Hari Mohan Gupta vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh Thr on 6 March, 2026

                          NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:7974




                                                                      1                WP. No. 5755 of 2016


                               IN THE        HIGH COURT              OF MADHYA PRADESH
                                                        AT G WA L I O R
                                                               BEFORE
                                   HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ANAND SINGH BAHRAWAT
                                                   ON THE 6th OF MARCH, 2026

                                                WRIT PETITION No. 5755 of 2016

                                                HARI MOHAN GUPTA
                                                      Versus
                                   THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH THR AND OTHERS


                          Appearance:
                          Shri M.P.S. Raghuvanshi Senior Advocate with shri Raj Bahadur Singh Tomar
                          -and Shri Girja Shankar Sharma - learned counsel for petitioner.
                          Shri B. M. Patel - Government Advocate for respondent/State.


                                                               ORDER

This petition, under Article 226 of Constitution of India, has been filed seeking the following relief (s):-

"i- That, the impugned order dated 10.8.2016 (Annexure P/1) may kindly be issued and following relief may be granted to the petitioner.

(ii) That, the appointment of the petitioner be upheld.

(iii) That, the other relief doing justice including cost be awarded."

2. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the petitioner is presently working on the post of Contract Teacher Grade-III and is posted in the

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Government Scheduled Caste Girls Hostel, Pichhore, District Gwalior. It is further submitted that the institution in which the petitioner was appointed and is working under the control of the Tribal Welfare Department. However, this control was transferred to the concerned Panchayats by the Government by issuing a notification dated 30.10.1996. It is further submitted that the petitioner has already passed the eligibility test conducted by VYAPAM (Annexure P/4). The petitioner is also holding all the qualifications and eligibility prescribed under the recruitment rules as he is a Post Graduate. The District Organizer, Tribal Welfare Department, vide its letter dated 12.05.2006, intimated the Chief Executive Officer, Zila Panchayat, Gwalior about the vacancies of Contract Teachers. Thereafter, on 25.05.2006, the Chief Executive Officer, Zila Panchayat, Gwalior directed the Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat, Dabra to make appointments in accordance with law (Annexure P/7). Pursuant to the aforesaid direction issued by the Chief Executive Officer, Zila Panchayat, an advertisement dated 06.06.2006 was issued by the respondents for Janpad Morar, Janpad Dabra, Janpad Bhitarwar and Janpad Ghatigaon. In pursuance of the advertisement, the petitioner applied for appointment and accordingly a duly constituted Selection Committee selected the petitioner and an appointment order was issued to the petitioner on 08.11.2006. Thereafter, the petitioner joined the service and since 2006 the petitioner has been working continuously. Subsequently, a show-cause notice dated 31.10.2009 was issued to the petitioner and he submitted a detailed reply to the aforesaid show-cause notice (Annexure P/11). The said notice was issued on the directions of the Collector and ultimately, the termination order dated 16.11.2009 has been passed. The said order was challenged by petitioner by filing W.P. No. 5545/2009, wherein an interim order was granted in favour of

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petitioner. Thereafter, the aforesaid writ petition was allowed by order dated 15.07.2015 and the termination order dated 16.11.2009 was quashed. The respondents were granted liberty to issue a show-cause notice to petitioner and were also directed to consider the response/reply of petitioner and pass an appropriate order in accordance with law without being influenced by order dated 16.11.2009. It is further submitted that thereafter a show-cause notice dated 08.06.2016 was issued by respondent to petitioner and petitioner submitted a detailed reply dated 24.06.2016 mentioning various facts and grounds. However, without considering the facts and grounds mentioned therein, the impugned order dated 10.08.2016 was passed by the respondent which is a non-speaking and unreasoned order, whereby the services of the petitioner have been terminated after giving one month's notice.

3. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for petitioner that the service conditions of petitioner are governed by the Rules of the M.P. Panchayat Contract Teacher Rules, 2005 / Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Samvida Shala Shikshak (Employment and Conditions of Contract) Rules, 2005. It is submitted that the appointing authority of petitioner is the Janpad Panchayat as per Schedule-I. It is further submitted that the schools under the Tribal Welfare Department are within the control of the Zila Panchayat and accordingly, by virtue of Rule 2(k), the appointment in the said school is required to be made under the Rules of 2005. It is further submitted that Rule 13 is applicable to the schools of the Tribal Welfare Department. It is further submitted that the petitioner was appointed by the competent authority i.e., the Janpad Panchayat. It is further submitted that the petitioner submitted a detailed reply (Annexure P/16) wherein he stated that similarly situated persons appointed in Balaghat

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District have already been absorbed by the respondents. It is further submitted that Atul Shrivastava of Janpad Panchayat Morar is continuing in service and his services have already been absorbed. Likewise, Smt. Rajkumari Jain and Smt. Trishana Rawat have also already been absorbed by the District Authority, Shivpuri. It is further submitted that the petitioner submitted a detailed reply consisting of 12 paragraphs but without considering the said reply, the respondents passed the impugned order, which is a non-speaking and unreasoned order whereby the services of the petitioner were terminated. The petitioner was initially appointed by order dated 08.11.2006 and at the time of issuance of the impugned order, the petitioner had already completed 10 years of service and now he has completed 20 years of service in the respondent department. The petitioner was appointed after following the due process of law, as an advertisement was issued, the petitioner applied along with other candidates, and after participating in the examination/selection interview, the petitioner was appointed by order dated 08.11.2006. Even if the appointment of the petitioner is considered to be irregular, it cannot be held to be illegal as the petitioner was appointed after following the due procedure of law. It is further submitted that there is no fault on the part of the petitioner and if any irregularity has been committed by the respondents/department/officers, the petitioner cannot be held responsible for the same.

4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent/State, on the other hand, opposed the prayer made by the learned counsel for the petitioner by submitting that the appointment of petitioner was not made as per the Rules. It is submitted that on the basis of the decision taken by the higher authority and as per the directions issued by the Collector, a notice was issued to the petitioner and after

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considering the reply, the services of the petitioner were terminated. It is further submitted that in the year 2009 it was found that the petitioner was illegally appointed; therefore, his services were terminated. However, as per the liberty granted by this Court, a show-cause notice was issued to petitioner and after following the due process of law, the impugned order dated 10.08.2016 (Annexure P/1) was issued by the respondent.

5. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

6. Perusal of the record reveals that petitioner was appointed on the post of Contract Teacher Grade-III pursuant to an advertisement dated 06.06.2006 issued by the competent authority and after due selection by a duly constituted Selection Committee, an appointment order was issued on 08.11.2006. Petitioner joined the service and has been working continuously since then in the Government Scheduled Caste Girls Hostel, Pichhore, District Gwalior under the Tribal Welfare Department. Initially, the services of the petitioner were terminated by order dated 16.11.2009, which was challenged in W.P. No. 5545/2009. The said writ petition was allowed by order dated 15.07.2015 and the termination order was quashed with liberty to the respondents to issue a fresh show-cause notice and pass an appropriate order after considering the reply of petitioner. Pursuant thereto, a show-cause notice dated 08.06.2016 was issued and petitioner submitted a detailed reply. However, without properly considering the reply and the grounds raised therein, the respondents passed the impugned order dated 10.08.2016 terminating the services of the petitioner by giving one month's notice. The record further indicates that petitioner was appointed by the competent authority under the provisions of the M.P. Panchayat Contract Teacher Rules, 2005 after following the due procedure of law, including advertisement and selection. Petitioner has also passed the eligibility test conducted by VYAPAM and

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possesses the requisite qualifications. At the time of passing the impugned order, the petitioner had already rendered about ten years of service and has now completed around twenty years of service. Petitioner has also pointed out that similarly situated persons have been absorbed by the authorities in other districts. Despite submission of a detailed reply, the impugned order has been passed without assigning adequate reasons and thus it appears to be a non-speaking and unreasoned order.

7. The petitioner has filed I.A. No. 10285/2025 stating that one Sanjay Kumar Upadhyay was appointed to the post of Samvida Shala Shikshak Grade-II by Janpad Panchayat Morar, District Gwalior vide order dated 06.12.2006 and he was posted in the Tribal Welfare Department at Awasiya Vidyalaya Higher Secondary School, Mangal Bhawan, Gwalior, which is situated within the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Thereafter, he was absorbed in the Adhyapak Cadre vide order dated 10.09.2010. Similarly, one Atul Shrivastava was also appointed to the post of Samvida Shala Shikshak Grade-II by Janpad Panchayat Morar, District Gwalior vide order dated 17.12.2006 and he was posted in the Tribal Welfare Department at Awasiya Vidyalaya (Girls), Gwalior, which is situated within the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Thereafter, he was also absorbed in the Adhyapak Cadre vide order dated 10.09.2010. It is submitted that the case of petitioner is similar to that of Sanjay Kumar Upadhyay as well as Atul Shrivastava and both of them are still continuing in service, whereas only the petitioner has been harassed by the department. As per the advertisement dated 06.06.2006, vacancies for Samvida Shala Shikshak for Janpad Panchayat Morar, Janpad Panchayat Ghatigaon, Janpad Panchayat Dabra and Janpad Panchayat Bhitarwar were advertised by the respondents but only the petitioner has been harassed by the respondents. Since advertisement was issued and in

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pursuance whereof the Selection Committee selected the petitioner who after adhering to the due process of law was appointed. The proper procedure was followed by the respondents and merely because the committee was not constituted as per Rules or the appointment order was allegedly not issued by the competent authority, the same cannot be made applicable against the petitioner in the present case. The petitioner was appointed after participating in the selection process/interview conducted by the respondents pursuant to the advertisement dated 06.06.2006 and therefore, any attempt to correct the alleged mistake at this stage would attract the principle of estoppel. The principles of equitable estoppel or promissory estoppel debar the respondents from correcting the alleged mistake after almost 10 years of service at the time of issuing the impugned order. Now, nearly 20 years have elapsed and petitioner has been continuing in service on the strength of interim order dated 22.08.2016. It is not the case of the respondents that the petitioner suppressed any material fact or misrepresented before the respondents. The impugned order passed by the concerned authority is a non- speaking and unreasoned order.

8. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab v/s. Bandip Singh and others reported in (2016) 1 SCC 724 is relevant to quote. In the said decision it had been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that every decision of an administrative or executive nature must be a composite and self-sustaining one, in that it should contain all the reasons which prevailed on the official taking the decision to arrive at his conclusion.

9. In the same judgment in paragraph 7, the Hon'ble Supreme Court clarifies that the Government does not have carte blanche to take any decision it chooses

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to; it cannot take a capricious, arbitrary or prejudiced decision. Its decision must be informed and impregnated with reasons. Paragraph 7 of the said decision is quoted as under:-

"7. The same principle was upheld more recently in Ram Kishun v. State of U.P. (2012) 11 SCC 511 : (2013) 1 SCC (Civ) 382. However, we must hasten to clarify that the Government does not have a carte blanche to take any decision it chooses to; it cannot take a capricious, arbitrary or prejudiced decision. Its decision must be informed and impregnated with reasons.

This has already been discussed threadbare in several decisions of this Court, including in Sterling Computers Ltd. v. M & N Publications Ltd (1993) 1 SCC 445, Tata Cellular v. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 651, Air India Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd. (2000) 2 SCC 617, B.S.N. Joshi & Sons Ltd. v. Nair Coal Services Ltd. (2006) 11 SCC 548 and Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa (2007) 14 SCC 517"

10. Also the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kranti Associates Pvt. Ltd. and another v/s Masood Ahmed Khan and others cited in (2010) 9 SCC 496 highlights this point. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 15 opined that the face of an order passed by a quasi judicial authority or even an administrative authority affecting the rights of parties, must speak. It must not be like the inscrutable face of a sphinx. In paragraph 47 the Honb'le Supreme Court summarized its discussion. The relevant subparagraphs of the said summary are quoted as under:-

"47. Summarising the above discussion, this Court holds:

(a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially.

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(b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions.

(c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well.

(d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power.

(e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision- maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations.

(f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision-making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies.

(g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior courts.

(h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial decision-making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice.

(i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system.

(j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency.

(k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision-making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism.

(l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or "rubber-stamp reasons" is not to be equated with a valid decision-making process.

(m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision-making not only makes the judges and decision-makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor [(1987) 100 Harvard Law Review 731-37].)

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(n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision-making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights andwas considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See Ruiz Torija v. Spain [(1994) 19 EHRR 553] EHRR, at 562 para 29 and Anya v. University of Oxford [2001 EWCA Civ 405 (CA)] , wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights which requires, "adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions".

(o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of "due process"."

11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case Oryx Fisheries Pvt.Ltd vs Union Of India & Ors; (2010) 13 SCC 427 has held as under:-

"41. In M/s Kranti Associates (supra), this Court after considering various judgments formulated certain principles in para 51 of the judgment which are set out below a. In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially.

b. A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions.

c. Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well.

d. Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power.

e. Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations.

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f. Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies. g. Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior Courts. h. The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the life blood of judicial decision making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice. i. Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system.

j. Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency.

k. If a Judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism.

l. Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or `rubber-stamp reasons' is not to be equated with a valid decision making process.

m. It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision making not only makes the judges and decision makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor (1987) 100 Harward Law Review 731-

737).

n. Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See (1994) 19 EHRR 553, at 562 para 29

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and Anya vs. University of Oxford, 2001 EWCA Civ 405, wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of European Convention of Human Rights which requires, "adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions". o. In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of "Due Process".

42. In the instant case the appellate order contains reasons. However, absence of reasons in the original order cannot be compensated by disclosure of reason in the appellate order.

43. In Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. L.K. Ratna and others,(1986) 4 SCC 537, it has been held:

"......after the blow suffered by the initial decision, it is difficult to contemplate complete restitution through an appellate decision. Such a case is unlike an action for money or recovery of property, where the execution of the trial decree may be stayed pending appeal, or a successful appeal may result in refund of the money or restitution of the property, with appropriate compensation by way of interest or mesne profits for the period of deprivation. And, therefore, it seems to us, there is manifest need to ensure that there is no breach of fundamental procedure in the original proceeding, and to avoid treating an appeal as an overall substitute for the original proceeding."

44. For the reasons aforesaid, this Court quashes the show cause notice as also the order dated 19.03.2008 passed by the third respondent. In view of that, the appellate order has no legs to stand and accordingly is quashed."

12. The respondent was entitled to correct his own mistake within a reasonable time from the date of appointment of the petitioner. He could not have waited for

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almost twenty years for discovering the mistake. There was implied promise on the part of respondent that he shall continue the services of the petitioner. The principles of promissory estoppel or equitable estoppel would be attracted by lapse of long time on account of sheer inaction on the part of respondent in discovering his mistake, if any. The concept of legitimate expectation of the petitioner, that he shall not be thrown out unceremoniously because there was some mistake on the part of the respondent, had also to be given due weight. The order of respondent was likely to affect the whole course of life of the petitioner. It was demand of fair-play-in-action that he should have been permitted to have his say. That apart there was nothing to indicate from the impugned order that there was any factual or legal mistake in giving appointment to the petitioner. No third party had challenged it.

13. It is a settled position in law that when a discretion is vested in an authority to exercise a particular power, the same is required to be exercised with due diligence, and in reasonable and rational manner. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in catena of decisions has reiterated time and again the necessity and importance of giving reasons by the authority in support of its decision. It has been held that the face of an order passed by a quasi-judicial authority or even by an administrative authority affecting the rights of parties must speak. The affected party must know how his case or defence was considered before passing the prejudicial order.

14. Considering the aforesaid, the present petition is allowed and disposed in following terms:

(i) the impugned order dated 10.8.2016 (Annexure P/1) is hereby quashed and;

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(ii) The respondents are directed to give consequential benefits to petitioner which has already been extended to similarly situated persons within a period of three months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order.

15. Pending interlocutory application, if any, are disposed of.

(Anand Singh Bahrawat) Judge Ahmad