Madras High Court
Hiranandani Township Private ... vs The Chief Controlling Revenue ... on 2 December, 2021
W.P.Nos.17490 to 17497 of 2012
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
DATED : 02.12.2021
CORAM
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE G.K.ILANTHIRAIYAN
W.P.Nos.17490 to 17497 of 2012
W.P.No.17490 of 2012:-
Hiranandani Township Private Limited,
[now “Hiranandani Realtors Private Limited”]
Represented by its Authorized Signatory,
R.Rajaratnam
No.514, Dalamal Towers,
Nariman Point,
Mumbai – 400 021. ... Petitioner
-Vs-
1. The Chief Controlling Revenue Authority
And Inspector General of Registration,
No.120, Santhome High Road,
Mandavelli,
Chennai – 600 028.
2. The District Registrar,
Chengalpattu,
Kancheepuram District.
3. The Sub-Registrar,
Thiruporur,
Chengalpattu Taluk,
Kancheepuram District. ... Respondents
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Prayer in W.P.No.17490 of 2012:- Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India praying for the issuance of a Writ of Certiorarified
Mandamus to call for the records pertaining to the order of the First
Respondent in Proceedings bearing No.53024/P1/2011, dated 10th April 2012
and the Certificate bearing No.8039/B2/2008, dated 4th October 2011 issued by
the Second Respondent in respect of Agreement for Sale Dated 15th October
2007, registered as Doc.No.9752 of 2007 and quash the same and forbear the
Respondents from initiating any further action basis the Agreement for Sale
dated 15th October 2007 registered as Doc.No.9752 of 2007, on the file to the
third Respondent and/or pass such further or other orders as this Hon'ble Court
may think fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.
In all W.P.s
For Petitioner : Mr.M.S.Murali
for M/s.R and P Partners
For Respondents : Mr.S.Silambanan
Additional Advocate General
Assisted by Mr. Yogesh Kannadasan
Special Government Pleader.
COMMON ORDER
All the writ petitions have been filed to call for the records
pertaining to the order of the first respondent in proceedings, bearing
No.53024/P1/2011, dated 10.04.2012 and the Certificate bearing
No.8039/B2/2008, dated 04.10.2011 issued by the second respondent and
quash the same and forbear the respondents from initiating any further action
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basis the Agreement for sale in respect of the subject property.
2. The petitioner is one and the same in all the writ petitions. The
case of the petitioner is that the petitioner company had entered into an
agreement for sale with its vendor and presented for registration before the
third respondent and all the agreement for sale were registered in the following
manner for the purchase of certain agricultural lands,
S.No Doct. No Date of Vendor Purchaser Confirming Consideration
execution Party amount in
crores
1. 10325/2007 17.10.2007 1. Hiranandani M/s.Sai 3,50,59,999
D.Suresh Township Surya
Reddy Private Ltd., Realtors
2. and
M.R.K.S. Developers
Varma
2. 10326/2007 17.10.2007 1. D. Peter Hiranandani M/s.Sai 14,50,00,000
Francis Township Surya
2. Private Ltd., Realtors
P.Solomon and
Francis Developers
S.Fathima
Jeyamary
4.P.
Antony
Josephine
3. 10327/2007 17.10.2007 T.L. Hiranandani M/s.Sai 3,16,25,000
Sridharan Township Surya
Private Ltd., Realtors
and
Developers
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S.No Doct. No Date of Vendor Purchaser Confirming Consideration
execution Party amount in
crores
4. 10328/2007 17.10.2007 M. Hiranandani M/s.Sai 4,73,80,000
Kausalya Township Surya
Private Ltd., Realtors
and
Developers
5. 10329/2007 17.10.2007 E. Hiranandani M/s.Sai 14,53,60,000
Rajendran Township Surya
Private Ltd., Realtors
and
Developers
6. 9752/2007 15.10.2007 I. Hiranandani M/s.Sai 1,90,00,000
Narasimha Township Surya
Reddy Private Ltd., Realtors
7. 9753/2007 15.10.2007 T.Chandra Hiranandani M/s.Sai 3,00,00,000
sekar Township Surya
Private Ltd., Realtors
8. 4387/2008 23.4.2008 1.R.Mayilv Hiranandani M/s.Sai 4,02,50,000
aganan Township Surya
2.A.R. Private Ltd., Realtors
Rosekumar and
Developers
3. The lands comprised in various survey numbers situated at Thaiyur
Village, Chengalpattu Taluk, Kancheepuram District (herein after called as
"subject property"). The vendor had agreed to sell the subject property to the
petitioner company and agreed to execute a sale deed in favour of the petitioner
company, subject to satisfaction of clear and marketable title. Under the
agreement of sale, the full sale consideration was paid by the petitioner
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company to the vendor and the vacant possession was also handed over to the
petitioner company by its vendors. All the agreement for sale were presented
for registration and the petitioner had paid Rs.100/- towards stamp duty, as per
the Article 5(j) of the Schedule 1A of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, as applicable
in the State of Tamil Nadu (herein after called as "the Act") and also paid 1%
on the sale consideration as registration fees. Accordingly, the above said
manner of the agreement for sale were registered by the third respondent.
4. In pursuant to the said agreement for sale, the vendors executed
the sale deeds in favour of the petitioner in the following manner,
S.No Writ Agreement For Sale Period of Sale Deed
Petition Doc.No Presented Limitation Doc. No Presented
No. for Expired for
Registration on Registration
on on
1 17490 of 9752/2007 15.10.2007 14.10.2010 1104/2011 31.05.2010
2 17491 of 10327/2007 17.10.2007 16.10.2010 1103/2011 31.05.2010
3 17492 of 10329/2007 17.10.2007 16.10.2010 1106/2011 31.05.2010
4 17493 of 4387/2008 23.04.2008 22.04.2011 1105/2011 31.05.2010
5 17494 of 10325/2007 17.10.2007 16.10.2010 3804/2010 31.05.2010
6 17495 of 10326/2007 17.10.2007 16.10.2010 4227/2010 14.06.2010
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S.No Writ Agreement For Sale Period of Sale Deed
Petition Doc.No Presented Limitation Doc. No Presented
No. for Expired for
Registration on Registration
on on
7 17496 of 10328/2007 17.10.2007 16.10.2010 1107/2011 31.05.2010
8 17497 of 9753/2007 15.10.2007 14.10.2010 1108/2011 31.05.2010
5. At the time of registering the sale deeds, the petitioner company
had also paid the requisite stamp duty at 8% on the total sale consideration paid
to its vendors, under Article 23(a) of the Act and also paid requisite registration
fees at 1% on the sale consideration. After a period of nearly four years, the
second respondent issued show cause notice under Section 33A of the Act,
dated 08.08.2011, directed the petitioner company to pay a sum as deficit stamp
duty in respect of the agreements for sale which were registered, within a
period of 15 days from the date of receipt of the show cause notice. The said
show cause notice revealed that as per Accountant General's Audit, by the
letter, dated 17.09.2009 and 17.05.2010 on the file of the first respondent
issued the show cause notice, thereby to show cause as to why the alleged
deficit stamp duty should not be collected.
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6. On receipt of the same, the petitioner had raised preliminary
objections on 24.08.2011 that the claim for deficit stamp duty was time barred
one as per the 2nd proviso to Section 33A(1) of the Act. Thereafter, the second
respondent called upon the petitioner to attend a personal enquiry on
26.09.2011. The representatives of the petitioner company appeared before the
second respondent on 26.09.2011 for enquiry and filed written objections.
However, the second respondent issued certificate on 04.10.2011 for the
recovery of the deficit stamp duty from the petitioner. Aggrieved by the same,
the petitioner preferred an appeal before the first respondent. The first
respondent rejected the appeal by the impugned order dated 10.04.2012.
7. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the
petitioner company originally entered into agreement for sale with its vendors
in the year 2007 on various dates and registered the same before the third
respondent. In pursuant to the same and completion of all necessary
formalities, the vendors had also executed a sale deed in favour of the
petitioner and all the sale deeds were duly registered by the third respondent in
the year 2010 itself. Thereafter, that too after lapse of three years on
08.08.2011, the second respondent issued the show cause notice to call upon
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the petitioner company to pay the deficit stamp duty based on the Accountant
General's Audit report. It is clearly barred by limitation as contemplated under
2nd proviso to Section 33A(1) of the Act. The said proviso does not empower
the second respondent to issue any demand notice. In fact, after registration of
agreement for sale, the vendors had duly executed the sale deeds and there is
absolutely no loss to the Ex-chequer.
8. He further submitted that the second respondent issued the alleged
certificate without stating any reasons whatsoever for issuance of the same.
The second respondent also without considering the preliminary objections
raised by the petitioner, mechanically issued the certificate. He also submitted
that the second respondent had conveniently interpreted the proviso to Section
33A(1) of the Act, to state that the enquiry and personal hearing are distinct.
The Accountant General had initiated enquiry within the time limit and as such
the certificate is valid one. The section 33A(1) of the Act, does not empower
the Accountant General to initiate an enquiry as contemplated under the said
proviso is to be conducted by the second respondent for issuance of the said
certificate.
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9. The first respondent by the letter dated 17.05.2010 has directed the
second respondent to take steps under Section 33A of the Act against the
petitioner. Therefore, even according to the said letter dated 17.05.2010, they
issued after period of limitation. Therefore, the enquiry itself is contrary to the
provisions of law and as such the impugned order is liable to be set aside. He
further submitted that the petitioner in pursuant to the agreement for sale, the
sale deed itself executed and it has been completed even before the receipt of
show cause notice from the second respondent. The first respondent has failed
to consider the objections that the deed of "Agreement for Sale" cannot be
considered as "Power for Consideration" for the reason that the same has no
ingredients of Power of Attorney. The recitals of the agreement for sale does
not find couple with power.
10. Per contra, Mr.S.Silambanan, learned Additional Advocate
General filed counter and submitted that the petitioner entered into agreement
for sale with various vendors. The recitals of the agreement for sale invariably
finding place that the Accountant General raised an audit objection by the
report dated 17.09.2009 stating that all the documents ought to have been
treated as "Sale Agreement cum Power of Attorney given for Consideration"
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and the action of the registering officer in having treated them as a mere
agreement to sell has resulted in loss of revenue to the tune of Rs.1,97,36,000/-
(Rupees One Crore Ninety Seven Lakhs Thirty Six Thousand only).
11. On receipt of the same, the first respondent by the letter dated
25.08.2010 by pointing out the recitals of the agreements for sale and made
remarks that in the instant case, the consideration is fully received by the
Vendor, possession handed over and the intended buyer is permitted to transfer
the right over the property. Hence, in addition to agreement of sale, it should
also be classified as a "Power for Consideration" since the consideration passed
through this document alone. After examining the audit objection, the remarks
made by the first respondent, the Government accepted the audit objection and
the remarks made by the first respondent and directed the second respondent to
initiate appropriate proceedings under Section 33A of the Act by the
communication, dated 17.05.2010 to recover the loss. Accordingly, the second
respondent, after issuance of show cause notice, dated 08.08.2011, conducted
the enquiry and issued the certificate dated 04.11.2011 under Section 33A of
the Act for recovery of deficit stamp duty. It was rightly confirmed by the first
respondent.
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12. The learned Additional Advocate General further submitted that
the only ground raised by the petitioner is that the action initiated by the second
respondent is clearly barred by limitation as per the 2nd proviso to Section
33A(1) of the Act. Though, the proviso stated as "shall ", it is directory in
nature, and not mandatory. Therefore, the period of limitation does not apply
to the case on hand, since, the petitioner evaded the stamp duty to the tune of
Rs.1,97,36,000/- (Rupees One Crore Ninety Seven Lakhs Thirty Six Thousand
only). It is a huge loss to the Ex-chequer and as such the respondents rightly
passed the order to recover the deficit stamp duty from the petitioner. The
recitals of the agreement for sale, clearly proved that the vendor received the
entire sale consideration and had given a right to sell the property and also had
given the entire possession of the property along with all original documents.
Therefore, it can rightly be construed the said agreement for sale cum Power of
Attorney for consideration.
13. In support of his contentions, he relied upon the judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court of India passed in C.A.Nos.2586 to 2600 of 2020,
dated 15.06.2020.
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14. Heard Mr.M.S.Murali, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner
and Mr.S.Silambanan, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the
respondents.
15. The petitioner company had entered into an agreement for sale to
purchase various properties on various dates such as 15.10.2007, 17.10.2007
and 23.04.2008 of various properties comprised in various survey numbers
from different vendors. All the agreements were presented for registration on
various Document numbers before the third respondent. Thereafter, in
pursuant to the said agreements for sale, all the vendors had duly executed the
sale deed in favour of the petitioner on 31.05.2010 and 14.06.2010, on the same
day presented for registration before the third respondent. The third respondent
had duly registered all the sale deeds by various Document numbers on the
same day. While being so, the second respondent issued show cause notice on
08.08.2011 to show cause as to why the deficit stamp duty should not be
collected. The said show cause notice in pursuant to the first reference cited,
dated 17.09.2009 by the Accountant General and the second reference cited,
dated 17.05.2010 issued by the first respondent. Therefore, on the receipt of the
same, the petitioner submitted the preliminary objections that the show cause
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notice is barred by limitation, since, the 2nd proviso to Section 33A(1) of the
Act provides only three years time for initiation of enquiry under Section 33A
of the Act.
16. However, the second respondent conducted the enquiry and issued
the certificate, thereby directed the petitioner to pay the deficit stamp duty to
the tune of Rs.1,97,36,000/- (Rupees One Crore Ninety Seven Lakhs Thirty Six
Thousand only). Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner preferred an appeal
before the first respondent and the first respondent also dismissed the appeal
and confirmed the certificate issued by the second respondent. The only point
arose in all the writ petitions is that whether the proceedings initiated under
Section 33A(1) of the Act is barred by limitation or not?.
17. It is relevant to extract the provisions under Section 33A(1) of the
Act is as follows,
"33A. Recovery of deficit stamp duty -
(1) Notwith-stand-ing anything contained in
Section 33 or in any other provisions of this Act,
if, after the registration of any instrument under
the Registration Act, 1908 (Central Act XVI of
1908), it is found that the property stamp duty
payable under this Act in respect of such
instrument has not been paid or has been
insufficiently paid, such duty or the deficit, as the
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case may be, may, on a certificate from the
Registrar of the district under the Registration
Act, 1908 (Central Act XVI of 1908) be recovered
from the person liable to pay the duty, as an
arrear of land revenue:
Provided that no such certificate shall
be granted unless due inquiry is made and such
person is given an opportunity of being heard:
Provided further that no such inquiry
shall be commenced after the expiry of three years
from the date of registration of the instrument."
18. Thus, it is clear that no enquiry for the recovery of deficit stamp
duty shall be commenced after the expiry of three years from the date of
registration of the instrument. In all the writ petitions the agreements for sale
were registered on 15.10.2007, 17.10.2007 and 23.04.2008. Whereas, the
show cause notice issued by the second respondent only on 08.08.2011. i.e.
After a period of three years from the date of registration of all the sale
agreements. Therefore, the enquiry itself is vitiated as barred by limitation.
19. The learned Additional Advocate General vehemently contented
that the 2nd proviso to Section 33A(1) of the Act, is only directory in nature and
not mandatory. The provision under Section 33A(1) of the Act is only to
collect the deficit stamp duty and no one can evade the stamp duty. If any
authority concerned committed wrong, it shall not be an advantage of action to
be taken into account to evade deficit stamp duty. Generally speaking the
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provisions of a statute creating public duties are directory and those conferring
private rights are imperative.
20. In support of his contentions, he relied upon the judgment in Civil
Appeal No.2586-2600 of 2020 in the case of "The Inspector General of
Registration, Tamil Nadu and ors Vs K.Baskaran.", is extracted hereunder:-
19.1 It is submitted on behalf of the
Appellants that sub-sections (1)
and (2) of Section 47-A do not prescribe any time
limit and the stipulation
in Rule 7 ought to be seen in the context and
setting of various stages in
the proceedings. It is submitted: -
“…Rules 4-7 of Rules 1968 require the
collector/authority to perform various tasks namely
issuance of Form I notice by granting 21 days time to
the parties to represent his case with evidence,
consider the representations sent by the parties, verify
the records, call for information or record from the
public office, officer or authority, inspect the property
after due notice and recording statements of the
parties etc. Thereafter, the collector is required to
provisionally determine the market value by taking
into consideration of various factors mentioned in
Rules and the same has to be communicated to the
parties with Form II notice calling upon them to lodge
their objections if any. Thereafter he has to consider
the representations and points urged at the time of
hearing and pass an order determining the market
value of the properties and the duty payable on the
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instrument and communicate the said order. The
entire exercise is time consuming and the same cannot
be completed within 3 months time.”
21. The expression “within three months from the
date of first notice”
is crucial. Is the description “first notice”
referable to notice in Form I
issued in terms of Rule 4(1)? The answer would
obviously be in the
negative. Form I notice itself must give twenty-one
days to the concerned
persons to respond. Depending upon their
response, their statements
would be recorded and/or certain information may
be required to be called
for, whereafter the Order in Form II is to be
issued provisionally
determining the market value. The concerned
persons are entitled to raise
objections in writing and must be afforded
hearing. After fulfilling these
requirements, the order in terms of Rule 7 can be
passed. All these stages
may not be completed in three months.
Further, the reference in Rule 7 is to the
“first notice” and not to
“notice in Form I”. Considering the context and
various stages preceding
the stage of passing of the Order under Rule 7, the
reference has to be to
the first “notice in Form II”. There could possibly
be more than one
notices in Form II, specially when the hearing is
to take place on an
adjourned date and that is why the period must be
reckoned from the first
notice in Form II. The expression immediately
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following “first notice” in
Rule 7 is “determining the market value of the
properties….” That is also
indicative that the reference to the notice is one in
Form II in the
immediately preceding Rule 6.
22. We now deal with the question whether the
stipulation of period of
three months in Rule 7 is mandatory or directory.
23. Some of the decisions of this Court dealing
with question as to in
what circumstances and context a statutory
provision can be considered to
be mandatory or directory may first be noted.
A) In State of Mysore and others v. V.K. Kangan and
others21
a bench of three Judges of this Court observed: -
“10. In determining the question whether a provision is
mandatory or directory, one must look into the
subjectmatter
and consider the importance of the provision
disregarded and the relation of that provision to the
general object intended to be secured. No doubt, all
laws are mandatory in the sense they impose the duty
to obey on those who come within its purview. But it
does not follow that every departure from it shall taint
the proceedings with a fatal blemish. The determination
of the question whether a provision is mandatory or
directory would, in the ultimate analysis, depend upon
the intent of the law-maker. And that has to be gathered
not only from the phraseology of the provision but also
by considering its nature, its design and the
consequences which would follow from construing it in
one way or the other. … …”
B) In T.V. Usman vs. Food Inspector, Tellicherry
Municipality, Tellicherry22, this Court was called upon
to consider
whether stipulation of period in Rule 7(3) of the
Prevention of Food
Adulteration Rules, 1955 within which time the report of
the analysis
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of the sample must be delivered, would be mandatory or
directory.
This Court quoted the following passage from the
decision of the
Constitution Bench of this Court:-
“10. In Dattatraya Moreshwar v. State of Bombay23 it
was held as under:
“[G]enerally speaking the provisions of a
statute creating public duties are directory
and those conferring private rights are
imperative. When the provisions of a
statute relate to the performance of a public
duty and the case is such that to hold null
and void acts done in neglect of this duty
would work serious general inconvenience
or injustice to persons who have no control
over those entrusted with the duty and at
the same time would not promote the main
object of the legislature, it has been the
practice of the Courts to hold such
provisions to be directory only, the neglect
of them not affecting the validity of the
acts done.”
B.1) Thereafter, this Court considered the effect of
stipulation in
Rule 7(3):
“11. In Rule 7(3) no doubt the expression “shall” is
used but it must be borne in mind that the rule deals
with stages prior to launching the prosecution and it is
also clear that by the date of receipt of the report of
the Public Analyst the case is not yet instituted in the
court and it is only on the basis of this report of the
Public Analyst that the authority concerned has to
take a decision whether to institute a prosecution or
not. There is no time-limit prescribed within which
the prosecution has to be instituted and when there is
no such limit prescribed then there is no valid reason
for holding the period of 45 days as mandatory. Of
course that does not mean that the Public Analyst can
ignore the time-limit prescribed under the rules. He
must in all cases try to comply with the time-limit.
But if there is some delay, in a given case, there is no
reason to hold that the very report is void and on that
basis to hold that even prosecution cannot be
launched. May be, in a given case, if there is
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inordinate delay, the court may not attach any value to
the report but merely because the time-limit is
prescribed, it cannot be said that even a slight delay
would render the report void or inadmissible in law.
In this context it must be noted that Rule 7(3) is only
a procedural provision meant to speed up the process
of investigation on the basis of which the prosecution
has to be launched. No doubt, sub-section (2) of
Section 13 of the Act confers valuable right on the
accused under which provision the accused can make
an application to the court within a period of 10 days
from the receipt of copy of the report of Public
Analyst to get the samples of food analysed in the
Civil Appeal No.2586 of 2020 @ SLP (C)No.15790 of
Central Food Laboratory and in case the sample is
found by the said Central Food Laboratory unfit for
analysis due to decomposition by passage of time or
for any other reason attributable to the lapses on the
side of prosecution, that valuable right would stand
denied. This would constitute prejudice to the accused
entitling him to acquittal but mere delay as such will
not per se be fatal to the prosecution case even in
cases where the sample continues to remain fit for
analysis in spite of the delay because the accused is in
no way prejudiced on the merits of the case in respect
of such delay. Therefore it must be shown that the
delay has led to the denial of right conferred under
Section 13(2) and that depends on the facts of each
case and violation of the time-limit given in sub-rule
(3) of Rule 7 by itself cannot be a ground for the
prosecution case being thrown out.”
C) In P.T. Rajan vs. T.P.M. Sahir and others24 the
principles
were summed up as follows: -
“48. Furthermore, even if the statute specifies a time
for publication of the electoral roll, the same by itself
could not have been held to be mandatory. Such a
provision would be directory in nature. It is a
wellsettled
principle of law that where a statutory
functionary is asked to perform a statutory duty
within the time prescribed therefor, the same would
be directory and not mandatory. (See Shiveshwar
Prasad Sinha v. District Magistrate of Monghyr25,
Nomita Chowdhury v. State of W.B.26 and Garbari
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Union Coop. Agricultural Credit Society Ltd. v.
Swapan Kumar Jana27.)
49. Furthermore, a provision in a statute which is
procedural in nature although employs the word
“shall” may not be held to be mandatory if thereby no
prejudice is caused. (See Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd.
v. Municipal Board, Rampur28, State Bank of Patiala
v. S.K. Sharma29, Venkataswamappa v. Special Dy.
Commr. (Revenue)30 and Rai Vimal Krishna v. State of
Bihar31.)”
21. In the above case, it is arising out of the provisions under Section
47A of the Act and Rule 7 of the Tamil Nadu Stamp (Prevention of
undervaluation of instruments) Rules, 1968 . The Hon'ble Supreme Court of
India held that the period of three months as contemplated under Rule 7 of the
Tamil Nadu Stamp (Prevention of undervaluation of instruments) Rules, 1968,
is directory in nature. Further, held that a period of three months to the general
object of the provisions are considered, the fixation of period has to be taken to
be directory. Otherwise, the very object of sub-serving public interest and
securing public revenue would get defeated. However, the above judgment has
dealt with the provisions under Section 47A of the Act and Rule 7 of the Tamil
Nadu Stamp (Prevention of undervaluation of instruments) Rules, 1968 .
22. The provisions under 47A of the Act arose, while any deed of
conveyance presented for registration, if the registering authority has reason to
believe that the market value of the property of which is subject matter of
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conveyance has not been truly set forth in the instrument, the registering
authority after registering such documents, refer such documents to the
Collector, for determination of market value of such property. Till such time
the said document is treated as pending document. Whereas, as per the
provisions under Section 33A of the Act, after registering of any deed of
conveyance under the Registration Act, if it is found that the proper stamp duty
payable has not been paid or has been insufficiently paid, such duty or the
deficit as the case may be made on a certificate from the Registrar of the
Registration District, be recovered from the person liable to pay the duty, as an
arrear of land revenue. Though, in both the provisions meant to collect
insufficient stamp duty, one is pending registration and another one is after
registration. Therefore, the judgment cited by the learned Additional Advocate
General is not helpful to the case on hand.
23. That apart, the Rule 7 of the Tamil Nadu Stamp (Prevention of
undervaluation of instruments) Rules, 1968, contemplates the collector shall
after considering the representations received at the time of hearing and after
careful consideration of all the relevant factors and evidence, pass orders within
a period of three months, determining the market value of the property.
Therefore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, held that the Rule 7 of the
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W.P.Nos.17490 to 17497 of 2012
Tamil Nadu Stamp (Prevention of undervaluation of instruments) Rules, 1968
is only directory in nature and not mandatory.
24. Admittedly, the enquiry was initiated by the second respondent
after completion of three years and issued certificate as contemplated under
Section 33A of the Act. It is also curious to note that even before the issuance
of show cause notice dated 08.08.2011, in pursuant to the agreements for sale,
all the vendors, executed sale deeds in favour of the petitioner and all the sale
deeds were duly registered and released in favour of the petitioner. Therefore,
there is no loss to the Ex-chequer.
25. In view of the above, having regard to the statutory provisions, the
impugned proceedings of the First Respondent in Proceedings bearing
No.53024/P1/2011, dated 10th April 2012 and the Certificate bearing
No.8039/B2/2008, dated 4th October 2011 issued by the Second Respondent in
respect of Agreement for Sale Dated 15th October 2007, registered as
Doc.Nos.9752 of 2007, 9753 of 2007, 10328 of 2007, 10326 of 2007, 10325 of
2007, 4387 of 2008, 10329 of 2007 and 10327 of 2007 are hereby quashed.
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W.P.Nos.17490 to 17497 of 2012
26. Accordingly, these writ petitions are allowed. There shall be no
order as to costs.
02.12.2021
Internet : Yes
Index : Yes/No
Speaking order/Non-speaking order
mn
To
1. The Chief Controlling Revenue Authority,
And Inspector General of Registration,
No.120, Santhome High Road,
Mandavelli,
Chennai – 600 028.
2. The District Registrar,
Chengalpattu,
Kancheepuram District.
3. The Sub-Registrar,
Thiruporur,
Chengalpattu Taluk,
Kancheepuram District.
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
W.P.Nos.17490 to 17497 of 2012
G.K.ILANTHIRAIYAN, J.
mn
W.P.Nos.17490 to 17497 of 2012
02.12.2021
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
