[Cites 7, Cited by 0]
Madhya Pradesh High Court
Naushad Choudhary vs Chief Executive Officer Ujjain ... on 19 January, 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:1645
1 RP-2256-2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT INDORE
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ALOK AWASTHI
REVIEW PETITION No. 2256 of 2025
NAUSHAD CHOUDHARY
Versus
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER UJJAIN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Vishal Baheti, learned Senior Advocate alongwith Shri Tehjeeb Khan,
learned counsel for the petitioner.
Ms. Mini Ravindran, learned counsel for the respondent.
Reserved on : 01.12.2025
Pronounced on : 19.01.2026
ORDER
Heard.
2) Petitioner has preferred this petition under Order XLVII Rule 1
read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short "CPC")
seeking review of the order dated 18.11.2025 passed in Miscellaneous
Petition No.845/2025 (Chief Executive Officer, Ujjain Development
Authority and Others Vs. Smt. Naushad Choudhary), whereby Miscellaneous
Petition filed by the respondent challenging the order dated 11.11.2024
passed by IInd District Judge, District Ujjain in MCA No. 47/2024, has been
allowed.
3) It is submitted by Shri Vishal Baheti, learned Senior Counsel for
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the petitioner that by allowing the petition, in para 9 and 11, this Court has
observed that the lease in question had been transferred without obtaining
prior permission/consent of the Authority. The said observation is factually
incorrect and contrary to the material on record. The lease of the petitioner
(original plaintiff) had in fact been duly renewed by the authority itself up to
the year 2041 vide order dated 29.03.2021. It is further submitted that the
alleged "transfer without consent" was never a pleaded ground in the petition
filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, nor was any foundational
fact or pleading raised by the respondents:in this regard. Hence, the finding
recorded on an issue neither pleaded nor argued constitutes an error apparent
on the face of the record.
4 ) It is also argued that the learned Courts below, upon due
consideration of the pleadings and documents, have concurrently held that
the petitioner has a prima facie case, as the lease had not expired and that the
alleged violation of any other terms of the lease is a matter requiring
evidence and cannot be adjudicated at the interlocutory stage. This Court,
while exercising supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India, could not have interfered with concurrent findings of
fact, 'particularly when no perversity or jurisdictional error was
demonstrated by the respondents. Therefore, the impugned order dated
18.11.2025 suffers from a clear error, warranting review by allowing the
present petition.
5 ) Ms. Mini Ravindran learned counsel for the respondent has
submitted that in the instant case there is no error apparent on the face of
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record. The impugned order passed by appreciating each and every aspect of
the case. Hence, the review petition filed by the petitioners be dismissed.
6) Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the
impugned order and documents available on record.
7) Vide impugned order dated 18.11.2025 passed in M.P.
No.845/2025, this Court has dismissed the petition by observing as under :-
"9. It is apparent from the record that the
original lease holder is the government and it
is at the discretion of the government to
provide lease. Initially lease deed was
granted in the year 1986 in favour of
Banarsilal Bobel for residential purpose for a
period of 30 years and renewable for further
30 years in accordance with the conditions
stipulated in the lease. Thereafter, the
leasehold rights was sold to the plaintiff
however the aforesaid transfers were effected
without prior permission of the petitioners.
When the show cause notice was issued to
the original lease holder Banarsilal Bobel, the
petitioners were not aware that the transfer of
the lease has already happened without their
permission, thus taking note of the fact that
the lease has been transferred without
consent of the petitioners, the lease has been
cancelled by UDA. The respondent preferred
a civil suit before the Trial Court in which his
application for temporary injunction has been
allowed against which petitioners/UDA
presented an appeal before the Appellate
Court which was dismissed vide impugned
order.
11. On perusal of the record, it is evident that
the petitioners have not forcibly attempted to
dispossess the respondent from the suit
property but has resorted to the procedure as
prescribed by law. In this case, the notice and
cancellation order appears to have been
passed in exercise of powers conferred by
Rule 35-A of the Madhya Pradesh Vikas
Pradhikarno Ki Sampatiyo Ka Prabandhan
Tatha Vyayan Niyam, 2018. The respondent
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cannot claim himself to be the lessee of the
land when the initial lessee has not obtained
permission for the transfer effected with
regard to the suit property. In view of the
aforesaid, it is found that the petitioners have
not resorted to forceful dispossession of the
of the plaintiff, without any due procedure of
law. The Court of first instance did not
consider this aspect while granting temporary
injunction in favour of the respondent. This
Court does not find any illegality or error
having been committed by the UDA in
issuing notice and cancelling the lease deed."
8) Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC reads as under :-
"47. Application for review of judgment.-
(1) Any person considering himself aggrieved, -
(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is
allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred,
b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is
allowed, or
(c) by a decision on reference from a Court of
Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and
important matter or evidence which, after the exercise
of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could
not be produced by him at the time when the decree was
passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or
error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other
sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the
decree passed or order made against him, may apply for
a review of judgment to the Court which passed the
decree or made the order.
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(2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or
order may apply for a review of judgment
notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by some
other party except where the ground of such appeal is
common to the applicant and the appellant, or when,
being respondent, he can present to the Appellate Court
the case on which he applies for the review.
Explanation.- The fact that the decision on a
question of law on which the judgment of the Court is
based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent
decision of a superior Court in any other case, shall not
be a ground for the review of such judgment."
9) The explanation of Order XLVII Rule 1, sub-rule (2) CPC says
the fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the
Court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a
superior Court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such
judgment.
10) In Board of Control of Cricket India Vs. Netaji Cricket Club
(AIR 2005 SC 592), it is observed that "the words "sufficient reason"
occurring in rule 1 is wide enough to include a misconception of fact or law
by a court or even an advocate. An application for review may be
necessitated by way of invoking the doctrine 'actus curiae neminem
gravabit". Similarly, in Union of India Vs. Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd., (AIR
2008 (Gau) 161), it is observed that the review is not an appeal in disguise.
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The scope of review as well as the appeal is completely different. While the
review petition is limited the appellate jurisdiction is wide. In Akhilesh
Yadav Vs. Vishwanath Chaturvedi & Ors. reported in (2013 AIR SCW
1316), the Apex Court held that scope of review petition is very limited and
submissions made on questions of fact cannot be a ground to review the
order. It was further observed that review of an order is permissible only if
some mistake or error is apparent on the face of the record, which has to be
decided on the facts of each and every case. Further held that an erroneous
decision, by itself, does not warrant review of each decision.
11) The scope of compass of review of an order by a Court of Civil
Judicature, is circumscribed by Section 114 of CPC which provides that a
review of an order is permissible upon a discovery of new and important
matter of evidence. But in the present case no new and important matter has
been brought before the Court by the petitioner. It is also well settled that
only errors apparent on the face of record are liable to be reviewed.
12) In the light of above judgments, it is well settled principle of law
that the scope of review is very limited. There is no error apparent on the face
of record in the impugned order passed by this Court as all the arguments
advanced by learned counsel for the parties have already been considered
while passing the impugned order.
13) In view of the foregoing discussion and the settled principles of
law, the instant petition seeking review of the impugned order dated
18.11.2025 passed in Miscellaneous Petition No. 845/2025 is devoid of
merits and accordingly, dismissed.
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14) In consequence whereof, this review petition is dismissed.
(ALOK AWASTHI)
JUDGE
Vindesh
