Madras High Court
R.Jayachandran vs The State Of Tamil Nadu on 5 February, 2025
Author: N. Anand Venkatesh
Bench: N. Anand Venkatesh
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
DATED 05.02.2025
CORAM
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE N. ANAND VENKATESH
W.P.No.3267 of 2023
and WMP Nos.3317 and 3318 of 2023
1. R.Jayachandran
2. Jeyakanthi ..Petitioners
Vs.
1. The State of Tamil Nadu,
Rep. By its Secretary to Government,
Revenue Department,
Fort St. George,
Chennai 600 009.
2. The Commissioner of Land Administration,
Ezhilagam,
Chepauk, Chennai 600 005 ... Respondents
Prayer : Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for
issuance of a Writ of Certiorari to call for the records of the 2nd respondent
pertaining the impugned order dated 20.01.2023 passed in ROC
No.K1/51512/2001 and quash the same.
1/24
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For Petitioners : Mr.Abudukumar Rajarathinam
Senior Counsel
for Mr.G.Krishnakumar
For Respondents : Mr.A.Selvendran
Special Government Pleader
ORDER
This writ petition has been filed challenging the proceedings of the
2nd respondent dated 20.01.2023.
2. The case of the petitioner is that on 15.03.1971, the father of the
petitioner purchased the subject property from one Perumal Naicker through a
registered sale deed. Thereafter, Settlement Officer issued a notice dated
24.01.1973 under Act 30 of 1963 and through proceedings dated 24.12.1999,
the Assistant Settlement Officer, Thiruvannamalai, primarily issued patta in
favour of the father of the petitioners. Pursuant to the same, on 10.07.2000, the
father of the petitioners executed a sale deed in favour of the Government of
Tamil Nadu, which was registered as Document No.1577 of 2000 and a portion
of the property was conveyed for the purpose of a inner ring road. Thereafter, a
claim was made over the property by filing a suit before the competent Civil
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Court seeking for the relief of declaration and recovery of possession by a third
party and this suit was also dismissed.
3. The further case of the petitioners is that a show cause notice came
to be issued by the 2nd respondent dated 21.06.2004 in exercise of power and
jurisdiction under Section 6 (c) of the Tamil Nadu Minor Inams (Abolition and
Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act 30 of
1963”). The proceedings was initiated for cancellation of the patta that was
issued in favour of the father of the petitioners by the Assistant Settlement
Officer, Thiruvannamalai. Ultimately, after nearly 20 years, the impugned
proceedings came to be issued by the 2nd respondent dated 20.01.2023
cancelling the patta that was issued in favour of the father of the petitioners and
a direction was also given to the Tasildhar to make necessary changes in the
revenue records.
4. Heard Mr.Abudukumar Rajarathinam, learned Senior Counsel for
Mr.G.Krishnakumar, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr.A.Selvendran,
learned Special Government Pleader for respondents.
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5. The submissions were made primarily on two grounds and they are
:-
(a) The 2nd respondent lacks power and jurisdiction under
Section 6(c) of the Act 30 of 1963. and
(b) The entire proceedings is barred by limitation and that
apart, the 2nd respondent virtually deprived the appellate remedy
that is available to the petitioners before the Tribunal and such
order was passed disregarding the specific power that has been
conferred under the Act.
6. The primary ground which has to be taken into consideration by
this Court is as to whether the order passed by the 2nd respondent in exercise of
power and jurisdiction under Section 6(c) of Act 30 of 1963 is sustainable. To
decide this issue, it will be relevant to extract Section 6 of Act 30 of 1963
hereunder :-
6.Powers of control of the Board of Revenue:- The Board of
Revenue shall have power :-
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(a) to give effect to the provisions of this Act
(b) to issue instructions for the guidance of [the Settlement
Officers] and Assistant Settlement Officers;
(c) to cancel or revise within each period as may be prescribed
any of the orders, acts or proceedings of [the Settlement
Officers], other than those in respect of which an appeal lies to
the Tribunal.
7. A plain reading of Section 6(c) of the Act 30 of 1963, makes it
clear that such suo-motu power can be exercised :-
(a) Where such cancellation or revision is made within the
period prescribed.
(b) Where it touches upon the orders, acts or Proceedings of
the Settlement Officers and
(c) Only in those cases in respect of which there is no appeal
provided to the Tribunal.
8. In the instant case, the patta was granted in favour of the father of
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the petitioners by the Assistant Settlement Officer, primarily through
proceedings dated 24.12.1999. It will be very relevant to take note of the fact
that the father of the petitioners had conveyed a portion of the property to the
Government of Tamil Nadu for the purpose of putting up a inner ring road and
the same was done through a registered sale deed dated 10.07.2000 registered
as document No.1577 of 2000. It is also quite evident that the patta was issued
not by the Settlement Officer but it was actually issued by the Assistant
Settlement Officer, Thiruvannamalai. As against the order passed by the
Assistant Settlement Officer, an appeal lies under Section 11 (3) of the Act
within a period of one year from the date of the order for the Government and
three months insofar as the other persons, who are aggrieved.
9. Insofar as the Assistant Settlement Officer is concerned, the
functions of an Assistant Settlement Officer is dealt with under Section 5 of the
Act and it is clearly stated that the Assistant Settlement Officer shall be
subordinate to the Settlement Officer and it is the Settlement Officer, who will
have the power to revise the orders passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer
within the period prescribed other than those in respect of which an appeal lies
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to the Tribunal.
10. The 2nd respondent has exercised power and jurisdiction under
Section 6(c) of the Act as against an order passed by the Assistant Settlement
Officer against whose order there is an appeal provided to the Settlement
Officer and such power has been exercised in the year 2004 and whereas, the
proceedings of the Assistant Settlement Officer is of the year 1999. That apart,
there is a further appeal before the Tribunal which power has now been
conferred on the Commissioner of Land Administration. Thus, the 2nd
respondent, who is the Appellate Authority in this case has virtually denied that
right to the petitioners and has exercised the power of suo-motu revision which
again goes against the language used under Section 6(c) of the Act.
11. I had an occasion to deal with the similar issue in WP No.35303 of
2007 in the case of [R.Jeyachandran Vs. The State of Tamil Nadu and others]
dated 15.07.2022. The relevant portions are extracted hereunder :-
17. In order to understand the scope of the provision of
Section 6(c) of the Act, it will be more gainful to take note of an
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in pari materia provision which was available under the Tamil
Nadu Estate (Abolition and conversion into ryotwari) Act 1948.
The provisions under Section 6 of Act 30 of 1963 is impari
materia to Section 7 of that Act. Similarly, Section 11 of the Act
30 of 1963 is in pari materia to Section 15 of that Act. While
considering those provisions, a Division Bench of this Court had
an occasion to deal with the effect of the same. The findings
rendered by the Division Bench in that judgement will have a
direct bearing on the issue that is involved in the present writ
petition. In view of the same, the relevant portions in the
judgement in [Rajathi and another Vs. The Principal Secretary
to Commissioner of Land Administration and another] reported
in 2013 2 LW 485 are extracted hereunder :~
12. But, however, in the case on hand, it is not the case of the
petitioners that suo motu revision cannot be taken by the first
respondent exercising the power under clause (c) of Section 7 of
the Act without an application before him. The point that has
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been canvassed by the learned counsel appearing for the
petitioners is that such power could be exercised in a case other
than an appeal remedy is available. In order to appreciate the
said contention, it would be useful to extract clause (c) of Section
7 of the Act and the same is extracted hereunder:~
7. Powers of control of the Board of Revenue:~
(a)
(b)
(c) to cancel or revise any of the orders, acts or proceedings of
any Settlement Officer other than those in respect of which an
appeal lies to be Tribunal or of any managers; and
(d) The said provision clearly contemplates that the Board of
Revenue shall have the power to cancel or revise any of the
orders, acts or proceedings of any Settlement Officer other than
those in respect of which an appeal lies to the Tribunal or of any
managers. That means, if the remedy of appeal is provided under
the Act to challenge the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer,
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the suo motu revision cannot be taken up exercising power under
clause (c) of Section 7 of the Act.
13. In the given case on hand, it is not the case of the
respondents that there is no appeal remedy against the order of
the Assistant Settlement Officer, Dharapuram. Section 15 of the
Act clearly spells out that against the decision of the Settlement
Officer, an appeal will lie before the Government. It would be,
therefore useful to extract the said provision and the same is
extracted hereunder:~
“ 15. Determination of lands in which the landholder is entitled
to ryotwari patta under foregoing provisions:~ (1) The
Settlement Officer shall examine the nature and history of all
lands in respect of which the landholder claims a ryotwari patta
under section 12, 13 or 14 as the case may be, and decide in
respect of which lands the claim should be allowed.
(2)(a) Against a decision of the Settlement Officer under
sub~section (1), the Government may, within one year from the
date of commencement of the Tamil Nadu Estates (Abolition and
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Conversation into Ryotwari) Amendment Act, 1954, or from the
date of the decision, whichever is later, and any person aggrieved
by such decision may, within two months from the date, appeal to
the Tribunal;
Provided that the Tribunal may, in its discretion, allow further
time not exceeding six months from the filing of any such
appeal;
Provided further that the Tribunal may, in its discretion,
entertain an appeal by the Government at any time if it appears
to the Tribunal that the decision of the Settlement Officer was
vitiated by fraud or by mistake of fact.
(b) The decision of the Tribunal on any such appeal shall be
final and not be liable to be questioned in any Court of Law.“
14. A reading of clause (c) of Section 7 of the Act coupled
with Section 15 of the Act will make it amply clearly that suo
motu revision could be entertained by the first respondent, if
there is no appeal remedy available to challenge the order of the
Assistant Settlement Officer. In the case on hand, since the
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appeal remedy is available as provided under Section 15 of the
Act, in our considered view, as rightly contended by the learned
counsel appearing for the petitioners, the suo motu revision will
not lie before the first respondent.
15. We may add that the power given to an authority under an
Act or Rule has to be exercised strictly only in accordance with
the mode provided therein. It cannot be denied that the power
clothing with an authority through the legislation has to be
exercised within the four corners of its conferment. It cannot be
travelled beyond that. The language employed in the provisions
of an Act can be interpreted only if there is any ambiguity and
the Courts have no power to enter into the field of presumption
or assumption. Absolutely there is no possibility to travel beyond
what has been set out in the provisions to a statue. Therefore, in
our considered view, when clause (c) of Section 7 of the Act
clearly spells out that suo motu revision could be exercised for
cancelling or revising the order passed by the Settlement Officer
other than those in respect of which an appeal lies before the
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Tribunal, leaving the remedy available under Section 15 of the
Act, which envisages an appeal, the first respondent has no legal
right to entertain suo motu revision, that too, after nearly 11
years from the date of the order of the Assistant Settlement
Officer, Dharapuram.
16. The Courts are normally bound to give effect to the plain
meaning of the words used in the statute, unless and otherwise
such an interpretation leads to some absurd or illogical
consequence or is in variance with the intention of the
legislature. In this connection, the judgement reported in (2002)
1 SCC 633, Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai Vs. Anjum
H. Ghaswala and others, more so para 29 of the said judgement
is usefully extracted here under:~
“29. Nextly, the Commission has elaborately discussed the object
of introduction of Chapter XIX~A in the Act, the history behind
the introduction and schematic rationalization of the provisons
of Chapter XIX~A brought about through the Finance Act, 1987
to hold that in exercising its power under Chapter XIX~A it has
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almost an unbridled power to arrive at a settlement. This exercise
of purposive interpretation by looking into the object and scheme
of the Act and legislative intendment would arise, in our opinion,
if the language of the statute is either ambiguous or conflicting
or gives a meaning leading to absurdity. We do no find any such
problem in the provisions of the Act to which we have already
referred to....“
17. That apart, it has to be seen that it is not the case of the
respondents that the first petitioner has played fraud on the
Assistant Settlement Officer, Dharapuram and got patta in her
favour.
18. For all the reasons stated above, we are of the considered
view that the impugned show cause notice issued by the first
respondent exercising power under clause (c) of Section 7 of the
Act is liable to be set aside.
18. The Division Bench of this Court in no uncertain terms
held that in a case where an appeal remedy is available as
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provided under Section 15 of the Tamil Nadu Estate (Abolition
and conversion into ryotwari) Act 1948, the suo~motu power of
revision under Section 7(C) of that Act cannot be invoked. Infact,
that was a case where the commissioner of land administration
had put forth the plea of fraud played by the petitioner before the
Assistant Settlement Officer. In the teeth of such a serious
allegation, the Division Bench proceeded to consider the scope of
invoking the suo~motu revision and held that, the power or
authority given under an Act or a Rule has to be exercised
strictly only in accordance with the mode provided therein.
19. The above findings of the Division Bench will squarelly
apply to the facts of the present case. In this case, the order
passed by the Assistant Settlement officer dated 19.07.2000 was
an appellable order under Section 11 (3) of Act 30 of 1963. In
view of the same, the 2nd respondent did not have the power or
jurisdiction to invoke the suo~motu revision power under Section
6(c) of the Act. Hence, the impunged order dated 20.12.2002 is
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illegal and is liable to be interfered by this Court. Accordingly,
the same is hereby quashed.
12. It is also brought to the notice of this Court that another single
Judge of this Court has also relied upon the Judgement of the Division Bench in
Rajathi case in WP No.26301 of 2009 by order dated 08.03.2022 and had
setaside the suo-motu revision power exercised by the authority. The Division
Bench Judgement in WA No.1748 of 2015 dated 25.09.2023 was also placed
before this Court.
13. It is clear from the above that the 2nd respondent lacks power and
jurisdiction under Section 6(c) of the Act, since the requirements were not
fulfilled as explained supra.
14. The next issue that was placed for consideration before this Court
is the question of limitation. It is not necessary for this Court to independently
go into this issue since even under Section 6(c) of the Act, it specifically states
that such cancellation or revision of the orders passed by the Settlement Officer
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must be made within such period as may be prescribed. The period has been
prescribed under Section 11 (3) of the Act and there is no dispute that the
proceedings itself was initiated by the 2nd respondent much beyond the period
prescribed. The order passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer was on
24.12.1999 and whereas, the proceedings were initiated by the 2nd respondent
through show cause notice issued in the year 2004.
15. When it comes to the issue of limitation, the Apex Court has recently
held in [Union of India and another Vs. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy(d)
through his Lr] reported in 2024 SCC online SC 489 that the question of
limitation is not merely a technical consideration or a procedural formality and
it involves a substantive right. For proper appreciation, Paragraph Nos.26 and
27 are extracted hereunder :-
26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court
must take into consideration while considering whether the delay
should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of
the appellants, it appears that they want to fix their own period of
limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has
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prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has
lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of
his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-
deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot
be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be
preferred as against the technical considerations. While
considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not
start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to
first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the
party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause
assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is
equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of
the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.
27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not
merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are
based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of
equity. We should not keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging
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over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be
determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants.
16. The other connected issue that was raised is that the 2nd
respondent has virtually usurped the appellate remedy available and that the
power was exercised other than the manner in which it has been prescribed
under the Act. For this purpose, useful reference can be made to the judgement
in [Manohar Lal (Dead) by Lrs Vs. Ugrasen (dead) by Lrs and others]
reported in 2010 11 SCC 557 and the relevant portions are extracted hereunder
:-
23. Therefore, the law on the question can be summarised to the
effect that no higher authority in the hierarchy or an appellate or
revisional authority can exercise the power of the statutory
authority nor can the superior authority mortgage its wisdom
and direct the statutory authority to act in a particular manner. If
the appellate or revisional authority takes upon itself the task of
the statutory authority and passes an order, it remains
unenforceable for the reason that it cannot be termed to be an
order passed under the Act.
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17. Yet another judgement that can be taken note of is the judgement
in [Hussein Ghadially alias M.H.G.A Shaikh and others Vs. State of Gujarat]
reported in 2014 8 SCC 425 and the relevant portions are extracted hereunder :-
21.1.We say so firstly because the statute vests the grant of
approval in an authority specifically designated for the purpose.
That being so, no one except the authority so designated, can
exercise that power. Permitting exercise of the power by any
other authority whether superior or inferior to the authority
designated by the statute will have the effect of rewriting the
provision and defeating the legislative purpose behind the same
—a course that is legally impermissible. In Joint Action
Committee of Air Line Pilots' Assn. of India v. DG of Civil
Aviation [(2011) 5 SCC 435] this Court declared that even senior
officials cannot provide any guidelines or direction to the
authority under the statute to act in a particular manner.
21.3.Thirdly, because if the statute provides for a thing to be
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done in a particular manner, then it must be done in that manner
alone. All other modes or methods of doing that thing must be
deemed to have been prohibited. That proposition of law first was
stated in Taylor v. Taylor [(1875) LR 1 Ch D 426] and adopted
later by the Judicial Committee in Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor
[(1935-36) 63 IA 372 : (1936) 44 LW 583 : AIR 1936 PC 253]
and by this Court in a series of judgments including those in Rao
Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh [AIR 1954 SC
322 : 1954 Cri LJ 910] , State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh [AIR
1964 SC 358 : (1964) 1 Cri LJ 263 (2)] , Chandra Kishore Jha v.
Mahavir Prasad [(1999) 8 SCC 266] , Dhanajaya Reddy v. State
of Karnataka [(2001) 4 SCC 9 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 652] and Gujarat
Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Essar Power Ltd. [(2008) 4 SCC 755]
The principle stated in the above decisions applies to the cases at
hand not because there is any specific procedure that is
prescribed by the statute for grant of approval but because if the
approval could be granted by anyone in the police hierarchy the
provision specifying the authority for grant of such approval
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might as well not have been enacted.
18. It is pellucid from the above judgments that where a hierarchy has
been prescribed under an enactment, the power that is exercised must be in the
manner prescribed under the Act and if any Appellate authority takes upon
himself the task of passing an order, it becomes unenforceable since it is not in
line with the hierarchy prescribed under the Act. Similarly, when the statute
provides for a thing to be done in a particular manner, it must be done in that
manner alone.
19. In the considered view of this Court, the suo-motu power that was
exercised by the 2nd respondent is not within the scope of Section 6(c) of the
Act, since every other condition that has been mandated under that provision
has not been fulfilled. That apart, even on the issue of limitation, the power has
been exercised much beyond the period of limitation and also by an authority
who has been vested with the appellate power in the place of the Tribunal. Thus
in every way, the impugned proceedings of the 2nd respondent dated 20.01.2023
suffers from illegality and it requires the interference of this Court.
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20. In the result, the proceedings of the 2nd respondent dated
20.01.2023 passed in ROC No.K1/51512/2001 is hereby quashed and this writ
petition stands allowed. No costs. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous
petitions are closed.
05.02.2025
Internet : Yes
Index : Yes
Speaking Order
rka
To
1. The State of Tamil Nadu,
Rep. By its Secretary to Government,
Revenue Department,
Fort St. George,
Chennai 600 009.
2. The Commissioner of Land Administration,
Ezhilagam,
Chepauk, Chennai 600 005
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N. ANAND VENKATESH, J.
rka
and WMP Nos.3317 and 3318 of 2023
05.02.2025
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
