Madras High Court
Balamurugan vs The State Of Tamil Nadu Rep By Its on 15 May, 2025
BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT
Reserved on : 15.11.2024
Pronounced on : 15.05.2025
CORAM :
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.RAMAKRISHNAN
Crl.O.P.(MD)No.19783 of 2024
1.Balamurugan
vs.
1.The State of Tamil Nadu rep by its,
The Inspector of Police,
Pamban Police Station,
Ramanathapuram District.
(Crime No.338 of 2020)
... Respondents/Complainant
2.Ganesan ... Respondents/Defacto
Complainant
Prayer : Criminal Original Petition has been filed under Section 482 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, to call for the records pertaining to the
case in Cr.No.338 of 2020 dated 04.11.2020 on the file of the first
respondent namely, The Inspector of Police, Pamban Police Station,
Ramanathapuram District and quash the same and all further proceedings.
For Petitioners : Mr.R.Mahendrarajan
For R1 : Mr.A.Thiruvadi Kumar,
The Additional Public Prosecutor.
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ORDER
This petition has been filed to quash the FIR in Cr.No.338 of 2020
on the file of the first respondent police.
2. The petitioners are accused in Crime No.338 of 2020 on the file
of the respondent police. The petitioners are said to have abused the
defacto complainant in filthy language and caused damages to the defacto
complainant's property and also assaulted him and caused injuries. Hence,
a case was registered in Crime No.338 of 2020 against the petitioners for
the offences punishable under Sections 294(b), 324, 336, 427 & 506(i) of
IPC and the investigation is pending.
3. Pending the investigation, the petitioners have filed this petition
to quash the proceedings on the ground that the investigation is not
completed within the limitation period provided in the proviso under
Section 468(2) of Cr.P.C., The learned counsel appearing for the
petitioners also supported the said plea by placing reliance on the order of
this Court in Crl.OP(MD)No.11363 of 2023 dated 26.06.2023.
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4. The learned Additional Public prosecutor submitted that the plea
of the petitioners to quash the FIR under Section 468 (2) of Cr.P.C., is not
legally maintainable when the allegations in the FIR clearly constitute the
offences under Sections 294(b), 324, 336, 427 & 506(i) of IPC. He also
relied upon the Judgements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Sarah Mathew v. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases, reported in AIR
2014 SC 448 and this Court in Crl.OP(MD)No.17860 of 2024 and
Crl.OP(MD)No.6077 of 2021. Therefore, he seeks for dismissal of this
petition.
5. This Court considered the rival submissions and perused the
impugned FIR and the precedents relied on either side.
6. There are allegations against the petitioners which constitute the
offences under Sections 294(b), 324, 336, 427 & 506(i) of IPC. The
punishment for the said offences are as follows:-
S.No. Offences Punishment
1 294(b) of IPC 3 months imprisonment
2 324 of IPC 3 years imprisonment
3 336 of IPC 3 months imprisonment
4 427 of IPC 2 years imprisonment
5 506(i) of IPC 2 years imprisonment
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7.1. This Court in Abiganesh Vs. Inspector of Police in
Crl.OP(MD)No.17860 of 2024, has held as follows:-
“5. Let us take the plea of limitation first. This
Court had an occasion to deal with similar plea of
limitation in the case of Kishore Vs. State represented by
the Inspector of Police, Reddiyarchatram Police Station
in Crl.R.C.(MD)No.614 of 2023 dated 13.07.2023,
wherein, FIR came to be registered for the offences under
Sections 279 and 337 IPC on 02.04.2018 for the accident
held on 02.04.2018 and subsequently, since the victim had
died, the case was altered into Sections 279 and 304(A)
IPC, that the first respondent has filed the final report on
02.03.2023 along with an application to condone the
delay under Section 473 Cr.P.C. and the learned
Magistrate has passed an order condoning the delay in
filing the final report and consequently taken the case on
file and that when that order was challenged before this
Court on the ground that charge sheet laid was clearly
barred by limitation as contemplated under Section 468
Cr.P.C., this Court, by following the judgment of the
Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Sarah Mathew Vs. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases
by its Director Dr.K.M.Cherian and others reported in
(2014) 2 SCC 62 and subsequent Division Bench
judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Darshan Singh
Saini Vs. Sohan Singh and others reported in (2015) 14
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SCC 570 and in the case of Amritlal Vs. Shantilal Soni
and others reported in 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 248 to the
point that for the purpose of computing the period of
limitation under Section 468 Cr.P.C., the relevant date is
the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution
of prosecution and not the date on which the Magistrate
takes cognizance of the offence, has observed that since
the accident was allegedly occurred on 02.04.2018 and a
complaint came to be lodged on 02.04.2018, the date of
occurrence itself, the question of invoking Section 468
Cr.P.C. does not arise at all.
6. When the decision in Kishore's case above
referred came to be referred before Hon'ble Mr.Justice
N.Anand Venkatesh, while dealing with two cases in
A.Kaliyaperumal Vs. The Superintendent of Police,
Cuddalore and others and Subash and others Vs. State
and others reported in 2024-1-LW(Crl)332, the learned
Judge, by observing that the judgment of the Constitution
Bench in Sarah Mathew's case and the cases referred by
the Constitution Bench, Krishna Pillai Vs. T.A Rajendran
(1990 Supp SCC 121), Bharat Damodar Kale Vs. State of
A.P. ((2003) 8 SCC 559) and Japani Sahoo Vs. Chandra
Sekhar Mohanty ((2007) 7 SCC 394), all had arisen from
the private complaint cases and as such, the decision of
the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Sarah Mathew's case, cannot be made applicable to the
police cases, had practically over ruled the decision in
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Kishore's case. No doubt, as rightly observed by the
learned Judge, Sarah Mathew's case and the cases
referred therein had arisen from the private complaint
cases. But it is pertinent to note that the Constitution
Bench in Sarah Mathew's case has nowhere stated that
the decision given therein is applicable only to the private
complaint cases under Section 190(1)(a) and not to the
police cases under Section 190(1)(b) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure.
7. As already pointed out, the Constitution Bench
has specifically held that the relevant date for the purpose
of computing the period of limitation under Section 468
Cr.P.C. is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of
institution of prosecution. The learned Judge has
interpreted the words “institution of prosecution” in a
narrow way and observed that the same are being used in
the enactments such as the Drugs and Cosmetics Act,
which would only mean about commencing prosecution
by filing the complaint under Section 190(1)(a) before the
Magistrate and that the words institution of prosecution
used in Sarah Mathew's case had nothing to do with the
prosecution under Chapter XII of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. The learned Judge has further observed that
date of filing of the complaint would only denote the
private complaint which came to be defined under Section
2(d) Cr.P.C. and the information given to the police
officer under Section 154 Cr.P.C., cannot be taken as a
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complaint. More importantly, the learned Judge has
relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Arun Vyas Vs. Anita Vyas reported in (1999) 4 SCC 690,
Three Judges Bench decision of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in State of H.P. Vs. Tara Dutt reported in (2000) 1
SCC 230 and another Two Judges Bench decision in
Ramesh Vs. State of T.N. reported in (2005) 3 SCC 507,
wherein, it has been held that the relevant date for
reckoning the cut-off is the date on which the final report
was filed and not the date on which the FIR was
registered. Considering the above decisions, we can
categorize the above decisions in two parts; those
rendered prior to and those subsequent to the judgment of
the Constitution Bench in Sarah Mathew's case.
8. It is pertinent to note that since a Two Judges
Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court noticed a conflict
between the Two Judges Bench decision in Bharat
Damodar Kale's case and another Two Judges Bench
decision in Japani Sahoo's case above referred with the
Three Judges Bench decision in Krishna Pillai's case, the
matter was referred to Larger Bench and hence, Five
Judges Bench has dealt with the issue in extenso and
came to the conclusion that for the purpose of computing
the period of limitation under Section 468 Cr.P.C., the
relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or the
date of institution of prosecution and not the date on
which the Magistrate had taken cognizance.
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9. In Sarah Mathew's case above referred, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court has examined the present issue in
the context of Article 14 of the Constitution and opted for
reasonable construction rather than literal construction
and the relevant passage is extracted hereunder:-
“37. We also concur with the observations in Japani
Sahoo, where this Court has examined this issue in the
context of Article 14 of the Constitution and opted for
reasonable construction rather than literal construction.
The relevant paragraph reads thus: “The matter can be
looked at from different angle also. Once it is accepted (and
there is no dispute about it) that it is not within the domain
of the complainant or prosecuting agency to take
cognizance of an offence or to issue process and the only
thing the former can do is to file a complaint or initiate
proceedings in accordance with law, if that action of
initiation of proceedings has been taken within the period
of limitation, the complainant is not responsible for any
delay on the part of the court or Magistrate in issuing
process or taking cognizance of an offence. Now, if he is
sought to be penalised because of the omission, default or
inaction on the part of the court or Magistrate, the
provision of law may have to be tested on the touchstone of
Article 14 of the Constitution. It can possibly be urged that
such a provision is totally arbitrary, irrational and
unreasonable. It is settled law that a court of law would
interpret a provision which would help sustaining the
validity of law by applying the doctrine of reasonable
construction rather than making it vulnerable and
unconstitutional by adopting rule of litera legis. Connecting
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the provision of limitation in Section 468 of the Code with
issuing of process or taking of cognizance by the court may
make it unsustainable and ultra vires Article 14 of the
Constitution.”
10. The word “prosecution” has not been defined
anywhere in the Code of Criminal Procedure and a
Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in Suneel Kumar
Singh Vs. State of U.P. in Crl.A.No.724 of 2017 dated
18.02.2019, has observed as follows; “The prosecution
has not been defined specifically in the light of proviso to
Section 24(8) Cr.P.C. The meaning of word 'prosecution'
as defined in Webster Dictionary, 3rd Edition is as
follow; "the carrying out of a plan, project, or course of
action to or toward a specific end." In view of the
aforesaid definition the 'end' for which a plan or project
is carried out is called prosecution. In respect of proviso
to Section 24(8) Cr.P.C. prosecution in respect of an
offence begin with putting the law into motion by any
individual or sufferer of crime. The 'end' in a prosecution
within the meaning of proviso to sub-section 8 of section
24 Cr.P.C. would be adjudication of guilt of an offender
who is charged with commission of an offence in
accordance with procedure established by law in a court
constituted under this code. So the prosecution starts with
giving information of commission of crime and continued
during investigation or inquiry, trial of offender and if
any appeal is filed finally end by an order passed in
appeal.”
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11. Considering the above, it can easily be inferred
that the prosecution starts with giving information of
commission of crimes. As rightly contended by the
Government Advocate (Criminal Side), the words
“institution of prosecution” used in Sarah Mathew's case
cannot be limited to the private complaint cases.
12. At this juncture, it is necessary to refer the
subsequent Division Bench judgment of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Amritlal's case, “In Sarah Mathew, the
Constitution Bench of this Court examined two questions
thus: - 3. No specific questions have been referred to us.
But, in our opinion, the following questions arise for our
consideration:
3.1. (i) Whether for the purposes of computing the
period of limitation under Section 468 CrPC the relevant date
is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution
of the prosecution or whether the relevant date is the date on
which a Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence?
3.2. (ii) Which of the two cases i.e. Krishna Pillai
[Krishna Pillai v. T.A. Rajendran, 1990 Supp SCC 121] or
Bharat Kale [Bharat Damodar Kale v. State of A.P., (2003) 8
SCC 559] (which is followed in Japani Sahoo [Japani Sahoo
v. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty, (2007) 7 SCC 394]), lays down
the correct law? The Constitution Bench answered the
aforesaid questions as follows: -
“51. In view of the above, we hold that for the
purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section
468 CrPC the relevant date is the date of filing of the
complaint or the date of institution of prosecution and not
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the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance. We
further hold that Bharat Kale [Bharat Damodar Kale v.
State of A.P., (2003) 8 SCC 559] which is followed in
Japani Sahoo [Japani Sahoo v. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty,
(2007) 7 SCC 394] lays down the correct law. Krishna
Pillai [Krishna Pillai v. T.A. Rajendran, 1990 Supp SCC
121 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 646] will have to be restricted to its
own facts and it is not the authority for deciding the
question as to what is the relevant date for the purpose of
computing the period of limitation under Section 468 CrPC.
(emphasis supplied) Therefore, the enunciations and
declaration of law by the Constitution Bench do not admit
of any doubt that for the purpose of computing the period of
limitation under Section 468 CrPC, the relevant date is the
date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of
prosecution and not the date on which the Magistrate takes
cognizance of the offence. The High Court has made a
fundamental error in assuming that the date of taking
cognizance i.e., 04.12.2012 is decisive of the matter, while
ignoring the fact that the written complaint was indeed filed
by the appellant on 10.07.2012, well within the period of
limitation of 3 years with reference to the date of
commission of offence i.e., 04.10.2009.”
13. In Amritlal's case, the offence was allegedly
committed on 04.10.2009 and complaint came to be
lodged on 10.07.2012, that final report came to be filed
on 13.11.2012 and that the learned Magistrate had taken
cognizance on 04.12.2012 and in that scenario, the
Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that since complaint
came to be lodged on 10.07.2012 for the offence alleged
to have been committed on 04.10.2009, the same is well
within the period of limitation of three years.
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14. In Johnson Alexander Vs. State by CBI, ACB in
Crl.A.No.1478 of 2010 dated 26.02.2015, where the
occurrence was allegedly held in the year 1995, FIR was
lodged and the proceedings were initiated in the year
1999 and cognizance was taken on 21.06.2001, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court has quashed the proceedings in
view of the bar under Section 468 Cr.P.C. for the reason
that there was no application filed by the prosecution
explaining the delay caused from the date of the alleged
occurrence till the date of filing of the complaint and
registering the FIR. It is pertinent to note that the Hon'ble
Apex Court has specifically assigned the reason that the
complaint and FIR came to be registered beyond one
year, therefore, the proceedings are not maintainable in
law and on that ground, quashed the proceedings.
15. In light of the above discussion, it is clear that
the institution of prosecution, for the purposes of Section
468 Cr.P.C., refers to the date of filing the complaint or
registering the FIR. Consequently, if the complaint or FIR
is filed within the prescribed limitation period, the
proceedings cannot be deemed barred by Section 468
merely because the order of cognizance or issuance of
process occurs on a subsequent date.
16. At the risk of repetition, judgments relied on by
the learned Judge of this Court in A.Kaliyaperumal and
Subash's case above referred, were rendered prior to the
Constitution Bench judgment in Sarah Mathew's case.
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More importantly, the legal position declared by the
Constitution Bench in Sarah Mathew's case came to be
reiterated by a Division Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court. In light of this, reliance on earlier judgments of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court, prior to the Constitution Bench,
is no longer permissible. The Constitution Bench
judgment, as reaffirmed by the Division Bench, is binding
and taken precedence over earlier decision.
17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Suganthi Suresh
Kumar Vs. Jagdeeshan reported in AIR 2002 SC 681 has
specifically held that it is impermissible for the High
Court to overrule its decision on the ground that Supreme
Court did not consider the other points, it is not only a
matter of discipline for the High Courts in India, it is the
mandate of the Constitution as provided in Article 141
that the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be
binding on all courts within the territory of India. In Anil
Kumar Neotia and others Vs. Union of India and others
reported in AIR 1988 SC 1353, it has been held that the
High Court cannot question the correctness of the
decision of the Supreme Court even though the point
sought before the High Court was not considered by the
Supreme Court.
18. The sole contention raised was that the
Constitution Bench laid down the dictum only for private
complaint cases, not police cases. However, a subsequent
Division Bench of the Supreme Court has unequivocally
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clarified that the Constitution Bench judgment is indeed
applicable to the police cases. In light of this
authoritative clarification, this Court has no jurisdiction
or power to deviate from the Supreme Court's binding
precedent.
19. Section 473 Cr.P.C. is a vital provision that
empowers courts to take cognizance of a complaint even
after the expiry of the limitation period. This section is
pivotal in administering justice, as it allows complainants
or aggrieved persons to institute complaints beyond the
prescribed period, provided the court is satisfied with the
facts and circumstances of the case that the delay has
been properly explained or that it is necessary to extend
the period in the interest of justice.
20. At this juncture, it is necessary to refer the
following passages in Sarah Mathew's case above
referred,
“28. We are inclined to take this view also because
there has to be some amount of certainty or definiteness in
matters of limitation relating to criminal offences. If, as
stated by this Court, taking cognizance is application of
mind by the Magistrate to the suspected offence, the
subjective element comes in. Whether a Magistrate has taken
cognizance or not will depend on facts and circumstances of
each case. A diligent complainant or the prosecuting agency
which promptly files the complaint or initiates prosecution
would be severely prejudiced if it is held that the relevant
point for computing limitation would be the date on which
the Magistrate takes cognizance. The complainant or the
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prosecuting agency would be entirely left at the mercy of the
Magistrate, who may take cognizance after the limitation
period because of several reasons; systemic or otherwise. It
cannot be the intention of the legislature to throw a diligent
complainant out of the court in this manner. Besides it must
be noted that the complainant approaches the court for
redressal of his grievance. He wants action to be taken
against the perpetrators of crime. The courts functioning
under the criminal justice system are created for this
purpose. It would be unreasonable to take a view that delay
caused by the court in taking cognizance of a case would
deny justice to a diligent complainant. Such an interpretation
of Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. would be unsustainable and
would render it unconstitutional. It is well settled that a
court of law would interpret a provision which would help
sustaining the validity of the law by applying the doctrine of
reasonable construction rather than applying a doctrine
which would make the provision unsustainable and ultra
vires the Constitution. (U.P. Power Corporation Ltd. v.
Ayodhaya Prasad Mishra).”
21. The view taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in Sarah Mathew's case above referred, is primarily for
the reason that so far as the complainant is concerned, as
soon as he files a complaint, he has done everything
which is required to be done by him and thereafter he has
no control over the proceedings or any delay in taking
cognizance.
22. After filing a private complaint, the
complainant has no further role to play, and it is solely
the court's responsibility to take cognizance and proceed.
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In my view, this reasoning should also apply to cases
instituted through an FIR. When an informant diligently
lodges an FIR within the limitation period, the police, as
the statutory authority, take over the responsibility for
registration and investigation. The complainant/informant
has no control over the police's actions, including
registration, investigation, and filing of the final report. If
the police fail to take timely action, the
complainant/informant should not be penalized for the
police's inaction. Consequently, the
complainant/informant cannot be held responsible for any
subsequent delays in investigation, taking cognizance,
issuing process, or any other action contemplated under
law.
23. Considering the above, for the purpose of
computing the period of limitation for taking cognizance
of an offense under Section 468 Cr.P.C., this Court has no
hesitation to hold that the relevant date is when the first
information was given to the police, not when the police
submitted the final report to the court.
24. It is a fundamental principle of law that the act
of sovereign authorities shall not prejudice anybody.
Therefore, for the inaction or delay on the part of the
police authority or the court, the complainant/informant
should not be penalized, as it would be unjust to deny
them justice due to circumstances beyond their control.
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25. The Parliament, in response to the judgments of
the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Sarah Mathew's case, as interpreted by the subsequent
Division Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Amritlal's
case, while enacting the BNSS, incorporated an
explanation to clarify the computation of the period of
limitation. Section 514 BNSS, corresponding to Section
468 Cr.P.C., now includes an explanation that provides
clarity on this issue. Section 468 Cr.P.C. states:-
“468. Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the
period of limitation.-
(1)Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this
Code, no Court shall take cognizance of an offence of the
category specified in sub-section (2), after the expiry of the
period of limitation.
(2)The period of limitation shall be -
(a)six months, if the offence is punishable with fine
only;
(b)one year, if the offence is punishable with
imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year;
(c)three years, if the offence is punishable with
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not
exceeding three years.
(3)For the purposes of this section, the period of
limitation, in relation to offences which may be tried
together, shall be determined with reference to the offence
which is punishable with the more severe punishment or, as
the case may be, the most severe punishment.”
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26. The explanation added to Section 514 BNSS
reads:-
“Explanation.—For the purpose of computing the
period of limitation, the relevant date shall be the date of
filing complaint under section 223 or the date of recording
of information under section 173.”
27. This explanation, along with Section 515 BNSS
(corresponding to Section 469 Cr.P.C.), conclusively
resolves the issue in dispute. The explanation to Section
514 BNSS unequivocally states that the relevant date for
computing the period of limitation is the date of filing the
complaint under Section 223 BNSS or recording the
information under Section 173 BNSS.
28. In the present case, the occurrence took place
on 03.04.2021, and the FIR was registered on the same
day. Consequently, the date of institution of prosecution is
03.04.2021, being the date of FIR registration. In light of
the settled legal position, it is clear that the case is not
barred by limitation, as the charge sheet filing date is
irrelevant for computing the limitation period. Therefore,
the prosecution in this case is well within the prescribed
limitation period.”
7.2. This Court also in Zakaria Farah Mohamed Vs. The Inspector
of Police in Crl.OP(MD)No.6077 of 2021 has held as follows:-
“7. Delay in filing the final report is not a ground
to quash FIR when the nature of offence and other
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relevant circumstances does not warrant in the interest of
justice. Further, a crime never dies and would reach its
logical end either in acquittal or conviction. The same
was considered in detail manner by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Japani Sahoo v. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty
reported in (2007) 7 SCC 394 held as follows:-
“14. The general rule of criminal justice is that “a
crime never dies”. The principle is reflected in the well-
known maxim nullum tempus aut locus occurrit regi (lapse
of time is no bar to Crown in proceeding against
offenders). The Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply to
criminal proceedings unless there are express and specific
provisions to that effect, for instance, Articles 114, 115,
131 and 132 of the Act. It is settled law that a criminal
offence is considered as a wrong against the State and the
society even though it has been committed against an
individual. Normally, in serious offences, prosecution is
launched by the State and a court of law has no power to
throw away prosecution solely on the ground of delay.
52. In view of the above, we hold that for the
purpose of computing the period of limitation, the relevant
date must be considered as the date of filing of complaint
or initiating criminal proceedings and not the date of
taking cognizance by a Magistrate or issuance of process
by a court. We, therefore, overrule all decisions in which it
has been held that the crucial date for computing the
period of limitation is taking of cognizance by the
Magistrate/court and not of filing of complaint or initiation
of criminal proceedings.”
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8. The above ratio was affirmed by the Hon'ble
Constitution Bench of Supreme Court in Sarah Mathew v.
Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases, reported in AIR
2014 SC 448. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that
only prescribed period for preferring complaint to the
respondent police:-
'51. In view of the above, we hold that for the
purpose of computing the period of limitation under
Section 468 CrPC the relevant date is the date of filing of
the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution and
not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance. We
further hold that Bharat Kale [Bharat Damodar Kale v.
State of A.P., (2003) 8 SCC 559 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 39]
which is followed in Japani Sahoo [Japani Sahoo v.
Chandra Sekhar Mohanty, (2007) 7 SCC 394 : (2007) 3
SCC (Cri) 388] lays down the correct law. Krishna Pillai
[Krishna Pillai v. T.A. Rajendran, 1990 Supp SCC 121 :
1990 SCC (Cri) 646] will have to be restricted to its own
facts and it is not the authority for deciding the question as
to what is the relevant date for the purpose of computing
the period of limitation under Section 468 CrPC.
8.1. In this case, serious allegation is forgery of
exit permit. Using the sais forged exit permit, the
petitioner tried to go to Sri Lanka from Trichy Airport.
So, the Airport authorities seized the documents and
made a complaint to the respondent police. Based on the
said complaint, the respondent registered the case and
concluded the investigation belatedly. In the peculiar
circumstances of the case, the quashment of FIR is not in
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the interest of justice. The Hon'ble Supreme Court
reiterated the principle to consider the nature of the
offence in like situation. In this case, the petitioner is
facing the offence under the Foreigners Act, Passport Act
and relevant IPC provisions. So, this Court is not
inclined to accept the contention of the petitioner.
9. Even in the Hon'ble Supreme Court judgment
heavily relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner in
Vakil Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, [AIR 2009 SC
1822], the said principle is reiterated in the following
manner:-
“25. Where the Court comes to the conclusion that
the right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed,
the charges or the conviction, as the case may be, may be
quashed unless the Court feels that having regard to the
nature of offence and other relevant circumstances,
quashing of proceedings may not be in the interest of
justice. In such a situation, it is open to the Court to make
an appropriate order as it may deem just and equitable
including fixation of time-frame for conclusion of trial.”
10. In his counter, the Investigation Officer stated
that the number of summons issued to the persons
suspected in the fabrication of the above document had a
residence in Mumbai. Further, the case of the accused is
that in Hyderabad, one of his friends arranged the
alleged forged exit permit, so the investigation officer
issued summons and the said summons were not served
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to complete investigation. Hence, the delay occurred.
11. In the said circumstances, there was no
intentional delay on the part of the respondent. At this
stage, it is the duty of this Court to follow the principle
laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in
2013 4 SCC 642, 2012 Crl LJ 4206, 2012 9 SCC 241:
Ranjan Dwivedi v. CBI, (2012) 8 SCC 495:
“21. The reasons for the delay is one of the factors
which the courts would normally assess in determining as
to whether a particular accused has been deprived of his
or her right to speedy trial, including the party to whom
the delay is attributable. Delay, which is occasioned by
action or inaction of the prosecution is one of the main
factors which will be taken note of by the courts while
interjecting a criminal trial. A deliberate attempt to delay
the trial, in order to hamper the accused, is weighed
heavily against the prosecution.
....
The good cause exception to the speedy trial
requirement focuses on only one factor i.e. the reason for
the delay and the attending circumstances bear on the
inquiry only to the extent to the sufficiency of the reason
itself.
23. The length of the delay is not sufficient in itself
to warrant a finding that the accused was deprived of the
right to a speedy trial. Rather, it is only one of the factors
to be considered, and must be weighed against other
factors. Moreover, among factors to be considered in
determining whether the right to speedy trial of the
accused is violated, the length of delay is least conclusive.
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While there is authority that even very lengthy delays do
not give rise to a per se conclusion of violation of
constitutional rights, there is also authority that long
enough delay could constitute per se violation of the right
to speedy trial. In our considered view, the delay tolerated
varies with the complexity of the case, the manner of proof
as well as the gravity of the alleged crime. This, again,
depends on case-to-case basis. There cannot be universal
rule in this regard. It is a balancing process while
determining as to whether the accused's right to speedy
trial has been violated or not. The length of delay in and
itself, is not a weighty factor.
Niranjan Hemchandra Sashittal v. State of
Maharashtra, [(2013) 4 SCC 642]
24. It is to be kept in mind that on the one hand,
the right of the accused is to have a speedy trial and on
the other, the quashment of the indictment or the acquittal
or refusal for sending the matter for re-trial has to be
weighed, regard being had to the impact of the crime on
the society and the confidence of the people in the judicial
system. There cannot be a mechanical approach. From
the principles laid down in many an authority of this
Court, it is clear as crystal that no time-limit can be
stipulated for disposal of the criminal trial. The delay
caused has to be weighed on the factual score, regard
being had to the nature of the offence and the concept of
social justice and the cry of the collective.
8. In this case, the occurrence took place on 03.11.2020 and the FIR
was registered on 04.11.2020. In the said circumstances, the case of the
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petitioners to invoke Section 468(2)(c) Cr.P.C., is misconceived one. In the
said Section, the language used is that 'no Courts shall take cognizance of
the offence'. Therefore, only for taking cognizance alone, the period of
limitation is to be taken into account. Therefore, this Court declines to
accept the case of the petitioners to quash the proceedings by invoking the
proviso under Section 468(2) (c) of Cr.P.C.,
9. Accordingly, this Criminal Original Petition stands dismissed.
15.05.2025
NCC : Yes/No
Index : Yes/No
Internet:Yes/No
dss
To
1.The Inspector of Police,
Pamban Police Station,
Ramanathapuram District.
2.The Additional Public Prosecutor,
Madurai Bench of Madras High Court, Madurai.
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K.K.RAMAKRISHNAN, J.,
dss
Crl.O.P.(MD)No.19783 of 2024
15.05.2025
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