Orissa High Court

Sanatan Mahakud vs State & Others on 13 January, 2021

                        CORAM : HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE S.PUJAHARI
                                   CRLMC No.148 of 2019

                           Sanatan Mahakud                 ...     Petitioner
                                      - versus -
                           State & others                  ...     Opp. Parties


                                          ORDER

20. 13.01.2021 This petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been

filed by the petitioner to quash the FIR lodged against

him in Bamibari P.S. Case No.161 dated 16.12.2018

corresponding to G.R. Case No.714 of 2018 pending on

the file of learned J.M.F.C., Barbil as well as the entire

proceeding initiated in the said case.

2. The impugned F.I.R. has been lodged by one

Balabhadra Patra in writing with the allegation as

follows :-

One ESSAR Steel India Limited is operating

mining in Badakalimati Panchayat area and

transporting iron ore from the locality. The villagers

have donated their lands to the company. The

petitioner, who is the M.L.A of Champua representing

himself as the representative of the villagers and on

behalf of the village committee, made an agreement with

the ESSAR Steel India Limited exerting force on the

same company with a threat that unless the company

entered into the contract they will block their mining

activities. The company agreed to pay crores of rupees

to the village committee for welfare of the villagers. The

said act of the petitioner was neither sanctioned by the

law nor by the Government. The petitioner along with

his henchmen started extorting crores of rupees. They

terrorized the company to pay money to the private

mafia as a "Private CSR Fund" in the name of welfare of

the local people and pocketed the same for themselves.

The petitioner also used the said money for his personal

gain and distributed the money in the shape of cash,

seeds, blankets, bhatta etc. among his supporters and

projected himself as a "Robin hood" of the locality by

floating an organization in his name as "Sana Sena". For

such activities of the petitioner, the villagers have been

suffering. When the villagers demand the money

provided by the company, they are being harassed and

threatened by the henchmen of the petitioner as named

in the report. The petitioner takes money not only from

the ESSAR Steel India Ltd. but also from many other

companies operating in the area, and if any company

refuses to do so, the petitioner harasses them by

resorting to protest, dharana, blocking etc. in their

mining area. In this way, he is engaged in extortion of

money from different companies so also coercing the

companies to engage his own people and pay them

salary without any duty.

3. Police in Bamebari P.S. on receipt of the said

allegation registered the same as FIR vide the aforesaid

P.S. case, inasmuch as according to the police, the

allegations so brought disclose commission of

cognizable offence under Sections 467/ 468/ 471/ 420/

506/ 385/ 386/ 120-B of IPC against the petitioner and

others named in the FIR.

4. The petitioner has approached this Court seeking

invocation of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482

Cr.P.C. to quash the F.I.R. and the consequential

proceeding, with the averments that such allegations

have been made by the political opponents of the

petitioner and manufactured at the behest of the

District Police Administration and that the FIR

allegations make out no criminal offence much less the

offences for which the same has been registered i.e.

under Sections 467/ 468/ 471/

420/506/385/386/120-B of IPC. It has also been

averred that the person said to be the informant being

not the victim of the act alleged, no case ought to have

been registered by the police at his instance and

investigated without recording its satisfaction as to

whether the allegations reveal any cognizable offence.

But, on false, baseless, politically motivated and

concocted allegations made at the behest of the political

opponents of the petitioner, the case has been registered

and investigated causing undue harassment to him.

Hence, the F.I.R. and the consequential proceeding are

liable to be quashed in view of the law laid down by the

apex Court in the case of State of Haryana and

others vrs. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others, reported in

1992 Supp (1) SCC 335.

5. No detailed counter affidavit has been filed in this

case by the police to the aforesaid petition, but an

affidavit has been filed by the I.I.C., Bamebari Police

Station indicating that after registration of the FIR, the

investigation being in progress and several documents

being yet to be collected, it cannot be said at the stage

that no offence is made out.

6. During the course of hearing, learned counsel

appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the FIR

and the consequential investigation is liable to be

quashed inasmuch as the FIR allegation is baseless and

frivolous one and does not disclose commission of any

cognizable offence. According to him, in the absence of

allegation disclosing any cognizable offence, police could

not have treated the report as an FIR and registered the

same, that too, without conducting any preliminary

investigation about the veracity of such version.

Elaborating the submission, he has pointed oout that

the allegations made in the FIR by the so called

informant are too broad and vague without disclosure of

the date, time and manner in which such extortion of

money was made from companies named and unnamed,

and how fraud and forgery was committed, and who was

cheated and to whom the petitioner extended threat or

with whom he entered into any criminal conspiracy. In

such premises, the said information should not have

been given the status of FIR under Section 154 Cr.P.C.

and registered for alleging commission of the offences

under the IPC as mentioned in the formal FIR drawn

pursuant to such report. Otherwise also, the informant

being not aggrieved by the alleged action of the

petitioner and not being a victim of the overt act

allegedly committed by the petitioner, in any manner, a

vague allegation made by such a person should not

have been entertained as a report under section 154 of

Cr.P.C. Furthermore, a submission has also been

advanced that even if the FIR was registered the police

should not have hurriedly commenced the investigation

and harassed, the petitioner by freezing his accounts

and the accounts of others without recording a

satisfaction that on the allegations made in the FIR a

case for investigation was made out. In this case since

the investigation is conducted without any legal basis

and the petitioner is being harassed thereby, the FIR as

well as the consequential investigation against the

petitioner is liable to be quashed in view of the law laid

down in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra) is also the

submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner.

According to the learned counsel, in order to suppress

the voice of dissension of the petitioner who was the

MLA of Champua then and opposed to the present

political dispensation ruling the State, at their behest,

the District Police Administration manufactured the

F.I.R. which was hurriedly registered and undue

harassment is caused to the petitioner by freezing his

different Bank accounts extending threat of arrest etc.

The aforesaid action demonstrates that the police is

working at the behest of the ruling political dispensation

of the State without any basis, but only to harass the

petitioner and suppress his voice. The learned counsel

for the petitioner submits that the FIR is liable to be

quashed in exercise of the power under Section 482

Cr.P.C. in view of the law laid down in the case of

Bhajan Lal (supra).

7.         Per    contra,   learned    Addl.    Government

Advocate    for   the   State   has   submitted    that   the

contention raised by the learned counsel for the

petitioner is without any substance. There being no

requirement of law to conduct any preliminary inquiry

before registration of an FIR, to verify its veracity, even if

the same is lodged by a third person disclosing

commission of cognizable offence, the contention raised

by the learned counsel for the petitioner challenging the

registration of the FIR and seeking quashment of the

same is without any substance. With regard to locus

standi, it is submitted that the same is not a

requirement when information lodged discloses

commission of any cognizable offence. So also it is

submitted that at this stage the court should not go to

the detailed appreciation of the FIR allegation to

examine as to whether or not the same make out the

ingredients of the offences alleged, but to see whether

the same prima facie discloses commission of any

cognizable offence. If the same prima facie discloses

commission of any cognizable offence, it becomes

incumbent on the part of the police to register the FIR.

Registration of the FIR, therefore, cannot be challenged

advancing the submission that all the ingredients of the

alleged offences are not made out. Furthermore, it is

submitted that allegation of political vendetta is without

any basis and substance and the same has also no

bearing when the report lodged discloses the

commission of cognizable offence. On receipt of the

report disclosing commission or suspected commission

of cognizable offence, police has to register the FIR, is

the mandate of Section 154 Cr.P.C., and it being only

during investigation the veracity / truthfulness of the

allegation is to be tested through prima-facie materials,

if any, collected against the person made accused, the

petitioner at this stage cannot say that the FIR is liable

to be quashed for the reasons contended. Hence, the

contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner

being without any substance, this Court should be

loathed in throttling the investigation at the threshold

by quashing the F.I.R., more so when the police has

substantially proceeded in the matter, collected

incriminating materials and the case of the petitioner is

not covered by any of the categories of cases laid by the

apex Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra) to quash

the F.I.R. / prosecution, is the submission of the

learned counsel for the opposite party-State.

8. As it transpires from the averments made in the

petition and the contentions advanced by the learned

counsel for the petitioner, the grounds in precision on

which the registration of the F.I.R. and continuance of

the investigation is assailed, are as follows :-

(i) The informant has no locus standi to lodge

the prosecution.

(ii) The report has been registered as F.I.R.

without testing the veracity of the

allegations through any preliminary enquiry.

(iii) The allegations made in the report do not

disclose any cognizable offence much less

the offences for which the case has been

registered by police.

(iv) Continuance of the investigation with the

allegations not satisfying the precondition of

disclosure of commission of cognizable

offence is bad in law.

(v) Allegations raised being actuated with

malice owing to political animosity of the

petitioner with the ruling political

dispensation of the State.

9. Before addressing the contention of the parties, it

would be apposite to mention here that the law with

regard to quashment of the FIR and consequential

investigation in exercise of the power under Section 482

Cr.P.C has since been well settled. Inherent power

under Section 482 Cr.P.C for quashment of the FIR and

the consequential investigation can be made when the

FIR itself registered does not prima facie disclose

commission or suspected commission of any cognizable

offence but still the same has been registered and the

investigation has been carried on. However, if the FIR

discloses commission of a cognizable offence, normally,

the Court will not interfere with the investigation into

the offence alleged and will allow the same to be

completed for the purpose of collecting materials for

proving the offence. Reliance in this regard can be

placed on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of

State of West Bengal vrs. Swapan Kumar Guha,

reported in (1982) 1 SCC 561, wherein the Apex Court

have held as follows:-

"...... the legal position is well settled. The legal position appears to be that if an offence is disclosed, the court will not normally interfere with an investigation into the case and will permit investigation into the offence alleged to be completed; if, however, the materials do not disclose an offence, no investigation should normally be permitted .... Once an offence is disclosed, an investigation into the offence must necessarily follow in the interests of justice. If, however, no offence is disclosed, an investigation cannot be permitted, as any investigation, in the absence of any offence being disclosed, will result in unnecessary

harassment to a party, whose liberty and property may be put to jeopardy for nothing. The liberty and property of any individual are sacred and sacrosanct and the court zealously guards them and protects them. An investigation is carried on for the purpose of gathering necessary materials for establishing and proving an offence which is disclosed. When an offence is disclosed, a proper investigation in the interests of justice becomes necessary to collect materials for establishing the offence, and for bringing the offender to book. In the absence of a proper investigation in a case where an offence is disclosed, the offender may succeed in escaping from the consequences and the offender may go unpunished to the detriment of the cause of justice and the society at large. Justice requires that a person who commits an offence has to be brought to book and must be punished for the same. If the court interferes with the proper investigation in a case where an offence has been disclosed, the offence will go unpunished to the serious detriment of the welfare of the society and the cause of the justice suffers. It is on the basis of this principle that the court normally does not interfere with the investigation of a case where an offence has been disclosed ..... Whether an offence has been disclosed or not must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each particular case .... If on a consideration of the relevant materials, the court is satisfied that an offence is disclosed, the court will normally not interfere with the investigation into the offence and will generally allow the investigation into the offence to be completed for collecting materials for proving the offence."

10. The Apex Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra)

placing reliance in the case of Swapan Kumar Guha

(supra) and many other decisions, have categorized the

cases in which the FIR/prosecution can be quashed in

exercise of the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Those

cases are as follows :

"(a) where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused;

(b) where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code;

(c) where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused;

(d) where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code;

(e) where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused;

(f) where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party;

(g) where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."

11. Keeping in mind the settled position of law quoted

above, the contentions advanced by the learned counsel

for the parties vis-à-vis the materials on record need to

be addressed.

12. The first contention, that is raised by the learned

counsel for the petitioner that since the Informant is in

no way aggrieved and not a victim of the crime on his

vague allegation, the police could not have registered

the case and continued with the investigation. However,

such a contention appears to this Court to be without

any substance, inasmuch as a third party, even if he is

not aggrieved, but aware of commission of cognizable

offence, can very well lodge a report with police

indicating commission of the said offence to set the

criminal law into motion. Unless statutorily provided,

locus standi is not a sine-qua-non for lodging a report

indicating the commission of a cognizable offence to set

the criminal law into motion, is the settled position of

law. In this regard, reliance can be placed on a decision

of the Constitution Bench of Apex Court rendered in the

case of A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak &

another, reported in (1984) 2 SCC 500, wherein the

Apex Court, while examining the concept of locus standi

under the criminal jurisprudence, made it clear that

locus is immaterial and irrelevant unless statute

indicates to the contrary. The Apex Court held as

follows :

"It is well recognized principle of criminal jurisprudence that anyone can set or put the criminal law into motion except where the statute enacting or creating an offence indicates to the contrary. The scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure envisages two parallel and independent agencies for taking criminal offences to court. Even for the most serious offence of murder, it was not disputed that a private complaint can, not only be filed but can be entertained and proceeded with according to law. Locus standi of the complainant is a concept foreign to criminal jurisprudence save and except that where the statue creating an offence provides for the eligibility of the complainant, by necessary implication the general principle gets excluded by such statutory provision. Numerous statutory provisions, can be referred to in support of this legal position such as (i) Section 187-A of Sea Customs Act, 1878, (ii) Section 97 of Gold Control Act, 1968,

(iii) Section 6 of Import and Export Control Act, 1947, (iv) Section 271 and Section 279 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, (v) Section 61 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, (vi) Section 621 of the Companies Act, 1956 and (vii) Section 77 of the Electricity Supply Act. This list is only illustrative and not exhaustive. While Section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits anyone to approach the Magistrate with a complaint, it does not prescribe any qualification the complainant is required to fulfil to be eligible to file a complaint. But where an eligibility criterion for a complainant is contemplated specific provisions have been made such as to be found in Sections 195 to 199 of the Cr.P.C. These specific provisions clearly indicate that in the absence of any such statutory provision, a locus standi of a complainant is a concept foreign to criminal jurisprudence. In other words, the principle that anyone can set or put the criminal law in motion remains intact

unless contra-indicated by a statutory provision. This general principle of nearly universal application is founded on a policy that an offence i.e. an act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force is not merely an offence committed in relation to the person who suffers harm but is also an offence against society. The society for its orderly and peaceful development is interested in the punishment of the offender. Therefore, prosecution for serious offences is undertaken in the name of the State representing the people which would exclude any element of private vendetta or vengeance. If such is the public policy underlying penal statues, who brings an act or omission made punishable by law to the notice of the authority competent to deal with it, is immaterial and irreverent unless the statute indicates to the contrary. Punishment of the offender in the interest of the society being one of the objects behind penal statues enacted for larger good of the society, right to initiate proceedings cannot be whittled down, circumscribed or fettered by putting it into a strait-jacket formula of locus standi unknown to criminal jurisprudence, save and except specific statutory exception."

13. The second, third and fourth grounds of

challenge are co-related inter-se, inasmuch as the core

contention of the petitioner is that the purported FIR

does not qualify to be treated as such or registered

under Section 154 of Cr.P.C. and that without resorting

to any preliminary enquiry to test the veracity of the

allegations embodied therein and in absence of any

satisfaction being recorded regarding disclosure of any

cognizable offence, no investigation could have been

commenced. In the petition the penal provisions have

been quoted in verbatim with the pleading that the FIR

allegations do not disclose the ingredients of the

cognizable offences as alleged. Drawing the notice of

this Court to the same and also to the allegations made

in the F.I.R. which admittedly do not disclose the time,

date, manner of commission of the crime in specific, it is

strenuously urged by the learned counsel for the

petitioner that the same could not have been registered

as FIR without conducting a preliminary inquiry to test

the veracity of such allegation. This contention has been

controverted by the learned counsel for the State as

being without any substance.

It goes without saying that when an information

lodged prima facie discloses the commission of a

cognizable offence, the same stands qualified to be an

information to be registered as an FIR under Section

154 Cr.P.C. and in such circumstances police cannot

refuse to register the same. There is no mandate of law

that before registration of the case police on receipt of

the same must verify the veracity or truthfulness of

such allegation. The aforesaid position of law has since

been well settled in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra),

wherein the apex Court in paragraphs-31, 32 and 33

have held as follows:-

"31. At the stage of registration of a crime or a case on the basis of the information disclosing a cognizable offence in compliance with the mandate of Section 154(1) of the Code, the concerned police officer cannot embark upon an enquiry as to whether the information, laid by the informant is reliable and genuine or otherwise and refuse to register a case on the ground that the information is not reliable or credible. On the other hand, the officer in charge of a police station is statutorily obliged to register a case and then to proceed with the investigation if he has reason to suspect the commission of an offence which he is empowerd under Section 156 of the Code to investigate, subject to the proviso to Section 157. (As we have proposed to make a detailed discussion about the power of a police officer in the field of investigation of a cognizable offence within the ambit of Sections 156 and 157 of the Code in the ensuing part of this judgment, we do not propose to deal with those sections in extensor in the present context.). In case, an officer in charge of a police station refuses to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him and to register a case on the information of a cognizable offence reported and thereby violates the statutory duty cast upon him, the person aggrieved by such refusal can send the substance of the information in writing and by post to the Superintendent of Police concerned who if satisfied that the information forwarded to him discloses a cognizable offence, should either investigate the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by any police officer subordinate to him in the manner provided by sub-section (3) of section 154 of the Code.

32. Be it noted that in Section 154(1) of the Code, the legislature in its collective wisdom has carefully and cautiously used the expression "information" without qualifying the same as in Section 41(1)(a) or (g) of the Code wherein the expressions, "reasonable complaint" and "credible information" are used. Evidently, the non- qualification of the word "information" in Section 154(1) unlike in Section 41(1)(a) and (g) of the Code may be for the reason that the police officer should not refuse to record an information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence and to register a case thereon on the ground that he is not satisfied with the reasonableness or credibility of the information. In other words, 'reasonableness' or 'credibility' of the said information is

not a condition precedent for registration of a case. A comparison of the present Section 154 with those of the earlier Codes will indicate that the legislature had purposely thought it fit to employ only the word "information" without qualifying the said word. Section 139 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1861 (Act 25 of 1861) passed by the Legislative Council of India read that 'every complaint or information' preferred to an officer in charge of a police station should be reduced into writing which provision was subsequently modified by Section 112 of the Code of 1872 (Act 10 of 1872) which thereafter read that 'every complaint' preferred to an officer in charge of a police shall be reduced in writing. The word 'complaint' which occurred in previous two Codes of 1861 and 1872 was deleted and in that place the word 'information' was used in the Codes of 1882 and 1898 which word is now used in Sections 154, 155, 157 and 190(c) of the present Code of 1973 (Act 2 of 1974). An overall reading of all the Codes makes it clear that the condition which is sine qua non for recording a first information report is that there must be an information and that information must disclose a cognizable offence.

33. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that if any information disclosing a cognizable offence is laid before an officer in charge of a police station satisfying the requirements of Section 154(1) of the Code, the said police officer has no other option except to enter the substance thereof in the prescribed form, that is to say, to register a case on the basis of such information."

14. So also, subsequently, a Constitution Bench of the

Apex Court in the case of Lalita Kumari v.

Government of Uttar Pradesh and others, reported in

(2014) 2 SCC 1, have also held that registration of the

FIR is mandatory under Section 154 of the Criminal

Procedure Code, if the information discloses commission

of a cognizable offence and no preliminary inquiry is

permissible in such a situation. The aforesaid rule must

be strictly complied with. However, where information

received does not disclose a cognizable offence, a

preliminary inquiry may be conducted to ascertain

whether or not cognizable offence is disclosed, so also in

matrimonial dispute/family dispute, commercial

offences, medical negligence cases, corruption cases or

cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating

criminal prosecution there may arise the necessity of

preliminary inquiry. Even if a preliminary inquiry in

those limited cases is permissible, the same is not to

verify the veracity or otherwise of the information

received, but only to ascertain whether the information

received reveals commission of any cognizable offence.

15. Now coming to the contention of the learned

counsel for the petitioner that since the F.I.R. allegation,

as stated above, does not disclose commission of any

offence, inasmuch as there is no mention of the date

and time of commission of the offence or the manner in

which the crime is committed, the police should not

have treated the same as an F.I.R.. In this regard, he

has also drawn notice of this Court to the ingredients of

different offences and the F.I.R. allegations.

In the light of the aforesaid when the allegation

made in the FIR registered, is examined, it appears to

this Court that prima facie it discloses certain

cognizable offences regarding extortion of money by the

petitioner and his associates from different companies,

extending threat to companies and giving threat to

different persons who raised grievance regarding mis-

utilization of funds collected in the name of welfare of

the people in the locality etc.. In the information, it is

not a requirement that the same must be very specific,

pinpointed and must disclose the time and manner of

commission of the offence. So also, it is not necessary

that ingredients of all the penal provisions that is stated

to be disclosed in the report, while registering the same

as F.I.R., must be available in the allegations made to

qualify and sustain as F.I.R. The FIR is meant to set

the criminal law into motion to investigate into the

information of commission of a cognizable offence. The

same is not the be all and all of a case, so also not an

encyclopedia. However, broadly the same must disclose

the commission or suspected commission of a

cognizable offence. Therefore, if the same prima-facie

discloses the commission of any cognizable offence, that

would suffice and justify its registration. That being the

requirement of law, the contention that is advanced

assailing the registration of the FIR on the aforesaid

ground by the learned counsel for the petitioner is held

to be bereft of substance.

16. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the

petitioner that even if the FIR discloses commission of

cognizable offence the police could not have plunged to

action without recording a satisfaction on the veracity

of the same and the fact that the case is one of such

nature which warrants investigation. According to him,

in this case since the police has hurriedly acted upon

the FIR though the same does not disclose commission

of any offence and harassed the petitioner in different

manner, the Court should, in view of the law in this

regard laid down in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra),

interfere with the investigation.

Needless to say that in the case of Bhajan Lal

(supra) the apex Court have held that the

commencement of the investigation by police officer is

subject to two conditions, firstly, the police officer

should have reason to suspect the commission of a

cognizable offence as required by Section 157(1) and

secondly, the police officer should subjectively satisfy

himself as to whether there is sufficient ground for

entering into the investigation even before he starts an

investigation into the facts and circumstances of the

case as contemplated under clause (b) of proviso to

Section 157(1) of the Code. The expression "reason to

suspect" as occurring in section 157(1) is not qualified

as in section 41 (a) and (g) of the Code wherein the

expression reasonable suspicion is used. As the words

"reason to suspect" are apparently clear, plain and

unambiguous, considering the context and the objects

of the procedural provision in question, only the plain

meaning rule is to be adopted so as to avoid hardship

or absurdity resulting therefrom and the words used

are also to be understood only in common parlance. So

read the expression "reason to suspect" the commission

of an offence would mean the sagacity of rationally

inferring the commission of a cognizable offence based

on the specific articulate facts mentioned in the first

information report as well in the Annexures, if any,

enclosed and any attending circumstances which may

not amount to proof. Therefore, the existence of the

reason to suspect the commission of a cognizable

offence has to be, prima facie disclosed by the allegation

made in the first information placed before the police

officer under Section 154(1). The meaning of expression

"reason to suspect" has to be governed and dictated by

the facts and circumstance of each case and at the

stage the question of adequate proof of facts alleged in

the first information report does not arise. As clause (b)

of proviso to section 157 of Cr.P.C. permits the police

officer to satisfy himself about the sufficiency of the

grounds even before entering on an investigation, it

postulates that the police officer has to draw his

satisfaction only on the materials which are placed

before him at that stage, namely, the first information

together with the documents, if any, enclosed. In other

words, the police officer has to satisfy himself only on

the allegation mentioned in the first information before

he enters on an investigation as to whether those

allegations do constitute a cognizable offence

warranting an investigation.

In view of the aforesaid authoritative

pronouncement in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra) and

since in this case the FIR lodged discloses the

commission of cognizable offence, the decision of the

police officer to investigate the case which is based on

subjective satisfaction of the officer concerned with

regard to the fact suspecting the commission of a

cognizable offence, cannot be said to be bad and

impermissible in the absence of any material to support

the credibility or veracity of such allegation satisfying

him to commence the investigation.

17. The last and final contention of the learned

counsel for the petitioner is that the aforesaid allegation

has been made against the petitioner owing to political

vendetta, inasmuch as he was opposed to the present

ruling political dispensation of the State which can be

visualized from the fact that on a vague and frivolous

allegation without any specific detail, the F.I.R. was

registered, investigation was carried on and his Bank

accounts were freezed and he is harassed. In this

regard, the Apex Court in the case of Bhajan Lal

(supra), in paragraphs-108, 109 and 110 have held as

follows:-

"108. No doubt, there was no love lost between Shri Bhajan Lal and Dharam Pal. Based on this strained relationship, it has been then emphatically urged by Mr. K. Parasaran that the entire allegations made in the complaint due to political vendetta are not only scurrilous and scandalous but also tainted with mala fides, vitiating the entire proceedings. As it has been repeatedly pointed out earlier the entire matter is only at a premature stage and the investigation is not yet proceeded with except some preliminary effort taken on the date of the registration of the case, that is on November 21, 1987. The evidence has to be gathered after a thorough investigation and placed before the court on the basis of which alone the court can come to a conclusion one way or the other on the plea of mala fides. If the allegations are bereft of truth and made maliciously, we are sure, the investigation will say so. At this stage, when there are only allegations and recriminations but no evidence, this court cannot anticipate the result of the investigation and render a finding on the question of mala fides on the materials at present available. Therefore, we are unable to see any force in the contention that the complaint should be thrown overboard on the mere unsubstantiated plea of mala fides. Even assuming that Dharam Pal has laid the complaint only on account of his personal animosity, that, by itself, will not be a ground to discard the complaint containing serious allegations which have to be tested and weighed after the evidence is collected. In this connection, the following view expressed by Bhagwati, C.J. in Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar, may be referred to: (SCC p.318, para 16) "It is a well established proposition of law that a criminal prosecution, if otherwise justifiable and based upon adequate evidence does not become vitiated on account of mala fides or political vendetta of the first informant or the complaint." Beyond the above, we do not wish to add anything more.

109. It was again contended that mala fides are writ large on the extraordinary interest evinced by the police officers and the hasty direction given by the SP. Needless to say that the question of mala fide exercise of power will assume significance only if an authority acts for unauthorized purpose. The proper test to be applied in such a case is as to what is the dominant purpose for

which the power is exercised. The principle of dominant purpose is explained in the following decisions:

(1) King v. Minister of Health; (2) Rex v. Brigton Corporation ex-parte Shoosmity; (3) Earl Fitzwilliam's Wentworth Estate Co. Ltd. v. Minister of Town and Country Planning and (4) P.V. Jagannath Rao v. State of Orissa.

110. Applying the test laid down in the above decisions to the present case, we are of the opinion that the dominant purpose of registration of the case and the intended follow up action are only to investigate the allegations and present a case before the court, if sufficient evidence in support of those allegations are collected but not to make a character assassination of Shri Bhajan Lal and their relatives. Therefore, we are not able to see any substance in this submission."

18. So also, the Apex Court in the case of State of

Maharashtra & Ors vs Ishwar Piraji Kalpatri,

reported in 1996 SCC (Criminal) 150, have observed

that if the ingredients which establish the commission

of the offence or misconduct exist, then the prosecution

cannot fail merely because there was an animus of the

complainant or the prosecution against the accused.

Allegations of malafides may be relevant while judging

the correctness of the allegations or while examining the

evidence. But the mere fact that the complainant is

guilty of malafides, would be no ground for quashing

the prosecution.