Citation : 2022 Latest Caselaw 8 Meg
Judgement Date : 9 February, 2022
Serial No.02
Supplementary List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
WA No.20/2021
Date of Order: 09.02.2022
State of Meghalaya & ors Vs. Umsaw Khwan Village Durbar & anr
Coram:
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sanjib Banerjee, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s) : Mr. K Paul, Sr.Adv
For the Respondent(s) : Mr. VGK Kynta, Sr.Adv with
Ms. M Kynta, Adv
i) Whether approved for reporting in Yes/No Law journals etc.:
ii) Whether approved for publication in press: Yes/No
JUDGMENT: (per the Hon'ble, the Chief Justice) (Oral) The appeal is directed against a judgment and order of February
17, 2014 passed on a writ petition instituted in the year 2012.
2. The appeal was filed after a colossal delay of 861 days and it
appears that the application for condonation of delay was not pursued with
due diligence despite such application being filed in 2016. The relevant
application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 came to be allowed
by an order of November 24, 2021. It is necessary to notice the two material
paragraphs of the relevant order:-
"The primary ground made out is that the appellant acted on erroneous advice. However, a serious objection is put up by the respondent, including the ground that the appellant had already acted in terms of the order and, thus, can no longer prefer an appeal thereagainst.
Without prejudice to the respondent's contention that the conduct of the appellant precludes the appellant from filing or proceeding with the appeal, in view of the sufficient cause shown, the delay in preferring the appeal is condoned. Let the appeal appear for appropriate consideration a week hence."
3. Courts are, by and large, reluctant to shut out a litigant on the
ground of limitation. Even though the State is not a favoured litigant, when
delay is cited on behalf of the Government, Courts frequently take a lenient
view. In this case the Court was more than charitable in taking on board an
appeal of the year 2016 against an order of the year 2014 that was sought to
be effectively assailed only towards the end of the year 2021. As will be
evident from the order of November 24, 2021, the respondents seriously
objected to the condonation of delay, but primarily on the ground that the
order had worked itself out and that the appellants had acted in terms of the
order. Since such ground of opposition was, strictly speaking, not
pertaining to the cause cited for the delay in preferring the appeal, but had
more to do with the right of the appellants to question the propriety of an
order that the appellants may have already accepted or acted upon, the issue
was left open to be urged in the course of the appeal.
4. It is necessary at this stage to indicate the case sought to be made
out by the appellants. According to the appellants, the first of which is the
State of Meghalaya, no less, a parcel of land at Umsaw Khwan village was
absolutely owned by the State of Assam and, upon, the bifurcation of the
State and the creation of Meghalaya in 1972, the ownership of such parcel
of land passed on to the newly constituted State and it was in the possession
of the Soil and Conservation Department. For reasons that are unclear and
in respect whereof no explanation is forthcoming, the State of Meghalaya,
through its Forest Department, apparently proceeded to acquire the land
that the appellants now claim was owned by the State.
5. The acquisition proceedings were instituted under the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894. Section 17 of the Act was invoked on the ground of
urgency and the parties - the acquirer at the behest of the department
requiring the land on the one hand and the perceived land-owners on the
other hand - agreed that a compensation of Rs.10 crore would be just in
respect of the acquisition. A sum of Rs.8 crore was promptly paid and the
possession of land was apparently made over to the State. Again, it is not
clear as to whether physical possession was actually made over to the State
or, the land being rather huge, only a letter of possession was made over as
a token of physical possession being surrendered by the perceived land-
owners to the State.
6. At a time when the further sum of Rs.2 crore remained
outstanding, it apparently dawned on the State that though the Forest
Department had prompted the State to acquire the land, such land was,
indeed, a government land under the possession of the Soil and
Conservation Department of the State. Upon such realisation, a letter dated
October 8, 2012 came to be addressed by the Deputy Commissioner of Ri
Bhoi District to the respondents to the following effect:-
"With reference to the subject cited above, it has been reported by the Forest Department, that the plantation in Mawplai is still in possession of Soil & Water Conservation Department and they were maintaining it for the last 40-52 years. Therefore, the land acquisition proceedings for the said plantation has to be quashed and payment made to you amounting to Rs.8 Crores needs to be recovered immediately.
Therefore, you are requested to refund the above mentioned amount failing which action may be taken as per Bengal Public demand and Recovery Act for recovery of the amount."
7. A reminder followed on October 15, 2012 to the effect that the
erstwhile land-owners should appear before the Extra Assistant
Commissioner (Rev) "so that necessary steps may be taken to annul the
land acquisition proceedings for the above." It may do well to notice that
the initial letter alluded only to possession and not to ownership, though the
case made out by the appellant is founded on the State having exclusive
title to the land in question.
8. These letters were challenged by way of WP (C) No.299 of 2012
culminating in the judgment and order under appeal being rendered on
February 17, 2014. In the course of allowing the writ petition, the writ court
referred to Section 48 of the Act of 1894 that permits the acquirer to
withdraw the acquisition proceedings prior to possession of the land being
taken over. The writ court observed that since the possession of the land
had already been taken over under the acquisition proceedings, such
provision could not be resorted to. The writ court also expressed the view
that since the acquisition proceedings were conducted under the orders and
at the behest of the Collector, the letters issued by the Deputy
Commissioner to annul such proceedings where without jurisdiction.
9. However, since the Court noticed that the case sought to be made
out by the State was that the State had been induced to purchase its own
land, the writ court gave the State the liberty to institute appropriate
proceedings for recovery of the money. The Court also required the
outstanding amount of Rs.2 crore to be paid, without reference to any action
that could be instituted by the State, and provided for interest for the
delayed payment.
10. Pursuant to the order dated February 17, 2014, the State
proceeded to institute Title Suit No.8 of 2014 before a Court at Nongpoh,
primarily for recovery of the money paid to the respondents herein on the
ground that the respondents had no title to the land that was the subject-
matter of the acquisition proceedings. The plaint relating to such suit has
since been rejected on the respondents' application under Order VII Rule
11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the relevant Court discovering
that the plaintiff in such suit had no cause of action, particularly in the light
of the acquisition proceedings not having been appropriately annulled. The
appellants say that an appeal was preferred against the order of rejection of
the plaint, but such appeal has since been dismissed for default. The
appellants claim that an application has been filed for readmission of the
appeal, but it does not appear that the matter has been prosecuted with any
degree of diligence.
11. In 2016, the respondents instituted Title Suit No.4 of 2016 before
the same Court at Nongpoh seeking the balance payment of Rs.2 crore and
interest due from the State in connection with the said acquisition. Such suit
has been decreed on August 8, 2017 and it is the admitted position that the
decree for payment of the relevant amount remains unchallenged till date.
In essence, it is the case of the State that either due to mistake or upon
being induced by certain persons, the Forest Department of the State
proceeded to acquire a parcel of land that already belonged to the State and
in respect whereof the respondents herein had no title at all. And yet, no
meaningful steps have been taken by the State in such regard.
12. It is elementary that in the course of acquisition proceedings
under the Act of 1894 the title of the land-owners is looked into and the
compensation is paid only upon the relevant authority being satisfied as to
the title of the payee. Indeed, disputes as to title and rival claims to the land
sought to be acquired ought to be decided in the course of the acquisition
proceedings as the scheme of the Act of 1894 would indicate. Despite the
obvious seriousness of the matter, it is also disconcerting that the
Collector's authority was not invoked and a Deputy Commissioner issued
administrative letters in an attempt to undo the acquisition proceedings
which ought to be regarded as judicial or quasi-judicial in nature. It is
further distressing that though the State seeks to paint a picture that it has
been defrauded, the manner in which the matter has been conducted on
behalf of the State leaves little doubt as to who may have failed or duped
the State more than the respondents herein. Equally, it is conceivable that
the Soil and Conservation Department was merely in possession of the land
and the State may not have been the owner thereof; and, the exercise
launched by the State is for obvious extraneous considerations of its
officials connected with the matter.
13. It is quite possible that the State may have been the owner of the
land and whether by inducement or by mistake, proceeded to take steps to
acquire its own property. There were legal avenues open to the State to
undo the mistake committed, whether or not any fraud was perpetrated by
any other in course of the acquisition proceedings. It is also not to be lost
sight of that this is not an ordinary party which claims to have been
defrauded; it is the State. If, indeed, the land was owned by the State and it
purchased its own property with public money, all that was done was to
issue two letters by the concerned Deputy Commissioner without taking
any legal steps to annul the acquisition proceedings or undo what had been
done. There is much more to the matter than meets the eye and there is no
doubt that a responsible State Government will get to the bottom of the
matter and book the culprits.
14. As far as the present matter is concerned, it is evident that the
appellants accepted the impugned order and acted in terms thereof, inter
alia, by filing the suit for recovery of the money. It is elementary that no
litigant may approbate or reprobate in the same breath or in respect of the
same cause. Indeed, upon the appellants having accepted the order and
having instituted Title Suit No.8 of 2014 before the relevant Court at
Nongpoh, the appellants herein could not be seen any longer to be persons
aggrieved by the relevant order to be entitled to prefer or pursue any appeal
therefrom. In addition, the appellants herein have accepted the rejection of
the plaint in their suit or, at any rate, such rejection has attained finality
upon the appeal from the order of rejection of the plaint not being pursued
by the appellants. The attempt at readmission of the appeal appears to be
cosmetic.
15. The further conduct of the appellants as evident from the
appellants not preferring any appeal from the decree of August 8, 2017
passed in respondents' money suit for recovery of the balance
compensation pertaining to the acquisition proceedings is the final nail in
the coffin. It may also be noticed that no serious attempt was made in the
writ petition to assert or establish the State's title to the land in question,
whether or not the writ court may have been minded to enter into such
disputed questions.
16. There is no doubt that the entire charade has been enacted with
the deliberate intention of the State seeking to justify that it had tried to take
action but it was the Court which went against the State. It is just as
possible that the entire saga is a red herring. What must be realised at the
end of the day is that the conduct of the State and the manner in which it
pursued the matter has resulted in the adverse orders suffered. There is also
a lurking suspicion that the entire scheme has been designed with ulterior
motive.
17. For the reasons aforesaid and since the appellants cannot be
regarded as persons aggrieved by the order impugned upon having accepted
the same and acted in accordance therewith, WA No.20 of 2021 is
dismissed with costs assessed at Rs.50,000/- to be paid to the respondents
and a further sum of Rs.50, 000/- to be paid to the State Legal Services
Authority within eight weeks from date.
18. MC (WA) No.70 of 2021 is disposed of.
(W. Diengdoh) (Sanjib Banerjee)
Judge Chief Justice
Meghalaya
09.02.2022
"Lam DR-PS"
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