Manipur High Court
Smt. Veijalhing vs The State Of Manipur Represented ... on 3 June, 2022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MANIPUR
LHAINEI Digitally
by
signed
CHONG HAOKIP
LHAINEICHONG
AT IMPHAL
HAOKIP Date: 2022.06.03
13:08:56 +05'30'
M.C.(L.A. APPEAL) NO. 3 OF 2021
[Ref:- L.A. Appeal No. 2 of 2018]
Smt. Veijalhing, aged about 63 years old, W/o Lelet Haokip of
Songpi Village, P.O & P.S Churachandpur, Churachandpur District,
Manipur-795006.
... Applicant
-Versus -
1. The State of Manipur represented by the Commissioner
(Revenue), Government of Manipur, P.O & P.S. Imphal, Imphal
West District, Manipur-795001.
2. The Collector (LA), Churachandpur District, Manipur-795128.
3. Mr. Zamlianlal Haokip, S/o L.K. Haokip, Songpi Village, P.O &
P.S. Churachandpur, Manipur-795128.
4. The Union of India represented by the Secretary (Home),
Ministry of Home Affairs, North Block, Central Secretariat, New
Delhi-110001.
5. The Officer-in-Charge (Estate), Director General Assam Rifles
(Estate Branch), Shillong, Pin No. 793010.
........RESPONDENT/S
AND
IN THE MATTER OF LA APPEAL NO. 2 OF 2018
1. The State of Manipur represented by the Commissioner
(Revenue), Government of Manipur, P.O. & P.S. Imphal, Imphal
West District, Manipur - 795001.
2. The Collector (LA), Churachandpur District, Manipur - 795128.
........APPELLANTS
-Versus -
1. Mr. Zamlianlan Haokip, S/o L.K. Haokip, Songpi Village, P.O. &
P.S. Churachandpur, Manipur - 795128.
M.C.(L.A.Appeal) No. 3 of 2021 Page 1
2. The Union of India represented by the Secretary (Home),
Ministry of Home Affairs, North Block, Central Secretariat, New
Delhi - 110001.
3. The Officer-in-Charge (Estate), Director General Assam Rifles
(Estate Branch), Shillong, Pin No. 793010.
........RESPONDENTS
B E F O R E
HON'BLEMR. JUSTICE AHANTHEM BIMOL SINGH
For the Applicant : Mr. N. Ibotombi, Sr. Adv.
For the respondents : Mr. R.K. Umkanta, GA,
Mr. Ashish Deep Verma,
Adv. assisted by Mr. M.
Tapan Sharma, Adv. &
Mr. Kh. Samarjit, ASG.
Date of Hearing : 05.05.2022.
Date of Order : 03.06.2022.
O R D E R
[1] Heard Mr. N. Ibotombi, learned senior counsel appearing for the
applicant, Mr. R.K. Umakanta, learned GA appearing for the respondents
No. 1 & 2, Mr. Ashish Deep Verma, learned counsel assisted by Mr. M.
Tapan Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 3 and
Mr. Kh. Samarjit, learned ASG appearing for the respondents No. 4 & 5.
The present application had been filed with a prayer for
allowing the applicant to be impleaded as private respondent No.
5/intervener in the connected L.A. Appeal No. 2 of 2018.
[2] The case of the applicant is that the Chief of Songpi Village namely
Shri Thienkholet Haokip gifted some portion of Songpi Village reserved
unsurvey hill land measuring an area of about 120 hectares to the
M.C.(L.A.Appeal) No. 3 of 2021 Page 2
applicant, the present respondent No. 3 and another person in the year
1992 vide gift deed bearing Registered No. G/Deed 85/92 dated
17.07.1992. Thereafter, the portion of the Songpi Village reserved
unservey hill land measuring about 120 hectares which was gifted to the
applicant, the said respondent No. 3 and another person were partitioned
and an area of about 103 acres out of the said 120 hectares of the said
land was partitioned as absolute share of the said respondent No. 3 and
the remaining area of the said land was partitioned as the share of the
present applicant and another person.
[3] It is the case of the present applicant that the land acquired by the
Assam Rifles falls within the share portion of the applicant, however, the
applicant recently came to know that the respondent No. 3 had withdrawn
the compensation amount without any authority and had filed the
connected Original (Land Acquisition) Case No. 1 of 2018 before the
learned District Judge, Churachandpur and that the respondent No. 3,
while filing the above preferred case, did not implead the applicant as one
of the parties in the said case even though the present applicant is very
much a necessary party.
[4] Mr. N. Ibotombi, learned senior counsel appearing for the applicant
submitted that the respondent No. 3 did not dispute that the applicant is
the rightful owner of the land acquired by the Assam Rifles, however, the
respondent No. 3 did not implead the present applicant as one of the
parties while filing the aforesaid Original (Land Acquisition) Case No. 1 of
M.C.(L.A.Appeal) No. 3 of 2021 Page 3
2018 before the learned District Judge, Churachandpur. The learned
senior counsel submitted that if the present Land Acquisition Appeal No. 2
of 2018 is decided without giving an opportunity of being heard to the
present applicant, the applicant will suffer an irreparable loss and injury.
The learned counsel accordingly submitted that the applicant is very much
interested to assist the Hon'ble Court during the proceedings of the
connected appeal so as to enable her to protect her right and interest and
accordingly, the learned senior counsel made a prayer for allowing the
impleadment of the present applicant as private respondent No.
5/intervener in the connected appeal.
[5] Mr. Ashish Deep Verma, learned counsel appearing for the
respondent No. 3 submitted that on 10.05.2017, the Government of
Manipur issued a notification under Section 11 (1) of Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition Act, 2013
(hereinafter referred to as the 'said Act' for short) for acquiring one
hundred acres of land urgently for public purpose and that except for the
respondent No. 3, no one including the present applicant submitted any
claim to the authorities in connection with the proposed land acquisition.
Subsequently, after taking into consideration the claim of the respondent
No. 3, the Collector calculated the market value of the acquired land under
Section 15 (2) of the said Act by issuing notification dated 21.08.2017. The
learned counsel further submitted that after calculating the market value of
the acquired land, the Collector issued a notice dated 11.05.2018 under
M.C.(L.A.Appeal) No. 3 of 2021 Page 4
Section 21 of the said Act inviting any interested person to claim their
compensation and raised any objection, however, at that point of time
except the respondent No. 3, no person including the present applicant
claimed any interest and accordingly, the Collector finally passed the
award of compensation dated 11.06.2018.
[6] The learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 also submitted that
several opportunities were given at different point of time during the
proceedings of the land acquisition process and passing of the award,
however, the applicant remained silent for the last about four years and
after all the process of the land acquisition proceedings had been
completed, the applicant is now suddenly claiming to be an interested
person in the land acquisition proceedings. The learned counsel submitted
that as the applicant remained silent throughout the land acquisition
proceedings, she had waived her right and that as the period of limitation
had already expired, the applicant cannot be allowed to be joined as a
party in the connected appeal at this juncture and that the application is
liable to be dismissed.
[7] The learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 strenuously submitted
that under Section 15 (1) and Section 21 of the said Act, time limitations
are prescribed for making objection to the land acquisition proceedings as
well as to the amount of compensation and persons entitled to the
compensation amount. It has been submitted that in the present case
except for the respondent No. 3, no person including the applicant
M.C.(L.A.Appeal) No. 3 of 2021 Page 5
submitted any objection or made any claim whatsoever and almost four
years after all the land acquisition proceedings have been completed and
when the connected appeal is at the final stage of hearing, the applicant
cannot claim to have any interest in the acquisition proceedings and such
claims deserves to be rejected outright.
Mr. R.K. Umakanta, learned Government Advocate appearing
for the respondents No. 1 & 2 and Mr. Kh. Samarjit, learned CGSC
appearing for the respondents No. 4 & 5 endorsed the submission of the
learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 3.
[8] After hearing the rival submissions of the learned counsel appearing
for the parties and on careful examination of the records of the present
case, this Court is of the considered view that there is no dispute among
the parties in the present case with regard to the fact that the present
applicant never made a claim or raised any objection before the Collector
during the whole process of the land acquisition proceedings. It is also an
undisputed fact and found on record that the respondent No. 3 filed an
application dated 15.06.2018 before the Deputy Commissioner/Collector
(L.A.), Churachandpur District, raising objection to the amount of
compensation as provided under Section 64 of the said Act and that on
receiving the said application, the Deputy Commissioner/Collector (L.A.)
issued an Office Memorandum dated 13.07.2018 referring the claim of the
respondent No. 3 as to the amount of compensation for the acquired land
M.C.(L.A.Appeal) No. 3 of 2021 Page 6
to the District Judge, Churachandpur for deciding the matter as provided
under Section 64 of the said Act.
[9] It may be pointed out that the Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act,
2013 is a self-contained code and it not only provides for mode and
manner in which acquisition proceedings are initiated but also the mode
and manner in which the proceedings for making an award as also the
mode and manner in which an application for reference by a person
dissatisfied therewith is to be made. Under Section 64 of the said Act, it is
provided that a reference may be prayed for by a person interested in the
proceedings and ordinarily, he should be a party to the proceedings and
he is required to file an application for making a reference before the
Collector within the time specified therein and the reference to the Civil
Court should be with regard to the objection raised in the application,
which may be in respect of the measurement of the land, the amount of
compensation, the person to whom it is payable, the apportionment of the
compensation amongst the person interested, etc.
[10] In the present case, the reference was made only in respect of the
amount of compensation and no reference has been made in regard to the
right of persons to whom it was payable or apportionment of compensation
amongst the persons interested. Accordingly, the lis between the party to
the reference, i.e., the respondent No. 3 and the State, is with regard to
only the quantum of compensation and no other question can be raised
M.C.(L.A.Appeal) No. 3 of 2021 Page 7
therein since a Reference Court is not a Court of original jurisdiction and it
derives its jurisdiction from the terms of reference and exercises a limited
jurisdiction. In view of the above, this Court is of the considered view that if
this Court allowed the impleadment of the present applicant, who is a third
party in the lis pending before this Court and who was not a party before
the Collector, the nature of the dispute in the present case will be
substantially changed, for a new dispute incorporating the claim of the
applicant will be raised, inasmuch as, the claim of the applicant is that she
is entitled to the compensation amount for the acquired land. Since the
applicant did not made any such claim before the Collector and since such
claim/objection had not been included in the reference made by the
Collector, consideration of such claim by this Court in the present appeal is
not permissible under law and accordingly, this Court is not inclined to
entertain the present application. In this regard, we may gainfully refer to
the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
"Muthavalli of Sha Madhari Diwan Wakf V. Syed Zindasha" reported in
(2009) 12 SCC 280 wherein, it has been held that:-
"11. The Act is a self-contained code. It not only provides for
the mode and manner in which the acquisition proceedings are
initiated but also the mode and manner in which the proceedings for
making an award as also the mode and manner in which an
application for reference by a person dissatisfied therewith is to be
made. A reference may be prayed for by a person interested in the
proceeding. Ordinarily, he should be a party to the proceedings for
making an award. He has to file an application for making a reference
before the Collector of the district within the time specified thereunder.
Such an application must be in writing and the reference to the civil
court which which may be prayed for before the Collector would be in
regard to his objection as regards measurement of land, the amount
of compensation, the person to whom it is payable or the
apportionment of the compensation amongst the persons interested.
M.C.(L.A.Appeal) No. 3 of 2021 Page 8
"12. The reference was made only in respect of the amount of
compensation. No reference has been made in regard to the right of
persons to whom it was payable or apportionment of compensation
amongst the persons interested. The claim of the first respondent has
been noticed by us. He has laid his claim on the title of the property.
He has prayed for proper and effective implementation of the decree
passed by a civil court. He alleged mismanagement of the wakf
property by the first appellant.
"13. A Reference Court is not a court of original jurisdiction. It
derives jurisdiction only in terms of the order of reference. The Act
being a self-contained code, the manner in which the reference is to
be made and the statement required to be made by the Collector has
been specified in Section 19 of the Act. The lis between the parties to
the reference meaning thereby a person interested and the State is
with regard to the quantum of compensation. No other question can
be raised therein. The Reference Court exercises a limited
jurisdiction. It derives its jurisdiction from the terms of reference.
"14. Even otherwise a civil court can direct impleadment of a
third party in a suit only in a case where it is a proper or necessary
party and otherwise has an interest in the subject-manner of the suit.
Even the civil court ordinarily would not entertain a petition for
impleadment of a third party in a lis pending before it which would
enlarge the scope and ambit of the dispute between the parties. A civil
court would also not ordinarily implead a third party as a result
whereof fresh dispute(s) either amongst the plaintiffs inter se claiming
under the same title or inter se between the defendants would be
required to be determined."
[11] On careful examination of the present application, this Court also
found that the applicant did not give any reason for her failure to appear or
made any claim or objection before the Collector during the land
acquisition proceedings and also the delay in approaching this Court. In
the absence of any reason or explanation given by the applicant for such
delay, this Court is also not inclined to entertain the present application at
this point of time. In this regard, we may refer to the judgment of the
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of "Tamil Nadu Housing Board, Chennai
V. M. Meiyappan & Ors." reported in (2010) 14 SCC 309 wherein, it has
been held that:-
M.C.(L.A.Appeal) No. 3 of 2021 Page 9
"13. ...................... It is trite law that delay and laches is one of
the important factors which the High Court must bear in mind while
exercising discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution. If
there is such negligence or omission on the part of the petitioner to
assert his right which, taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and
other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party, the High
Court must refuse to invoke its extraordinary jurisdiction and grant
relief to the writ petitioner.
"14. In Durga Prashad v. Controller of Imports and Exports this
Court had held that it is well settled that the relief under Article 226 is
discretionary, and one ground for refusing relief under Article 226 is
that the petitioner has filed the petition after a delay for which there is
no satisfactory explanation. It was noted that:
"4. Gajendragadkar, C.J., speaking for the Constitution
Bench, in Narayani Debi Khaitan v. State of Bihar,
observed:
„It is well settled that under Article 226, the power of
the High Court to issue an appropriate writ is discretionary.
There can be no doubt that if a citizen moves the High
Court under Article 226 and contends that his fundamental
rights have been contravened by any executive action, the
High Court would naturally like to give relief to him; but
even in such a case, if the petitioner has been guilty of
laches, and there are other relevant circumstances which
indicate that it would be inappropriate for the High Court to
exercise its high prerogative jurisdiction in favour of the
petitioner, ends of justice may require that the High Court
should refuse to issue a writ. There can be little doubt that
if it is shown that a party moving the High Court under
Article 226 for a writ is, in substance, claiming a relief
which under the law of limitation was barred at the time
when the writ petition was filed, the High Court would
refuse to grant any relief in its writ jurisdiction. No hard-
and-fast rule can be laid down as to when the High Court
should refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a party
who moves it after considerable delay and is otherwise
guilty of laches. That is a matter which must be left to the
discretion of the High Court and like all matters left to the
discretion of the Court, in this matter too discretion must be
exercised judiciously and reasonably.‟"
"15. In Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India a Constitution
Bench of this Court, dealing with the same issue in relation to Article
32 of the constitution, had observed that: (SCC pp. 96-97, para 32)
"32. ....... We are of the view that no relief should be
given to petitioners who, without any reasonable explanation,
approach this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution after
inordinate delay. The highest court in this land has been given
original jurisdiction to entertain petitions under Article 32 of the
M.C.(L.A.Appeal) No. 3 of 2021 Page 10
Constitution. It could not have been the intention that this Court
would go into stale demands after a lapse of years. It is said that
Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right. So it is, but it does not
follow from this that it was the intention of the Constitution-
makers that this Court should discard all principles and grant
relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay."
"16. Though the afore-extracted observations in Rabindranath
Bose relate to Article 32 of the Constitution, a fortiori, they would
apply to writ petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution as
well. [See Yunus (Baboobhai) A. Hamid Padvekar.]
"17. Similarly, in Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of W.B. [to which
one of us (D.K. Jain, J.) was a party], this Court had observed as
under: (SCC p. 784, paras 56-57)
"56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no
doubt true that there can be no waiver of fundamental right. But
while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226,
227 or 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes into account
certain factors and one of such considerations is delay and
laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. It
is well settled that power to issue a writ is discretionary. One of
the grounds for refusing reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of the
Constitution is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches.
"57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a writ
court, he should come to the Court at the earliest reasonably
possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the motion for a
writ will indeed be a good ground for refusing to exercise such
discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying object of this principle
is not to encourage agitation of stale claims and exhume matters
which have already been disposed of or settled or where the
rights of third parties have accrued in the meantime."
"18. Moreover, in relation to the land acquisition proceedings,
the Court should be loathe to encourage stale litigation as the same
might hinder projects of public importance. The Courts are expected
to be very cautious and circumspect about exercising their
discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 or Article 32 of the
Constitution if there has been inordinate unexplained delay in
questioning the validity of acquisition of land. In this regard, it will be
useful to advert to the observations made in P. Chinnanna v. State of
A.P. where in this Court had observed thus: (SCC p. 494, para 11)
"11. .... In fact, in relation to acquisition proceeding
involving acquisition of land for public purposes, the court
concerned must be averse to entertain writ petitions involving
the challenge to such acquisition where there is avoidable delay
or laches since such acquisition, if set aside, would not only
involve enormous loss of public money but also cause undue
delay in carrying out projects meant for general public good."
M.C.(L.A.Appeal) No. 3 of 2021 Page 11
"21. In the present case, as already stated, the respondents did
not furnish any explanation as to why it took them 16 years to
challenge the acquisition of their lands, when admittedly they were
aware of the acquisition of their lands and had in fact participated in
these proceedings before the Land Acquisition Collector. We have no
hesitation in holding that the High Court ought not to have entertained
the writ petition of the respondents after 16 years of the passing of the
award. The High Court should have dismissed the writ petition at the
threshold on the ground of delay and laches on the part of
Respondents 1 to 17, notwithstanding its earlier decision in WP No.
2244 of 1991, which decision, according to the appellant, was
otherwise distinguishable."
[12] In view of the facts and circumstances of the present case narrated
hereinabove and for the foregoing reasons, this Court did not find any
merit in the present application and the same is accordingly dismissed,
however, without any costs.
JUDGE
FR/NFR
Lhaineichong
M.C.(L.A.Appeal) No. 3 of 2021 Page 12
