Citation : 2021 Latest Caselaw 12112 Ori
Judgement Date : 24 November, 2021
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
CRLMC No. 1623 of 2020
(An Application under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973)
Smt. Bijaya Soren @ Murmu .... Petitioner
-versus-
State of Odisha and others .... Opposite Parties
Advocates appeared in the case by Hybrid mode:
For Petitioner : Mr. Rabi Narayan Behera,
S.N. Sahoo, L.T. Pal &
L.K. Padhi, Advocates.
-versus-
For Opposite Parties : Mr. M.K. Mohanty,
Additional Standing Counsel,
(for opposite party no.1)
Mr. Ajay Kumar Pradhan,
Advocate
Mr. S.K. Swain, Advocate
(For opposite party nos. 2 and 3)
CORAM:
JUSTICE SASHIKANTA MISHRA
ORDER
24.11. 2021
SASHIKANTA MISHRA, J.
1. In the present application, filed under Section 482
Cr.P.C., the petitioner questions the legality and propriety of the
judgment passed by 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Rourkela on
05.11.2020 in Criminal Revision No. 19 of 2020 in reversing
the order dated 13.10.2020 passed by learned J.M.F.C. (Rural)
Panposh at Rourkela in CMC (Misc. Case) No. 149 of 2020.
Learned J.M.F.C., (Rural) Panposh at Rourkela, vide the
aforementioned order had allowed the prayer of the petitioner-
mother and issued a search warrant under Section 97 of Cr.P.C.
to search the house of the opposite parties and to produce the
female child kept with them before the court.
2. The facts of the case, sans unnecessary details are
that the petitioner filed a petition under Section 97 of Cr.P.C.
before learned J.M.F.C., (Rural), Panposh inter alia stating that
she had married one Surender Kumar Murmu and out of such
wedlock, a female child namely, Sanshita Murmu was born on
14.05.2018. Unfortunately, the husband of the petitioner died on
02.04.2020 and thereafter, the petitioner continued to stay in her
matrimonial home with her child, mother-in-law (opposite party
no.1) and brother-in-law (opposite party no.2). It is alleged that
the petitioner was tortured by the opposite parties who wanted
to drive her away from their home. The intention of the opposite
parties was to deprive the petitioner from the share of money
received by selling the property at their native place. But
somehow, the petitioner continued to reside with her in-laws.
On 28.09.2020 at about 10.45 A.M., the opposite parties drove
out the petitioner forcibly from their house, but kept her two
year old child with them and also went away to another quarter
in Rourkela. When the petitioner went to the said quarter, she
was not allowed to enter but was assured that her child would be
returned after two days. The petitioner again went to the quarter
of the opposite parties on 30.09.2020, but she was not allowed
to take her child and was not allowed even to enter into the
house. The petitioner approached Sector-7 Police Station who
directed her to approach Tangarpali Police Station within whose
jurisdiction the occurrence had taken place. But when the
petitioner approached the Tangarpali Police Station on the same
day, the IIC of the said P.S. asked her to obtain appropriate
order from the competent court for rescue of her child.
3. The opposite parties appeared before the Magistrate
and filed a joint show cause disputing the averments made in the
petition under Section 97 Cr.PC. However, the facts relating to
marriage of the petitioner, birth of the female child, death of the
husband of the petitioner etc. were admitted. As regards the
child, it was stated that the petitioner had voluntarily left the
matrimonial home by disclosing her intention to remarry and as
such, had requested her mother-in-law to keep her child under
her care and custody. It is stated that the petitioner left her
matrimonial home taking all her belongings but left behind her
child who is being looked after by the opposite parties.
Subsequently when the petitioner raised a dispute to get her
child back, a meeting was held in their Samaj but her claim was
turned down having regard to the unhealthy and criminal
atmosphere prevailing in the petitioner's house which was
considered detrimental for the progress of the child. The
allegation that the child was kept in their custody forcibly and
was confined was specifically denied by the opposite parties. It
was also pleaded that the necessary ingredients for exercise of
power under Section 97 of Cr.PC. are not present for which the
proceeding was not maintainable.
4. After hearing both sides, learned J.M.F.C., (Rural),
Panposh held that according to the Hindu Minority and
Guardianship Act. 1956, mother is considered as primary care
giver of children below the age of 5 years and that best interest
of child will be served, if she is in the custody of her mother. As
regards the objection regarding maintainability, it was held that
since the opposite parties have snatched away the child from the
petitioner without her will and are denying to handover the
custody of the child to her, the petition under Section 97 Cr.P.C.
is maintainable as the child is with the opposite parties who are
not entitled to its custody. As such, the petition under Section 97
Cr.P.C. was allowed and search warrant was issued directing the
concerned IIC to search the house of opposite parties and to
produce the female child before the Court.
5. Being aggrieved, the opposite parties carried the
matter in revision to the court of 1st Additional Sessions Judge,
Rourkela in Criminal Revision No. 19 of 2020. Learned 1st
Additional Sessions Judge considered the rival contentions put-
forth before him, the ingredients of the statutory provision and
several case laws to hold that the present opposite parties being
grandmother and paternal uncle of the child are not strangers to
the said child and that though they may not be preferential
guardian according to Section 2 of the Guardianship Act
(presumably, Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act), the
opposite parties can also be said to be guardians of the minor
child as they are having the care of the person of the minor at
present. It was further held that such custody cannot be treated
as confinement which amounts to an offence. Thus, it was held
that learned Magistrate had failed to assign reasons as to on
what basis he came to conclusion regarding confinement of the
child and that the same amounts to offence. On the above
findings, learned Additional Sessions Judge allowed the
revision by holding that learned J.M.F.C., had acted in excess of
his jurisdiction and accordingly set aside the impugned order.
The judgment passed by the revisional court is impugned in the
present application.
6. Before examining the correctness or otherwise of the
judgment passed by the revisional court as well as learned
J.M.F.C., this Court deems it proper to examine scope and
purpose of the power conferred under Section 97 of Cr.P.C.
7. Section 97 of Cr.P.C. runs as follows:
97. Search for persons wrongfully confined. If any District Magistrate, Sub-divisional Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class has reason to believe that any person is confined under such circumstances that the confinement amounts to an offence, he may issue a search- warrant, and the person to whom such warrant is directed may search for the person so confined; and such search shall be made in accordance therewith, and the person, if found, shall be immediately taken before a Magistrate, who shall make such order as in the circumstances of the case seems proper."
A plain reading of the provision quoted above clearly
reveals that three conditions need to be satisfied for exercise of
order thereunder:
i. A person is confined.
ii. Such confinement amounts to an offence and
iii. The Magistrate has reasons to believe in the
existence of the aforementioned two conditions.
What is the meaning of 'confinement' and when can such
confinement become wrong or illegal so as to 'amount to an
offence?' The dictionary meaning of "confinement" is 'the
situation in which a person or animal is kept somewhere,
usually by force.' Thus, the application of force is sine qua non
for a situation to qualify as confinement vis-à-vis a person or an
animal. Section 340 of I.P.C. defines wrongful confinement as a
punishable offence depending on the period, place and intention
as delineated under Sections 343 to 348. For the confinement to
amount to an offence as required under Section 97 of Cr.P.C.
quoted above, the same must be as described under Section 340
IPC read with the penal provisions enumerated under Section
343 to Section 348 of I.P.C. Of course, every confinement
cannot be wrongful so as to constitute an offence. Therefore, the
facts and circumstances surrounding every confinement are to
be taken into account to determine whether the same is wrongful
or not because, unless it is wrongful it cannot partake the nature
of an offence so as to attract the provisions of Section 97
Cr.P.C.
8. The facts of the case may now be examined in the
backdrop of the aforementioned legal provisions and
propositions.
Admittedly, the petitioner is the biological mother of
the female child named Sanshita Murmu who is presently with
the opposite parties. Further admittedly, the opposite party no.1
is the grandmother and opposite party no.2 is the paternal uncle
of the said child. The date of birth of the child, as already
indicated is 14.05.2018 which makes her aged about 2 years as
on the date of filing of the application by her mother under
Section 97 of Cr.P.C. The fact that the petitioner had married
the son of opposite party no.1 and that her husband had died on
02.04.2020 is also not disputed. It is also not disputed that the
petitioner remained in her in-laws house for some time after
death of her husband, though the date on which she stopped
living there is in dispute inasmuch as according to her, she was
driven out by the opposite parties from her matrimonial home
on 28.09.2020 but according to the opposite parties, she left on
her own volition on 23.06.2020 with the intention of remarriage.
It is to be kept in mind that the proceeding under Section 97
Cr.P.C. is summary in nature which provides for emergent order
to be passed upon satisfaction of the Magistrate that the
confinement in question amounts to an offence. So it is not
required to go into the question as to on which date the
petitioner stopped residing with the opposite parties. From the
averments made in the petition under Section 97 Cr.P.C. and
show cause filed by the opposite parties, it is abundantly clear
that the mother has been denied access to her child. The
opposite parties have attempted to justify such denial of access
on the ground that the petitioner had voluntarily left her
matrimonial home. Now, even assuming that the petitioner had
voluntarily left her matrimonial home, can the same be a reason
to deny her access to the child who at the relevant time was
aged about 2 years? The answer can obviously be in the
negative. Once the biological mother is debarred from accessing
her own two year old child, it goes without saying that the
holding of the child by the grandmother or other persons
becomes entirely wrongful and hence, amounts to an offence.
Such being the factual position there can be no gainsaying that
as between the petitioner and the opposite parties, it is the
former, who has a natural and legal right over the child while
the latter do not have such right. A reading of the order passed
by learned J.M.F.C. (Rural) Panposh at Rourkela reveals that
the above aspects have evidently weighed upon the mind of the
learned Magistrate in holding that the opposite parties have
wrongfully confined the child.
9. Coming to the order passed by the revisional court,
it seems that the learned court below has approached the matter
from an entirely different perspective, i.e, from the point of
view of the right of custody of the child as per law. Even then, it
is seen that apart from being replete with repetitions the
impugned order is also found to contain several contradictions.
For instance, despite holding that the grandmother or the
paternal uncle may not be preferential guardians under the
Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, it is held at the same
time that they can also be said to be guardians as they are
having care of the person of a minor at present. Further, it is
held that except for some allegations made in the petition filed
under Section 97 Cr.P.C., there is no material to substantiate the
allegations made with regard to kidnapping/forcible keeping
away of the minor child from the custody of the petitioner and
yet at the same time, it is also held that grounds taken by the
opposite parties that the petitioner on her own left the
matrimonial home and also handed over the custody of the
female child to them cannot be ignored completely. It is difficult
to reconcile both the observations as above inasmuch as in a
summary proceeding under Section 97 of Cr.P.C., the
Magistrate is required to record his satisfaction with regard to
the allegation of confinement and that the same amounts to an
offence before exercising the power conferred thereunder. Law
does not make it obligatory for the Magistrate to delve into the
merits of the rival contentions at that stage.
10. Having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances
of the case as narrated in detail herein before, learned J.M.F.C.
was satisfied and very rightly held that the circumstances
warranted issuance of a search warrant. Even considering the
plea taken by the opposite parties that the petitioner voluntarily
left her matrimonial home with the intention of remarriage on
either 23.06.2020 or 30.09.2020 as the case may be, it is not
comprehended as to why would she turn around and seek to
return to her matrimonial home again. Moreover, even assuming
that she had left home with the intention of remarriage, the same
cannot be a reason to deprive her access to her own child. These
are relevant issues left entirely unanswered by the opposite
parties. The very fact that the opposite parties have opposed the
petitioner's prayer on the plea of her purported intention of
remarriage, by itself proves that they are holding the child
illegally. There is no law that a mother can no longer have access
to her minor child once she intends to remarry. Unfortunately,
these aspects have not been considered at all by the learned court
below. It is further observed that learned Magistrate has recorded
specific reasons for passing the order at paragraph-7 of the order,
but learned court below held that learned Magistrate has failed to
assign reasons. Clearly, the order of the learned Magistrate was
misread by learned court below. On the other hand, learned court
below appears to have misdirected itself in delving into several
case laws, mostly unnecessary, without bothering to look
underneath the facade of the rival contentions to ascertain the
truth of the matter. It further appears that the learned court
below, acting on a misconceived notion held that learned
Magistrate by passing the impugned order had acted in excess of
his jurisdiction whereas this Court, for the reasons cited
hereinbefore, finds that learned Magistrate has appreciated the
facts in the correct perspective, that too keeping the settled
position of law in mind. The impugned order passed by learned
court below, therefore cannot be sustained in the eye of law and
hence, warrants interference.
11. For the foregoing reasons therefore, the CRLMC is
allowed. The impugned order passed by learned 1st Additional
Sessions Judge, is hereby quashed and the order passed by
learned J.M.F.C., (Rural) Panposh at Rourkela is hereby
confirmed.
12. Accordingly, the CRLMC is disposed of.
(Sashikanta Mishra) Judge
Orissa High Court, Cuttack The 24th November, 2021/ B.C. Tudu
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