[Cites 22, Cited by 0]
Madras High Court
C.J.Charles Rajkumar vs Mrs.Rahamathunnisa (Died) on 27 February, 2026
Author: N.Anand Venkatesh
Bench: N.Anand Venkatesh
2026:MHC:835
O,A,No.1188 of 2025
In the High Court of Judicature at Madras
Dated : 27.2.2026
Coram:
The Honourable Mr.Justice N.ANAND VENKATESH
O.A.No.1188 of 2025
C.J.Charles Rajkumar, Proprietor
M/s.Kiruba Constructions, No.11,
Cross Street, West Karikalan
III Street, Adambakkam,
Chennai-88.
...Applicant
Vs
Mrs.Rahamathunnisa (died)
W/O A.Isfahai
No.19/1, Sundaram Lane,
Purasawalkam, Chennai-7.
1.Mr.I.Syed Ahmed
S/O A.Isfahani,
No.16/2, Venkambakkam
Main Road, Puthur,
Chennai-126.
2.Mr.I.Haja Saibudin
S/O A.Isfahani,
No.19/1, Sundaram Lane,
Purasawalkam, Chennai-7. ...Respondents
APPLICATION under Order XIV Rule 8 of the Madras High
Court Original Side Rules, 1956 read with Section 9((ii)(a) of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 praying to pass an order of
1/27
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 27/02/2026 05:55:47 pm )
O,A,No.1188 of 2025
injunction restraining the respondents from in any manner dealing,
encumbering or alienating the property more fully described in the
schedule to the Judges Summons
Schedule of Property
All that piece and parcel of vacant land (dry) and building lying
in No.10, Village Puthur within the Registration Sub-District of
Tambaram and Registration District of South Madras bearing survey
No.16/2 Part measuring 92 cents and in survey No.16/3 Part
measuring 31 cents and in survey No.16/4 Part measuring 1 cent in
all totaling to an extent of 1 acre and 24 cents having patta No.123,
situated at Puthur Village, Chengalpet Taluk, Selaiyur, Chengalpet
District.
Boundaries of S.F.No.16/2 measuring an extent of 92 cents
North by : Property in survey No.16/1
South by : Property allotted to 4th Part
East by : Property belonging to 7th Part
West by : Land in survey No.15
Boundaries of S.F.No.16/3 measuring an extent of 31 cents
North by : Property allotted to 4th Part in survey No.16/2
South by : Highways Road
East by : Property allotted to 4th Part in survey No.16/4
West by : Land in survey No.15
Boundaries of S.F.No.16/4 measuring an extent of 1 cent
2/27
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 27/02/2026 05:55:47 pm )
O,A,No.1188 of 2025
North by : Property allotted to 4th Part in survey No.16/2
South by : Highways Road
East by : Property belonging to 7th Part in survey No.16/4
West by : Property allotted to 4th Part in survey No.16/3
For Applicant : Mr.Srikanth
For R-1 : Mr.P.V.Balasubramanian, SC for
Mr.M.Marudhachalam
ORDER
This is an application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter ‘the Act’) seeking an order of ad-
interim injunction restraining the respondents from alienating the
property which forms the subject matter of the execution petition in
EP 31 of 2023 on the file of the Principal District Judge at
Chengalpet.
2. Heard both.
3. The applicant is the decree-holder. The applicant had
initiated arbitration proceedings against the respondents which
culminated into an arbitral award dated 26.05.2022 awarding a sum
of Rs 10,04,25,376 together with interest at the rate of 18 % per
annum. The award has remained unchallenged and has become
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 27/02/2026 05:55:47 pm )
final. The applicant levied execution proceedings under Section 36 of
the Act in E.P 31 of 2023 before the District Court, Chengalpet. In
the execution application, the applicant invoked Order XXI Rules 54
& 66 and sought attachment and sale of the property of the
respondent/judgment debtors. During the pendency of the EP, the
instant petition has been filed under Section 9 of the Act seeking an
order of ad-interim injunction restraining the judgment debtors from
alienating or encumbering the properties which form the subject
matter of the EP before the executing court.
4. When the matter had come up on 23.02.2026, I enquired
from the learned counsel for the applicant as to how an application
under Section 9 could be entertained seeking the relief of injunction
when the applicant had already commenced proceedings in EP 31 of
2023 which was still pending before the executing court. The
learned counsel for the applicant brought to my notice a decision of
a Full Bench of this Court in B.M.Insulation Private Limited Vs.
Vardeep Petro Chemical Private Limited in Arbitration
Application No.374 of 2025 and 628 of 2025, dated 21.01.2026. It
was contended that till the award is satisfied in the execution
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 27/02/2026 05:55:47 pm )
proceedings pending, an application under Section 9 of the Act can
be filed.
5. Section 9 of the Act empowers the Court to grant interim
measures in favour of a party at three distinct stages ie., (a) before
(b) during arbitral proceedings or (c) at any time after the making of
the arbitral award but before it is enforced in accordance with
section 36. In Gopuram Enterprises v Integrated Finance
Limited, AIR 2021 Mad 119, the question before the Division Bench
was whether an application under Section 9 was maintainable at the
post award stage to direct discovery of the assets of the judgment-
debtor. The Court went on to observe:
“To the extent that a post-award
application for interim measures may be regarded
as something in aid of the award by way of its
enforcement, the doors of a Court under Section
9 of the Act will be open to an award-holder till
such time that the award becomes enforceable.
Once the award ripens for implementation, it
has per force to be executed in accordance with
the Code.”
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 27/02/2026 05:55:47 pm )
6. In other words, the Division Bench held that the the doors of
the Section 9 Court would remain open only till such time the award
became enforceable. As is common knowledge, an arbitral award
becomes enforceable in terms of Section 36(1) which is as follows:
“(1) Where the time for making an
application to set aside the arbitral award under
section 34 has expired, then, subject to the
provisions of sub-section (2), such award shall be
enforced in accordance with the provisions of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), in the
same manner as if it were a decree of the court.”
7. The Division Bench held that once the time prescribed in
Section 36(1) had expired the award became enforceable and an
application under Section 9 could not be maintained thereafter.
8. However, in O.A.No.284 of 2023, a learned single judge of
this Court took the view that the decision of the Division Bench in
Gopuram Enterprises had not taken note of the decision of the
Bombay High Court in Dirk India Private Limited v. Maharashtra
State Electricity Generation Company Limited reported in 2013
SCC OnLine Bom 481, which in turn was taken note of by the
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 27/02/2026 05:55:47 pm )
Supreme Court of Hindustan Construction Company Ltd., v.
Union of India and others reported in (2020) 17 SCC 324.
According to the learned single judge, in view of the aforesaid
decisions an application under Section 9 of the Act was maintainable
till such time the award was enforced in terms of Section 36 of the
Act.
9. When Application No.374 of 2025, B.M Insulation Private
Limited Vs. Vardeep Petro Chemical Private Limited, had come
up before me on 01.09.2025, it was brought to the notice of this Court
that the decision of the learned single judge in O.A.No.284 of 2023,
was carried on appeal in OSA (CAD) No.94 of 2023 dated 21.08.2023,
and that the order of the learned single judge was set aside, not on
the ground that an application under Section 9 was not maintainable,
but on merits and the matter was remanded for fresh consideration.
10. It was also brought to my notice that the view taken in
Gopuram Enterprises, supra, had been doubted by a Division Bench
of the Calcutta High Court in Bidyutlata Mahapatra v Shrachi
Developers Pvt. Ltd, 2025 SCC Online Cal 6073, where it was
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 27/02/2026 05:55:47 pm )
observed:
“42. The fulcrum of the appellant's
argument on this point was the decision of the
Madras High Court in the case of Gopuram
Enterprises Ltd., Chennai v. Integrated Finance
Company Ltd., Chennai, (Supra). Apart from the
fact that in that case, the attention of the Court
was not drawn to the decision of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Hindustan Construction
Company Limited v. Union of India, Supra, what
was decided in that case is that however wide the
powers of a Court under section 9 of the 1996 Act
may be, such powers may not extend to issuing
orders for discovering the assets of an award
debtor. Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure
provides for execution and carries the necessary
provisions for such purpose. Section 9 of the Act
cannot be enlarged to incorporate the wide
authority that an executing Court has to aid the
award-holder, who metamorphoses as a decree
holder by the legal fiction contained in Section
36(1) of the 1996 Act, to seek or obtain orders of
such nature or of arrest or detention of the award
debtor or the sequestration of its assets and
properties. I am unable to read the said case as
an authority for the proposition that once an
award becomes final and enforceable, an
application under Section 9 of the 1996 Act
cannot be filed in the Court. In my considered
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 27/02/2026 05:55:47 pm )
opinion, such an application would lie inter alia, to
preserve and protect the fruits of the award at the
instance of the award holder. One must keep in
mind the difference between enforceability of an
award and enforcement of an award. A Court
retains jurisdiction under Section 9 even after an
arbitral award may become enforceable but till it
is in fact enforced in accordance with the
provisions of Section 36 of the Act.”
11. In view of the conflicting views expressed, an authoritative
pronouncement was deemed necessary, and this Court directed the
matter be placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justice for constituting an
appropriate Bench to decide the following questions of law:
“a. When Section 9 of the Act provides for
interim measures before the Court even post
arbitral award, but before it is enforced, whether
the word 'enforced' can be read down as
'enforceable' and thereby limit the scope of
Section 9 of the Act?
b. Whether an application under Section 9 of
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 can be
maintained even after the expiry of the period
prescribed under sub-section (3) of Section 34
of the Act?”
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 27/02/2026 05:55:47 pm )
12. The aforesaid backdrop leading to the reference is to point
out that the entire issue was whether an application under Section 9
could be maintained after the period prescribed under Section 34(3)
when the award became enforceable. There exists a vital difference
between maintainability and entertainability as was pointed out by
the Supreme Court in Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. v. E&TOCAA, (2023
SCC OnLine SC 95). It was held that an objection as to
"maintainability" went to the root of the matter and if such objection
were found to be of substance, the courts would be rendered
incapable of even receiving the lis for adjudication. On the other hand,
the question of "entertainability" was entirely within the realm of
discretion of the Court. Thus, for a petition to be entertainable by a
Court, it must first be maintainable. Even if it is maintainable, the
petition may still not be entertained as the Court may decline to
exercise its discretionary jurisdiction for a variety of reasons.
13. Coming back to B.M Insulation Private Limited v
Vardeep Petro Chemical Private Limited, supra, it would be
evident from the questions referred, extracted supra, that the issue
was whether an application under Section 9 was maintainable after
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 27/02/2026 05:55:47 pm )
the expiry of the period prescribed in Section 34(3). The Full Bench
has answered the reference as under:
“A) The word ‘enforced’ under Section 9
cannot be read down as ‘enforceable’.
B) The word ‘enforced’ denotes a
completed act. Hence, the phrase ‘before it is
enforced’ signifies ‘until the complete
satisfaction of the award’.
C) The correct position of law has been
already laid down in Dirk India Private Limited’s
case cited supra, which has also been approved
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in
Hindustan Construction Company’s case cited
supra. In the light of the same the stance taken
by the Division Bench of this Court in Gopuram
Enterprises Limited’s case cited supra by reading
down the word ‘enforced’ as ‘enforceable’ is held
to be bad in law.”
14. In view of the aforesaid declaration of law, it follows that
the view of the Division Bench in Gopuram Enterprises, supra, that
an application under Section 9 is not maintainable after the award
becomes enforceable is no longer good law. For the sake of
completion, it should be mentioned that in Alok Saraf v Shyam
Sundar Nangalia, 2026: CHC-OS:59-DB, a Division Bench of the
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 27/02/2026 05:55:47 pm )
Calcutta High Court has followed the decision of the Full Bench.
15. As noted above, the question referred to the Full Bench was
whether a petition under Section 9 was maintainable after the award
became enforceable. The Full Bench did not, and could not have,
taken to have decided when and in what circumstances a petition
under Section 9 should be entertained. As I have pointed out earlier,
by holding that a petition under Section 9 is maintainable till the stage
of complete satisfaction of the award, it does not follow that a petition
under Section 9 should be entertained in all cases. There is no
gainsaying that the power under Section 9 and the quality of orders
which can be passed under the said provision are discretionary in
nature. Consequently, it would always be open to the Court, on the
facts of a given case, to decline the exercise of discretionary powers
under Section 9 for good and sound reasons. This would be more so
in case like the one at hand when the executing court is seized of the
EP concerning the very same property which forms the subject matter
of this application.
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 27/02/2026 05:55:47 pm )
16. What must not be lost sight of is the fact that the Act itself
contemplates execution of an award only through the process
involved in the execution of a decree. Section 36(1) of the Act reads
as follows:
“(1) Where the time for making an
application to set aside the arbitral award under
section 34 has expired, then, subject to the
provisions of sub-section (2), such award shall be
enforced in accordance with the provisions of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), in the
same manner as if it were a decree of the court.”
17. Thus, the Act itself envisages that an award must be
executed primarily in terms of Order XXI which is the procedure
prescribed for execution of a decree of a civil court. In this scheme of
things, an application under Section 9 has supplemental role to act as
a step-in-aid towards enforcement. In other words, an application
under Section 9 can supplement but cannot supplant the process of
execution contemplated through the route of Order XXI of the Code.
18. To illustrate, in L&T Finance Limited v JKS
Constructions Private Limited (2014) 1 LW 888, a learned single
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 27/02/2026 05:55:47 pm )
judge of this Court held that a post award direction under Section 9,
to the award-debtor to furnish security for the claim amount, cannot
be taken to be equivalent to enforcement of the award.
19. In Samson Maritime Limited v Hardy Exploration &
Production (India) Inc (2016) 2 LW 342, it was held that the
principles governing the grant of relief under Order XXXVIII Rule 5
cannot be applied at the post award stage to consider a case for
furnishing security. It was held that the award holder is entitled to
seek protection as a matter of right since the delay in execution would
undoubtedly cause hardship. In Citicorp v Manoj Ray, AIR 2017 Cal
268, it was held that Section 9 can be resorted to for interim execution
if the same is more efficacious. The award holder may thereafter levy
formal execution to satisfy the award.
20. The power of the Court under Section 9 to direct the
judgment debtor to deposit the sum under the award has been
recognized by the Supreme Court in Sepco Electric Power
Construction Corporation v Power Mech Projects Ltd, reported
in 2024 SCC Online SC 1243. The parameters have been set out as
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 27/02/2026 05:55:47 pm )
under:
“All that the Court is required to see is,
whether the applicant for interim measure has
a good prima facie case, whether the balance of
convenience is in favour of interim relief as
prayed for being granted and whether the
applicant has approached the court with
reasonable expedition.”
21. The aforesaid decisions show that the power under Section
9 can be used as step-in-aid and not as a substitute for execution.
This has been reiterated by the Full Bench in B.M Insulation Private
Limited v Vardeep Petro Chemical Private Limited, supra.
22. Reverting to the case on hand, the award holder has already
levied execution of the award arising out of a claim for money. Order
XXI Rule 30 of the CPC reads as follows:
“30. Decree for payment of money —Every
decree for the payment of money, including a
decree for the payment of money as the
alternative to some other relief, may be executed
by the detention in the civil prison of the
judgment-debtor, or by the attachment and sale
of his property, or by both.”
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 27/02/2026 05:55:47 pm )
23. Order XXI Rules 54 & 64 are as follows:
“54. Attachment of immovable property.—
(1) Where the property is immovable, the
attachment shall be made by an order prohibiting
the judgment-debtor from transferring or
charging the property in any way, and all persons
from taking any benefit from such transfer of
charge.”
…….
“64. Power to order property attached to
be sold and proceeds to be paid to person
entitled.—Any Court executing a decree may
order that any property attached by it and liable
to sale, or such portion thereof as may see
necessary to satisfy the decree, shall be sold, and
that the proceeds of such sale, or a sufficient
portion thereof, shall be paid to the party entitled
under the decree to receive the same.”
24. The power to order conditional attachment can be traced
to Order XXXVIII Rule 5(3) of the Code. Though the said provision is
applicable at the stage of attachment before judgment, it cannot be
said that the executing court is powerless to grant an order of interim
attachment of the property pending further proceedings in the
execution proceedings if the circumstances of the case so warrant.
The mistake lies in assuming that since the power is not expressly
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 27/02/2026 05:55:47 pm )
found anywhere in Order XXI, the executing court is powerless to
grant suitable interim reliefs in aid of the final relief in execution.
25. In Ammakannu Ammal v Natesa Thevar, (1984) 1 MLJ
187, a learned judge of this Court had pointed out that the rules under
Order XXI were by no means exhaustive. It was held that
enumeration of powers of a particular kind did not rule out the
exercise of appropriate enabling or ancillary powers of another kind
to make execution an effective instrument to help the decree holder
realize the fruits of his decree. The observations of the learned judge
merit reproduction in extenso:
“The mistake lies in supposing that O. 21
of the Code is so exhaustive of the court's powers
in execution that whatever is left un-expressed in
it must be held to have been deliberately left out
of the scape of the jurisdiction. O. 21 is by no
means an exhaustive Code on the subject of
execution of decrees. It is only its length and
attention to details that give O. 21 the humbug
impression of exhaustiveness. There are fearful
gaps in the rules on vital topics in execution. If
the statute makers had the imagination to
vismlise these situations they might well have
made provision for them too. But, the fact that
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 27/02/2026 05:55:47 pm )
there are gaps and they remain so does not mean
those represent lacunae in the legislation which
can be filled only by legislative enactment. In
other words, O. 21 dose not exhaustively define
the jurisdiction and powers of the executing
court. It only enumerates them in its various
rules. The incompleteness in enumeration is
however nothing serious; it only affords scope for
the invocation of implied or ancillary powers in
appropriate cases to see if the executing Court
can grant the relief asked for.”
26. Once the aforesaid position is understood there is no
difficulty in concluding that the executing court possesses all such
implied or ancillary powers which are necessary to enable it to
effectively execute the decree and assist the decree holder to realize
the fruits of litigation. Thus, where there exists a threat of alienation,
the executing court could always protect the interests of the decree
holder by effecting an order of interim attachment. Any alienation
made thereafter would be void as regards all claims enforceable under
the attachment by virtue of Section 64 of the Code.
27. The position as regards injunctions is no longer res-
integra. The injunctions contemplated under Order XXXIX Rules 1 &
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 27/02/2026 05:55:47 pm )
2 are those passed during a suit. This, however, does not rule out the
grant of injunctions in exercise of inherent powers under Section 151.
Prior to 1962, there existed a difference of opinion between various
High Courts as to whether Section 151 could be exercised to grant
injunctions in a case that was not covered by Order XXXIX Rule 1 &
28. The consistent view of the Madras High Court in
Varadacharlu v. Narsimha Charlu [reported in AIR 1926 Mad
258]; Govindarajulu v. Imperial Bank of India [reported in AIR
1932 Mad 180]; Karuppayya v. Ponnuswami [reported in AIR
1933 Mad 500 (2)]; Murugesa Mudali v. Angamuthu Mudali
[reported in AIR 1938 Mad 190] and Subramanian v.
Seetarama [reported in AIR 1949 Mad 104], was that an order
of injunction cannot be granted if the circumstances fell outside the
purview of Order XXXIX. These decisions are no longer good law in
view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Manohar Lal Chopra
v. Seth Hiralal [reported in AIR 1962 SC 527], wherein it was
held as follows:
“……..the Courts have inherent jurisdiction
to issue temporary injunctions in circumstances
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 27/02/2026 05:55:47 pm )
which are not covered by the provisions of Order
39 CPC. There is no such expression in Section 94
which expressly prohibits the issue of a
temporary injunction in circumstances not
covered by Order 39 or by any rules made under
the Code. It is well settled that the provisions of
the Code are not exhaustive, for the simple
reason that the legislature is incapable of
contemplating all the possible circumstances
which may arise in future litigation and
consequently for providing the procedure for
them. The effect of the expression “if it is so
prescribed” is only this that when the rules
prescribe the circumstances in which the
temporary injunction can be issued, ordinarily the
Court is not to use its inherent powers to make
the necessary orders in the interests of justice,
but is merely to see whether the circumstances of
the case bring it within the prescribed rule. If
the provisions of Section 94 were not there in the
Code, the Court could still issue temporary
injunctions, but it could do that in the exercise
of its inherent jurisdiction. No party has a right to
insist on the Court's exercising that jurisdiction
and the Court exercises its inherent jurisdiction
only when it considers it absolutely necessary
for the ends of justice to do so. It is in the
incidence of the exercise of the power of the Court
to issue temporary injunction that the provisions
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 27/02/2026 05:55:47 pm )
of Section 94 of the Code have their effect and
not in taking away the right of the Court to
exercise its inherent power.”
29. Thus, where there is an allegation that the property forming
the subject matter of the EP is or is about to be alienated, the
executing court can always draw upon its inherent powers to pass a
suitable order to protect the rights of the parties before it. This is not
to say that the Court can in no case exercise its powers under Section
9 to grant an injunction pending an EP, if the circumstances of the
case so warrant. As I have pointed out, though a post award Section
9 is maintainable, the Court still retains the discretion to entertain a
post award EP if the circumstances so justify provided the relief
sought is a step in aid to enforcement. All that can and should be said
is that the Court must necessarily take into consideration whether the
same relief could be granted by the executing court where the EP is
pending, and if so whether there are any other circumstances which
make the interim order under Section 9 the most appropriate relief in
facts and circumstances of the case. This would also have the added
advantage of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings in different courts
concerning the same subject matter.
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 27/02/2026 05:55:47 pm )
30. In this case, the petitioner has filed the EP in Chengalpet
where the assets of the judgment debtors are located. In the
considered opinion of this Court, having regard to the facts of this
case, it would be more appropriate if the petitioner approaches the
executing court to seek for interim relief by way of interim
attachment/injunction. At the same time, the directions that this
Court proposes to issue will allay any apprehension that the EP will
continue to remain pending indefinitely.
31. A look at the record of the proceedings in the EP discloses
that on 20.04.2023 the 1st respondent was reported to have died in
August 2022, even prior to the filing of the EP. The case has been
adjourned for steps from April 2023 and remains pending without any
effective order. The tardy pace of the proceedings before the EP Court
coupled with the threat of alienation by the respondents may have
prompted the petitioner to approach this Court under Section 9.
Otherwise, it makes little sense as to why a litigant in Chengalpet
should come all the way to the Madras High Court to obtain an order
of injunction as regards a property situated in Chengalpet. Is the
executing court powerless to offer such protection or is there
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 27/02/2026 05:55:47 pm )
something fundamentally wrong with the way justice is being
administered by the executing court? Or worse still, has justice taken
leave of the precincts of the executing court forcing the litigant to
rush to Chennai to seek protection to ensure that hard won fruits of
litigation are not wasted.
32. The cliched observations of the Privy Council in The
General Manager of the Raja Durbhunga v. Maharaja Coomar
Ramaput Sing [reported in (1871-72) 14 M I.A. 605], that the
actual difficulties of a litigant in India begin when he has obtained a
decree is a judicial favorite to demonstrate the realities of execution.
Though several things have changed since then, the pace of execution
has remained the same since 1872 and in many cases, may have
receded even further. In some cases, the pace of execution is so tardy
that it would make even the proverbial snail blush. This case is an
illustrative example. Month after month after month the case has seen
nothing but adjournments before the executing court. The time has
now come to set the house in order.
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 27/02/2026 05:55:47 pm )
33. In a recent decision in Periyammal v. V. Rajamani,
[reported in (2025) 9 SCC 568], the Supreme Court passed the
following directions:
“77. In view of the aforesaid, we direct
all the High Courts across the country to call for
the necessary information from their respective
district judiciary as regards pendency of the
execution petitions. Once the data is collected by
each of the High Courts, the High Courts shall
thereafter proceed to issue an administrative
order or circular, directing their respective
district judiciary to ensure that the execution
petitions pending in various courts shall be
decided and disposed of within a period of six
months without fail otherwise the Presiding
Officer concerned would be answerable to the
High Court on its administrative side. Once the
entire data along with the figures of pendency
and disposal thereafter, is collected by all the
High Courts, the same shall be forwarded to the
Registry of this Court with individual reports.”
34. The aforesaid decision was delivered on 06.03.2025. Nearly
a year has passed, and the execution petition filed in 2023 remains
pending as on date.
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 27/02/2026 05:55:47 pm )
35. In view of the above discussion, the following order is
passed:
a. O.A 1188 of 2025 is closed granting liberty to the
applicant to move the executing court for the same
relief, if so advised.
b. The Mahila Court, Chengalpattu shall take up E.P.No.31
of 2023 and conclude the same on or before 30.6.2026,
and a compliance report shall be filed before the
Registrar General of this Court.
c. In the interregnum, if there is any threat of alienation it
will be open to the decree holder to move the executing
court for appropriate orders by way of interim
attachment/injunction.
d. The Registrar General, High Court, Madras is directed to
call for an explanation from the Mahila Court,
Chengalpattu as to why E.P.No.31 of 2023 has remained
pending on its file without any effective progress despite
the orders of the Supreme Court in Periyammal v. V.
Rajamani, [reported in (2025) 9 SCC 568],
extracted supra. The explanation shall be placed before
this Court on the next date.
e. The Registrar General, High Court, Madras is directed to
call for a report from the Principal District Judge,
Chengalpattu on the following aspects (i) Total number
of pending execution petitions in Chengapattu District
involving execution of arbitral awards (ii) Number of
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 27/02/2026 05:55:47 pm )
such petitions which are pending for more than six
months (to be listed from oldest to newest) (iii) Reasons
for the delay in disposal (iv) Number of execution
petitions filed after April 2025 and their current stage
and number of such cases which have been disposed
within six months as required by the Supreme Court in
Periyammal v. V. Rajamani [reported in (2025) 9
SCC 568].
f. In cases where the execution petitions have been
pending for more than six months, the report of the
Principal District Judge, Chengalpet shall also indicate
the names of the concerned judicial officers who have
been presiding over these Courts since April 2025.
g. For consideration of the reports indicated in paragraphs
35(d)-(f), post this case on 01.7.2026 at 2:15 pm.
27.2.2026
Index : Yes
Internet : Yes
RS
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 27/02/2026 05:55:47 pm )
N.ANAND VENKATESH,J
RS
27.2.2026
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 27/02/2026 05:55:47 pm )
