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Mrs.Amjathkhan Sharmila Siraj vs The Income Tax Officer
2022 Latest Caselaw 119 Mad

Citation : 2022 Latest Caselaw 119 Mad
Judgement Date : 4 January, 2022

Madras High Court
Mrs.Amjathkhan Sharmila Siraj vs The Income Tax Officer on 4 January, 2022
                                                                      W.P.(MD)No.2387 of 2020

                       BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT

                                               DATED: 04.01.2022

                                                    CORAM:

                                  THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE M.SUNDAR

                                           W.P.(MD)No.2387 of 2020
                                                    and
                                          W.M.P(MD).No.2043 of 2020



                     Mrs.Amjathkhan Sharmila Siraj                      : Petitioner


                                                       Vs.




                     1. The Income Tax Officer,
                        Income Tax Department,
                        Office of the Income Tax Officer,
                        Non Corp. Ward 3 (3) MDU,
                        No.2, V.P.Rathinasamy Nadar Road,
                        CR Building, Bibikulam,
                        Madurai – 625 002.

                     2. The Union of India,
                        Rep. by the Secretary to the Government,
                        Ministry of Finance,
                        Income Tax Department,
                        New Delhi.                                        : Respondents




https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

                     1/14
                                                                               W.P.(MD)No.2387 of 2020

                     PRAYER: Writ Petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of
                     India for issuance of Writ of Certiorari calling for the records relating to
                     the                   impugned               Assessment                   Order
                     No.ITBA/ASTS/S/144/2019-20/1021992420(1) issued by the first
                     respondent and quash the same.
                                       For Petitioner   : Mr.V.Veerapandian
                                       For Respondents : Mr.N.Dilip Kumar,
                                                         Senior Standing Counsel for Income Tax
                                                         for R1
                                                         Ms.S.Ragaventhre,
                                                         Junior Standing Counsel for Central
                                                         Excise and Customs

                                                       ORDER

********************

In the captioned main writ petition an 'assessment order dated

09.12.2019 bearing reference No.ITBA / ASTS /S /144 / 2019-20 /

1021992420(1)' and a consequential 'demand notice which has also dated

09.12.2019 bearing reference No. ITBA / AST / S / 156 / 2019-20 /

1021992539(1)' have been assailed and the same shall be collectively

referred to as 'impugned orders' for the sake of convenience and clarity.

2. Mr.V.Veerapandian, learned counsel for writ petitioner

notwithstanding very many averments made in the writ affidavit and very https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

W.P.(MD)No.2387 of 2020

many grounds raised in the writ affidavit, in the hearing, made one

focussed submission qua his campaign against the impugned orders and

that one point is the writ petitioner was served with a show cause notice

dated 23.11.2019 fixing hearing date and time on 29.11.2019 at 10:30

AM qua assessment order 2017-18, writ petitioner went over to the

Office of the first respondent but she was informed that the first

respondent is on leave. Thereafter, the impugned orders came to be

issued and therefore it would only be appropriate that one opportunity is

given to the writ petitioner to explain her stand as the matter pertains to

cash deposits made by the writ petitioner during demonetisation period.

3. In response to the aforementioned focussed submission made by

learned counsel for writ petitioner, Mr.N.Dilip Kumar, learned Revenue

counsel adverting to the counter-affidavit submitted that the averment of

the writ petitioner that she went over to the Office of the first respondent

has been specifically denied. To be noted, the averment that the writ

petitioner went over to the Office of the first respondent has been made

in paragraph 6 of the writ petitioner's affidavit and the same has been

refuted in paragraph 6 of the counter-affidavit of the Revenue.

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W.P.(MD)No.2387 of 2020

A scanned reproduction of Paragraph 6 of the writ petitioner's

affidavit is as follows:

A scanned reproduction of Paragraph 6 of first respondent's

counter-affidavit is as follows:

I do not propose to enter upon the aforementioned factual disputation in

writ jurisdiction.

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W.P.(MD)No.2387 of 2020

4. This takes us to the other submissions made by learned Revenue

counsel. Learned Revenue counsel submits that the 23.11.2019 show

cause notice is not the first and lone notice which the writ petitioner was

served with. Adverting to typed set of papers filed along with the

counter-affidavit, learned Revenue counsel submitted that a notice under

Section 143(2) of 'the Income Tax Act, 1961' [hereinafter 'IT Act' for the

sake of convenience and brevity] dated 10.08.2018 was issued followed

by another notice under Section 143(2) of IT Act dated 28.09.2018. Both

these notices did not evoke any reply is learned Revenue counsel's say.

Thereafter, a notice dated 14.01.2019 under Section 142(1) of IT Act was

issued and it is only after all of these that aforementioned 23.11.2019

show cause notice was issued is learned Revenue counsel's emphatic say.

5. Learned counsel for writ petitioner, by way of reply arguments

submitted that at the time of inception of captioned writ petition, an

interim order was made on 07.02.2020 saying that there shall be an order

of interim stay subject to payment of 25% of the amount demanded and

this payment of 25% of the amount demanded has since been made.

There is no disputation on this aspect of the matter.

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W.P.(MD)No.2387 of 2020

6. In the light of the narrative thus far, the matter on hand, in my

considered opinion now hinges on one argument of learned Revenue

counsel and that argument is alternate remedy available to the writ

petitioner by way of an appeal under Section 246A of IT Act. Learned

Revenue counsel also points out that it is well open to the writ petitioner

to avail the alternate remedy and also make a prayer before the appellate

authority to not to treat the writ petitioner as 'Assessee-in-default' and

under normal circumstances, such an interim prayer is acceded to on

condition that 20% of the demand should be deposited. To be noted, in

the case on hand 25% of the demand has already been paid.

7. Alternate remedy rule is no doubt not an absolute rule. It is a

rule of discretion. It is not only a rule of discretion, it is a self-imposed

restraint qua writ jurisdiction. However, Hon'ble Supreme Court in a long

line of authorities starting from Dunlop India case [Assistant Collector

of Central Excise, Chandan Nagar, West Bengal Vs. Dunlop India

Ltd., and others reported in (1985) 1 SCC 260] ; Satyawati Tandon

[United Bank of India Vs. Satyawati Tondon and others reported in

(2010) 8 SCC 110] and K.C.Mathew [Authorized Officer, State Bank of

Travancore and another Vs. Mathew K.C. reported in (2018) 3 SCC https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

W.P.(MD)No.2387 of 2020

85], has repeatedly held that when it comes to fiscal law Statutes,

alternate remedy rule has to be applied with utmost rigour. Relevant

paragraph in Dunlop case law is paragraph No.3 and relevant portion of

the same reads as follows:

'3. ....... Article 226 is not meant to short-circuit or circumvent statutory procedures. It is only where statutory remedies are entirely ill-suited to meet the demands of extraordinary situations, as for instance where the very vires of the statute is in question or where private or public wrongs are so inextricably mixed up and the prevention of public injury and the vindication of public justice require it that recourse may be had to Article 226 of the Constitution. But then the Court must have good and sufficient reason to bypass the alternative remedy provided by statute. Surely matters involving the revenue where statutory remedies are available are not such matters. We can also take judicial notice of the fact that the vast majority of the petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution are filed solely for the purpose of obtaining interim orders and thereafter prolong the proceedings by one device or the other. The practice certainly needs to be strongly discouraged.'

(Underlining made by this Court to supply emphasis and

highlight)

Relevant paragraph in K.C.Mathew case is paragraph 10 and the

same reads as follows:

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W.P.(MD)No.2387 of 2020

'10. In Satyawati Tondon the High Court had restrained further proceedings under Section 13(4) of the Act. Upon a detailed consideration of the statutory scheme under the SARFAESI Act, the availability of remedy to the aggrieved under Section 17 before the Tribunal and the appellate remedy under Section 18 before the Appellate Tribunal, the object and purpose of the legislation, it was observed that a writ petition ought not to be entertained in view of the alternate statutory remedy available holding: (SCC pp.123 & 128, Paras 43 & 55)

“43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this Rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc., the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

W.P.(MD)No.2387 of 2020

available under the relevant statute.

55.It is a matter of serious concern that despite repeated pronouncement of this Court, the High Courts continue to ignore the availability of statutory remedies under the DRT Act and the SARFAESI Act and exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 for passing orders which have serious adverse impact on the right of banks and other financial institutions to recover their dues. We hope and trust that in future the High Courts will exercise their discretion in such matters with greater caution, care and circumspection.'

(underlining made by this Court to supply emphasis highlight and for

ease of reference)

Paragraph 10 of K.C.Mathew case extracts Satyawati Tandon

principle i.e., portions of case law from Satyawati Tandon and the same

has been reproduced. Therefore, I deem it appropriate to not to burden

this order with extracts from Satyawati Tandon case.

8. In this regard, this Court deems it appropriate to refer to a recent

judgment which was rendered by a three Member Bench of the Hon'ble

Supreme Court on 03.09.2021 i.e., Commercial Steel Limited case [The

Assistant Commissioner of State Tax and others Vs. M/s.Commercial

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W.P.(MD)No.2387 of 2020

Steel Limited in Civil Appeal No.5121 of 2021] . Three Member Hon'ble

Bench had culled out the exceptions to the alternate remedy rule and had

clearly held that interference in writ jurisdiction will arise only in

exceptional cases where the exception adumbrated therein are attracted.

Relevant paragraphs in Commercial Steel case law are paragraph Nos.

11, 12 and the same read as follows:

'11 The respondent had a statutory remedy under section 107. Instead of availing of the remedy, the respondent instituted a petition under Article 226. The existence of an alternate remedy is not an absolute bar to the maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. But a writ petition can be entertained in exceptional circumstances where there is: (i) a breach of fundamental rights; (ii) a violation of the principles of natural justice; (iii) an excess of jurisdiction; or (iv) a challenge to the vires of the statute or delegated legislation.

12 In the present case, none of the above exceptions was established. There was, in fact, no violation of the principles of natural justice since a notice was served on the person in charge of the conveyance. In this backdrop, it was CA 5121/2021 7 not appropriate for the High Court to entertain a writ petition. The assessment of facts would have to be carried out by the appellate authority. As a matter of fact, the High Court has while doing this exercise proceeded on the basis of surmises. However, since we are inclined to relegate the respondent to the pursuit of the alternate statutory https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

W.P.(MD)No.2387 of 2020

remedy under Section 107, this Court makes no observation on the merits of the case of the respondent.'

9. To be noted, the exceptions qua alternate remedy rule are well

settled vide Whirlpool principle [Whirlpool Corporation Vs. Registrar

of Trade Marks, Mumbai and others reported in (1998) 8 SCC 1].

These exceptions are so well settled that it has come to stay as 'Whirlpool

exceptions' in litigation parlance. In the case on hand, the writ petitioner's

case does not fall in any one of the exceptions, i.e., there is no violation

of NJP (Natural Justice Principles) owing to the series of notices prior to

29.11.2019 show cause notice the details of which have been captured

supra.

10. A careful perusal of the narrative thus far will make it clear that

the writ petitioner has been given adequate and ample opportunities but

the writ petitioner has not availed the same. The argument that the notice

dated 10.08.2018 itself makes it clear that it is a e-process also weighs in

the mind of this Court. In the light of the alternate remedy being not only

efficacious and effective but also a highly tenable option in the case on

hand owing to 25% of demand having been already deposited by the writ

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W.P.(MD)No.2387 of 2020

petitioner, I deem it appropriate to relegate the writ petitioner to the

alternate remedy of an appeal under Section 246A of IT Act.

11. In the light of the narrative, discussion and dispositive

reasoning set out supra, I find no reason to interfere qua impugned orders

i.e., impugned assessment order dated 09.12.2019 and impugned demand

notice dated 09.12.2019, but it is made clear that if the writ petitioner

chooses to approach the appellate authority under Section 246A of IT

Act, it is well open to the appellate authority to consider the appeal on its

own merits and in accordance with law uninfluenced by any observation

made in this order which may come across as an observation on merits or

which may come across as an observation having the trappings of an

expression of opinion on merits of the matter.

12. Captioned writ petition is disposed of on above terms.

Consequently, captioned W.M.P is disposed of as closed. There shall be

no order as to costs.

04.01.2022

Index : Yes / No Internet : Yes / No pkn https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

W.P.(MD)No.2387 of 2020

To

1. The Income Tax Officer, Income Tax Department, Office of the Income Tax Officer, Non Corp. Ward 3 (3) MDU, No.2, V.P.Rathinasamy Nadar Road, CR Building, Bibikulam, Madurai – 625 002.

2. The Secretary, Union of India, Ministry of Finance, Income Tax Department, New Delhi.

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

W.P.(MD)No.2387 of 2020

M.SUNDAR., J.

pkn

W.P.(MD)No.2387 of 2020

04.01.2022

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

 
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