Madras High Court
M/S. Bharat Petroleum ... vs H.A. Mohd. Aleemuddin on 22 August, 2023
AS Nos.538 and 391 of 2022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
DATED : 22.08.2023
CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE R.SUBRAMANIAN
and
THE HONOURABLE MRS.JUSTICE R.KALAIMATHI
A.S.Nos.538 and 391of 2022
and CMP Nos.20022/22 and 17780/23 in AS No.538 of 2022
AS No.538 of 2022
1. M/s. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd.,
Bharat Bhavan, 4 & 6, Curimbhay Road,
P.B.No.688, Ballard Estate,
Mumbai – 400 001.
(Rep. By its Chairman & Managing Director)
2. The General Manager, (Madras Division)
M/s. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd.,
Ranganathan Gardens,
Off 11th Main Road, Anna Nagar,
Chennai 600 040.
3. The Chief Divisional Manger, (Madras Division)
M/s. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd.,
Ranganathan Gardens,
Off 11th Main Road, Anna Nagar,
Chennai 600 040. ... Appellants/ Defendants 1 to 4
Vs
1. H.A. Mohd. Aleemuddin
2. Mrs. Rasheed Begum @ Rasheed Aleemuddin
3. Mr. Rajiv Sampath
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1/24
AS Nos.538 and 391 of 2022
4. Mr.s Jutika R.Sampath
5. Mrs. B.J. Sampat
6. Mrs. Nila B. Sampat
7. Mr. Punit Sampat
8. Mrs. Sweta P. Sampat
9. Mr.Hamir B. Sampat
10. Mrs. Jidnyasa Hamir Sampat
... Respondents 3to 10/Plaintiffs 1 to 10
5th Respondent died, Respondents 3,4 & 6 to 10 are recorded
as legal representatives of the deceased 5th Respondent
vide order dated 22.08.23 made in CMP No.17773 of 2023
[RSMJ & RKMJ]
11. T.K.Koshi, Formerly General Manager,
(Madras Division M/s. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd,
No.1 Ranganathan Gardens,
Off 11th Main Road, Anna Nagar,
Chennai 40. ... 11th Respondent / 4th Respondent
This appeal is filed under Section 96 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, to set aside the judgement and decree dated 26.10.2021, made
in O.S.No.7082/2019 in so far as relief “A” is concerned, on the file of
XVI Additional City Civil Court, Chennai.
For Appellants : Mr.A.K.Sriram, Senior Counsel
for M/s. O.S.karthikeyan
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AS Nos.538 and 391 of 2022
For Respondents : Mr.R.Parthasarathy, Senior Counsel
for M/s. Rahul Balaji, for RR3 to 10
RR 1 and 2 – served – No appearance
R11 – Retired from service
AS No.391 of 2022
1. Mr. Rajiv Sampath
2. Mrs. Jutika R.Sampath
Mrs. B.J. Sampat (Deceased)
3. Mrs. Nila B. Sampat
4. Mr. Punit Sampat
5. Mrs. Sweta P. Sampat
6. Mr.Hamir B. Sampat
7. Mrs. Jidnyasa Hamir Sampat ... Appellants/Plaintiffs 3 to 10
vs.
1. M/s. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd.,
Bharat Bhavan, 4 & 6, Curimbhay Road,
P.B.No.688, Ballard Estate,
Mumbai – 400 001.
(Rep. By its Chairman & Managing Director)
2. The General Manager, (Madras Division)
M/s. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd.,
Ranganathan Gardens,
Off 11th Main Road, Anna Nagar,
Chennai 600 040.
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AS Nos.538 and 391 of 2022
3. The Chief Divisional Manger,
M/s. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd.,
Ranganathan Gardens,
Off 11th Main Road, Anna Nagar,
Chennai 600 040.
4. T.K.Koshi, Formerly General Manager,
M/s. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd,
... Respondents/Defendants
5. H.A. Mohd. Aleemuddin
6. Mrs. Rasheed Begum @ Rasheed Aleemuddin
... Respondents/Plaintiffs 1 & 2
This appeal is filed under Section 96 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, to set aside the judgement and decree of the learned XVI
Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai dated 26.10.2021 passed in
O.S.No.7082 of 2019 to the extent of dismissing prayer (f) of the
appellants herein seeking Mesne Profits.
For Appellants : Mr.R.Parthasarathy, Senior Counsel
for M/s. Rahul Balaji
For Respondents :Mr.A.K.Sriram, Senior Counsel
for M/s. O.S.karthikeyan, for RR1 to 3
R5 & R6 served – No appearance
R4 – Retired from service
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AS Nos.538 and 391 of 2022
COMMON JUDGEMENT
(Judgment of the Court was delivered by R.SUBRAMANIAN, J.)
The defendants 1 to 3 in OS No.7082 of 2019 (CS No.121 of 1998
on the file of the original side of this Court) on the file of the XVI
Additional City Civil Judge, Chennai are the appellants. The suit was
laid for the relief of recovery of possession of Schedule II property,
mesne profits and for several other reliefs by respondents 1 and 2 in this
Appeal as plaintiffs 1 and 2.
2. According to the plaintiffs, the suit I Schedule property
measuring about 11726 sq. ft. was leased to the appellants on 01.06.1969
for a period of 20 years, when the appellant Corporation was known as
Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Company of India Ltd.
Subsequently upon acquisition of the said Company under the Burma
Shell (Acquisition of Undertakings in India) Act 1976, the lease was
transferred to the appellants herein. The original plaintiffs viz. the
respondents 1 and 2 herein had purchased the property subject matter of
lease on 29.07.1981. During the year 1993, there was an understanding
between the original owners viz. plaintiffs 1 and 2 and the appellants
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AS Nos.538 and 391 of 2022
herein, wherein the appellants agreed to surrender the entire extent of
11726 sq.ft. subject to the condition that the respondents 1 and 2
purchased alternate land at Sathangadu for the purposes of the appellant
Corporation.
3. Pursuant to the said understanding, according to the original
plaintiffs, a Lease cum Sale Agreement was entered into between the
Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority then known as the Madras
Metropolitan Development Authority and the appellants herein, for
allotment of a piece of land for relocation of the Petrol Bunk which is
situate in Schedule II property. It is claimed that the consideration for the
said Lease cum Sale Agreement was paid by the original plaintiffs and it
is denied by the Corporation. Claiming that after having obtained the
land at Sathangadu under the lease cum sale agreement marked as
Ex.A22, the defendants have not vacated the entire extent of the suit
property and they had only surrender an extent of 7700 sq. ft. and
retained possession of 4026 sq. ft. The original plaintiffs had filed the
suit for recovery of possession and for other reliefs.
4. The suit was resisted by the Corporation contending that the suit
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AS Nos.538 and 391 of 2022
is premature, since it had exercised its option for renewal of the lease on
29.03.1989 under Ex.A7 followed by Exs.A8 & A9 dated 03.04.1989 and
16.05.1989. In view of the provisions of the Burma Shell (Acquisition of
Undertakings in India) Act 1976, one statutory renewal is available to the
Corporation for a period of 20 years and the option having been
exercised, the lease stood extended upto 31.05.2009 and therefore the
suit is premature. It was also contended that the suit as framed is not
maintainable in this Court, since leave to sue has not been obtained in
respect of the relief sought for in respect of the III Schedule property,
which was admittedly situate outside the jurisdiction of the Court.
5. An application under Order VII Rule 11 of the code of Civil
Procedure was also filed seeking rejection of the plaint on the ground
that the suit is premature. This Court held that in the light of the
averments made in the plaint, it cannot be said that the suit is premature
and dismissed the application. There was no appeal against the said
order. The respondents 3 to 10 herein purchased the property from the
original plaintiffs under Exs.A30 to A33 on 21.01.2004. Thereafter, by
notice dated 03.03.2004, the defendant attorned the tenancy to the
purchasers on 03.03.2004 under Ex.A34. Thereafter the purchasers were
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AS Nos.538 and 391 of 2022
impleaded as parties to the suit as plaintiffs 3 to 10 by order dated
19.04.2007.
6. Upon amendment of the Madras City Civil Courts Act and
enhancement of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the City Civil Court, the
suit stood transferred to the City Civil Court from the original side of this
Court and was numbered as OS No.7082 of 2019.
The following issues were framed for trial on 04.12.2007:
1. Whether the defendants are entitled to
protection under the provisions of Section 5(2) and 7(3)
of the Burmah Shell Acquisition Act, 1976 on the
existing terms and conditions with regard to the plaint
Schedule-II mentioned property;
2. Whether the defendants are liable to handover
vacant possession of plaint Schedule-II mentioned
property;
3. Whether the defendants are liable to execute a
deed reconveying the plaint Schedule-III mentioned
property in favour of the plaintiffs;
4. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for a
direction directing the defendants to enter into a fresh
lease deed with the plaintiff in respect of plaint
Schedule-III mentioned property or whether the
plaintiffs are entitled to the alternative prayer pleaded
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AS Nos.538 and 391 of 2022
in this regard in the plaint;
5. Whether the defendants are liable to pay to the
plaintiffs a sum of Rs.1,26,949/- being the excess
amount wrongfully collected by the defendants towards
compensation in respect of plaint Schedule-I mentioned
property;
6. Whether the defendants are liable to pay a sum
of Rs.4,52,000/- towards past mesne profits for use and
occupation of plaint Schedule-II mentioned property
from 12.2.1997 to 11.1.1998 at the rate of Rs.10/- per
sq. ft;
7. Whether the defendants are liable to pay a sum
of Rs.45,200/- per mensem towards future mesne profits
for the use and occupation of plaint Schedule-II
mentioned property;
8. Whether the defendants are liable to pay a sum
of Rs.35,500/- towards past mesne profits for the use
and occupation of plaint Schedule-III mentioned
property from 1.12.1995 to 15.1.1998;
9. Whether the defendants are liable to pay a sum
of Rs.1000/- per mensem towards future mesne profits
for the use and occupation of plaint Schedule-III
mentioned property; and
10. To what other reliefs the parties are entitled
to.
Additional issues were framed on 08.02.2016:
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AS Nos.538 and 391 of 2022
1. Whether the Court is having territorial jurisdiction to
entertain the suit;
2. Whether leave of the Court is necessary for
institution of the suit; and
3. Whether the suit is bad for joinder of cause of action.
7. At trial, the third plaintiff was examined as P.W.1 and the first
plaintiff was examined as P.W.2, Exhibits A1 to A53 were marked. One
Tr.Kshitiji Midha,Territorial Manager of the appellant was examined as
D.W.1, Exhibits B1 to B13 were marked.
8. The learned Trial Judge on a consideration of the evidence on
record concluded that the plaintiffs 3 to 10 would be entitled to the relief
of recovery of possession of the II Schedule property. It negatived all the
other reliefs that were sought for. The original plaintiffs, who were
interested in the other reliefs except the relief of mesne profits for the II
Schedule property, had not filed an Appeal against the dismissal of their
suit for those Appeals. The defendants 1 to 3 are on Appeal against the
decree for possession and the plaintiffs 3 to 10 are on Appeal against the
rejection of their claim for mesne profits and for damages for use and
occupation.
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AS Nos.538 and 391 of 2022
9. We have heard Mr.A.K.Sriram, learned Senior Counsel
appearing for the appellants in A.S.No.538 of 2022 and respondents 1 to
3 in AS No.391 of 2022 and Mr.R.Parthasarathy, learned Senior Counsel
appearing for respondents 3, 4 and 6 to 10 in AS No.538 of 2022 and
appellants 1 to 7 in AS No.391 of 2022. The other parties though served
are not appearing either in person or through counsel duly instructed.
10. Mr.A.K.Sriram, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
appellants in A.S.No.538 of 2022 would contend that the Trial Court was
not right in decreeing the suit for possession as the lease was in currency
on the date when the suit was instituted. According to the learned Senior
Counsel on the exercise of option by the Corporation pursuant to the
statutory provisions of the Burma Shell (Acquisition of Undertakings in
India) Act 1976, the lease stood automatically renewed upto 31.05.2009,
therefore without terminating the lease in the manner known to law, the
suit filed for possession is premature. He would also contend that except
the relief (a) viz. the relief for possession of the property and the relief
for recovery of mesne profits of Schedule II Property, the other reliefs
relating to Schedule III property could not have been maintained in this
Court without leave being obtained since the property subject matter of
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AS Nos.538 and 391 of 2022
those reliefs viz. the Schedule III property is situate outside the
jurisdiction of this Court. The learned Senior Counsel is in unenviable
position and is unable to urge any other ground since the lease period has
expired on 31.05.2009 and the position of the appellants as of today is
that of trespassers.
11. Mr.R.Parthasarathy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for
respondents 3, 4 and 6 to 10 in AS No.538 of 2022 would submit that the
suit has been held to be not premature by an order of this Court dated
13.06.2011 made in the Application No.7080 of 2010 filed under Order
VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure and that order having not
been appealed against, the appellant cannot now raise the issue relating
to the deficiency of cause of action for the suit. The learned counsel
would also point out that the suit for possession was on the basis of the
plea that there was an agreement between the defendants 1 to 3 and the
original plaintiffs for surrender of possession on purchase of the land at
Sathangadu and therefore, it cannot be said that the suit was without any
cause of action.
12. On the maintainability of the suit without leave having been
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AS Nos.538 and 391 of 2022
obtained under Clause 12 with reference to the other prayers, the learned
Senior Counsel Mr.R.Parthasarathy would submit that those prayers have
been rejected by the City Civil Court and there is no Appeal by the
original plaintiffs, who figure as respondents 1 and 2 in AS 538 of 2022,
therefore, we need not dwell upon that issue at all. Addressing the issue
relating to rejection of the relief for damages for use and
occupation/mesne profit, learned Senior Counsel would contend that the
Trial Court was not right in rejecting the same on the ground that there is
no evidence on record, he would submit that once it is found that the
defendants are in possession even after the expiry of the lease and their
possession is akin to that of the trespassers, they are liable for damages
for use and occupation. He would also submit that the Court can grant a
decree for mesne profits and relegate the quantum to be determined after
an enquiry to be held under Order XX Rule 12 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
13. From the above arguments of the counsel on either side,
the following points emerge for consideration:
(i) Whether the suit could be dismissed as
premature even in a case where the lease had expired
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AS Nos.538 and 391 of 2022
by the time the suit is taken up for disposal.
(ii) Whether the fact that leave has not been
obtained for the reliefs claimed in respect of the
Schedule III property would affect the maintainability
of the suit for possession in respect of Schedule II
Property which is admittedly within the jurisdiction of
this Court.
(iii) Whether the Trial Court was right in
rejecting the relief of mesne profits on the ground that
there was no evidence.
Point No.I:
14. Admittedly, the original lease was entered into on 15.09.1969
with effect from 01.06.1969 for a period of 20 years and the same
expired on 31.05.1989. The option to renew was exercised on 29.03.1989
and therefore, the lease stood extended upto 31.05.2009. If the suit
simplicitor for eviction had been filed prior to 31.05.2009 without any
other claim, it has to be thrown out as premature. As rightly pointed out
by Mr.Parthasarathy, learned Senior Counsel, the suit originally filed was
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AS Nos.538 and 391 of 2022
not only based on a termination of an existing tenancy, it was based on an
alleged understanding between the parties that there was an arrangement
in the year 1993 by which the defendants had agreed to surrender
possession of the entirety of the property upon obtaining alternate land at
Sathangadu. Whether such an arrangement has been proved or not is a
different question. In the light of the averments in the plaint to that
effect, we cannot conclude that the suit was completely without cause of
action. This very question was addressed by this Court while deciding
Appn No.7080 of 2010, an application filed under Order VII Rule 11
seeking rejection of the plaint. Hon’ble Mr.Justice V.Ramasubramanian,
had after a detailed analysis of the pleadings of the parties and after
considering the various judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and
this Court held that the suit cannot be said to be without cause of action
and this surrender of a portion of the land in the year 1997 was also
considered by the Hon’ble Judge to conclude that there is a possibility
for the plaintiff to contend that the defendants have waived the benefits
under the Section 5(2) and &7(3) of the Burma Shell (Acquisition of
Undertakings in India) Act 1976. The Hon’ble Judge observed as
follows:
“30. The above events, which have happened
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AS Nos.538 and 391 of 2022
after the defendants invoked the provisions for the
renewal of the lease, show that there is a possibility
for the plaintiffs to contend that the defendants
waived the benefits of Sections 5(2) and 7(3). In other
words, it is possible for the plaintiffs to contend in the
case on hand that the benefits of Sections 5(2) and
7(3) are not available any more to the defendants, in
view of the defendants agreeing to take up an
alternative site and also surrendering a major part of
the leasehold land on 12.02.1997. The possibility for
the plaintiffs raising such a contention cannot be
scuttled by throwing the plaint out under Order VII,
Rule 11. In my view, the events that happened
subsequent to 29.3.1989, which diluted the benefits
available under Section 5(2) of the Act, do certainly
disclose a cause of action for the plaintiffs. It must be
remembered that after a full fledged trial, the
plaintiffs may even fail in establishing that the
conduct of the defendants amounted to waiver of the
rights conferred by Section 5(2). But, it is a
fundamental principle that a Court cannot reject a
plaint on a presumption that the plaintiff may
ultimately fail in their suit.”
14.1. Therefore, we do not think that the appellant Corporation
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AS Nos.538 and 391 of 2022
could be allowed to contend that the suit is premature on the date of its
institution and therefore it should be dismissed. Useful reference can also
be made to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vithalbhai (P)
Ltd v. Union Bank of India, reported in 2005 (4) SCC 315, where the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as follows:
“21. Where the right to sue has not matured on the
date of the institution of the suit an objection in that
regard must be promptly taken by the defendant. The Court
may reject the plaint if it does not disclose the cause of
action. It may dismiss the suit with liberty to the plaintiff
to file a fresh suit on its maturity. The plaintiff may himself
withdraw the suit at that stage and such withdrawal would
not come in the way of the plaintiff in filing the suit on its
maturity. In either case, the plaintiff would not be
prejudiced. On the other hand, if the defendant by his
inaction amounting to acquiescence or waiver allows the
suit to proceed ahead then he cannot be permitted to
belatedly urge such a plea as that would cause hardship,
may be irreparable prejudice, to the plaintiff because of
lapse of time. If the suit proceeds ahead and at a much
later stage the Court is called upon to decide the plea as
to non-maintainability of the suit on account of its being
premature, then the Court shall not necessarily dismiss the
suit. The Court would examine if any prejudice has been
caused to the defendant or any manifest injustice would
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AS Nos.538 and 391 of 2022
result to the defendant if the suit is to be decreed. The
Court would also examine if in the facts and circumstances
of the case it is necessary to drive the plaintiff to the need
of filing a fresh suit or grant a decree in the same suit
inasmuch as it would not make any real difference at that
stage if the suit would have to be filed again on its having
matured for filing.
22. We may now briefly sum up the correct position
of law which is as follows :
A suit of a civil nature disclosing a cause of action even if
filed before the date on which the plaintiff became actually
entitled to sue and claim the relief founded on such cause
of action is not to be necessarily dismissed for such
reason. The question of suit being premature does not go
to the root of jurisdiction of the Court; the Court
entertaining such a suit and passing decree therein is not
acting without jurisdiction but it is in the judicial
discretion of the Court to grant decree or not. The Court
would examine whether any irreparable prejudice was
caused to the defendant on account of the suit having been
filed a little before the date on which the plaintiff's
entitlement to relief became due and whether by granting
the relief in such suit a manifest injustice would be caused
to the defendant. Taking into consideration the explanation
offered by the plaintiff for filing the suit before the date of
maturity of cause of action, the Court may deny the
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AS Nos.538 and 391 of 2022
plaintiff his costs or may make such other order adjusting
equities and satisfying the ends of justice as it may deem
fit in its discretion. The conduct of the parties and
unmerited advantage to plaintiff or disadvantage
amounting to prejudice to the defendant, if any, would be
relevant factors. A plea as to non-maintainability of the
suit on the ground of its being premature should be
promptly raised by the defendant and pressed for decision.
It will equally be the responsibility of the Court to examine
and promptly dispose of such a plea. The plea may not be
permitted to be raised at a belated stage of the suit.
However, the Court shall not exercise its discretion in
favour of decreeing a premature suit in the following cases
: (i) When there is a mandatory bar created by a statute
which disables the plaintiff from filing the suit on or before
a particular date or the occurrence of a particular event;
(ii) when the institution of the suit before the lapse of a
particular time or occurrence of a particular event would
have the effect of defeating a public policy or public
purpose; (iii) if such premature institution renders the
presentation itself patently void and the invalidity is
incurable such as when it goes to the root of the Court's
jurisdiction, and (iv) where the lis is not confined to
parties alone and affects and involves persons other than
those arrayed as parties, such as in an election petition
which affects and involves the entire constituency. (See :
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AS Nos.538 and 391 of 2022
Samar Singh v. Kedar Nath and Ors., reported in 1987
Supp. SCC 663). One more category of suits which may be
added to the above is: where leave of the Court or some
authority is mandatorily required to be obtained before the
institution and was not so obtained.”
14.2. Viewing from any angle, we do not think that the appellant
could be allowed to raise the issue relating to maintainability of the suit
on the date of its institution. Since almost a quarter of a century has gone
by since the institution of the suit. We will be doing violence to the very
concept of justice, if we are to entertain such a plea and drive the
plaintiffs to another suit after a quarter century. As pointed out by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag &
Another v. Katiji and Ors., reported in 1987 (2) SCC 107, technical
considerations should take a back seat when they are pitted against a
substantial justice. We are therefore unable to sustain the contention of
the learned counsel for the appellant that the suit should have been
thrown out as premature.
14.3. Hence Point No.I is answered in favour of the Plaintiffs.
Point No.II:
15. Adverting to the next submission of Mr.A.K.Sriram, learned
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Senior Counsel, relating to the maintainability of the suit with reference
to the Schedule III property, we do not see any necessity to dwell into the
said issue as the Trial Court has dismissed the suit with reference to those
reliefs and the same are not subject matter of any of the two Appeals
which are before us. The prayers for possession of the II Schedule
property and recovery of mesne profits are completely severable from the
other prayers. We do not find any unity of cause of action and also the
reliefs are not interdependent or interlinked. We, therefore, do not see
any reason to consider the said question, excepting to observe that the
non maintainability or otherwise of the suit relating to the other prayers
with reference to the Schedule III property would not affect the
maintainability of the suit with reference to the Schedule II property.
15.1. Hence Point II is answered in favour of the Plaintiffs.
Point No.III:
16. On the issue of mesne profits, we find that the Trial Court has
erred in rejecting the prayer outright. It is not in dispute that the rents
agreed upon upto 31.05.2009 have been paid. Thereafter the
plaintiffs/appellants in AS No.391 of 2022 have, in our opinion, rightly
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AS Nos.538 and 391 of 2022
refused to receive the rents which was a pittance compared to the value
of the property that was in the occupation of the Corporation.
Admittedly, the Corporation is in occupation of very valuable land of an
extent of about 4026 sq. feet. Order XX Rule 12 of the Code of Civil
Procedure enables a Court to pass a decree for possession and for
directing an enquiry as to mesne profits that would be payable. When the
appellants in AS No.538 of 2022 are continuing in possession dehors the
expiry of the lease, it would be a travesty of justice to favour them with
the dismissal of the suit for mesne profits.
16.1. Being a Navratna Company the appellants in AS No.538 of
2022 ought to have come forward to pay a fair rent, if they do not, the
Court can always compel to pay them such rents. We, therefore, find that
the Trial Court ought to have relegated the matter to an enquiry since it
cannot be said that the plaintiffs 3 to 10 are not entitled to mesne profits.
Since their ownership is admitted, the tenancy is attorned to them and the
possession of the appellants in AS 538 of 2022 is akin to that of
trespassers after 31.05.2009.
16.2. Hence we find that the plaintiffs would be entitled to a
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AS Nos.538 and 391 of 2022
decree for mesne profits also which shall be determined in an enquiry to
be held under Order XX Rule 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The
plaintiffs 3 to 10 would be entitled to mesne profits from 01.06.2009 till
the date they get vacant possession.
17. In fine, the Appeal in AS No.538 of 2022 is dismissed with
costs and Appeal in AS 391 of 2022 is allowed with costs, the decree for
possession granted by the Trial Court is confirmed. There will be a
decree for mesne profits from 01.06.2009 till date of delivery of
possession and the quantum is relegated to an enquiry under Order XX
Rule 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The plaintiffs 3 to 10 would also
be entitled to costs of the suit. Consequently the connected miscellaneous
petitions are closed.
(R.SUBRAMANIAN, J .) (R.KALAIMATHI, J.)
22.08.2023
jv
Index : Yes/No
Internet : Yes/No
Speaking order/Non Speaking order
Neutral Citation: Yes/No
To
The XVI Additional Judge,
City Civil Court, Chennai.
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AS Nos.538 and 391 of 2022
R.SUBRAMANIAN, J.
and
R.KALAIMATHI, J.
jv
To
The XVI Additional Judge,
City Civil Court,
Chennai.
A.S.Nos.538 and 391of 2022
and CMP Nos.20022/22 and 17780/23 in AS No.538 of 2022
22.08.2023
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
