Orissa High Court

Harihar Kharasudha Patnaik vs The State Of Orissa on 10 April, 2025

                     THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK

                                   CRLA No.519 of 2009

         (In the matter of an appeal under Section 374 of the Code of Criminal
         Procedure 1973)


         Harihar Kharasudha Patnaik          .......                   Appellant

                                           -Versus-

         The State of Orissa                 .......                   Respondent

For the Appellant : Mr. Subir Palit, Senior Advocate along with Ms. S. Sen, Advocate

For the Respondent : Mr. M.S. Rizvi, ASC, Vigilance

CORAM:

THE HONOURABLE SHRI JUSTICE SIBO SANKAR MISHRA

Date of Hearing: 10.03.2025 : Date of Judgment: 10.04.2025

S.S. Mishra, J. The present Criminal Appeal has been filed by the appellant

under Section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, challenging

the Judgment and Order dated 17.11.2009 passed by the learned Special

Judge (Vigilance), Jeypore, in G.R. Case No. 28 of 1995(V)

corresponding to T.R. No. 81 of 2007. By the impugned judgment, the appellant, along with his co-accused, were convicted under Section 13(2)

read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, as

well as under Sections 467, 477-A, and 34 of the Indian Penal Code,

1860. Four persons were convicted by the impugned judgment, all of

whom filed separate appeals before this Court assailing conviction and

sentence passed against them. However, during pendency of appeals,

three of the appellants passed away, resulting in the abatement of their

respective appeals. Consequently, only the present appeal remains for

adjudication.

2. The brief fact of this case is that, on 01.10.1995, the Inspector of

Vigilance, Berhampur Squad, submitted the First Information Report

(FIR) before the Superintendent of Police, Vigilance, Berhampur. In the

FIR it is alleged that a vigilance inquiry had revealed irregularities in the

M.E. Common Examination for the year 1994, conducted by the Board

of Secondary Education, Cuttack, Orissa, in May 1994.

The examination was conducted under the Chairmanship of the

concerned Circle Inspector of Schools, with the District Inspector (D.I.)

of Schools supervising the evaluation of answer sheets. The answer

papers of Jeypore Education District were valued under the supervision

of the D.I. of Schools, Umerkote, who later prepared the result sheets.

During verification, it was found that in the result sheet of

Kabisurya M.E. School, U.K. Power House Colony, 15 students had

originally been marked as failed. However, Gananath Joshi, the then D.I.

of Schools, issued a handwritten chit to the Headmaster of Kabisurya

M.E. School, instructing him to bring the result sheet on 04.07.1994.

Upon submission of the result sheet, Joshi, along with other accused

persons, manipulated the marks, altering the results by striking off the

word "fail" and rewriting "pass" in columns 8 to 17 of the result sheet,

thereby illegally declaring 15 students as passed without making any

corresponding corrections in their answer papers.

Further inquiry established that similar manipulations were made

in the result sheets of U.G.M.E. School, Harijan Sahi, Municipal High

School No.2, Chandanbada Sahi, and other schools, allowing 38

additional failed students to be declared as passed through falsification

of official records.

The present appellant happened to be the Headmaster of Municipal

High School No.2 at the relevant time.

Based on this report, a vigilance case was registered, and during the

investigation, the Vigilance Inspector examined witnesses and verified

relevant documents, including the manipulated result sheets seized from

the concerned schools. Specimen handwriting and signatures of the

accused, including the then D.I. of Schools and attached teacher M.

Prasad Rao, were collected and sent for handwriting analysis. The expert

opinion confirmed the manipulations; therefore, the competent authority

accorded sanction to prosecute the accused.

3. After completion of the investigation, a charge sheet was

submitted against the accused persons. During course of trial, Gananath

Joshi, the then D.I. of Schools, passed away, resulting in the abatement

of proceedings against him. Consequently, the cases proceeded against

the remaining four accused persons and accordingly after the completion

of trial, they were convicted by the learned Trial Court and awarded

various sentences which are under challenge.

Being aggrieved by the aforementioned Judgement and order

dated 17.11.2009 of learned Special Judge, Vigilance, Jeypore, the

appellant has preferred the present appeal.

4. Heard Mr. Subir Palit, learned Senior Counsel with Ms. Subhashree

Sen, learned Counsel for the appellant and Mr. M.S. Rizvi, learned

Additional Standing Counsel for the Vigilance Department.

5. Mr. Palit, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant contended that the

appellant, who was the Headmaster of Municipal High School No. II,

Chandanbada, Jeypore, was on leave from 24.05.1994 to 26.06.1994,

during which one Krushna Ch. Panigrahi was in charge. During this

period, manipulations in the result sheets of eleven failed students of 7th

Board Eamnination were allegedly made at the D.I. of Schools level.

Upon the appellant‟s return on 27.06.1994, the D.I. of Schools, Gananath

Joshi, issued a handwritten chit, directing him to submit the result sheets

on 04.07.1994, which he complied with. However, the manipulation of

marks and alteration of the results of eleven students from "fail" to

"pass" was done by Gananath Joshi and others, without the appellant‟s

knowledge or participation.

It was further argued that the prosecution failed to establish any

pre-arranged plan or prior concert between the accused persons to prove

a common intention under Section 34 of IPC to commit the alleged

crime. The appellant‟s mere compliance with the direction of his

superior does not amount to active participation in the commission of

alleged offence. The learned counsel relied on Dani Singh v. State of

Bihar1, which held:

"20. "Common intention" implies prearranged plan and acting in concert pursuant to the prearranged plan. Under this section a preconcert in the sense of a distinct previous plan is not necessary to be proved. The common intention to bring about a particular result may well develop on the spot as between a number of persons, with reference to the facts of the case and circumstances of the situation. Though common intention may develop on the spot, it must, however, be anterior in point of time to the commission of offence showing a prearranged plan and prior concert. (See Krishna Govind Patil v. State of Maharashtra [AIR 1963 SC 1413 : (1963) 2 Cri LJ 351] .) In Amrik Singh v. State of Punjab [(1972) 4 SCC (N) 42 : 1972 Cri LJ 465] it has been held that common intention presupposes prior concert. Care must be taken not to confuse same or similar intention with common intention; the partition which divides their bonds is often very thin, nevertheless, the distinction is real and substantial, and if overlooked, will result in miscarriage of

(2004) 13 SCC 203

justice. To constitute common intention, it is necessary that intention of each one of them be known to the rest of them and shared by them. Undoubtedly, it is a difficult thing to prove even the intention of an individual and, therefore, it is all the more difficult to show the common intention of a group of persons. But however difficult may be the task, the prosecution must lead evidence of facts, circumstances and conduct of the accused from which their common intention can be safely gathered. In Maqsoodan v. State of U.P. [(1983) 1 SCC 218 :

1983 SCC (Cri) 176 : AIR 1983 SC 126] it was observed that prosecution must lead evidence from which the common intention of the accused can be safely gathered. In most cases it has to be inferred from the act, conduct or other relevant circumstances of the case in hand. The totality of the circumstances must be taken into consideration in arriving at a conclusion whether the accused had a common intention to commit offence for which they can be convicted. The facts and circumstances of cases vary and each case has to be decided keeping in view the facts involved. Whether an act is in furtherance of the common intention is an incident of fact and not of law. In Bhaba Nanda Sarma v. State of Assam [(1977) 4 SCC 396 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 602 : AIR 1977 SC 2252] it was observed that prosecution must prove facts to justify an inference that all participants of the acts had shared a common intention to commit the criminal act which was finally committed by one or more of the participants. Mere presence of a person at the time of commission of an offence by his confederates is not, in itself sufficient to bring his case within the purview of Section 34, unless community of design is proved against him. (See Malkhan Singh v. State of U.P. [(1975) 3 SCC 311 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 919 : AIR 1975 SC 12] ) In the Oxford English Dictionary, the word "furtherance" is defined as "action of helping forward". Adopting this definition, Russell says that "it indicates some kind of aid or assistance producing an effect in future" and adds that any act may be regarded as done in furtherance of the ultimate felony if it is a step intentionally taken, for the purpose of effecting that felony.

(Russell on Crime, 12th Edn., Vol. I, pp.487 and 488.) In Shankarlal Kacharabhai v. State of Gujarat [AIR 1965 SC 1260 : (1965) 2 Cri LJ 266] this Court has interpreted the word "furtherance" as "advancement or promotion". "

Similarly, reliance was placed on Ramesh Singh v. State of A.P.2,

wherein the Hon‟ble Supreme Court observed:

" 12. To appreciate the arguments advanced on behalf of the appellants it is necessary to understand the object of incorporating Section 34 in the Penal Code, 1860. As a general principle in a case of criminal liability it is the primary responsibility of the person who actually commits the offence and only that person who has committed the crime can be held guilty. By introducing Section 34 in the Penal Code the legislature laid down the principle of joint liability in doing a criminal act. The essence of that liability is to be found in the existence of a common intention connecting the accused leading to the doing of a criminal act in furtherance of such intention. Thus, if the act is the result of a common intention then every person who did the criminal act with that common intention would be responsible for the offence committed irrespective of the share which he had in its perpetration. Section 34 IPC embodies the principle of joint liability in doing the criminal act based on a common intention. Common intention essentially being a state of mind it is very difficult to procure direct evidence to prove such intention. Therefore, in most cases it has to be inferred from the act like, the conduct of the accused or other relevant circumstances of the case. The inference can be gathered from the manner in which the accused arrived at the scene and mounted the attack, the determination and concert with which the attack was made, and from the nature of injury caused by one or some of them. The contributory acts of the persons who are not responsible for the injury can further be inferred from the subsequent conduct after the attack. In this regard even an illegal omission on the part of such accused can indicate the sharing of common intention. In other words, the totality of circumstances must be taken into consideration in arriving at the conclusion whether the accused had the common intention to commit an offence of which they could be convicted. (See Noor Mohammad Mohd. Yusuf

(2004) 11 SCC 305

Momin v. State of Maharashtra [(1970) 1 SCC 696 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 274 : AIR 1971 SC 885] .)."

Mr. Palit, learned Senior Counsel, extensively read out the

evidence of the prosecution and submitted that the prosecution evidences

indeed established the innocence of the appellant, however

overwhelming evidence illuminating on record in favour of the appellant

has been mis-appreciated by the trial court. On the strength of Judgement

cited at the Bar, Mr. Palit submits that the appeal deserves merit.

6. The prosecution witness (P.W.7), Krushna Chandra Panigrahi,

who was the acting Headmaster during the appellant‟s leave, admitted

that he handed over the result sheets to Jhadeswar Pattanaik, a Clerk in

the D.I. of Schools Office, and received them back with corrections. He,

however, denied any knowledge of the manipulation. The learned Trial

Court, while dealing with the testimony of P.W.7 has observed as under:

P.W.7, the assistant teacher of Municipality High School no.2 stated in his evidence that accused Jhadeswar Patnaik was working as a clerk in D.I. of Schools, Jeypore and he requested the Headmaster to give the result sheets of M.E. common examination, 1994, and the headmaster gave him the result sheets and those were returned to the schools with some corrections. But in cross-examination he clarified that he did not

remember who handed over the result sheets to Jhadeswar Patnaik.

Similarly, while dealing with the allegations of manipulation, the Trial

Court relied upon the testimony of P.W.6, who was the handwriting

expert. The Trial Court appreciated the evidence of P.W.6 and returned

the following findings:

"Again, according to P.W.6, the person who wrote B-I to B-7 did not write the red enclosed disputed signature appearing in Exts. 15 and 16, marked as W-1 and W-2, purported to have been sent from the office of the D.I. of Schools did not belong to the said D.I. Gananath Joshi and those signatures have been forged. So the corollary inference would be that the contents of Ext. 15 were stated to have been written by accused M. Prasad Rao, he also forged the signature of the D.I. in Exts. 15 and 16 without the knowledge of the D.I. or C.I. and abused his official position by putting the seal of the D.I. of Schools after forging the signature and thereby illegally issued letters from the office of the D.I. of Schools vide letter no. 5437 of dated 19.9.94 promoting two students vide Ext. 15 and vide letter no. 4624 dated 16.8.94 thereby promoting 11 students having different roll numbers to have promoted to VIII class under his consideration. Again P.W.6 found several corrections in the result sheets and interpolation in the marks as pointed out in X-I to X-50. Again according to p.w.6 in the result sheets the original word 'fail' has been scored through and 'Pass' has been written subsequently as noticed in Y-I to Y-52 marked by him either the 'Pass' was written subsequently to the write or decified word 'fail' or the original word 'fail' has been changed to 'pass' by overwriting or has been written separately. So even though no definite opinion was made by P.W.6 as to who had made the correction of pass and fail or interpolated the marks in the result sheets, the gist of his evidence revealed that the then D.I. Gananath Joshi had issued the chit of letter (Ext. 19) to the Headmaster, Kabisurya

M.E. School for the production of his result sheets but the subsequent letters' vide Exts. 15 and 16 signatures therein, and the result sheets of the disputed two schools were found to have been manipulated, interpolated and forged, either by the attached teacher M. Prasad Rao, who stated to have issued Exts. 15 and 16 declaring 13 unsuccessful students to have passed and there were several manipulations and interpolations in marks of different students who were originally failed as per the copy of the result sheets of the C.I. of Schools and that of the D.I. of Schools, Jeypore, but subsequently were shown to have passed as per the said result sheets of the two schools, vide Exts. 7 and 9,the custodians of which were accused Harihar Karasudha Patnaik and Smt. Pramila Gantayat.

The opinion of the handwriting expert can be relied upon when supported by other items of internal and external evidence. A.I.R.2003 SC 282. It is not the law that the handwriting expert's opinion can never be acted upon unless substantially corroborated by other evidence in case where the reasons for opinion are convincing and there is no reliable evidence throwing any doubt, the uncorroborated testimony of handwriting expert may be relied upon. A.I.R.1980 SC 531 .So basing upon this when the evidence by P.W.6 has not been shaken by way of cross-examination by any of the accused particularly M.Prasad Rao, the same can be accepted and can be held to be reliable with reference to the opinion in Exts. 15 and

16."

The documentary evidence, namely Ext.15 - Letter No. 4624,

Ext.16 - Letter No. 5437, and Ext.19 - Paper chit, were found to have

been issued under the forged signature of the D.I. of Schools by accused

No.1, M. Prasad Rao, to dispatch the result sheets through the Clerk,

Jhadeswar Pattanaik. The accused Headmaster, instead of verifying the

authenticity of the letters and the paper chit, simply handed over the

result sheets. The Trial Court based its reasoning on this aspect to

connect the appellant to the offence. However, it was contended that the

accused Headmaster might be negligent on the part of his duty, but

having no criminal mindset merely cannot be liable in a criminal offence

based on presumption of fact.

7. In its judgment, the Learned Trial court acknowledged the absence

of direct evidence against the appellant and relied solely on Section 114

of the Evidence Act to infer guilt based on presumption. For ready

reference, the relevant part of the impugned judgement is reproduced as

under:

Direct evidence is one of the modes through which a fact can be proved but that is not the only mode envisaged in the Evidence Act. Proof of fact depends upon the degree of probabilities of its having existed. The standard required for reaching the supposition is that of a prudent man acting in any important manner concerning him. In this connection Flatcher Maulton L.J in Hawkins Vrs. Pawels Tillery steam coal Co. Ltd. 1991(I) KB 988 observed as follows: "Proof does not mean proof through rigid mathematical demonstration, because that is impossible, it must mean such evidence as would induce a reasonable man to come to a particular conclusion". The said observation has stood the test of time and can now to be followed as standard of proof. In reaching the conclusion, the court can use the process of inference to be drawn from the facts produced or proved. Such inferences are a kin to presumption in Law. Law gives absolute discretion to the court to pressure the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened. In

that process the court may have to regard to common course of natural event, human conduct, public or private business vis. a vis the fact of particular case. The discretion is clearly envisaged in sec.114 of the Evidence Act.

"Presumption" is an inference of certain fact drawn from other proved facts. While interfering the existence of a fact from another, the court is only applying the process of intelligent reason which the mind of a prudent man would do under similar circumstances. Presumption is not the final conclusion to be drawn from other facts but it could as well be final if it remain undisturbed later. Presumption in law of evidence is a rule indicating the stage of shifting the burden of proof. From a certain fact or facts the court can drawn an inference and that would remain until such inference is either disproved or dispelled as observed on 2001 (I) S.C.C.691.

8. The learned Senior Counsel emphasized that in the absence of

concrete evidence proving common intention or active participation, the

conviction of the appellant under Section 34 of IPC is unsustainable in

law.

The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant further submitted

that the allegations against the appellant rest solely on presumption

under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, which permits the court to

assume the existence of certain facts unless disproven by a

preponderance of evidence. However, presumption alone cannot

substitute for concrete proof, especially when the prosecution's case

hinges on the doctrine of common intention under Section 34 of IPC.

Relying on Dani Singh v. State of Bihar (supra), it was argued that

liability under Section 34 of IPC requires the satisfaction of two essential

tests:

1. Existence of a prearranged plan demonstrating common intention.

2. Active participation of the accused in the criminal act.

The Counsel contended that neither of these elements was established

in the present case nor any corroborative evidence born on record to

support presumption. The failure of the appellant to verify the

authenticity of the forged signature of M. Prasad Rao and his compliance

with instructions from the D.I. of Schools without waiting for a duly

signed letter may at most amount to negligence. The learned Counsel

submits that such an act might attract departmental proceedings but does

not constitute criminal complicity in the alleged offence.

Since common intention was neither proved nor established, the

appellant cannot be held vicariously liable under Section 34 of IPC

alongside the co-accused. Therefore, the appellant is not guilty of the

offences charged and cannot be convicted on mere presumption.

9. On contrary, learned Additional Standing Counsel (Vigilance) for

the respondent vehemently opposed the contentions of the appellant and

submitted that as sufficient evidences and witnesses have deposed

against the appellant and with the support of such evidences; the learned

Trial Court has rightly convicted the accused appellant. To substantiate

his submissions about the sustainability of conviction the learned

Additional Standing Counsel for Vigilance has relied upon the findings

of the Trial Court, which reads under: -

"12. That apart it has been brought out that as per the entries in the despatch register and despatch number put in Exts. 15 and 16, the contents of those letters and the subjects thereof were different and did not tally with each other which clearly go to show that the accused persons like M.Prasad Rao and Jhadeswar Patnaik attached to D.I. of Schools and the later being the in charge of despatch register issued Exts.15 and 16 by forging the signatures of the D.I. of schools but put the official seal of the D.I. and put fake despatch numbers in those letters and issued the names and roll numbers of 13 students who had originally failed to have passed and promoted. That apart as it is seen from the result sheet of the two impugned schools and the result sheet of which was admittedly under the strict care and custody of the respective headmaster/headmistress with that of the result sheet of the C.I. and D.I. originally in U.G.M.E. school, Harijan sahi, Jeypore 74 students had appeared out of which 33 'passed' and at Municipality High schoo1 no.2,114 students had appeared out of which 33 'passed' vide Exts.4 and 5 respectively out of 74 students appeared in U.G.M.E. school. Harijan sahi, Jeypore, 60 students were stated to have passed instead of 33 and out of 114 students, 42 were stated to have passed instead of 33 from Municipality High School no.2.

It was submitted by the prosecution that after recording among the 114 students sent by C.I. of Schools, the roll no.3167 was only covering for these two schools and on comparison of the said result sheets it is sen that the marks in the said roll number was also manipulated before reaching the letter of recounting in that school to which the concerned headmaster had not explained. So as stated by the I.0. (P.W.11) and other witnesses. Exts.3 to 6 were copy of result sheets of C.I. of Schools where no corrections were made Exts. 30 to 33 were copies of result sheets of D.I.of Schools and out of it in Exts. 32 and 33, two corrections were made as per the recounting of the result sheets out of 114 students made by the C.I.of Schools. Exts.7 to 10 are the result sheets of the four concerned schools out of which the present two head masters are facing the trial for the result sheets of Exts.7 and 9. So on a comparision of three copies of the result sheets, as per Ext.7, the result sheet of U.G.M.E. School, Harijan sahi, Jeypore corrections in 26 roll numbers were made who were shown to have been passed by overwriting the marks and by striking out the word 'fail' . So also as per the result sheet. Ext.9 of Municipality High School no.2 out of 114 students as against 11 roll numbers, the marks were manipulated and they were shown to have passed by striking out the word 'fail' including th of the roll no.3167.

Prosecution clarified that in the result sheet of Govt. Girls High School, Jeypore, the Headmaster was not prosecuted, since the consideration was made with respect to other 7 students as seen from both the result sheets of C.I. copy (Ext.3) and school copy (Ext.10) out of 18 students.

13. Thus, the result sheets being one of valuable documents to be possessed by the headmaster himself under his strict custody or vigilance for any alteration or manipulation therein he or she is to account for the same as to how and under what circumstances, the corrections or manipulations in the result sheet with respect to unsuccessful students were made and the same was in accordance with examination Regulation and procedure conducted under the chairmanship of the C.I. of schools. Any deviation or defalcation thereof has to be explained reasonably by the headmaster. Here in this case, the C.I. had no knowledge regarding the extra correction or alteration nor there was any official communication by the concerned D.I. to the Headmasters

who were the custodian of the result sheets of the students. Merely because the D.I. of Schools subsequently died it can not be taken for granted in the absence of any positive proof that he asked for the result sheets to the headmasters non-officially and made the manipulations for any unlawful gain and returned the same without the knowledge of the headmaster under whose authorities those were handed over and were brought back. So the connivance or conspiracy by the staffs of the D.I. of schools and the concerned Headmaster or headmistress for abuse of their official position can not be ruled out in the absence of any official communication to them either through the C.I. or D.I. The headmasters being the person in authrotiy for the custody of the result sheets-a valuable security by which the future of a students is created or remained at stake any deviation on the part of the headmaster/headmistress has to be reasonably explained by them. So, considering the opinion evidence by p.w.6 who has found the role of accused attached teacher M. Prasad Rao in sending forged letters by forging the signatures of the D.I. by manipulating the despatch register un under the custody of Jhadeswar Patnaik who also took part in bringing the result sheets privately from one of the schools and in view of the tampering in the results of 'pass' and fail' of so many students, indisputeably the role by the concerned headmaster/headmistress can not be stated to be official or in accordance with examination norms. Instead of simply handing over the result sheets they should have asked for the official written order or should have brought it to the notice of the higher authority i.e. the Committee of examination or the C.I. of Schools, so that such manipulation should have been prevented."

10. Mr. Rizvi, learned Additional Standing Counsel for Vigilance

further contended that the oral testimonies of all Prosecution Witnesses

(PWs) were unequivocal and unambiguous, specifically establishing the

forgery and falsification of the Result Sheet and the credibility of PW-2

(Sr. Clerk-cum-Jr. Accountant) and PW-6 (G.E.Q.D.) remained

unimpeached, even under meticulous cross-examination.

He further submitted that the learned Trial Court thoroughly

analysed the evidence and rightly concluded that the appellant was

responsible for forgery and falsification of the Result Sheet as he was the

custodian of the result sheet. Therefore, there is no legal infirmity or

perversity in the impugned judgment dated 17.11.2009.

11. This Court has carefully examined the precedents cited, the

materials on record, the depositions of witnesses, and the reasoning of

the learned trial court. From the collective evidence of Prosecution the

narrative in entirety vis-a-vis the appellants borne on record is that the

appellant was working as Headmaster in Municipal High School No. 2

during the alleged crime happened. He was on leave from 24.05.1994 to

26.06.1994. In his absentia P.W.7 was in charge. On 04.07.1994,

appellant‟s boss, the D.I. of Schools send a chit in the form of letter

(Ext.19) asking him to send the result sheet. The said Ext.19 found to be

a manipulated letter at the instance of the co-accused namely M. Prasad

Rao. He complied the purported direction of the D.I. of Schools

oblivious of the fact that the chit was a forged one. Prosecution also

proved on record that all manipulation in the result sheet has been done

by the co accused persons. However, the appellant‟s complicity in the

commission of crime has been assumed as he was the custodian of the

result sheet being the Headmaster. Therefore, the conviction is solely

based on the inference of presumption u/s 114 of the Evidence Act,

1872. Appellant is convicted under aid of Section 34 of IPC as

admittedly he has not participated in the forging of the documents. It is

well established that a conviction under Section 34 of IPC requires proof

of a common intention, which necessitates: (i) A pre-arranged plan or

prior meeting of minds. (ii) Active participation of the accused in the

commission of the offence.

12. In the present case, there is no direct evidence establishing that the

appellant conspired or acted in concert with the principal accused to

manipulate the result sheets. The evidence of prosecution witness

(P.W.7), Krushna Chandra Panigrahi, clearly suggests that the result

sheets were already altered before they were handed back to the

appellant. Furthermore, the handwriting expert's report (P.W.6) merely

confirmed the alteration but did not link the appellant directly to the

forgery.

13. The reliance on Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, to

infer guilt solely based on circumstantial evidence is misplaced. As held

in Dani Singh v. State of Bihar (supra) and Ramesh Singh v. State of

A.P. (supra), mere negligence or omission cannot be equated with guilt

of criminal liability unless there is clear evidence of intent and active

participation. The learned trial court erred in placing undue reliance on

"presumption" without substantial proof of common intention.

14. Moreover, in a criminal trial, the burden lies on the prosecution to

establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The absence of any material

linking the appellant directly to the act of forgery or tampering of marks

negates the prosecution's case. At best, the appellant's actions amount to

mere procedural negligence on his part which cannot lead to draw a

presumptive inference as „mens rea', hence, does not satisfy the

ingredients of the offences charged under Sections 467, 477-A, and 34 of

IPC along with Section 13(2) r/w Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of

Corruption Act, 1988.

15. Moreover, the learned Trial Court while recording conviction for

the offense U/s 467 of the IPC, considered the manipulated result sheet

to be "Valuable Security". It is an established principle of law that a

valuable security as defined U/s 30 of IPC denotes a document which is

or purport to be a document whereby any legal right is created, extended,

transferred, restricted, extinguished or released, or where by any person

acknowledges that he lies under a legal liability or has not ascertained

legal right. At this point it would be apt to rely on the ruling of the

Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Shriniwas Pandit Dharamadhikari v. State

of Maharashtra3, in which it was held thus: -

"The appellant was convicted of offence under Sections 417, 420 read with Section 511 and Section 471 read with Section 467 of the Penal Code, 1860 and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment and fine for those offences. Having heard counsel for both sides we do not find any reason to disturb the order of conviction in respect of offences under Sections 417 and 420 read with Section 511 but as regards the offence under Section 471 read with Section 467 IPC we do not think that the two certificates the appellant has been found to have forged to get admission in the Arts and Commerce College affiliated to Poona University could be described as "valuable security" as the expression is defined in Section 30 of the Penal Code, 1860. We therefore alter the conviction under the aforesaid sections to one

(1980) 4 SCC 551

under Section 471 read with Section 465 of the Penal Code, 1860.

However, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we set aside the sentences passed against the appellant and remit the matter to the trial court to consider, as provided in Section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, whether the appellant should be given the benefit of Section 4 of the said Act. If the trial court does not find it expedient to release the appellant on probation of good conduct under Section 4 of that Act, it should then pass proper sentences on the appellant for the offences of which the appellant has been found guilty. The fine imposed on the appellant, if paid, shall be refunded. The appeal is disposed of as above."

Going with the reasoning given by the Hon‟ble Apex Court, the

alleged result sheet can‟t fall under the definition of "valuable security".

Therefore conviction of the co-accused u/s 467 of IPC cast a shadow of

doubt. Under the aid of Section 34 of IPC it is not safe to sustain

conviction of the appellant, when the evidence is doubtful and unclear,

which undermines the prosecution case beyond a reasonable threshold

warranting acquittal.

16. Considering the totality of the circumstances, this Court finds that

the prosecution has failed to establish the appellant‟s guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt. The conviction and sentence imposed by the learned

Trial Court are thus unsustainable in law and are hereby set aside.

17. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The appellant is acquitted of