Section 34(3) of

the A&C Act, in view of the undisputed receipt of the award by MCL

and the timeline of filing?

V. COURT'S REASONING AND ANALYSIS:

6. Heard Learned Counsel for parties and perused the documents placed

before this Court.

7. The first issue to be considered is whether the Learned District Judge,

Sundargarh possessed the requisite territorial jurisdiction to entertain

the petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,

1996, in view of the seat of arbitration being Cuttack and the prior

invocation of jurisdiction by this Court in the Section 11 proceedings.

It is by now trite that the concept of "seat" of arbitration is of seminal

importance under the scheme of the Act.

8. This principle, first elucidated in the context of domestic arbitrations

by the Constitution Bench in Bharat Aluminium Co. v. Kaiser

Aluminium Technical Services4and later in Indus Mobile Distribution

(P) Ltd. v. Datawind Innovations (P) Ltd.5, marks a clear departure

from the traditional Code of Civil Procedure approach that tied

jurisdiction to where the cause of action arose. In arbitration law, once

the seat is designated, it is treated as conferring exclusive jurisdiction

(2012) 9 SCC 552.

2017 (7) SCC 678.

Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK

on the courts at that location, irrespective of where the underlying

dispute or cause of action arose. As the Supreme Court in Indus

Mobile(Supra) clarified:

"19. The amended Act, does not, however, contain the aforesaid amendments, presumably because the BALCO judgment in no uncertain terms has referred to "place" as "juridical seat" for the purpose of Section 2(2) of the Act. It further made it clear that Section 20(1) and 20 (2) where the word "place" is used, refers to "juridical seat", whereas in Section 20 (3), the word "place" is equivalent to "venue". This being the settled law, it was found unnecessary to expressly incorporate what the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court has already done by way of construction of the Act.

20. A conspectus of all the aforesaid provisions shows that the moment the seat is designated, it is akin to an exclusive jurisdiction clause. On the facts of the present case, it is clear that the seat of arbitration is Mumbai and Clause 19 further makes it clear that jurisdiction exclusively vests in the Mumbai courts. Under the Law of Arbitration, unlike the Code of Civil Procedure which applies to suits filed in courts, a reference to "seat" is a concept by which a neutral venue can be chosen by the parties to an arbitration clause. The neutral venue may not in the classical sense have jurisdiction - that is, no part of the cause of action may have arisen at the neutral venue and neither would any of the provisions of Section 16 to 21 of the CPC be attracted. In arbitration law however, as has been held above, the moment "seat" is determined, the fact that the seat is at Mumbai would vest Mumbai courts with exclusive jurisdiction for purposes of regulating arbitral proceedings arising out of the agreement between the parties."

9. Applying the above law to the facts of the present case, it stands

undisputed that the entire arbitration proceedings, including the

Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK

hearing, recording of evidence, and passing of the award, were

conducted at Cuttack. Furthermore, the appointment of the learned

Sole Arbitrator was made by this Court exercising its jurisdiction

under Section 11(6) of the Act. In such circumstances, Cuttack must be

treated as the juridical seat of arbitration, and by necessary

implication, the courts at Cuttack alone are vested with exclusive

jurisdiction to entertain any application under Part I of the Act,

including a petition under Section 34. Once parties expressly or

impliedly chose Cuttack as the seat, the law assigns "exclusive

jurisdiction" to the courts of that seat for all proceedings concerning

arbitration.

10. The opposite party urged that Clause 40 of the contract confers

territorial jurisdiction on courts at Sundargarh, since the contract was

executed and the project located in Sundargarh. In the present case,

Clause 40 of the contract cannot resurrect the jurisdiction of

Sundargarh in face of the parties' arbitration having been anchored at

Cuttack. It is noteworthy that Clause 40 is a standard forum selection

clause for disputes under the contract; but once those disputes were

referred to arbitration and a seat was chosen for that arbitration, the

selection of seat supplants the general forum clause.

11. The petitioner rightly invokes Section 42 of the Act as an additional

buttress to its case on jurisdiction. Section 42 begins with a broad non-

obstante clause and mandates that once a party has approached a

"Court" for any application under Part I of the Act, all subsequent

applications arising out of that arbitration agreement shall be made in

Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK

that same Court and no other. This provision aims to prevent forum

shopping and conflicting rulings by different courts in relation to the

same arbitration.

12. In Associated Contractors (Supra) the Supreme Court applied Section

42 in exactly such a scenario. In that case, a Section 9 application had

been made to the Calcutta High Court, and a later Section 34 was filed

in a District Court in another jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held

that by virtue of Section 42, the Calcutta High Court, being the court

first approached, had exclusive jurisdiction to entertain the Section 34

petition; the District Court's assumption was held to be in error. The

relevant excerpts are produced below:

"18...In case an application is made, as has been made in the present case, before a particular court, Section 42 will apply to preclude the making of all subsequent applications under Part-I to any court except the court to which an application has been made under Section 9 of the Act..

...

21. One other question that may arise is as to whether Section 42 applies after the arbitral proceedings come to an end. It has already been held by us that the expression "with respect to an arbitration agreement"are words of wide import and would take in all applications made before during or after the arbitral proceedings are over. In an earlier judgment, KumbhaMawji v. Dominion of India, (1953) SCR 878, the question which arose before the Supreme Court was whether the expression used in Section 31(4) of the 1940 Act "in any reference" would include matters that are after the arbitral proceedings are over and have culminated in an award. It was held that the words "in any reference" cannot be taken to mean "in

Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK

the course of a reference", but mean "in the matter of a reference" and that such phrase is wide enough and comprehensive enough to cover an application made after the arbitration is completed and the final Award is made.

(See Paras 891-893). As has been noticed above, the expression used in Section 42 is wider being "with respect to an arbitration agreement" and would certainly include such applications."

13. The abovementioned precedent squarely covers the present situation.

Here, the first application under Part I was the Section 11(6) petition

before the Orissa High Court, for appointment of the arbitrator. That

High Court at Cuttack, which is indeed a "Court" as defined in

Section 2(1)(e) for this purpose, was thus the court initially seized of

the arbitral dispute. By operation of Section 42, "that Court alone"

would have the jurisdiction over all subsequent applications arising

from the same arbitration agreement. Consequently, the Section 34

petitions filed before the Sundargarh court are barred by Section 42,

since the Orissa High Court had already been invoked in respect of

the arbitration.

14. It is contended by the Opposite Party that Section 42 should not bar

the Sundargarh court's jurisdiction. This argument is misconceived.

The language of Section 42 is couched in mandatory terms and begins

with a non-obstante clause: "Notwithstanding anything contained

elsewhere in this Part...".It provides that once a Court has been

approached under Part I of the Act, that Court alone shall have

jurisdiction over all subsequent applications arising from the

Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK

arbitration agreement. The only caveat to this rule was provided in

the BGS SGS Soma (Supra) wherein it was held as follows:

"Section 42 is meant to avoid conflicts in jurisdiction of Courts by placing the supervisory jurisdiction over all arbitral proceedings in connection with the arbitration in one Court exclusively. This is why the section begins with a non-obstante clause, and then goes on to state "...where with respect to an arbitration agreement any application under this Part has been made in a Court..." It is obvious that the application made under this part to a Court must be a Court which has jurisdiction to decide such application. The subsequent holdings of this Court, that where a seat is designated in an agreement, the Courts of the seat alone have jurisdiction, would re- quire that all applications under Part I be made only in the Court where the seat is located, and that Court alone then has jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings and all subsequent applications arising out of the arbitral agreement. So read, Section 42 is not rendered in- effective or useless. Also, where it is found on the facts of a particular case that either no "seat" is designated by agreement, or the so- called "seat" is only a convenient "venue", then there may be several Courts where a part of the cause of action arises that may have jurisdiction. Again, an application under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 may be preferred before a court in which part of the cause of action arises in a case where parties have not agreed on the "seat" of arbitration, and before such "seat"

may have been determined, on the facts of a particular case, by the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 20(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1996. In both these situations, the earliest application having been made to a Court in which a part of the cause of action arises would then be the exclusive Court under Section 42, which would have control over the arbitral proceedings. For all these reasons,

Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK

the law stated by the Bombay and Delhi High Courts in this regard is incorrect and is overruled."

15. In the present case, the Section 11 application was not only first in

point of time but was also filed before this Court at Cuttack, which

undisputedly has jurisdiction as the seat of arbitration. Therefore, the

objection to the applicability of Section 42 is untenable. The Court

accordingly finds that the District Judge, Sundargarh ought to have

declined to entertain the Section 34 petitions on this ground alone,

instead of rejecting the petitioner's objection.

16. The Opposite Party's reliance on Section 2(1)(e) of the Act (the

definition of "Court") and the traditional notions of cause of action is

also misplaced. Post-BALCO, the law is settled that the phrase

"subject-matter of the arbitration" in Section 2(1)(e) does not refer to

the subject-matter of the underlying dispute (as a civil suit would),

but to the subject-matter of the arbitration proceedings, which is

intrinsically connected to the location of the arbitration (the seat). In

the BALCO (Supra) case, the Constitution Bench cautioned the

following:

"96...The term 'subject matter' in Section 2(1)(e) is confined to Part I. It has a reference and connection with the process of dispute resolution. Its purpose is to identify the courts having supervisory control over the arbitration proceedings. Hence, it refers to a court which would essentially be a court of the seat of the arbitration...the legislature has intentionally given jurisdiction to two courts i.e. the court where the cause of action is located, and the courts where the arbitration takes place....where the arbitration is held at a neutral venue chosen by the parties, the courts at the seat would exercise supervisory

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jurisdiction, irrespective of where the obligations under the contract were performed."

17. In line with this, the Supreme Court in Indus Mobile (Supra)

reiterated that in arbitration law, the seat is the center of gravity, and

the Civil Procedure Code's cause-of-action based jurisdiction has a

limited role once the seat is designated. The Opposite Party's

argument that Sundargarh courts have jurisdiction because the

contract was executed or performed there is a relic of the pre-BALCO

era. While multiple courts could theoretically have jurisdiction if no

seat was specified (based on where the cause of action arose), that

principle yields once the seat is agreed or determined. Here, since

Cuttack is the seat, the "court having jurisdiction" under

Section 2(1)(e) is the court at Cuttack, and not Sundargarh, regardless

of where the work was executed or the contract signed.

18. Moreover, even if one were to momentarily consider the cause-of-

action paradigm: the record indicates that significant aspects of the

arbitration, including the signing of terms of reference, conduct of

hearings, and ultimately the issuance of the award, took place at

Cuttack. These factors further tether the jurisdiction to Cuttack if

cause of action were relevant. But, as discussed, the legal position

post-BALCO is that it is the seat that is determinative. The Orissa High

Court at Cuttack, and by extension the District Court, Cuttack, are the

courts vested with jurisdiction to supervise this arbitration. The

District Judge, Sundargarh, in proceeding to entertain the Section 34

petitions, acted beyond his jurisdictional competence. His decision to

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reject the petitioner's objection on this point cannot withstand the

scrutiny of the aforementioned settled legal principles.

19. An ancillary issue raised by the petitioner pertains to the Commercial

Courts Act, 2015 and the State Government Notification dated

13.11.2020 issued thereunder. The petitioner submits that the State of

Odisha has, by this Notification, designated certain courts for

entertaining "commercial disputes" (which include arbitration

matters of a specified value), and that Sundargarh is not a notified

venue for a Commercial Court with jurisdiction over the subject

dispute. Without delving into the granular details of the Notification,

this Court notes that the arbitration award in question arises from a

commercial contract and, given the value, the challenge thereto

should indeed be heard by a designated Commercial Court as per the

2015 Act.

20. Even if arguendo Sundargarh's District Judge were otherwise

competent, the absence of a Commercial Court designation for

Sundargarh at the relevant time would pose an additional legal

impediment to the maintainability of the Section 34 petitions there. In

other words, the proper forum under the Commercial Courts regime

would lie elsewhere. This reinforces the conclusion that the petitions

were filed in the wrong forum. However, since the core jurisdictional

invalidity has already been established on the basis of the seat and

Section 42, the Court need not rest its decision on the Commercial

Courts Act aspect alone. It is noted here only to highlight that the

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petitioners' objection to jurisdiction finds support from multiple

angles, statutory and factual.

21. Aside from jurisdiction, the petitioner also contends that the Opposite

Party's challenges under Section 34 were barred by limitation under

Section 34(3) of the Act. The arbitral award was passed and received

by the parties long before the filing of the petitions in Sundargarh,

and on the petitioner's calculation, the filing exceeded the period of

three months (and even the condonable grace period of 30 days) from

the date of receipt of the award. On this aspect, the legal position is

clear and inflexible: an application to set aside an award must be

made within three months from the date on which the party received

the arbitral award, and a further delay of only up to 30 days can be

condoned for sufficient cause, but not thereafter. The Supreme Court

outlined this principle in the case of M/s. Simplex Infrastructure Ltd.

v. Union of India6. The relevant excerpts are produced below:

"13. A plain reading of sub-section (3) along with the proviso to Section 34 of the 1996 Act, shows that the application for setting aside the award on the grounds mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 34 could be made within three months and the period can only be extended for a further period of thirty days on showing sufficient cause and not thereafter. The use of the words "but not thereafter" in the proviso makes it clear that the extension cannot be beyond thirty days. Even if the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act is given to the respondent, there will still be a delay of 131 days in filing the application. That is beyond the strict timelines prescribed in sub-section (3) read along with the proviso

2019 (2) SCC 455.

Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK

to Section 34 of the 1996 Act. The delay of 131 days cannot be condoned. To do so, as the High Court did, is to breach a clear statutory mandate."

22. In the present case, the District Judge, Sundargarh appears to have

taken a lenient view of the delay, perhaps under the impression that

filing in a wrong forum or other logistical issues could excuse the time

overrun. However, even if the petitions in Sundargarh were treated as

initially filed in the wrong court, the time spent there could at best be

sought to be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act on a

refiling in the correct court, but such refiling never happened within

the permissible window. The Opposite Party chose to persist in the

wrong court and by the time this issue is being adjudicated, the delay

far exceeds what is condonable. Therefore, quite apart from the lack of

jurisdiction, the Section 34 petitions are plainly time-barred. The

District Judge's refusal to reject the petitions on the ground of

limitation was a material illegality, as it amounted to entertaining a

time-barred challenge contrary to the statute.

VI. CONCLUSION:

23. For the foregoing reasons, this Court finds that the learned District

Judge, Sundargarh lacked jurisdiction to entertain the Opposite

Party's Section 34 petitions, owing to the arbitration's seat being at

Cuttack and the mandate of Section 42 of the Act which tied all

subsequent proceedings to the court first approached. The attempted

reliance on a contract clause for Sundargarh and on cause-of-action

factors is unavailing in light of settled law giving primacy to the seat

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of arbitration. Moreover, the petitions were filed beyond the period of

limitation prescribed under Section 34(3) and therefore could not have

been entertained on that ground as well.

24. Accordingly, the impugned order of the learned District Judge,

Sundargarh, which rejected the petitioner's objections and assumed

jurisdiction, is unsustainable in law. It is hereby quashed. The

Section 34 petitions filed by the Opposite Party before the learned

District Judge, Sundargarh are held to be not maintainable for want of

jurisdiction and are liable to be dismissed as time-barred.

25. The Writ Petition is allowed with the above findings, leaving the

parties to pursue any remedy available in the proper forum at

Cuttack, subject of course to limitation.

26. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is allowed.

27. Interim order, if any, passed earlier stands vacated.

(Dr.S.K. Panigrahi) Judge

Orissa High Court, Cuttack, Dated the 20th June, 2025/