Laishram Suresh vs The State Of Manipur
2022 Latest Caselaw 219 Mani

LAIRENM Digitally
         by
                  signed

AYUM LAIRENMAYUM
         INDRAJEET                   IN THE HIGH COURT OF MANIPUR
INDRAJE SINGH                                  AT IMPHAL
         Date: 2022.05.24
ET SINGH 13:17:54 +05'30'
                                       Cril. Petition No.44 of 2021
                 1. Laishram Suresh, age about 58 years,
                    s/o (L) L.Surchand Singh of Lilong Chajing
                    Konjeng Leikai, P.O. & P.S. Singjamei,
                    Imphal West District, Manipur - 795001.
                 2. Laishram Surjit Singh, age about 54 years,
                    s/o (L) L.Surchand Singh of Lilong Chajing
                    Konjeng Leikai, P.O. & P.S. Singjamei,
                    Imphal West District, Manipur - 795001
                                                                                ... Petitioners

                                                  -Versus-
                   The State of Manipur, represented by the Officer-in-Charge,
                   Wangoi Police Station, Imphal West District, Manipur - 795001.
                                                                                ...Respondent

                                                  BEFORE
                     HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. SANJAY KUMAR


                     For the petitioners                   : Mr. M.Gunedhor, Advocate

                     For the respondent                    : Mr. M.Rarry, Special PP.

                     Date of reserving of order            : 13.05.2022

                     Date of delivery of Order             : 24.05.2022



                                           JUDGMENT AND ORDER (CAV)


           [1]              In exercise of power under Section 437(6) Cr.P.C., the learned

           Judicial Magistrate First Class, Imphal West-I, Manipur, granted bail to the accused

           in Cril. (P) Case No.2 of 2020 {Ref: FIR No.14(04) 2020 on the file of Wangoi Police

           Station}, vide order dated 20.03.2021 in Cril. Misc.(B) Case No.5 of 2021.


           Cril.Petn.No.44 of 2021                                                         Page 1
 Bail was granted as more than sixty days had elapsed after the commencement of

the trial and both the accused had remained in custody during that period.

Aggrieved thereby, the State of Manipur filed an application under Section 439(2)

Cr.P.C., in Cril. Misc. Case No.100 of 2021, before the learned Sessions Judge,

Imphal West, to quash/set aside the bail order dated 20.03.2021. By order dated

20.11.2021, the learned Sessions Judge, Imphal West, held that the accused were

not entitled to be released on bail under Section 437(6) Cr.P.C. and set aside the

bail order dated 20.03.2021. Assailing the said order, the accused filed this Criminal

Petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. r/w Section 439 Cr.P.C.

[2]            By order dated 26.11.2021, this Court suspended paragraph No.22 of

the impugned order dated 20.11.2021 till the next date. Thereby, the learned

Sessions Judge had directed the accused to surrender before the Trial Court within

one week, i.e., by 26.11.2021. The interim order was extended thereafter from time

to time. The last such extension was on 15.03.2022, operative till 11.04.2022.

However, the accused are admittedly still at large as on date.

[3]            Heard Mr. M.Gunedhor Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners/

accused; and Mr. M.Rarry, learned Special PP, appearing for the respondent.

[4]            Earlier, Mr. M.Rarry, learned Special PP, had raised the issue that this

Criminal Petition is not maintainable in law. Upon considering the objections raised

by him, a learned Judge of this Court passed order dated 29.12.2021, rejecting the

objections raised as to maintainability and directing the matter to be listed for

hearing on merits. This order has attained finality. The contention of Mr. M.Rarry,

learned Special PP, that the issue of maintainability of this petition should again be

revisited, therefore, stands rejected.

Cril.Petn.No.44 of 2021                                                          Page 2
 [5]            Facts

, to the extent relevant, may be nutshelled thus: After the onset

of Covid-19 virus in India and the imposition of a nationwide lock down in March,

2020, there was a large scale hoarding and black-marketing of petroleum products.

Officials of the Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution Department

(CAF&PD), Government of Manipur, were given the responsibility of inspecting

petroleum outlets across the State under the Disaster Management Act, Essential

Services Maintenance Act, etc. H. Bobby Singh, Civil Supply Inspector, CAF&PD,

along with L.Ibotombi Singh, Area Officer, CAF&PD, were assigned the duty of

checking oil pumps located in Imphal East and Imphal West areas. On 17.04.2020,

at about 9.30 pm, these officials visited Heibok Filling Station KSK located at Naran

Konjin in Imphal West and found that it was being run by two brothers, viz.,

Laishram Suresh Singh and Laishram Surjit, the accused. The officials allegedly

met with resistance from them and were physically assaulted. H. Bobby Singh, Civil

Supply Inspector, sustained grievous injuries on his nose and leg. In consequence,

FIR No.14(04) 2020 was registered under Sections 353, 326, 307 and 34 IPC along

with Section 25(1-C) of the Arms Act, 1959. This FIR was registered on 18.04.2020

at 6.30 pm upon the complaint made by L. Ibotombi Singh, Area Officer, CAF & PD.

During the course of investigation, it was discovered that the oil pump, Heibok

Filling Station KSK, at Naran Konjin, was allotted to Smt. Khaidem (O) Sushila Devi,

w/o late Khaidem Gojendro Singh, a police officer who had died in the line of duty.

The trade license was also issued in her name but the business was being run by

the two brothers, viz., the accused. Thereupon, FIR No.19(05) 2020 WGI PS was

registered against them on 09.05.2020 under Sections 420 and 120-B IPC along

with Section 13(1)(d) & (e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. It appears that

Cril.Petn.No.44 of 2021 Page 3 Sections 468, 471, 419, 168 and 34 IPC were added later on and Section 120-B

IPC was removed. The accused were arrested on 09.05.2020 by Wangoi Police

Station in connection with this FIR. They were formally arrested thereafter in

relation to FIR No.14(04) 2020 on 09.05.2020 at 02.45 pm.

[6] The accused secured interim bail on medical grounds, in relation to

FIR No.19(05) 2020, from the learned Special Judge (PC Act), Imphal West, in Cril.

Misc. (LD)(B) Case No. 8 of 2020/Cril. Misc.(B) Case No.44 of 2020. For that

purpose, they produced documents purportedly issued by Dr.Th.Premchand Singh.

Using the same medical documents, the accused then filed Cril. Misc. (B) No.30 of

2020 in June, 2020, seeking to be released on bail in relation to FIR No.14(04)

2020. However, upon an objection being raised, the genuineness of the medical

documents was verified and it came to light that the same were fabricated and

forged. The Trial Court rejected Cril. Misc. (B) Case No.30 of 2020 on that ground.

[7] The accused then filed their 1st default bail application in relation to

FIR No.19(05) 2020 under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C., in Cril. Misc. Case No.82 of

2020, before the learned Special Judge (PC Act), Imphal West. This application

was dismissed on 16.09.2020, holding that it was not maintainable as the accused

were already granted interim bail. The State of Manipur then filed an application in

Cril. Misc. (LD-8) Case No. 01 of 2020/80 of 2020 seeking cancellation of the

interim bail granted to the accused in relation to FIR No.19(05) 2020, as they had

used fake documents to obtain the same. This application was filed in September,

2020. Thereupon, the learned Special Judge (PC Act), Imphal West, cancelled the

interim bail granted to the accused, accepting that they had played fraud upon the

Court by using forged documents. The accused then filed their 2nd default bail

Cril.Petn.No.44 of 2021 Page 4 application under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. in relation to FIR No.19(05) 2020, before

the learned Special Judge (PC Act), Imphal West. This 2nd application was

dismissed on 21.10.2020, holding that the period of custody of the accused was not

sufficient and in view of the observations made in the earlier dismissal order.

[8] The accused then filed Bail Application No.12 of 2020 before this

Court under Section 439 Cr.P.C. read with Section 167 Cr.P.C.. This application

was filed in October, 2020, seeking release on medical grounds. It was dismissed

as withdrawn on 04.11.2020. The accused then filed their 3 rd default bail application

under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. in relation to FIR No.19(05) 2020. This application

was filed on 18.11.2020. On 15.12.2020, the learned Special Judge (PC Act),

Imphal West, granted default bail to the accused in relation to FIR No.19(05) 2020.

[9] Investigation having been completed in relation to FIR No.14(04)

2020, a final report was filed by the police before the Trial Court, leading to framing

of charges on 04.12.2020. Charges were framed against the accused under

Sections 325, 353 and 34 IPC. The case was taken on record as Cril. (P) Case

No.2 of 2020. The accused then filed Cril. Misc.(B) Case No.5 of 2021 therein

under Section 437(6) Cr.P.C. on 01.02.2021 seeking to be released on bail.

[10] While so, the State of Manipur filed Cril. Petitions Nos.5 and 6 of 2021

before this Court aggrieved by the grant of default bail to the accused by the

learned Special Judge (PC Act), Imphal West, vide order dated 15.12.2020, in

relation to FIR No.19(05) 2020. During their pendency, the Trial Court passed order

dated 20.03.2021 in Cril. Misc.(B) Case No.5 of 2021, accepting the plea of the

accused that they were entitled to bail under Section 437(6) Cr.P.C. Shortly

thereafter, this Court allowed Cril. Petition Nos.5 and 6 of 2021, vide order dated

Cril.Petn.No.44 of 2021 Page 5 26.03.2021, and directed the State to re-arrest the accused. As the accused were

not traceable then, this event did not come to pass immediately.

[11] Aggrieved by the order dated 26.03.2021 passed in Cril. Petition

Nos.5 and 6 of 2021, the accused approached the Supreme Court in Special Leave

to Appeal (Crl.) Nos.3637-3638 of 2021. By order dated 13.05.2021 passed therein,

the Supreme Court directed the accused to surrender before the concerned police

station within two weeks. They did so on 26.05.2021 at around 4 pm. Ultimately,

Special Leave to Appeal (Cril.) Nos.3637-3638 of 2021 filed by the accused were

dismissed by the Supreme Court on 27.07.2021, giving liberty to them to file

applications for release on bail on merits.

[12] The accused then filed Cril. Misc.(B) Case Nos.71 and 72 of 2021

before the learned Special Judge (PC Act), Imphal West, under Section 439

Cr.P.C., seeking to be released on bail in relation to FIR No.19(05) 2020. These

bail applications were filed on 06.8.2021. Parallelly, the State filed an application on

07.09.2021 under Section 439(2) Cr.P.C. before the learned Sessions Judge,

Imphal West, to quash and set aside the order dated 20.03.2021 passed by the

Trial Court in Cril. Misc. (B) Case No.5 of 2021. On 01.10.2021, the learned Special

Judge (PC Act), Imphal West, granted bail to the accused in relation to FIR

No.19(05) 2020 in Cril. Misc.(B) Case Nos.71 and 72 of 2021. Just over a month

later, the very same Special Judge, being the learned Sessions Judge, Imphal

West, passed the impugned order dated 20.11.2021, quashing and setting aside

the bail order dated 20.03.2021 passed by the Trial Court.

[13] The sequence of events that transpired in relation to both the FIRs

gains importance owing to the intricate link between the two and in the light of the

Cril.Petn.No.44 of 2021 Page 6 fact that the learned Sessions Judge, Imphal West, took into account this chain of

events while passing the impugned order.

[14] This being the preceding checkered history, it would be apposite to

now examine Section 437(6) Cr.P.C as the case turns upon the scope and ambit of

this provision. Section 437(6) Cr.P.C. reads as under: -

'437. When bail may be taken in case of non-bailable offence -

                               ***         ***            ***

               (6)     If, in any case triable by a Magistrate, the trial of a person

accused of any non-bailable offence is not concluded within a period of sixty days from the first date fixed for taking evidence in the case, such person shall, if he is in custody during the whole of the said period, be released on bail to the satisfaction of the Magistrate, unless for reasons to be recorded in writing, the Magistrate otherwise directs.'

The question that arises is whether an accused is entitled to statutory

bail under this provision as a matter of right or, alternatively, whether the provision

does not stand on par with the default bail provision under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C.

and, therefore, no such right would inure to an accused.

[15] There are no binding precedents on the issue but there is an

abundance of case law emanating from different High Courts. The same may be

taken note of at this stage.

In Anwar Hussain vs. State of Rajasthan [(2007) 1 RLW 12 (Raj)],

a learned Judge of the Rajasthan High Court observed that, from a plain reading of

Section 437(6) Cr.P.C., it is clear that, ordinarily, if the trial is not completed within

sixty days from the first date fixed for taking evidence, the accused would be

entitled to be released on bail but in the same provision, it is further stated that

while considering a bail application on this count, the Trial Court can refuse bail by Cril.Petn.No.44 of 2021 Page 7 assigning reasons. The learned Judge therefore held that it cannot be said that the

provision was mandatory in nature, similar to Section 167(2) Cr.P.C., which states

that if the investigation is not completed within the stipulated period, then the

accused is entitled to be released on bail mandatorily, irrespective of the merits of

the case. The learned Judge accordingly held that an accused would not get an

absolute right to be released on bail under Section 437(6) Cr.P.C. as the Trial Court

can refuse bail after assigning good reasons.

In Raman Lodhi vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh (ILR 2019 MP

1930), a learned Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court took note of the fact

that, in Devraj Maratha @ Dillu vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, {2018 (2) MPLJ

(Cri)386 = 2018 SCC OnLIne MP 151}, a learned Judge had referred this very

issue to a Division Bench, owing to cleavage of opinion as to the interpretation of

Section 437(6) Cr.P.C., and the Division Bench held that Section 437(6) Cr.P.C. is

mandatory in the sense that the Magistrate is required to exercise the power to

grant bail after the statutory period if the trial is not concluded. However, passing of

the order under Section 437(6) Cr.P.C. is mandatory but not grant of bail, as the

Magistrate is vested with full power to take into consideration - 1) nature of the

allegations; 2) whether the delay is attributable to the accused or to the prosecution;

and 3) criminal antecedents of the accused or any other justifiable reason, while

refusing to grant bail. In consequence, the learned Judge held that the law stood

settled that the accused became entitled to apply for bail if the trial of a non-bailable

offence was not concluded by the Magistrate within sixty days but the right was not

absolute and the Magistrate, for reasons to be recorded in writing, could reject the

plea for bail even under Section 437(6) Cr.P.C.

Cril.Petn.No.44 of 2021 Page 8 In Robert Lendi vs. The Collector of Customs and another [1987

Crl.L.J. 55 = ILR (1986) 1 Del 147], a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court

observed that the object of Section 437(6) Cr.P.C. is that, if the trial of a non-

bailable offence before a Magistrate is not concluded within sixty days from the first

date fixed for taking evidence, such accused shall, if he is in custody during the

whole of the said period, be released on bail unless, for reasons to be recorded, the

Magistrate otherwise directs. The Division Bench then considered the question as

to whether, while refusing bail under Section 437(6) Cr.P.C., the Magistrate can

only refuse bail on limited reasoning germane to the cause of delay or whether bail

can be refused on general grounds recognized as good for refusal of bail. Noting

that the object of the provision is undoubtedly to eradicate delay in the trial, the

Bench opined that it would be equally important that the ends of justice do not

suffer. According to the Bench, the twin objects, viz., to eradicate delay in the trial

and to achieve the ends of justice would have to be harmonized. The Bench

accordingly concluded that the legislature had put no fetters on the power of the

Magistrate and that the bail can be refused for reasons other than those germane to

the delay.

In Arjun Sahu vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2008 Crl.L.J. 2771), a

learned Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court followed the ratio laid down in

Robert Lendi (supra) and held that it is manifestly clear that a Magistrate, after

recording reasons in writing, has a right to refuse bail even if the evidence was not

completed within sixty days of the commencement of the trial.

[16] The preponderance of judicial thought therefore weighs in favour of

holding that this provision does not envisage grant of bail to an accused as a matter

Cril.Petn.No.44 of 2021 Page 9 of right. It may be noted that default bail under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. stands on a

different footing. This provision postulates that the detention of an accused,

otherwise than in the custody of the police, can be maintained for a total period not

exceeding ninety days, where the investigation relates to an offence punishable

with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than 10

years, and sixty days, where the investigation relates to any other offences. If the

investigation is not completed within the stipulated period, the provision states that

the accused person 'shall be released on bail' if he is prepared to do and does

furnish bail. Significantly, Section 437(6) Cr.P.C. is also worded on the same lines,

in as much as it states that if the trial of the person accused of a non-bailable

offence is not concluded by the Magistrate within sixty days from the first date fixed

for taking evidence, such person 'shall be released on bail' if he has been in

custody during the whole of the said period. However, the provision does not end

there and goes on to add the rider that the Magistrate may otherwise direct by

recording reasons in writing. Therefore, no indefeasible right is conferred upon an

accused to seek release on bail under this provision, on par with Section 167(2)

Cr.P.C., and it would be open to the Magistrate to refuse bail to an accused under

Section 437(6) Cr.P.C., by recording reasons as to why bail is being refused.

[17] Viewed thus, in the case on hand, it may be noted that the Trial Court

was very much conscious of the proper interpretation and application of Section

437(6) Cr.P.C. Though it was contended on behalf of the accused that bail under

Section 437(6) Cr.P.C. would stand on par with default bail under section 167(2)

Cr.P.C., the Trial Court observed that it is settled that Section 437(6) Cr.P.C. is

Cril.Petn.No.44 of 2021 Page 10 mandatory in nature but the Magistrate could refuse to grant bail after assigning

good reasons in writing.

[18] Having noted the legal position correctly, the Trial Court then went on

to note that the case against the accused involved offences under Sections 353 and

326 IPC read with Section 34 IPC. The Trial Court noted that the trial in Cril. (P)

Case No.2 of 2020 commenced on 19.12.2020 and the prosecution had sought

adjournments twice but valid reasons were offered therefor. Examination of PW-1

commenced only on 22.01.2021. By the date of the passing of the order, viz.,

20.03.2021, the examination of PW-1 had not even concluded and 10(ten) more

prosecution witnesses were still to be examined. Admittedly, the accused remained

in custody from 04.12.2020 till that date.

[19] The Trial Court also took note of the fact that the accused had

produced false medical documents leading to dismissal of their earlier bail

application in Cril. Misc. (B) Case No.30 of 2020 and that the other bail application

filed by them had met with the same fate. The sequence of events in the trial were

then noted and it was observed that there was no intention to cause delay, in so far

as the State was concerned. The Trial Court then noted that there was no material

produced to infer that the accused would tamper with the prosecution evidence and

influence witnesses after enlargement on bail or to suspect that they would flee

from justice. As Section 325 IPC is a bailable offence and the offence under Section

353 IPC, though non-bailable, entailed imprisonment which may extend up to 2

years, the Trial Court opined that the accused would be entitled to be released on

bail subject to conditions. Bail was accordingly granted to the accused upon

Cril.Petn.No.44 of 2021 Page 11 furnishing bail bonds for a sum of `80,000/- each with one surety in the like

amount, apart from imposing other conditions: -

"(i) The sureties shall be near relatives or (from, sic) localities of the accused persons;

(ii) The accused persons shall appear before this Court on every date fixed by this Court;

(iii) The accused shall not make any attempt to contact any prosecution witnesses directly or indirectly;

(iv) the accused shall not try to tamper with the evidence and influence any witnesses.

(v) The accused persons shall not commit offences similar to the offences which they are accused of;

(vi) The accused persons shall not leave the State of Manipur without prior permission of this Court."

[20] The learned Sessions Judge, Imphal West, reversed this order upon

the application filed by the State under Section 439(2) Cr.P.C., vide order dated

20.11.2021. Therein, after setting out the arguments advanced by the counsel for

both sides at length, the learned Sessions Judge opined that failure to complete the

trial of a non-bailable offence before a Magistrate within sixty days from the date of

the first recording of evidence would entitle the accused to seek to be released on

bail under Section 437(6) Cr.P.C. but the Magistrate can refuse bail for reasons to

be recorded in writing. Reasons such as 1) gravity of the offence; 2) whether the

delay in the trial is attributable to the accused or to the prosecution; and 3) the

criminal antecedents of the accused. The learned Sessions Judge then analyzed

the record of the connected case in FIR No.19(05) 2020 with regard to the

allegation that the accused had forged cheques and their admitted failure to

surrender after revocation of their default bail by this Court in Cril. Petition Nos. 5

and 6 of 2021, and held that the accused lacked good antecedents. He then

observed that the period of punishment cannot be the sole criteria for deciding the

Cril.Petn.No.44 of 2021 Page 12 gravity of the offence when the allegation against the accused was that they had

assaulted government servants on duty during the peak of the pandemic. The

learned Sessions Judge held that the case of the accused did not fall within the

purview of the beneficial provisions of Section 437(6) Cr.P.C. and they were not

entitled to be released on bail thereunder. The learned Sessions Judge accordingly

set aside the order dated 20.03.2021 passed in Cril. Misc. (B) Case No.5 of 2021

and directed the accused to surrender within a time frame. In this regard, the

learned Sessions Judge placed reliance on Vipan Kumar Dhir vs. State of Punjab

[Cril. Appeal No.1161-62 of 2021 dated 04.10.2021], wherein the Supreme Court

examined the law on cancellation of bail and observed that bail can be revoked if

the Court concerned considered irrelevant factors or ignored relevant material

available on record, rendering the bail order legally untenable. Elaborating further,

the Supreme Court observed that the gravity of the offence, conduct of the accused

and societal impact of undue indulgence by the Court are amongst the situations

where the superior Court can interfere with a bail order so as to bolster

administration of criminal justice. The Supreme Court further pointed out that while

granting bail, the possibility of the accused influencing prosecution witnesses,

threatening family members of the victim, fleeing from justice or creating other

impediments in the fair investigation ought not to be overlooked.

[21] As already noted supra, the very same Sessions Judge, sitting as the

Special Judge (PC Act), thought it fit to grant bail to the accused in relation to FIR

No.19(05) 2020 just over a month earlier, vide common order dated 01.10.2021

passed in Cril. Misc. (B) Cases No.71 and 72 of 2021. Perusal of the said order

reflects that the learned Judge was very much aware, even then, of the fact that the

Cril.Petn.No.44 of 2021 Page 13 accused had not surrendered after the order dated 26.03.2021 was passed by this

Court in Cril. Petition Nos.5 and 6 of 2021 and that they did so only after the

Supreme Court directed them to surrender within a time frame. The learned Judge

then set out the arguments at length and opined that the consistent legal position

was that when the trial was yet to be initiated and where the charge-sheet was yet

to be filed and the trial of the case is likely to take a long period, injustice and

irreparable injury would be caused to the accused by keeping them in custody.

Therefore, in spite of being well aware of the past conduct of the accused, including

the alleged fabrication of false medical documents, the learned Judge observed

that, as most of the documents had been seized, statements had been recorded but

the trial was yet to commence, further custody of the accused was not warranted as

investigation could be continued even with the accused on bail. The learned Judge

accordingly allowed the application and granted bail to the accused upon their

furnishing PR bonds of `1,00,000/- each with a surety of a like amount, and

imposed the following conditions: -

"i) the accused shall co-operate with the investigation;

ii) the accused shall appear before the IO or the Court as and when directed;

iii) the accused shall not influence any of the prosecution witness;

iv) the accused shall not leave the State of Manipur without prior permission from the Court;

v) the accused shall deposit a sum of `50,000/- by cash each;

vi) the accused shall not indulge in propaganda in print, electronic and social media regarding this case."

Cril.Petn.No.44 of 2021                                                        Page 14
 [22]           Mr. M.Rarry, learned Special PP, would contend that irrespective of

the grant of bail in relation to FIR No.19(05) 2020, this Court would have to be

mindful of the seriousness of the offences alleged against the accused in Cril. (P)

Case No.2 of 2020. He would point out that the government officials were

undertaking duties during the pandemic lockdown and their assault by the accused

at such a time must be viewed seriously. He would rely on case law in support of

his contention that they are not entitled to be released on bail even though the trial

is stretching way beyond sixty days.

[23] In Chandraswami and another vs. Central Bureau of Investigation

{64 (1996) DLT 193}, a learned Judge of the Delhi High Court observed that the

accused in that case were not entitled to be released on bail under Section 437(6)

Cr.P.C. as they had made attempts to falsify medical reports and, therefore, the

possibility of their tampering with the evidence could not be ruled out. This decision

is relied upon in the light of the fact that the accused in the case on hand also

produced false medical documents. However, it may be noted that no separate

legal action has been initiated against them in that regard and only the bail granted

to them earlier was cancelled. Trite to state, unless a criminal charge is held

proved, it cannot be taken to constitute a criminal antecedent.

In Imamuddin vs. Ayub Khan and others, (1984 Cri.L.J. 117), a

learned Judge of the Rajasthan High Court dealt with the scope of Section 439(2)

Cr.P.C. Though the evidence collected in that case was circumstantial, it was held

to be crucial on the question as to whether the death was suicidal or homicidal.

Further, the conduct of the accused was alleged to be highly incriminatory. The

inquiry held by the committing Magistrate tended to show the alleged criminal

Cril.Petn.No.44 of 2021 Page 15 conduct of the accused. On this ground, the learned Judge cancelled the bail

granted to the accused and directed their re-arrest. Notably, this was a case arising

under Section 302 IPC.

In State vs. Captain Jagjit Singh (AIR 1962 SC 253), the Supreme

Court observed that the nature and seriousness of the offence, the character of the

evidence, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, the reasonable

possibility of the presence of the accused not being secured at the trial, reasonable

apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interest of the public

or the State would arise when the Court is considering grant of bail in a non-bailable

offence.

In Juber Khan vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (MCrC-29418/2020

dated 01.03.2021), a learned Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court noted that

other offences had also been registered against the accused and that the delay in

the trial was caused due to the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic and, accordingly,

upheld the order of the Magistrate rejecting the bail application of the accused

under Section 437(6) Cr.P.C.

In Centrum Financial Services Limited vs. State of NCT of Delhi

and another (Criminal Appeal No.94 of 2022 dated 28.01.2022), the Supreme

Court was dealing with a case involving offences under Sections 409, 420, 467, 468

and 120 B IPC. The Supreme Court found that the High Court had not at all

adverted to or considered the nature of the accusations and the material collected

during the course of the investigation and the serious allegation of siphoning of

huge amounts through shell companies while granting bail to the accused.

Reference was made to Prasanta Kumar Sarkar vs. Ashis Chatterjee and

Cril.Petn.No.44 of 2021 Page 16 another, {(2010) 14 SCC 496}, wherein it was observed that the factors to be

borne in mind, amongst others, while considering an application for bail are

i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused

had committed the offence; ii) nature and gravity of the accusation; iii) severity of

the punishment in the event of conviction; iv) danger of the accused absconding or

fleeing, if released on bail; v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of

the accused; vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; viii) reasonable

apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and viii) danger, of course, of

justice, being thwarted by grant of bail. As the High Court had not at all considered

the modus operandi adopted by the accused in the commission of the serious

offence of siphoning and/or transferring of huge sums through shell companies, the

Supreme Court cancelled the bail granted to the accused.

In Ms.Y vs. State of Rajasthan and another (Criminal Appeal

No.649 of 2022 dated 19.04.2022), the Supreme Court referred to earlier case law

on the issue of grant of bail and its cancellation and observed that it is essential for

the Court dealing with such applications to furnish reasons specifically which would

indicate as to what precipitated the passing of that particular order. On that ground,

the bail granted to the accused by the High Court was cancelled.

In Mahipal vs. Rajesh Kumar @ Polia and another (Criminal

Appeal No.1843 of 2019 dated 05.12.2019), the Supreme Court observed that the

fitness of a case for grant of bail would involve balancing of numerous factors

amongst which, the nature of the offence, the severity of the punishment and prima

facie view of involvement of the accused, would be important. Noting that no

straightjacket formula exists for Courts to assess an application for bail, the

Cril.Petn.No.44 of 2021 Page 17 Supreme Court held that a Court would not be required to enter into a detailed

analysis of the evidence on record to establish beyond reasonable doubt the

commission of the crime as that would be a matter for trial but the Court would be

required to examine whether there is a prima facie or reasonable ground to believe

that the accused had committed the offence and on a balance of the considerations

involved, whether the continued custody of the accused would sub-serve the

purpose of the criminal justice system. It was further observed that when bail has

been granted by a lower Court, the Appellate Court must be slow to interfere and

ought to be guided by the principles set out for exercise of such power. Reference

in this regard was made to Prasanta Kumar Sarkar (supra). The Supreme Court

went on to state that an Appellate Court would be required to consider whether the

order granting bail suffers from non-application of mind or is not borne out from a

prima facie view of the evidence on record and, therefore, it would be necessary for

the Court to assess whether, on the basis of evidentiary record, there exists a prima

facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the crime

while taking into account, seriousness of the crime and severity of the punishment.

[24] As already noted supra, the accused were granted bail in relation to

FIR No.19(05) 2020 even though the learned Special Judge was well aware of their

past conduct in the context of producing false medical documents and also avoiding

arrest until they surrendered upon the direction of the Supreme Court. Having

granted them such relief, the very same learned Judge, acting as the learned

Sessions Judge, Imphal West, relied upon that very past conduct to deny them the

benefit of bail in relation to Cril. (P) Case No.2 of 2020. When the said conduct did

not carry enough weight in relation to FIR No.19(05) 2020, to which it actually

Cril.Petn.No.44 of 2021 Page 18 related, such conduct could not have been imported into the case relating to FIR

No.14(04) 2020 and be held against the accused. That apart, it may be noted that

the offences alleged against the accused in Cril. (P) Case No.2 of 2020 are under

Sections 325 and 353 IPC. The offence under Section 325 IPC relates to voluntarily

causing grievous hurt and is a bailable offence, entailing imprisonment which may

extend up to 7 years apart from fine. Section 353 IPC is a non-bailable offence

pertaining to assault or criminal force to deter a public servant from discharging

duties but the punishment therefor is imprisonment for a term which may extend to

2 years or with fine or both. Though the nature of the offence is rather grave, as it

involves the assault or use of force against an official on duty, the fact remains that

the law makers did not think that it was serious enough to deserve a more severe

punishment. It may be noted that the State of Maharashtra amended the law in this

regard and enhanced the punishment under this provision to a maximum of 5 years

imprisonment but the general law, as applicable in the State of Manipur, remains

unaltered. Therefore, the seriousness of the offences alleged and the punishment

prescribed therefor are not sufficiently weighty enough to warrant the continued

incarceration of the accused pending the trial and there is no possibility of the same

concluding any time soon as 10(ten) more witnesses are still to be examined. In

Union of India vs. K.A.Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC 713], the Supreme Court held that

the Constitutional right to speedy trial would prevail over the stringent statutory

provisions of even the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, 1967. That apart, it may

be noted that the accused have been at large for some time now but it is not the

State's case that they have tried to tamper with the evidence or witnesses or

breached any of the conditions imposed by the Trial Court while granting them bail

Cril.Petn.No.44 of 2021 Page 19 under Section 437(6) Cr.P.C. Therefore, their subsequent conduct also did not

warrant any interference with the bail order.

[25] On the above analysis, this Court holds that the learned Sessions

Judge, Imphal West, Manipur, erred in setting aside the bail order dated 20.03.2021

passed in Cril. Misc.(B) Case No.5 of 2021.

The Criminal Petition is accordingly allowed, setting aside the order

dated 20.11.2021 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Imphal West, in Cril.

Misc. Case No.100 of 2021 and restoring the bail order dated 20.03.2021 passed

by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Imphal West-I, under Section 437(6)

Cr.P.C, in Cril. Misc.(B) Case No.5 of 2021.

                                                             CHIEF JUSTICE


FR/NFR
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