Puri @ Purusottam Behera vs State Of Orissa
2025 Latest Caselaw 10817 Ori

Orissa High Court

Puri @ Purusottam Behera vs State Of Orissa on 9 December, 2025

         THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK

                        CRA No.35 of 1994

(In the matter of an application under Section 374(2) of the Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973)


Puri @ Purusottam Behera              .......                Appellant

                               -Versus-

State of Orissa                      .......              Respondent

For the Appellant : Mr. Subham Sharma, Advocate For the Respondent : Mr. Ashok Kumar Apat, AGA

CORAM:

THE HONOURABLE SHRI JUSTICE SIBO SANKAR MISHRA

Date of Hearing: 02.12.2025 :: Date of Judgment: 09.12.2025

S.S. Mishra, J. The present Criminal Appeal, filed by the sole

appellant- Puri @ Purusottam Behera under Sections 374(2) of the

Cr.P.C., is directed against the judgment and order dated 18.01.1994

passed by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Deogarh in S.T. Case

No.224/12 of 1993, whereby the appellant has been convicted for the offence under Section 307 of I.P.C. and on that count, he has been

sentenced to undergo R.I. for seven years and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/-,

in default, to undergo R.I. for six months.

2. Heard Mr. Subham Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the

appellant and Mr. Ashok Kumar Apat, learned Additional Government

Advocate for the State.

3. The prosecution case, in brief, is that one Kuber Behera of village

Bampali under Barkot Police Station, District Deogarh, had four sons.

The accused-appellant is his eldest son. After marriage, the accused

resided separately with his wife. The second son lived in the house of his

father-in-law. The third son, Tikei @ Khirodra Behera, after the death of

his first wife, had remarried and was residing with his parents. The

youngest son, Jhanaketan, being unmarried, also resided with the parents

in the ancestral house.

It is alleged that Kuber Behera had not partitioned any land or

homestead property among his sons. The accused was persistently

quarrelling with his parents, demanding his share of land. His mother,

Maharagi, who was managing the affairs of the household, firmly

refused to make any allotment during her lifetime, which allegedly

caused the accused to bear a grudge against her. On an earlier occasion,

when the accused attempted to forcibly take possession of a portion of

his father‟s land, his mother is said to have resisted him.

In the year 1993, the accused had sown groundnut crops on two

„kita‟ of land in Khalimunda Chhack. In the adjacent field, his father had

also sown groundnut. A pit located near these fields served as a source of

irrigation. The prosecution asserts that the accused prevented his parents

from drawing water from this pit. On 5.4.1993, notwithstanding his

objection, Maharagi and Tikei irrigated their field from the pit. On the

following morning, 6.4.1993, upon discovering this, the accused became

enraged, went near his parents‟ house and abused them, allegedly

declaring that he would kill them if they continued to use water from the

pit.

On the evening of 6.4.1993, Kuber had gone to guard his

watermelon field; Tikei had gone to witness "Dandanacha" in another

village; and the youngest son, Jhanaketan, was also away participating in

"Dandanacha." Thus, only Sumati (P.W.1), the accused‟s sister-in-law,

and Maharagi (the deceased) were present in the house along with the

infant child of P.W.1. After dinner, P.W.1 retired to her room while

Maharagi slept on a cot in the verandah. A lantern was kept burning

throughout the night.

At about 10:00 p.m., when P.W.1 awoke to breastfeed her infant,

she heard unusual sounds and the groans of her mother-in-law. Rushing

to the verandah, she allegedly witnessed, in the light of the lantern, the

accused inflicting axe blows on Maharagi. P.W.1 states that she saw the

accused deliver another blow on Maharagi‟s neck, causing profuse

bleeding, after which he fled. Believing her mother-in-law to be dead,

P.W.1 raised an alarm. Her uncle-in-law and aunt-in-law, who resided in

the adjoining house, along with other villagers, arrived immediately.

P.W.1 informed them that the accused had assaulted Maharagi with an

axe.

On the basis of such allegation, the F.I.R. was lodged on the same

night. The police arrived at the spot, seized blood-stained earth and

sample earth, and sent the injured Maharagi, who was then senseless, to

the S.D. Hospital, Deogarh, where she was medically examined and

treated. The accused was arrested during investigation and, upon

completion of the inquiry, charge-sheet was submitted against him. On

the stance of complete denial and claim of trial, the appellant was put on

trial.

4. To substantiate its case, the prosecution examined twelve

witnesses, while the accused examined one witness in defence. P.W.1,

the wife of the accused‟s brother, is the principal occurrence witness.

P.W.2, the mother of the accused, is the victim of the assault. P.W.3 and

P.W.4, both co-villagers, reached the place of occurrence upon hearing

the alarm raised by P.W.1. P.Ws.3, 4, and 5 went to the Police Station

and lodged the F.I.R., and they have admitted their signatures on it.

P.Ws.6 and 7 arrived at the scene shortly after the incident and thereafter

proceeded to the watermelon field of the accused to ascertain his

presence; however, they did not find him, as he had allegedly absconded.

These two witnesses did not support the prosecution on material aspects.

P.W.8 was a formal witness, who proved the seizure of blood-stained

earth and sample earth. P.W.9 was examined regarding the alleged

animosity between the accused and his mother, but he did not support the

prosecution. P.W.10 was the Medical Officer, who examined the victim,

and P.Ws.11 and 12 were the Investigating Officers who conducted the

investigation at different stages.

The defence has examined one witness, i.e., D.W.1, a co-villager,

was examined to establish the relationship between the parties. The

evidence indicates that the victim was assaulted while asleep and

immediately lost consciousness; thus, she could not identify the

assailant. P.W.1 was the sole occurrence witness, and P.Ws.2 to 5

arrived at the spot on hearing her alarm, before whom P.W.1 made an

immediate complaint implicating the accused.

5. The learned trial Court, by analyzing and appreciating the entire

evidence brought on record by the prosecution, particularly the evidence

of the victim (P.W.2), eye witness (P.W.1) and the uncle of the accused

(P.W.4), recorded the following findings:-

"10. The accused took the plea that he was staying separately from his parents and his financial condition was sound though he had not taken any share and therefore, his younger brother Tikei and wife of Tujo (p.w.1) were convious and therefore,

foisted this false case against him. P.W.1 deposed that p.w.1 and her husband were not talking terms with the accused and his family and not pulling on well. Of course it would be after the incident. However, on the ground of anuity the evidence of one witness cannot be brushed aside. In such situation the court is to scrutinize her evidence and if it falls short of standard court may demand corroboration, circumstantial or direct, from independent sources. Keeping the such principle in mind, let it be seen whether the evidence of p.w.1 is trust worthy for acceptance. P.W.1 in her statement U/s 161, Cr.P.C. had not stated that her brother Jhasaketan had gone out of the house in the night of the occurrence to see the Danda nacha. P.W.2, the victim, herself deposed that her son had gone out of her house in that night of occurrence and she and p.w.l and the baby of p.w.1 were only available in their house. P.W.4 happens to be the uncle of the accused. His evidence does not reveal about the presence of Jhasaketan in that house in the night of occurrence. As appears the prosecution case regarding the absence of Jhasaketan in his house in the night of occurrence is above board. It seems that omission of p.w.1 to state about the absence of Jhasaketan in that night of occurrence does not affect her credibility. In fact her statement U/s 161, Cr.P.C. shows that she and her mother-in- law were only present in their house in the evening of occurrence. It was of mere details P.W.1 had stated before police that she came near her to mother-in-law and found her lying unconscious with bleeding cut injury on her head and neck and thinking her dead, she called her uncle and aunt- in-law. It is submitted that such portion of her

statement reveals that after the incident she came to the spot and had not seen the accused at all. Her statement is be a read as a whole to understand such portion. Prior to such part of the statement she had specifically stated U/s 161, Cr.P.C. that her slumber was disrupted due to breast feeding of her baby and hearing abnormal sound and groaning of her mother in law she got up and came out to verandah and found the accused dealing with axe blow to p.w.2 and then ran away and thereafter she came near her mother-in-law and saw her lying unconscious with bleeding injury on her head and neck and face and thinking her to be dead, she called a loud her uncle and aunt-in-law and on their arrival she complained about the incident before them. This does not amount to any contradiction. When such statement is singularly put to the witness showing inference that after the incident she came out of her room and finding her mother-in-law in a such condition she simply called other witnesses, having no chance to see the culprit, naturally she denied to have made such statement. This does not amount to any contradiction at all. Hence this submission has no force. P.W.1 had stated in her evidence that hearing the abnormal sound she placed her baby on the bed and came out of the room with lantern and found the accused dealing with one axe blow his mother-in-law (para-2 of her evidence). In para-6 of her cross-examination she expressed that one lantern was illuminating her bed room and hearing the sound she enhanced the illumination of the lantern light and then rushed out side with that lantern and in that lantern light saw the accused inflicting axe blow to her mother-in-law. In her

statement U/s 161, Cr.P.C. she had stated that one lantern was burning in the verandah and hearing the groaning sound of her mother-in-law she got up and came out of her room to see the accused inflicting cut blows to her mother-in-law. Her statement U/s 161, Cr.P.C. that one lantern burning in the verandah had been changed in her evidence to the effect that one lantern was burning in her bed room with low illumination and hearing groan of her mother in law and abnormal sound she enhanced the illumination and came out with that lantern. There is no inconsistency about the identification of the accused in the lantern light. The only point is whether the availability of the lantern in the verandah changed to bed room amounts contradiction. Undoubtedly, such claim is one omission, but it is minor contradiction of details. Her evidence is otherwise consistent having no infirmity. Her evidence is partly corroborated by the evidence of p.w.3,4 and 5 to the effect that hearing her hullah they reached at the spot and before then p.w.1 complained that the accused had inflicted such cut injury on p.w.2. Р.W.3 had lodged F.I.R. vide Ext.1 and p.w.4 and 5 had signed in it. Even in the F.I.R. it has been mentioned that p.w.1 had complained before Dambarudhar Behara (p.w.4) Muralidhar Padhan (p.w.5) that the accused had inflicted such cut injury on her mother in law and ran away. Such statement in the F.I.R. made at the earliest period of time circumstantially corroborates the evidence of p.w.1. The medical evidence probablised the evidence of p.w.1 that accused had inflicted such cut blows on p.w.2 by means of axe. As appears the evidence of p.w.1, is trustworthy having no

infirmity. It inspires credence to be accepted. The submission of the learned defence counsel that when the accused was the elder brother of the husband of p.w.1 and when p.w.1 was not freely mixing with the accused, there is every chance that she would have been under mistaken impression that the accused was the culprit and such view appears to be forceful when her statement before the police is that she came out of her room and finding her mother in law lying unconscious with cut bleeding injury, she thought her to be dead and then called others. When her statement is read as is whole, it shows that she got up from her and then came out of her bed room and found the accused inflicting cut blow on her mother in law under her own eyes and thereafter accused fled away and then she came near her mother-in-law to see her lying unconscious with cut injury and thinking her dead called others. It cannot be stretched to the effect that she came out of her room after departure of the culprit or when the culprit was running away after the assault and hence she might have been under mistaken impression that the culprit was the accused. She has specifically deposed and also stated before the police that under her own eyes the accused had dealt with axe blow to her mother-in- law. The accused happened to be petty senior to the husband of p.w.1 (as appears from the evidence of D.W.1) P.W.1 was not observing parda to him. She had specifically deposed that she had seen the accused many times before the occurrence. Therefore, when the accused was seen by her in the light of the lantern, there is no scope for any mistaken impression on her part that the culprit

was the accused. Such submission has not force and hence discarded."

6. Being aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and order of

sentence passed by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Deogarh, the

present appeal has been preferred by the appellant.

7. Mr. Subham Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant, at the

outset submitted that he would limit his argument to the nature of the

offence and the quantum of sentence. He submitted that even if the

evidence of the prosecution brought on record is left unchallenged, it

would not satisfy the ingredient of the offence under Section 307 of

I.P.C. and at best the prosecution can pitch its case to justify the guilt of

the appellant of the offence under Section 325 I.P.C. Hence, he

submitted that sentence of seven years imposed in lieu of the conviction

of the appellant under Section 307 of I.P.C. is shockingly

disproportionate. He further submitted that this is the case where the

victim/injured (P.W.2) herself has not supported the prosecution case.

The weapon of offence alleged to have been used to commit the crime

has also not been recovered by the police. The entire prosecution case

only hinges upon the testimony of P.W.1, who is the interested witness

and her evidence cannot be relied upon as she apparently tries to foist a

false case on the appellant so as to eliminate him from the claim of the

family properties. Mr. Sharma, further submitted that at the time of the

incident, only P.W.1 was present in the house and it cannot be ruled out

that the crime was perpetuated by her because the victim (P.W.2) though

injured, has deposed that she has not seen the assailant.

8. Per contra, Mr. Apat, learned Additional Government Advocate

for the State has taken me to the evidence of P.Ws.3, 4 and 5 and

submitted that the evidence of these three witnesses are directly stood

corroborated with the evidence of the doctor (P.W.10). Therefore, no

fault could be found from the appreciation of the evidence made by the

learned trial Court leading to recording of conviction against the

appellant for the offence under Section 307 of I.P.C.

9. I have carefully gone through the evidence on record in the light

of the submission made by the parties and also analysed the reasonings

and findings returned by the learned trial Court in the impugned

judgment. In the present case, P.W.2 is the injured/victim. The accused-

appellant is the elder son of P.W.2. She, in her testimony, has stated that

on the date of incident, she, along with her daughter-in-law (P.W.1) was

sleeping in the house. In the night, she suddenly woke up after she was

inflicted with a cut blow and she lost her senses immediately. She

regained her senses and found that she had sustained a cut blow on her

right temple and another cut blow on her upper lip below the right side

of the nose and also two cut injuries on her neck on the right side. She

very specifically stated that she does not know who had inflicted such

injuries on her. The said witness further deposed in paragraph-2 in

examination-in-chief that the accused is her elder son and has been

staying separately with his family in another house. She further deposed

that the accused-appellant was pulling well with her before the

occurrence.

P.W.3 is the informant. He has not witnessed the incident. He

stated that on 06.04.1993 at about 10. P.M., while he was sleeping in the

house, heard the hullah and reached the spot wherein he saw P.W.1

complaining to him that the accused had inflicted cut injuries and run

away. He then realized that P.W.2 was alive. Thereafter, he lodged the

F.I.R. (Ext.1). After the police arrived at the spot, P.W.2 was removed to

the hospital.

P.Ws.6 and 7, though independent witnesses have not supported

the prosecution. P.W.5 was the post-occurrence witness. He has only

deposed that he accompanied P.Ws.3 and 4 to register the F.I.R. after

reaching the spot.

In view of the nature of the evidence as discussed above, the

prosecution case now hinges upon the testimony of P.W.1 alone. P.W.1

is the sister-in-law of the accused-appellant. She deposed that the

accused is the elder brother of her husband. On the date of occurrence,

her husband had gone to see an Opera. The younger brother of her

husband was participating in Dandanacha and was, therefore, away from

the house, and her father-in-law had gone to the field to guard.

Therefore, in the night, she, along with her baby, aged about five months

and her mother-in-law (P.W.2) were sleeping in the house. She testified

that at about 10.30 P.M., she woke up as the baby cried. While

breastfeeding the baby, she heard some sound and came out of her room

with a lantern, and saw that the accused-appellant was dealing with one

axe blow to her mother-in-law. She further stated that she had seen with

her own eyes that the accused dealt further blows to her mother-in-law.

Out of fear, she ran away. Seeing her, the accused also fled away. She

then called her uncle and aunt-in-law from the neighbourhood and other

people gathered there. They took her mother-in-law (P.W.2) to the

hospital. This witness was vividly cross-examined by the defence to

create a dent in her testimony, but the defence largely remained

unsuccessful.

In light of this testimony of P.W.1, the evidence of the doctor

(P.W.10) needs to be evaluated. P.W.10 in his testimony has stated that

on 07.04.1993 at about 4.30 A.M., P.W.2 was admitted to the hospital

and he found the following injuries:-

"i. Incised injury-1 cm x ½ cm x ¼ cm-horizontal on the upper lip.

ii. Incised-5cm x 1 cm x 1 cm-rt. Side of neck extending obliquely below the ear lobe down wards. iii. Incised injury- 4 cm x 1 cm x 1 cm- Rt. side of neck 2 cm below and parallel to the 2nd injuries. iv. Incised injury- 1 cm x ½ cm x ½ cm-interior axillary fold.

v. Incised injury with under lying fracture of frontal bone 4 cm x 1 cm x ½ cm Rt. side of face 4 cm anterior to the ear."

The doctor (P.W.10) opined that the first four injuries were simple

in nature and might have been caused by sharp cutting weapon, however,

the last injury was grievous in nature and might have been caused by

sharp cutting weapon. Except for injury No.5, other injuries were simple

in nature. The doctor again testified that "Had the weapon of injury of

the last injury cutting the frontal bone, injured the brain material under

the bone, her life would have been endangered." In the cross-

examination, he has deposed as under:-

"The last injury has not injured the brain. Before my examination I asked for the consent of the patient and she replied in the affirmative consciously. As there was fracture of frontal bone in injury No.5, I opined it to be grievous in nature otherwise it would have been simple. No X-ray was made because the bone was

exposed. In long bones pathological fracture may occurred in aged persons but not on the frontal bone."

Reading of the evidence of the doctor (P.W.10) would lead to the

following conclusion:-

(a) Out of five injuries, injury No.5 was grievous.

(b) Injury No.5 being a fracture injury on the frontal bone, the doctor opined it to be a grievous one otherwise it would have been simple.

(c) Had the injury No.5 would have touched the brain, it would have been fatal, however, the injury has not caused any damaged to the brain.

(d) There is no opinion that in the ordinary course, such injury may cause death of the victim.

10. Mere existence of injury, whether simple or grievous, may not be

a reason to convict a person under Section 307 of I.P.C., unless the

requisite intention or the knowledge of the offender is proved. Such

factum can be ascertained from the evidence of the injured person or the

opinion of the doctor or both. In this case, the injured person has not

supported the prosecution; rather, she has stated that she had very cordial

relationship with the accused before the occurrence. The doctor‟s

evidence does not reveal anything as to whether any of the injuries

sustained by P.w.2 was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of

nature. Therefore, it would be apt to rely upon the judgment of this Court

in the case of Ananda Nath vrs. State of Odisha, reported in (2021) 82

OCR-264, wherein it has been held as under:-

"11. It is settled principles of law that to justify a conviction under section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, it is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should be inflicted. The nature of injury actually caused very often gives considerable assistance in coming to a finding relating to the intention of the accused. However, such intention can also be deduced from other circumstances without even any reference to the actual wounds. It is not necessary that the injury actually caused to the victim of the assault should be sufficient under ordinary circumstances to cause the death of the person assaulted. The Court has to see is whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the section. (Ref: A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 305, State of Maharashtra -Vrs.- Balaram Bama Patil).

          xxxxxx              xxxxxx                 xxxxxx
        xxxxxx                xxxxxx                 xxxxxx"

In the light of the judgment laid down by this Court in Ananda

Nath (supra), if the evidences are analysed, the only conclusion that

could be drawn is that this is a case where the prosecution has failed to

establish the required ingredient to satisfy the charges for the offence

under Section 307 of I.P.C., however, the evidence illuminating on

record that the appellant has caused assault to P.W.2, which stood

corroborated from the evidence of P.Ws.1, 4, 5 and 10. Therefore, all

ingredients to attract the offence under Section 325 of the I.P.C. are

attracted. Accordingly, the impugned judgment and order dated

18.01.1994 passed by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Deogarh is

modified to that of Section 325 of I.P.C. from Section 307 of I.P.C.

11. At this stage, Mr. Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant,

submitted that the incident relates back to the year 1994, at which point

the appellant was about 49 years of age. At present, he is aged about 80

years. He also submitted that during the trial, the appellant was arrested

on 10.04.1993 and released on bail on 19.04.1993. Therefore, the

appellant has already undergone custody for about nine days. After the

judgment was pronounced on 18.01.1994, the appellant was taken into

custody and on 25.01.1994, he was released on bail. Therefore, after

conviction, he has already undergone custody for about eight days. The

total period of incarceration is about seventeen days. Over the years, he

has led a dignified life, integrated well into society, and is presently

leading a settled family life. Incarcerating him after such a long delay, it

is argued, would serve little penological purpose and may in fact be

counter-productive, casting a needless stigma not only upon them but

also upon their family members, especially when there is no suggestion

of any repeat violation or ongoing non-compliance with regulatory

norms. Therefore, in the fitness of the situation, a lenient view should be

taken and the sentence of the appellant should be reduced to that of the

period he has already undergone.

12. The contention raised by Mr. Sharma, learned counsel for the

appellant, is not seriously controverted by the learned counsel for the

State. Otherwise, the submission made by Mr. Sharma, deserves

attention in view of the fact that the present appeal itself has been

pending since last more than three decades.

13. Taking into account the entire circumstances of the case, and the

gravity of the offence, the age of the appellant, I consider it an

appropriate case to modify the sentence. Hence, the sentence of seven

years is accordingly modified. The appellant is sentenced to undergo R.I.

for a period of one year and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- (Rupees one

thousand), in default of payment of the fine amount, to undergo R.I. for a

further period of three months. The period the appellant has already

undergone shall be set off from the substantive sentence.

14. Accordingly, the CRA is partly allowed.

(S.S. Mishra) Judge

The High Court of Orissa, Cuttack.

Dated the 9th December, 2025/ Swarna

Designation: Senior Stenographer

Location: High Court of Orissa