Citation : 2021 Latest Caselaw 20308 Mad
Judgement Date : 4 October, 2021
S.A.No.254 of 2007
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
DATED : 04.10.2021
CORAM
THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE R.HEMALATHA
S.A.No.254 of 2007
and
M.P.No.2.of 2007
1. Vijayaraghavan
2. Vijayaboopathy
3. Kalyani
4. Jayaraman
5. Sarangan
6. Kuppayee
7. Srinivasan
8. Ramachandiraman
9. Thangasamy
10.Rajakumari
11.Dhanalakshmi ...Appellants
Vs.
1. Radhakrishnan
2. Minor Munusamy (major)
Rep. by his father and guardian respondent ...Respondents
R2 declared as major and discharge his guardianship vide order of court
dated 26.02.2021 made in CMP No.6840/2020 in S.A.No.254 of 2007
(TKRJ)
Page 1 of 21
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/
S.A.No.254 of 2007
Prayer : Second Appeal filed under Section 100 of CPC, 1908 against the
decree and judgment dated 24.12.2003 passed in A.S. No.2 of 2003, on
the file of the Additional District Judge (Fast Track III), Vridhachalam,
reversing the decree and judgment dated 23.11.2001 passed in O.S.
No.222 of 1993, on the file of the Principal Sub Court, Vridhachalam.
For Appellants : Ms. Nilaphar
for Ms. R. Meenal
Respondents : Ms. Abirami Radhakrishnan
for Mr.V. Raghavachari.
JUDGMENT
The appellants are the defendants in O.S.No.222 of 1993 on
the file of the Subordinate Judge, Vridhachalam.
2. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to as
per their ranking in the trial court and at appropriate places, their ranking
in the present appeal would also be indicated.
3. The first plaintiff Kasiammal filed the suit in O.S.No.222
of 1993 against the defendants 1 to 11 for partition of the suit properties
in to four equal shares and to allot one such share to her.
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/ S.A.No.254 of 2007
4. The case of the first plaintiff is that the suit properties are the
self acquired properties of her father late Ramasamy and that though her
brothers and thereafter their children were giving share to the first
plaintiff from the income derived from the suit properties till the year
1991, subsequently stopped sharing the income. All the efforts of the first
plaintiff for partition of the suit properties went in vain and therefore, she
issued a legal notice dated 13.08.1992, a copy of which is marked as
Ex.A8, which also did not evoke any response from the defendants.
During the pendency of the suit the first plaintiff Kasiammal died and
thereafter her legal heirs were impleaded as plaintiffs 2 and 3 in the suit.
The plaintiff 2 and 3 amended the plaint by contending that the first
plaintiff executed two registered Wills on 06.12.1990 and 03.03.1993 in
favour of the plaintiffs 2 & 3 respectively bequeathing her 1/4 th share in
the suit properties. It is further contended by them that the properties
( Item Nos. 44 to 53) in Survey No.314/4C to 314/14 in Seppainatham
Village, are the exclusive properties of Janakiammal, the mother of the
first plaintiff. Their further contention is that Janakiammal purchased the
said properties through a registered sale deed dated 10.07.1920, a copy of
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/ S.A.No.254 of 2007
which is marked as Ex.A14.
5. The suit was resisted by the defendants on the following
grounds:
i. The suit filed by the plaintiffs is not maintainable.
ii. The suit properties were in joint possession of three brothers
namely Boorasamy, Govindasamy and Kumarasamy.
iii. Subsequent to the demise of Ramasamy the first plaintiff was
ousted from the suit properties.
iv. Though the properties in Survey No.314/4C to 314/14 (suit Item
Nos. 44 to 53) stood in the name of Janakiammal, the plaintiffs
cannot claim any right over the same.
6. The trial Court after framing appropriate issues and after full
contest, dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiffs vide its decree and
judgment dated 23.11.2001 on the following grounds:
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/ S.A.No.254 of 2007
i. The plaintiffs did not establish that the suit properties were the self
acquired properties of late Ramasamy.
ii. The suit properties are the joint family properties of three brothers
Boorasamy, Govindasamy and Kumarasamy and that the plaintiffs
can only claim 1/4 shares in respect of her father's share in the said
properties.
iii. Since the first plaintiff got married prior to 1989 and was ousted,
she cannot claim any right over the suit properties.
7. Aggrieved over the same, the plaintiff 2 & 3 filed an appeal
in A.S.No.2 of 2003 before the Additional District Judge, Fast Track
Court No.III, Vridhachalam. The learned Additional District Judge, after
analysing the evidence on record, reversed the findings recorded by the
trial court vide his judgment dated 24.12.2003 and decreed the suit in
favour of the plaintiffs and a preliminary decree for partition of the suit
properties into four equal shares and to allot one such share was passed
by the first appellate court.
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/ S.A.No.254 of 2007
8. Now, the present second appeal is filed on the following
Substantial Questions of Law :
(1) Whether in law the lower appellate court was right in
failing to see that Kasiyammal's right to a share, even
assuming that it existed, got extinguished by ouster
and that the respondents could not resuscitate a dead
cause?
(2) Whether in law the lower appellate court was right in
holding that the properties were the self acquisitions
of the plaintiff's father without any oral or
documentary evidence?
9. Ms..Nilaphar, learned counsel appearing for the appellants
contended that since the plaintiffs did not prove that the suit properties
were the self acquired properties of late Ramasamy and Janakiammal, the
plaintiffs cannot claim any right over the suit properties. she would also
contend that the first plaintiff got married in the year 1979 and no
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/ S.A.No.254 of 2007
amount was paid to her from the income derived from the suit properties
and that she has also been ousted from the suit properties.
10. A perusal of the written statements filed by the defendants
shows that nowhere in the written statements the defendants have denied
the contention of the plaintiffs that the suit Item Nos.1 to 43 are not the
self acquired properties of late Ramasamy. They have not also denied
that Item Nos.44 to 53 absolutely belonged to Janakiammal. In fact the
defendants in their written statements did not specifically state that Item
Nos. 1 to 43 are ancestral properties of late Ramasamy. As per Order VIII
Rule 5 of Code of Civil Procedure, where there is no denial of specific
allegations made in the plaint it is deemed to be admitted. Therefore, the
observation of the trial Court that suit Item Nos. 1 to 43 absolutely
belonged to late Ramasamy and Item Nos.44 to 53 absolutely belonged
to Janakiammal cannot be assailed. Moreover, the defendants by
pleading ouster had admitted the right of the plaintiffs in the suit
properties. In fact an attempt was made by the defendants during the
course of trial to appear as if late Ramasamy died prior to the advent of
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/ S.A.No.254 of 2007
the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. This is also without any pleadings.
However, the first appellate court found that late Ramasamy died only
after the advent of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. This observation of
the first appellate court is purely based on the evidence adduced on both
sides.
11. The first plaintiff Kasiammal, during her lifetime filed
another suit in O.S.No.609 of 1990 before the Principal District Munsif,
Cuddalore, against one of her brothers Govindasamy and the present
defendants 4 to 11 for partition of the properties belonging to her mother
Janakiammal into four equal shares and to allot one such share to her.
The suit was decreed by the Principal District Munsif, Cuddalore, on
26.09.1991 and a final decree for partition was passed on 29.09.2000 by
the Additional District Munsif, Cuddalore in I.A.No.73 of 1998. It is
pertinent to point out that neither Govindasamy Padayachi nor the
present defendants did not contest the suit. The properties mentioned in
the said suit have not been included in the present suit and since there is
nothing to upset the earlier decree passed in O.S.No.609 of 1990, the
subsequent suit filed by the plaintiff is maintainable.
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/ S.A.No.254 of 2007
12. The evidence on record shows that late Ramasamy did not
inherit any properties from his father or his ancestors and in the absence
of specific pleading by the defendants in the written statements that the
suit properties are the ancestral properties of late Ramasamy, the
plaintiff's case that the properties belonged to her father and mother and
after their death all the children are equally entitled to a share therein
stands proved. This is precisely the conclusion arrived at by the first
appellate court and the said finding does not call for any interference. It
is further contended by the defendants that no share of profits from the
suit properties was given to the first plaintiff after her marriage in the
year 1979 and therefore even if the first plaintiff is entitled to a share, it
got extinguished by ouster.
13. The Limitation Act, 1963 prescribes no time limit for filing
a suit for partition by a co-sharer or co-owner. However, under Article
110 of the Limitation Act, 12 years is the period prescribed for filing a
suit by a person who is excluded from joint family property to enforce a
right to the share and the starting point for limitation is when the
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/ S.A.No.254 of 2007
exclusion becomes known to the plaintiff. Thus, Article 110 requires for
its application,
i. the existence of joint family,
ii. joint family properties,
iii. the person excluded being one of the members of the joint family,
and
iv. exclusion of such member from a joint family.
14. It is also settled that possession of one co-sharer is the
possession of all co-sharers. In the instant case, the defendants had
merely contended that since the first plaintiff got married in the year
1979, she has been ousted from the suit properties. They have not even
prescribed title by adverse possession .
15. In P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L. Lakshmi Reddy reported in
AIR 1957 S.C. page 314 it is held as under:
“It is well settled that in order to establish adverse possession of one-co-heir as against another it is not enough to show that one
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/ S.A.No.254 of 2007
out of them is in sole possession and enjoyment of the profits, of the properties. Ouster of the non-possessing coheir by the co- heir in possession who claims his possession to be adverse, should be made out. The possession of one co-heir is considered, in law, as possession of all the coheirs. When one co-heir is found to be in possession of the properties it is presumed to be on the basis of joint title. The co-heir in possession cannot render his possession adverse to the other co-heir, not in possession, merely by any secret hostile animus of his own part in derogation of the other co-heir title. It is a settled rule of law that as between co-heirs there must be evidence of open assertion of hostile title, coupled with exclusive possession and enjoyment by one of them to the knowledge of the other so as to constitute ouster. This does not necessarily mean that there must be an express demand by one and denial by the other. There are cases which have held that adverse possession and ouster can be inferred when one co- heir takes and maintains notorious exclusive possession in assertion of hostile title and Continues in such possession for a very considerable time and excluded heir takes no steps to vindicate his title. It is well settled that the burden of making out ouster is on the person claiming to displace the lawful title of a co-heir by his adverse possession.”
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/ S.A.No.254 of 2007
In Shambu Prasad Singh v. Most. Phool Kumari reported in (1971) 2 SCC 28 : AIR 1971 S.C. page 1337 it is held at p ara 17 as under:
“On the question of adverse possession by a co-sharer, the law is fairly well settled. Adverse possession has to have the characteristics of adequacy, continuity and exclusiveness. The onus to establish these characteristics is on the adverse possessor. As between co-sharers, the possession of one co- sharer is in law the possession of all co-sharers. Therefore, to constitute adverse possession, ouster of the non-possessing co-
sharer has to be made out. As between them, therefore, there must be evidence of open assertion of a hostile title coupled with exclusive possession and enjoyment by one of them to the knowledge of the other.”
In Karbalai Begum v. Mohd. Sayeed reported in (1980) 4 SCC 396 : AIR 1981 S.C. 77 at para. 7 following proposition is laid down:
“It is well settled that mere non-participation in the rent and profits of the land of a co-sharer does not amount to an ouster so as to give title by adverse possession to the other co-sharer in possession. Indeed even if this fact is admitted, then the legal
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/ S.A.No.254 of 2007
position would be that the co-sharers in possession would become constructive trustees on behalf of the co-sharer who is not in possession and the right of such co-sharer would be deemed to be protected by the trustees. The possession of the defendants, apart from being in the nature of constructive trustees, would be in law the possession of the plaintiff.”
In Darshan Singh v. Gujjar Singh (dead) by LRs. reported in (2002) 2 SCC 62 : [2002 (1) ICC (S.C.) 578] at para 9 it is held as under:
“In our view, the correct legal position is that possession of a property belonging to several co-sharers by one cosharer shall be deemed that he possesses the property on behalf of the other cosharers unless there has been a clear ouster by denying the title of other co-sharers and mutation in the revenue records in the name of one cosharer would not amount to ouster unless there is a clear declaration that title of the other co-sharers was denied.”
The Apex Court in Binapani Paul v. Pratima Ghosh reported in (2007) 6 SCC 100 : [2007(2) HLR (S.C.) 234] at para. 39 has held as under:
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/ S.A.No.254 of 2007
“Interestingly, Amal pleaded ouster. If ouster is to be pleaded, the title has to be acknowledged. Once such a plea is taken, irrespective of the fact that as to whether any other plea is raised or not, conduct of the parties would be material. If, therefore, plea of ouster is not established, a fortiori the title of other co-
sharers must be held to have been accepted.”
The Apex Court in Jai Singh v. Gurmej Singh reported in 2009 AIR SCW page 3652 : [2009 (1) ICC (S.C.) 512] after referring to several earlier judgments, has laid down the following principles at para. 7 which reads as under:
“The principles relating to the inter se rights and liabilities of co-sharers are as follows:
1. A co-owner has an interest in the whole property and also in every parcel of it.
2. Possession of joint property by one co-owner is in the eye of law, possession of all even if all but one are actually out of possession.
3. A mere occupation of a larger portion or even of an entire joint property does not necessarily amount to ouster as the possession of one is deemed to be on behalf of all.
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/ S.A.No.254 of 2007
4. The above rule admits of an exception when there is ouster of a co-owner by another. But in order to negative the presumption of joint possession on behalf of all, on the ground of ouster, the possession of a co- owner must not only be exclusive but also hostile to the knowledge of the other as, when a co-owner openly asserts his own title and denies, that of the other.
5. Passage of time does not extinguish the right of the co- owner who has been out of possession of the joint property except in the event of ouster or abandonment.
6. Every co-owner has a right to use the joint property in a husband like manner not inconsistent with similar rights of other co-owners.
7. Where a co-owner is in possession of separate parcels under an arrangement consented by the other co-
owners, it is not open to anybody to disturb the arrangement without the consent of others expect by filing a suit for partition.”
16. It is settled that the plea of adverse possession raises a mixed question of law and fact. Where a person wants to base his title on it, he should specifically set up the plea. Unless the plea is raised, it cannot be entertained. A plea must be raised and it must be shown when
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/ S.A.No.254 of 2007
possession became adverse, so that the starting point of limitation against the party affected can be found. Therefore, a person who claims adverse possession should show:
(a) on what date he came into possession,
(b) what was the nature of his possession,
(c) whether the factum of possession was known to the other party,
(d) how long his possession has continued, and
(e) his possession was open, continuous and undisturbed."
17. It is also well settled that in order to establish adverse
possession of one co-heir as against another it is not enough to show that
one out of them is in sole possession and enjoyment of the profits, of the
properties. It is also seen from the above decisions cited supra, ouster of
the non-possessing co-heir by the co-heir in possession who claims his
possession to be adverse, should be made out and if ouster is to be
pleaded, the title has to be acknowledged. Once such a plea is taken,
irrespective of the fact that as to whether any other plea is raised or not,
conduct of the parties would be material.
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/ S.A.No.254 of 2007
18. In the instant case, as already observed, the defendants did
not contest the earlier suit filed by the plaintiff in the year 1990 and
therefore it has to be held that the plea of ouster is not established. It is
also to be noted that 'ouster' does not mean actual driving out of the co-
sharer from the property and mere non participation in the rent and
profits of the land of a co-sharer does not amount to an ouster so as to
give title by adverse possession to the other co-sharer in possession. In
fact the possession of co-sharer has to be construed as holding the
properties as a constructive trustee on behalf of the other co-sharer who
is not in possession and mere passage of time does not extinguish the
right of the co-owner who has been out of possession of the joint family
property. The first appellate court, in fact, had gone into all the above
aspects and had rightly decreed the suit filed by the plaintiffs.
19. As regards items 44 to 53 of suit properties, the first
appellate Court had observed in his judgment thus;
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/ S.A.No.254 of 2007
"If any property stands in the name of a female Hindu the
legal presumption which would arise is that properties
absolutely belongs to that female and contrary has to be
proved only by the persons who challenge it. The
respondents/defendants have miserably failed to prove that
suit items of properties 44 to 53 were not purchased by
Janaki Ammal. In view of Ex.A14 a clear legal presumption
existed in favour of Janakiammal and accordingly
Kasiyammal being the daughter of Janakiammal is entitled
to 1/4th share in the suit properties. The lower court has
miserably failed to see that first plaintiff/appellant did not
at all claim entire suit items of properties namely 44 to 53
as of her own but she claims only 1/4th share in respect of
those properties. This vital and factual aspects have not
been considered by the lower Court. The failure on the part
of the lower Court in not considering the aforesaid aspects
had resulted in the dismissal of the suit. Hence, decree and
judgment passed by the lower Court dismissing the suit in
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/ S.A.No.254 of 2007
entirety is not sustainable under law and accordingly this
point is answered in favour of plaintiffs/appellants."
In fact the first appellate court had analysed the evidence in a
thread bare manner and it is not necessary to reproduce the same here in
the second appeal. Suffice to say that all the observations made by the
first appellate court are based on well laid principles of law and hence the
substantial questions of law are answered against the appellants.
20. In the result,
i. the second appeal is dismissed. No costs.
Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is
closed.
ii. the decree and judgment 24.12.2003 passed the
learned Additional District Judge (Fast Track III),
Vridhachalam, in A.S. No.2 of 2003, are upheld.
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/ S.A.No.254 of 2007
iii. the decree and judgment dated 23.11.2001 passed by
the learned Principal Subordinate Judge,
Vridhachalam, in O.S. No.222 of 1993, are set aside.
04.10.2021 Index: Yes/No Internet: Yes/No Speaking/Non-Speaking order bga
To
1. The Additional District Judge (Fast Track III), Vridhachalam
2. The Principal Subordinate Judge, Vridhachalam,
3. The Section Officer, VR Section, High Court, Madras
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/ S.A.No.254 of 2007
R. HEMALATHA, J.
bga
S.A.No .254 of 2007
04.10.2021
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/
Publish Your Article
Campus Ambassador
Media Partner
Campus Buzz
LatestLaws.com presents: Lexidem Offline Internship Program, 2026
LatestLaws.com presents 'Lexidem Online Internship, 2026', Apply Now!