Orissa High Court

Sanjay Kumar Padhy vs State Of Odisha & Ors. .... Opposite ... on 18 July, 2025

Author: S.K. Panigrahi

Bench: S.K. Panigrahi

                                                                  Signature Not Verified
                                                                  Digitally Signed
                                                                  Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
                                                                  Reason: Authentication
                                                                  Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
                                                                  Date: 21-Jul-2025 16:59:40




                  IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK

                                 W.P.(C) No.457 of 2025
        (In the matter of an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the
        Constitution of India, 1950).

        Sanjay Kumar Padhy                          ....              Petitioner(s)

                                         -versus-
        State of Odisha & Ors.                      ....       Opposite Party (s)


      Advocates appeared in the case through Hybrid Mode:

        For Petitioner(s)            :          Ms. Deepali Mohapatra, Advocate



        For Opposite Party (s)       :                    Ms. Gayatri Patra, ASC

                  CORAM:
                  DR. JUSTICE S.K. PANIGRAHI

                       DATE OF HEARING:-24.06.2025
                      DATE OF JUDGMENT:-18.07.2025
      Dr. S.K. Panigrahi, J.

1. In this Writ Petition, the Petitioner seeks a direction from this Court to

quash the confiscation order passed under Section 56 of the Orissa

Forest Act, 1972, and to release the tractor and trolley seized for

alleged illegal transport of forest produce.

I. FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE CASE:

2. The brief facts of the case are as follows:

(i) The petitioner is the registered owner of a Swaraj Tractor (Reg. No.

OD-32-3447) and its Trolley (Reg. No. OD-32-3448), purchased on

Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK

19.11.2014, with a commercial permit valid until 24.11.2019 to ply on

all motorable roads within the state of Odisha.

(ii) On 05.06.2018, the tractor was detained by the Tahasildar, Seragada,

while transporting blasting stone from Ambuabadi Stone Quarry to

Valiatota. The Tahasildar allegedly threw the documents provided by

the petitioner and seized the vehicle, subsequently informing forest

officials.

(iii) The same vehicle was previously seized by the Tahasildar on

26.04.2016 for transporting blasting stone and was handed over to the

forest officials. Confiscation proceedings were initiated under O.R.

Case No. 07/2016/17, and the vehicle was confiscated on 04.11.2016.

(iv) The petitioner appealed the confiscation in F.A.O. No. 32/2016, and

the District Judge ordered the release of the vehicle, but the forest

officials did not comply. A writ petition (W.P.(C) No. 8355 of 2017)

was filed, resulting in the court directing the release of the vehicle on

27.05.2017.

(v) The vehicle was re-seized on 05.06.2018 near Badagada 'C' UDPF for

alleged transportation of forest produce (Mango Logs and Metal),

contradicting the petitioner's claim that the vehicle was carrying

blasting stone. A Writ Petition (W.P.(C) No. 12307 of 2018) led to an

order for the proceedings to be concluded within three months.

(vi) Despite the pendency of the Writ Petition, the Authorized Officer

issued an order on 05.12.2018 for the confiscation of the vehicle. The

petitioner's appeal in F.A.O. No. 02/2019 was dismissed, but on

24.06.2024, the High Court quashed the appellate order and remitted

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the case for fresh consideration. The District Judge again dismissed

the appeal on 13.11.2024.

(vii) The petitioner argues that the appellate court failed to consider the

mandatory requirement of a government notification under Section 34

of the Orissa Forest Act for declaring the area as a protected forest.

The petitioner also claims that no evidence supports the vehicle

carrying forest produce, asserting it was transporting blasting stone,

challenging the legitimacy of the confiscation.

(viii) The petitioner claims the Tahasildar demanded a bribe during the

seizure and that discrepancies in the seizure list raise doubts about the

legality of the seizure. The petitioner also points to two seizure lists,

one prepared at the spot and another a month later.

II. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:

3. Learned counsel for the Petitioner earnestly made the following

submissions in support of his contentions:

(i) The petitioner contends that the orders passed by the Authorized

Officer and the District Judge are liable to be set aside, as those are

based on incorrect findings and riddled with procedural errors,

including the failure to consider the mandatory notification under

Section 34 of the Orissa Forest Act and the lack of proof for the

presence of forest produce.

(ii) The petitioner submits that the repeated seizures and confiscation of

the vehicle without proper documentation or proof violate the

petitioner's legal rights, including property rights under the

Constitution.

Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK

(iii) The learned District Judge erred in not taking into consideration the

petitioner's allegations of bribery and the discrepancies in the seizure

lists. The appellate court also failed to apply relevant legal provisions,

particularly those concerning the requirement for a government

notification declaring the area as a protected forest.

(iv) The petitioner argues that no alternative efficacious remedy is

available, and thus, the writ petition is the only appropriate remedy to

address the grievance.

III. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE OPPOSITE PARTIES:

4. The Learned Counsel for the Opposite Parties earnestly made the

following submissions in support of her contentions:

(i) The opposite parties argue that the petitioner's claims regarding the

vehicle's contents, the receipt of documents, and the sequence of

events are inconsistent and unsubstantiated by official records.

(ii) The seizure of the vehicle and the forest produce was conducted by

following proper legal procedures. The petitioner's repeated claims of

improper detention and documentation are false.

(iii) The petitioner has been previously involved in illegal activities related

to the transportation of forest produce, as evidenced by the prior

seizure and confiscation in 2016 and the 2018 incidents.

(iv) The confiscation order is consistent with the provisions of the Orissa

Forest Act, as the area in question falls under UDPF, which does not

require a government notification under Section 34 of the Act.

Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK

IV. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT BELOW:

(i) The appeal, filed under Section 56(2-e) of the Orissa Forest Act,

challenged the confiscation of a tractor and trolley by Forest

authorities for transporting mango logs and blasting stones, allegedly

removed from an Un-Demarcated Protected Forest (UDPF).

(ii) The appellant contested the confiscation after the tractor and trolley

were seized in June 2018. The materials were claimed to be forest

produce, and the case revolved around the status of the land and

whether the materials qualified as forest produce under the Act.

(iii) The key issues were whether the materials were forest produce and

whether the seizure occurred within a protected or unprotected forest,

with the appellant arguing there was no government notification for

the area.

(iv) The court held that the materials were indeed forest produce under

the Orissa Forest Act. The appellant's defense lacked corroborative

evidence, and the testimonies provided were dismissed as

unsubstantiated, especially claims of bribery.

(v) The court dismissed the appeal, confirming the confiscation order.

The appellant failed to provide sufficient evidence to challenge the

seizure or prove the items were from a non-protected area.

V. COURT'S REASONING AND ANALYSIS:

5. Heard Learned Counsel for parties and perused the documents placed

before this Court.

Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK

6. In order to appreciate the merits of the case better, it is imperative for

this Court to peruse the relevant provisions in relation to the case in

hand. Under Section 33 of the Orissa Forest Act, "protected forest" has

been defined as follows:

"33. Protected forest :- (1) The State Government may, by notification declare the provisions of this Chapter applicable to any land which is not included in a reserved forest, but which is the property of Government or, over which the Government have proprietary rights.

(2) The lands comprised in any such notification shall be called a "protected forest."

...."

7. The abovementioned provision makes it clear that "protected forest"

includes any Government land not in a reserved forest that the State

declares protected. In practice, Odisha treats almost all forested or

unreserved lands as protected forest (UDPF). In other words, unless

land is explicitly not forest, forest laws apply. The Revised Working

Plan (2014-24) for Ghumsur South Division, which is noted by the

court below, records Badagada-C as Un-Demarcated Protected Forest.

Therefore, the Tahasildar and forest officials had jurisdiction as the

area was effectively protected forest without needing a fresh

notification.

8. Apart from that, it is also imperative to peruse the provisions related

to forest produce. Section 2(g) of the Act reads as follows:

"2(g) "forest" produce includes-

(i) the following whether found in, or brought from a forest or not, that is to say-

(a) timber, charcoal, caoutchouc catechu, wood- oil, resign, natural varnish, bark, Tussay Cocoon, lac, gums, roots of

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Patala Garuda, mohua flowers, mohua seeds, myrabolans, Kendu Leaves, sandalwood, tamarind, hill- broom, Siali leaves, Siali fibres, Sal seeds;

(b) wild animals and wild birds, skins, tusks, horns, bones, and all other parts or produce of wild life; and

(c) such other produce as may be notified by the State Government; and

(ii) the following when found in or brought from a forest that is to say

(a) trees and leaves, flowers and fruits and all other parts or produce of trees not hereinbefore mentioned;

(b) plants not being trees (including grass, creepers, reeds, and moss) and all parts or produce of such plants;

(c) honey, wax and arrowroot;

(d) peat, surface oil, rock, sand and minerals (including limestone, late rite, mineral oils and all products of mines or quarries)."

9. The perusal of the abovementioned provisions make it clear that

Section 2(g) of the Act defines "forest produce" to include timber,

bamboo, wild fruits, etc., and crucially includes minerals and quarry

products. Specifically, clause (ii) (d) states that "rock, sand and minerals

(including limestone, laterite, mineral oils and all products of mines or

quarries)" found in or brought from a forest are forest produce. Thus,

stone or ore extracted from a quarry in forest land is "forest produce."

In this case, the seized tractor was near or within a forest area carrying

stone and logged wood. Even if the petitioner claims the stone came

from a registered quarry, its removal from protected forest land is

prohibited. The contentions that the load was mere blasting stone

from a pit or that the tractor was on a road construction site lack

substantiation. Without clear proof the materials came from private

Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK

land, they fall under the forest laws. Therefore, the materials came

from private land, they fall under the forest laws. Hence, the materials

meet the statutory definition of forest produce, and their transport

(especially without transit permit) is punishable.

10. Once an offence under the Forest Act is set in motion, the law imposes

a reverse burden on the accused. This view has been resonated in

plethora of judicial precedents, including State of West Bengal v.

Sujit Kumar Rana1 wherein it was held as follows:

"20...Forest is a national wealth which is required to be preserved. In most of the cases, the State is the owner of the forests and forest produce. Depletion of forests would lead to ecological imbalance. It is now well-settled that the State is enjoined with a duty to preserve the forest so as to maintain ecological balance and, thus, with a view to achieve the said object forest must be given due protection. Statutes which provide for protection of forest to maintain ecological balance should receive liberal construction at the hands of the superior Courts. Interpretive exercise of such power should be in consonance with the provisions of such statutes not only having regard to the principle of purposive construction so as to give effect to the aim and object of the legislature; keeping the principles contained in Articles 48- A and 51-A (g) of the Constitution of India in mind. The provisions for confiscation have been made as a deterrent object so that felling of trees and deforestation is not made."

11. In the present case, Section 56(2-c) specifically states that no

confiscation shall be made if the owner proves to the satisfaction of

the authorized officer that the vehicle was used in carrying the forest

produce without his knowledge or connivance and that each of them

AIR 2004 SC 1851.

Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK

had taken all reasonable and necessary precaution against such use."

By the clear terms, the petitioner was required to satisfy the

authorized officer of lack of knowledge and reasonable precautions.

The evidence does not show this was done. No permits were shown; it

appears the petitioner never informed the authorized officer of any

prior permit or precautions. The Forest Act imposes this "stringent"

burden precisely to deter illegal transport of forest produce. Absent a

convincing discharge, the confiscation stands.

12. Another facet is whether the courts below could entertain release of

the vehicle after confiscation proceedings. In Sujit Kumar Rana

(Supra), the Supreme Court held that once confiscation proceedings

have commenced, a criminal court's power to order release of the

vehicle is excluded. This stance was reiterated in State of M.P. v.

Uday Singh2 wherein the Supreme Court held that after the initiation

of confiscation under the Forest Act, only the authorized officer can

grant custody and the magistrate or High Court in exercise of inherent

powers, cannot release the vehicle. Relevant excerpts are produced

below:

"The necessary corollary of such provisions is that in a case where the Authorized Officer is empowered to confiscate the seized forest produce on being satisfied that an offence under the Act has been committed thereof the general power vested in the Magistrate for dealing with interim custody/release of the seized materials under CrPC has to give way. The Magistrate while dealing with a case of any seizure of forest produce under the Act should examine whether the power to

AIR 2019 SUPREME COURT 1597.

Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK

confiscate the seized forest produce is vested in the Authorized Officer under the Act and if he finds that such power is vested in the Authorized Officer then he has no power to pass an order dealing with interim custody/release of the seized material. This, in our view, will help in proper implementation of provisions of the special Act and will help in advancing the purpose and object of the statute. If in such cases power to grant interim custody/release of the seized forest produce is vested in the Magistrate then it will be defeating the very scheme of the Act. Such a consequence is to be avoided."

13. As per the abovementioned precedent, because the authorised officer

properly invoked Section 56 against these vehicles, this Court's

inquiry is on the legality of the confiscation, not on ordering interim

release of vehicles. This Court, therefore, adjudicates the petition as a

challenge to the final confiscation order, not as an application for

release under CrPC.

14. In the light of these findings, this Court concludes that the

confiscation order does not violate any statutory requirements, and

the authorities acted within their legal bounds. The petitioner's failure

to discharge the burden of proof, coupled with the evidence

supporting the forest authorities' claims, results in the upholding of

the confiscation order.