Manipur High Court
Petitioners vs The State Of Manipur on 18 July, 2024
Author: Ahanthembimol Singh
Bench: Ahanthembimol Singh
SHOUGRAKPAM Digitally signed by [1]
SHOUGRAKPAM DEVANANDA
DEVANANDA SINGH
Date: 2024.07.18 15:58:03
SINGH +05'30'
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MANIPUR
AT IMPHAL
WP(C) No. 564 of 2017
1. Mr. Naorem Amar Meitei, aged about 34 years, S/o N. Shanti
Meitei of Nambol Naorem Awang Leikai, P.O. & P.S. Nambol,
Bishnupur District, Manipur, Secretary of the Bishnupur to Imphal
Tata Magic and Van Owners' and Drivers' Association being
Registration No. 41 of 2009 and
2. Mr. Thokchom Romen Singh, aged about 44 years, S/o Th.
Iboyaima Singh of Thoubal Makha Leikai, P.O. & P.S. Bishnupur,
Bishnupur District, Manipur, President of the Bishnupur to Imphal
Tata Magic and Van Owners' and Drivers' Association being
Registration No. 41 of 2009
... Petitioners
-Versus-
1. The State of Manipur, represented by the Commissioner/
Secretary (Co-operation), Government of Manipur, Imphal.
2. The Commissioner (Transport), Government of Manipur,
Imphal.
3. The Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Manipur, Imphal.
4. The District Co-operative Officer, Bishnupur District, Bishnupur,
Manipur.
5. The District Transport Officer, Bishnupur District, Bishnupur,
Manipur.
6. The Chairperson, Bishnupur Municipal Council, Bishnupur,
Bishnupur District, Manipur.
7. The Executive Officer, Bishnupur Municipal Council, Bishnupur
District, Manipur and
8. The President of Changangei Un-employed Youths Transport
Co-operative Society Limited being Registration No. 1 of 2006-
07 of Changangei, P.O. Tulihal Airport, P.S. Lamphel, Imphal
West District, Manipur.
... Respondents
WP(C) No. 564 of 2017 Contd.../-
[2]
B E F O R E
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AHANTHEMBIMOL SINGH
For the petitioners :: Mr. Th. Babloo, Advocate
For the respondents :: Mr. Th. Vashum, Govt. Advocate;
Mr. L. Anand, Advocate &
Mr. Kh. Santa, Advocate.
Date of hearing :: 07-03-2024
Date of judgment :: 18-07-2024
J U D G M E N T
[1] Heard Mr. Th. Babloo, learned counsel appearing for the
petitioners; Mr. Th. Vashum, learned GA appearing for the State
respondents No. 1 to 5, Mr. L. Anand, learned counsel appearing for the
respondents No. 6 and 7 and Mr. Kh. Santa, learned counsel appearing for
the respondent No. 8.
The present writ petition has been filed challenging the order dated
25-11-2015 issued by the Chairperson, Bishnupur Municipal Council, Manipur.
By the said order, the earlier allotment of parking site near Kha-Santipur
School (Block Lamkhai) in favour of the Association represented by the
petitioners had been changed as free parking space within Bishnupur
Municipal area.
[2] The case of the petitioners is that they are the President and
Secretary of the Bishnupur to Imphal Tata Magic and Van Owners' and Drivers'
Association (hereinafter referred to as the "Petitioners' Association", for
short). The Petitioners' Association is registered under the Societies
Registration Act and the area of operation for business of the members
of the Petitioners' Association is Bishnupur to Imphal including the area of
WP(C) No. 564 of 2017 Contd.../-
Bishnupur Municipal Council. The members of the Petitioners' Association
maintained themselves and their family from the income earned by them by
running their Tata Magic vehicles within the said area of operation.
[3] Pursuant to the decision of the Bishnupur Municipal Council under
Resolution No. 4(b) of the Council's meeting held on 05-03-2013, the
Executive Officer, Bishnupur Municipal Council, issued an order dated
06-03-2013 allotting the road side space lying near Kha-Santipur School
(Block Lamkhai) as parking site for Tata Magic (passengers) in favour of the
Petitioners' Association with immediate effect and until further order. About two
years after issuance of the said order and pursuant to the decision of the
Council under Resolution No. 7(A) of its meeting held on 05-09-2015, the
Chairperson, Bishnupur Municipal Council, issued an order dated 25-11-2015
thereby converting the parking site previously allotted to the Petitioners'
Association as free dropping point within Bishnupur Municipal area in public
interest.
[4] By taking advantage of the order dated 25-11-2015, the members
of the respondent No. 8 viz., Changangei Un-employed Youths Transport
Co-operative Society Limited started parking their vehicles at the said parking
site and also started picking up and dropping of passengers within the
Bishnupur Municipal area which directly affect and gave a great disturbance to
the business of the members of the Petitioners' Association. According to the
petitioners, the area of operation and route permit given to the respondent
No. 8 is totally different from the area of operation and route permit given to
the Petitioners' Association and that the members of respondent No. 8 cannot
WP(C) No. 564 of 2017 Contd.../-
operate or carry out their business of transportation within the Bishnupur
Municipal area. However, by taking advantage of the order dated 25-11-2015
issued by the Chairperson, Bishnupur Municipal Council, the members of the
respondent No. 8 started encroaching upon the area of operation of the
Petitioners' Association and greatly affected their business. Accordingly, the
petitioners submitted a representation dated 15-03-2016 to the Chairperson
and Executive Officer, Bishnupur Municipal Council, requesting for reviewing
or cancelling the said order dated 25-11-2015 and another representation
dated 15-03-2017 to the District Co-operative Officer, Bishnupur District,
requesting not to allow the members of the respondent No. 8 to operate their
transport service in Bishnupur Municipal Council area, however, without any
positive result. Having been aggrieved by the issuance of the subsequent
order dated 25-11-2015, the petitioners challenged the same by filing the
present writ petition.
[5] Mr. Th. Babloo, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners
submitted that under section 42 of the Manipur Municipalities Act, 1994, the
Executive Officer is entrusted to perform all the duties and exercise all the
powers conferred upon him under the Act and rules and Bye-Laws made
thereunder and he is entrusted to give effect to the decision taken by the Nagar
Panchayat or Council. According to the learned counsel, the Executive Officer
is the sole authority to give effect to the decision taken by the Bishnupur
Municipal Council as provided under section 42(b) of the Manipur
Municipalities Act, 1994. However, in the present case, the impugned order
dated 25-11-2015 was issued by the Chairperson of the Bishnupur Municipal
Council and not by the Executive Officer and as such, the impugned order is
WP(C) No. 564 of 2017 Contd.../-
liable to be quashed and set aside as being violative of the provision of section
42(b) of the Manipur Municipalities Act, 1994. In support of his contentions, the
learned counsel cited the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the
case of "Bhavnagar University Vs. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. & ors."
reported in (2003) 2 SCC 111, wherein it has been held as under:-
"40. The statutory interdict of use and enjoyment of the property
must be strictly construed. It is well settled that when a
statutory authority is required to do a thing in a particular
manner, the same must be done in that manner or not at all.
The State and other authorities while acting under the said Act
are only creature of statute. They must act within the four
corners thereof."
[6] Mr L. Anand, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 6
and 7 submitted that the order dated 25-11-2015 impugned in the present writ
petition had been issued in terms of the decision taken by the Bishnupur
Municipal Council under Resolution No. 7(A) of its meeting No. 68 held on
05-09-2015 in public interest. The learned counsel also submitted that the
petitioners cannot claim as a matter of right that the parking site in question
should be allotted exclusively in favour of the Petitioners' Association and not
as a free parking site. It has further been submitted that the allocation of
parking site in question has nothing to do with the area of operation or
allocation of route for plying Taxi service by the members of the Petitioners'
Association and that the Bishnupur Municipal Council has the power and
jurisdiction to convert the said parking site previously allotted to the Petitioners'
Association as a free parking site in public interest and that the Bishnupur
Municipal Council has not committed any illegality or irrationality in issuing the
impugned order.
WP(C) No. 564 of 2017 Contd.../-
[7] Mr. L. Anand, learned counsel also vehemently submitted that if
at all, the petitioners are aggrieved by the order dated 25-11-2015, they
ought to have challenged the same by filing an appeal to the State
Government or an officer authorized by the Government as provided under
section 196 of the Manipur Municipalities Act, 1994. However, without
availing the opportunity of filing such a statutory appeal, the petitioners
challenged the impugned order by filing the present writ petition. According
to the leaned counsel, the present writ petition is not maintainable and liable
to be rejected outright as there is an alternative and effective remedy of
filing a statutory appeal. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel
cited the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
"Nivedita Sharma Vs. Cellular Operators Association of India & ors."
reported in (2011) 14 SCC, wherein it has been held as under:-
"12. In Thansingh Nathmal v. Supdt. of Taxes this Court adverted to
the rule of self-imposed restraint that the writ petition will not be
entertained if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved
person and observed: (AIR p. 1423, para 7)
"7. ..... The High Court does not therefore act as a court of appeal
against the decision of a court or tribunal, to correct errors of
fact, and does not by assuming jurisdiction under Article 226
trench upon an alternative remedy provided by statute for
obtaining relief. Where it is open to the aggrieved petitioner
to move another tribunal, or even itself in another jurisdiction
for obtaining redress in the manner provided by a statute, the
High Court normally will not permit by entertaining a petition
under Article 226 of the Constitution the machinery created
under the statute to be bypassed, and will leave the party
applying to it to seek resort to the machinery so set up."
"13. In Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa this Court
observed: (SCC pp. 440-41, para 11)
"11 ..... It is now well recognised that where a right or liability is
created by a statute which gives a special remedy for
WP(C) No. 564 of 2017 Contd.../-
enforcing it, the remedy provided by that statute only must
be availed of. This rule was stated with great clarity by
Willes, J. in Wolverhampton New Waterworks Co. v.
Hawkesford in the following passage: (ER p. 495)
"... There are three classes of cases in which a
liability may be established founded upon a statute....
But there is a third class viz. where a liability not
existing at common law is created by a statute which at
the same time gives a special and particular remedy for
enforcing it. .... The remedy provided by the statute
must be followed, and it is not competent to the party to
pursue the course applicable to cases of the second
class. The form given by the statute must be adopted
and adhered to."
The rule laid down in this passage was approved by the
House of Lords in Neville v. London Express Newspapers Ltd.
and has been reaffirmed by the Privy Council in Attorney
General of Trinidad and Tobago v. Gordon Grant and Co.
Ltd. and Secy. of State v. Mask and Co. It has also been held to
be equally applicable to enforcement of rights, and has been
followed by this Court throughout. The High Court was therefore
justified in dismissing the writ petitions in limine."
"14. In Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J.
(speaking for the majority of the larger Bench) observed: (SCC p.
607, para 77)
"77. ... So far as the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article
226 or for that matter, the jurisdiction of this Court under
Article 32 - is concerned, it is obvious that the provisions of
the Act cannot bar and curtail these remedies. It is, however,
equally obvious that while exercising the power under Article
226/Article 32, the Court would certainly take note of the
legislative intent manifested in the provisions of the Act and
would exercise their jurisdiction consistent with the
provisions of the enactment."
"15. In the judgments relied upon by Shri Vaidyanathan, which, by and
large, reiterate the proposition laid down in Baburam Prakash
Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila Parishadis, it has been held
that an alternative remedy is not a bar to the entertaining of writ
petition filed for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights
or where there has been a violation of the principles of natural
WP(C) No. 564 of 2017 Contd.../-
justice or where the order under challenge is wholly without
jurisdiction or the vires of the statute is under challenge."
"16. It can, thus, be said that this Court has recognised some
exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy. However, the
proposition laid down in Thansingh Nathmal v. Supt. of Taxes and
other similar judgments that the High Court will not entertain a
petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective
alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved person or the
statute under which the action complained of has been taken
itself contains a mechanism for redressal of grievance still holds
the field."
[8] Mr. Th. Vashum, learned GA and Mr. Kh. Santa, learned counsel
endorsed the submission made by Mr. L. Anand, learned counsel
appearing for the respondents No. 6 and 7. The learned GA further
submitted that area of operation is given by the registering authority as
specified in the memorandum of Association and Transport Department
has the sole authority to give route permit. It has also been submitted that
area of operation and route permit given to an Association has nothing to
do with allocation or earmarking of a parking site for use of the public by
the Municipal Council.
[9] The grievances raised by the petitioners in the present writ
petition are that subsequent to the issuance of the impugned order dated
25-11-2015 and by taking advantage of the same, the members of the
respondent No. 8 Society started parking their vehicles in the parking site
in question and also started picking up and dropping passengers within the
Bishnupur Municipal Council by encroaching in the area of operation of the
Petitioners' Association. Such action by the members of the respondent
No. 8 Society not only disturb and affect the business of the members of
the Petitioners' Association but also the same is illegal inasmuch as, they
WP(C) No. 564 of 2017 Contd.../-
should confine their business in the area of operation and route allocated
to them and they cannot encroach upon the area of operation and route
allocated to the members of the Petitioners' Association.
[10] On hearing the rival submissions advanced by the learned
counsel appearing for the parties and on examination of the materials
available on record, this court find sufficient force and merit in the
submission advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the
respondents that the allocation of the parking site in question under the
impugned order dated 25-11-2015 has nothing to do with the
area of operation and route permit allocated to both the Petitioners'
Association and the respondent No. 8 Society and that the Bishnupur
Municipal Council has the power and jurisdiction to allocate or earmark
such parking site as provided under the Manipur Municipalities Act and that
while issuing the impugned order, the Bishnupur Municipal Council has not
committed any act of illegality. In the absence of any valid and reasonable
ground, the impugned order cannot be quash only on the alleged ground
that by taking advantage of the issuance of the impugned orders, the
members of the respondent No. 8 started encroaching upon the area of
operation of the Petitioners' Association and such action has caused
disturbance and affected the business of the members of the Petitioners'
Association.
This court also found force and merit in the submission advanced
by Mr. L. Anand, learned counsel that if the petitioners are aggrieved by the
impugned order dated 25-11-2015, they ought to have availed the
WP(C) No. 564 of 2017 Contd.../-
opportunity of filing a statutory appeal as provided under section 196 of the
Manipur Municipalities Act, 1994 and that they ought not to have approach
this court directly by filing the present writ petition.
[11] With regard to the contentions advanced by the learned counsel
appearing for the petitioners that the Executive Officer is the sole authority
to give effect to the decision taken by the Council as provided under section
42(b) of the Manipur Municipalities Act, 1994 and that the impugned order
having been issued by the Chairperson of the Council is liable to be quash
and set aside as being violative of the provision of Section 42(b) of the Act,
this court is of the considered view that such contentions are misconceived
and contrary to the provisions of Section 33 of the Manipur Municipalities
Act, 1994 which deals with the powers and functions of the Chairperson.
Under Section 33(d) of the said Act, it is provided, inter alia, that the
Chairperson of a Municipal Council has the power and function to direct, in
case of emergency, the execution or stoppage of any work or doing of any
act which requires the sanction of the Council and the immediate execution
or doing of which is, in his opinion necessary for the service or safety of the
public. In view of such provision of the Act, this court is of the considered
view that the Chairperson of the Bishnupur Municipal Council has the power
to issue the impugned order in public interest and that there is no merit and
force in the submission advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the
petitioners.
[12] In view of the reasons and findings given hereinabove, this court
is not inclined to interfere with the impugned order dated 25-11-2015 and
WP(C) No. 564 of 2017 Contd.../-
to grant the reliefs sought for by the petitioners in the present writ petition.
In the result, the writ petition is hereby dismissed as being devoid of merit,
however, without any order as to cost.
JUDGE
FR / NFR
Devananda
WP(C) No. 564 of 2017 Contd.../-
