[Cites 14, Cited by 0]
Madhya Pradesh High Court
Umesh @ Deendayal vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 20 February, 2026
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VIVEK KUMAR SINGH
&
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE AJAY KUMAR NIRANKARI
ON THE 20th OF FEBRUARY, 2026
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 2773 of 2014
UMESH @ DEENDAYAL
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
Appearance:
Shri Durgesh Gupta - Counsel for the appellant
Shri Amit Pandey - Government Advocate for respondent-State
Reserved on : 15/10/2025
Pronounced on : 20/02/2026
ORDER
Per: Justice Ajay Kumar Nirankari
This appeal has been preferred by the appellant under Section 374(2)
of Cr.P.C against the judgment dated 31/07/2014 passed by First Additional
Sessions Judge to the Court of Additional Judge Chhindwara in
S.T.No.186/2013, whereby the appellant has been convicted for an offence
punishable under Section 302 of IPC and sentenced to undergo LI with fine
of Rs.1,000/- and under Section 201 of IPC and sentenced to undergo RI for
seven years and fine of Rs.1,000/- with default stipulations.
2. The brief facts necessary for proper adjudication of the case are
that on 13/04/2013 at about 11:30 a.m.deceased Lalita Bai in a burnt
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condition reached at Police Station Tamia, District Chhindwara, and made an
oral complaint. She stated that she, along with her husband Umesh, her child
Navin and her uncle had gone to explore Patalcoat. After visiting Patalcoat,
they had food. Thereafter, her husband attempted to consume liquor and
when she restrained him, a quarrel ensued. She further alleged that at about
3:00 a.m., her husband and uncle unsuccessfully attempted to kill her.
Subsequently, after some time her husband poured acid or some other
inflammable substance on her, set her on fire and threw her into a ditch.
Thereafter, her husband fled from the spot along with the uncle and also took
away her son Navin. After some time, she somehow managed to come out of
the ditch and reached near a water tank. Two girls, namely Basanti and
Kavita, then took her to the police station.On the basis of the said oral
complaint, the police registered Crime No.54/2013 under Sections 307, 326-
B, and 34 of the Indian Penal Code against the present appellant and other
co-accused who known as topi wale uncle. After registration of FIR, the
deceased was sent for medical examination. She was medically examined on
13/04/2013 at about 11:50 a.m. As per the MLC report, she had sustained
approximately 82-90% burn injuries. Considering the seriousness of her
condition, the police commenced investigation, recorded statements of
witnesses, seized relevant articles, and arrested the appellant.
3. During investigation, the memorandum of the appellant under
Section 27 of the Evidence Act was recorded and on his instance, the dead
body of a child aged about six years was recovered in a decomposed
condition.
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4. During treatment, on 22/04/2013, Lalita Bai succumbed due to her
injuries. Post-mortem was conducted, and as per the medical opinion, she
died due to superficial burn injuries. The post-mortem of child Navin was
also conducted and the cause of death was opined to be strangulation. The
competent authority also recorded the dying declaration of the deceased.
5. After completion of investigation, the police filed a charge-sheet
before the Magistrate against the appellant and co-accused Laxman, alleging
that they had conspired to kill the deceased and her son. It was also alleged
that under the pretext of exploring Patalcoat, they vacated the rented house
where the deceased was residing, took her to Patalcoat by Magic Car, poured
an inflammable substance on her and set her on fire and committed the
murder of six-year-old child by strangulation.
6. The Judicial Magistrate first class after committal forwarded the
case to session court for trial and the matter was registered as S.T.No.186/13
before the First Additional Sessions Judge, Chhindwara.
7. Learned trial court formulated the charges under Section 302 and
in alternative 302/34 & 201 of IPC against the present appellant and co-
accused Laxman.Appellant refused to accept the charge and wished to face
the trial.
8. In order to substantiate its case, the prosecution examined 24
witnesses and exhibited documents marked as Exhibits P-1 to P-14. In his
statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
before the trial Court, the appellant denied all the incriminating
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circumstances appearing against him and pleaded innocence. He stated that
he had not committed any offence and he is not the husband of the deceased.
According to him, the actual husband of the deceased, namely Kailash,
falsely implicated him in the present case in order to save himself.
9. In defence, the appellant examined his wife Smt.Koushalya as
DW-1, Yuvraj Pawar, Upsarpanch as DW-2 and Jairam Kadwe, Secretary of
the concerned Gram Panchayat as DW-3.
10. Learned trial court after appreciating the material available on
record reached to the conclusion that the appellant and his uncle committed
murder of deceased Lalita and her minor son Navin. Thus, by holding him
guilty awarded life imprisonment under Section 302 of IPC.
11. Being aggrieved by the impugned judgment dated 31/07/2014,
the present appeal has been preferred before this Court on the grounds that
the appellant is innocent and learned trial Court has failed to properly
appreciate the material available on record. It is contended that there was no
intention of the appellant to kill deceased Lalita or her minor son Naveen. It
is further submitted that the deceased was the legally wedded wife of
Kailash, and Kailash committed the alleged offence. In order to protect and
defend himself, he has falsely implicated the present appellant in the case.
12. Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the
appellant is innocent and has not committed any offence. It is argued that the
deceased in her dying declaration, has stated that her husband poured acid or
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some other inflammable substance upon her. The deceased was not the
legally wedded wife of the appellant; rather, she was the legally wedded wife
of Kailash, who according to the defence committed the offence and falsely
implicated the present appellant. It is further submitted that even if it is
assumed that the appellant poured acid upon the deceased, there was no
intention to cause her death and the incident occurred in a sudden quarrel and
under grave and sudden provocation. Therefore, the appellant is entitled to
the benefit of Section 304 Part I or Part II of the Indian Penal Code. In
support of his submissions, learned counsel has placed reliance upon the
judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court i.e Maniben vs. State of Gujarat,
reported in (2009) 5 Supreme 700.
For ready reference relevant para 14 is reproduced as under:-
"It is established from the dying declaration of the
deceased that she was living separately from her
mother-in-law, the appellant herein, for many years and
that on the day in question she had a quarrel with the
appellant at her house. It is also clear from the evidence
on record that immediately after the quarrel she along
with her daughter came to fetch water and when she
was returning, the appellant came and threw a burning
tonsil on the clothes of the deceased. Since the deceased
was wearing a terylene cloth at that relevant point of
time, it aggravated the fire which caused the burn
injuries. There is also evidence on record to prove and
establish that the action of the appellant to throw the
burning tonsil was preceded by a quarrel between the
deceased and the appellant. From the aforesaid evidence
on record it cannot be said that the appellant had the
intention that such action on her part would cause the
death or such bodily injury to the deceased, which was
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sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the
death of the deceased. Therefore, in our considered
opinion, the case cannot be said to be covered under
clause (4) of Section 300 of IPC. We are, however, of
the considered opinion that the case of the appellant is
covered under Section 304 Part II of IPC."
13. Counsel has also relief on Bengai Mandal @ Begai Mandal vs. State of
Bihar, reported in (2010) 1 Supreme 49. For ready reference relevant para
no.18 is reproduced as under:-
However, keeping in mind the facts that the deceased
had turned down the sexual advances made by the
appellant and that he had accompanied the accused no.1
who was carrying a vessel containing acid in his hand at
the dead of the night and in an unearthly hour, it can be
said with certainty that the appellant had the intention to
inflict bodily harm on the deceased otherwise the
appellant would not have accompanied the accused no.1
to the house of the deceased. Since the appellant was
present at the scene of occurrence and simply watched
the accused no.1 throwing acid on the deceased without
preventing the accused no.1 from doing so clearly
establishes that the appellant had intended to cause
injury to and also disfigurement of the deceased and as
such is liable to be punished under Section 326 IPC.
Also since the appellant could be said to be possessing
knowledge that the throwing of acid is likely to cause
death of the deceased, a case under Section 304 part II is
also made out. The appellant has already served
rigorous imprisonment for a period of seven years.
Considering the facts that the death ensued after twenty
six days of the incident as a result of septicemia and not
as a consequence of burn injuries, we are of the
considered view that the period already undergone by
the appellant would be sufficient to meet the ends of
justice. We, therefore, partly allow the appeal to the
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aforesaid extent and direct that the appellant be released
forthwith if not wanted in connection with any other
case.
14. In Anbazhagan (supra) relied upon by learned counsel for the
appellant the deceased succumbed to burn injuries after some time. While
examining the element of intention, the Hon'ble Court observed that
although the accused at the time of pouring the inflammable substance, had
knowledge that such an act was likely to cause death but there was no clear
intention to cause death. The Court reiterated that every murder is culpable
homicide, but every culpable homicide is not murder, and the determination
depends upon the degree of intention and knowledge attributable to the
accused in the facts and circumstances of each case.
The relevant paragraph no.59 & 60 are reproduced as under:-
"We may lastly refer to the decision of this Court in
Pulicherla Nagaraju v. State of A.P., (2006) 11 SCC
444 [LQ/SC/2006/723] : (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 500,
[LQ/SC/2006/723] wherein this Court enumerated some
of the circumstances relevant to finding out whether
there was any intention to cause death on the part of the
accused. This Court observed : (SCC pp. 457-58, para
29)
"29. Therefore, the court should proceed to decide the
pivotal question of intention, with care and caution, as
that will decide whether the case falls under Section 302
or 304 Part I or 304 Part II. Many petty or insignificant
matters -- plucking of a fruit, straying of cattle, quarrel
of children, utterance of a rude word or even an
objectionable glance, may lead to altercations and group
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clashes culminating in deaths. Usual motives like
revenge, greed, jealousy or suspicion may be totally
absent in such cases. There may be no intention. There
may be no premeditation. In fact, there may not even be
criminality. At the other end of the spectrum, there may
be cases of murder where the accused attempts to avoid
the penalty for murder by attempting to put forth a case
that there was no intention to cause death. It is for the
courts to ensure that the cases of murder punishable
under Section 302, are not converted into offences
punishable under Section 304 Part I/II, or cases of
culpable homicide not amounting to murder, are treated
as murder punishable under Section 302. The intention
to cause death can be gathered generally from a
combination of a few or several of the following, among
other, circumstances : (i) nature of the weapon used; (ii)
whether the weapon was carried by the accused or was
picked up from the spot; (iii) whether the blow is aimed
at a vital part of the body; (iv) the amount of force
employed in causing injury; (v) whether the act was in
the course of sudden quarrel or sudden fight or free for
all fight; (vi) whether the incident occurs by chance or
whether there was any premeditation; (vii) whether
there was any prior enmity or whether the deceased was
a stranger; (viii) whether there was any grave and
sudden provocation, and if so, the cause for such
provocation; (ix) whether it was in the heat of passion;
(x) whether the person inflicting the injury has taken
undue advantage or has acted in a cruel and unusual
manner; (xi) whether the accused dealt a single blow or
several blows. The above list of circumstances is, of
course, not exhaustive and there may be several other
special circumstances with reference to individual cases
which may throw light on the question of intention."
(Emphasis supplied)
60. Few important principles of law discernible from
the aforesaid discussion may be summed up thus:-
"(1) When the court is confronted with the question,
what offence the accused could be said to have
committed, the true test is to find out the intention or
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knowledge of the accused in doing the act. If the
intention or knowledge was such as is described in
Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act will
be murder even though only a single injury was caused.
To illustrate : 'A' is bound hand and foot. 'B' comes and
placing his revolver against the head of 'A', shoots 'A' in
his head killing him instantaneously. Here, there will be
no difficulty in holding that the intention of 'B' in
shooting 'A' was to kill him, though only single injury
was caused. The case would, therefore, be of murder
falling within Clause (1) of Section 300 of the IPC.
Taking another instance, 'B' sneaks into the bed room of
his enemy 'A' while the latter is asleep on his bed.
Taking aim at the left chest of 'A', 'B' forcibly plunges a
sword in the left chest of 'A' and runs away. 'A' dies
shortly thereafter. The injury to 'A' was found to be
sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death.
There may be no difficulty in holding that 'B'
intentionally inflicted the particular injury found to be
caused and that the said injury was objectively sufficient
in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. This
would bring the act of 'B' within Clause (3) of Section
300 of the IPC and render him guilty of the offence of
murder although only single injury was caused.
(2) Even when the intention or knowledge of the
accused may fall within Clauses (1) to (4) of Section
300 of the IPC, the act of the accused which would
otherwise be murder, will be taken out of the purview
of murder, if the accused's case attracts any one of the
five exceptions enumerated in that section. In the event
of the case falling within any of those exceptions, the
offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to
murder, falling within Part 1 of Section 304 of the IPC,
if the case of the accused is such as to fall within
Clauses (1) to (3) of Section 300 of the IPC. It would be
offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case is such
as to fall within Clause (4) of Section 300 of the IPC.
Again, the intention or knowledge of the accused may
be such that only 2nd or 3rd part of Section 299 of the
IPC, may be attracted but not any of the clauses of
Section 300 of the IPC. In that situation also, the
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offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to
murder under Section 304 of the IPC. It would be an
offence under Part I of that section, if the case fall
within 2nd part of Section 299, while it would be an
offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case fall
within 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC.
(3) To put it in other words, if the act of an accused
person falls within the first two clauses of cases of
culpable homicide as described in Section 299 of the
IPC it is punishable under the first part of Section 304.
If, however, it falls within the third clause, it is
punishable under the second part of Section 304. In
effect, therefore, the first part of this section would
apply when there is 'guilty intention,' whereas the
second part would apply when there is no such
intention, but there is 'guilty knowledge'.
(4) Even if single injury is inflicted, if that particular
injury was intended, and objectively that injury was
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
death, the requirements of Clause 3rdly to Section 300
of the IPC, are fulfilled and the offence would be
murder.
(5) Section 304 of the IPC will apply to the following
classes of cases: (i) when the case falls under one or the
other of the clauses of Section 300, but it is covered by
one of the exceptions to that Section, (ii) when the
injury caused is not of the higher degree of likelihood
which is covered by the expression 'sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause death' but is of a
lower degree of likelihood which is generally spoken of
as an injury 'likely to cause death' and the case does not
fall under Clause (2) of Section 300 of the IPC, (iii)
when the act is done with the knowledge that death is
likely to ensue but without intention to cause death or
an injury likely to cause death.
To put it more succinctly, the difference between the
two parts of Section 304 of the IPC is that under the
first part, the crime of murder is first established and the
accused is then given the benefit of one of the
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exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC, while under the
second part, the crime of murder is never established at
all. Therefore, for the purpose of holding an accused
guilty of the offence punishable under the second part
of Section 304 of the IPC, the accused need not bring
his case within one of the exceptions to Section 300 of
the IPC.
(6) The word 'likely' means probably and it is
distinguished from more 'possibly'. When chances of
happening are even or greater than its not happening,
we may say that the thing will 'probably happen'. In
reaching the conclusion, the court has to place itself in
the situation of the accused and then judge whether the
accused had the knowledge that by the act he was likely
to cause death.
(7) The distinction between culpable homicide (Section
299 of the IPC) and murder (Section 300 of the IPC)
has always to be carefully borne in mind while dealing
with a charge under Section 302 of the IPC. Under the
category of unlawful homicides, both, the cases of
culpable homicide amounting to murder and those not
amounting to murder would fall. Culpable homicide is
not murder when the case is brought within the five
exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC. But, even though
none of the said five exceptions are pleaded or prima
facie established on the evidence on record, the
prosecution must still be required under the law to bring
the case under any of the four clauses of Section 300 of
the IPC to sustain the charge of murder. If the
prosecution fails to discharge this onus in establishing
any one of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC,
namely, 1stly to 4thly, the charge of murder would not
be made out and the case may be one of culpable
homicide not amounting to murder as described under
Section 299 of the IPC.
(8) The court must address itself to the question of
mens rea. If Clause thirdly of Section 300 is to be
applied, the assailant must intend the particular injury
inflicted on the deceased. This ingredient could rarely
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be proved by direct evidence. Inevitably, it is a matter of
inference to be drawn from the proved circumstances of
the case. The court must necessarily have regard to the
nature of the weapon used, part of the body injured,
extent of the injury, degree of force used in causing the
injury, the manner of attack, the circumstances
preceding and attendant on the attack.
(9) Intention to kill is not the only intention that makes a
culpable homicide a murder. The intention to cause
injury or injuries sufficient in the ordinary cause of
nature to cause death also makes a culpable homicide a
murder if death has actually been caused and intention
to cause such injury or injuries is to be inferred from
the act or acts resulting in the injury or injuries.
(10) When single injury inflicted by the accused results
in the death of the victim, no inference, as a general
principle, can be drawn that the accused did not have
the intention to cause the death or that particular injury
which resulted in the death of the victim. Whether an
accused had the required guilty intention or not, is a
question of fact which has to be determined on the facts
of each case.
(11) Where the prosecution proves that the accused had
the intention to cause death of any person or to cause
bodily injury to him and the intended injury is sufficient
in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, then,
even if he inflicts a single injury which results in the
death of the victim, the offence squarely falls under
Clause thirdly of Section 300 of the IPC unless one of
the exceptions applies.
(12) In determining the question, whether an accused
had guilty intention or guilty knowledge in a case where
only a single injury is inflicted by him and that injury is
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
death, the fact that the act is done without premeditation
in a sudden fight or quarrel, or that the circumstances
justify that the injury was accidental or unintentional, or
that he only intended a simple injury, would lead to the
inference of guilty knowledge, and the offence would
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be one under Section 304 Part II of the IPC."
15. Per contra, counsel for State has contended that the deceased
herself, despite having sustained 80-90% burn injuries reached the police
station and lodged FIR against the present appellant. It is submitted that
although the marriage of the deceased was solemnized with Kailash (PW-
16), she subsequently came into contact with the appellant and developed a
relationship of love and affair with him. Thereafter, she left her matrimonial
home along with her son Naveen and started residing with the appellant in
the rented house of Deepak Soni (PW-9).
16. The prosecution further alleges that the appellant in connivance
with the co-accused, hatched a conspiracy to kill the deceased. In furtherance
of the said plan, the appellant got the rented premises of Deepak Soni
vacated and loaded all the household articles into his Magic vehicle. The
loaded articles were then unloaded at the house of his relative, and thereafter,
under the pretext of exploring Patalcoat, they proceeded to Patalcoat to
execute the plan. It is also contended that the incident did not occur due to
sudden provocation; rather, it was pre-planned. In pursuance of the said plan,
the accused took the deceased and her minor son to the place of occurrence,
poured an inflammable substance upon the deceased, set her on fire, and
threw her into a ditch. Thereafter, he took away her son, who was allegedly
killed by strangulation, and an attempt was also made to burn his body. As
per the post-mortem report, the deceased died due to superficial burn
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injuries, whereas the minor child died due to strangulation.
17. We have heard the counsel for parties at length and perused the
record.
18. PW-20 Virendra Dhurve, who was working at the concerned
petrol pump, stated in his deposition that one day prior to the incident, the
accused came to the petrol pump in a Magic vehicle and purchased petrol in
a plastic bottle. He duly identified the present appellant before the Court.
19. The independent witnesses, PW-14 Basanti Bharti & PW-23
Kavita were also examined before the trial Court. In their depositions, they
stated that upon being asked, the deceased informed them that she had been
set on fire by her husband Umesh and the co-accused, whom she identified
as the "Topi wale uncle."
20. PW-7 Ramgopal Soni, Tahsildar, after obtaining a certificate
from the concerned doctor regarding the mental fitness of the deceased,
recorded her dying declaration. In the said declaration, the deceased stated
that her husband's name was Umesh and he had poured acid or some other
inflammable substance upon her, set her on fire, and thrown her into a ditch.
While undergoing medical treatment, the deceased succumbed to her injuries.
21. The post-mortem of the deceased was conducted by Dr. Sanjay
Rai (PW-11). In his deposition before the trial Court, he stated that the
deceased died due to superficial burn injuries.
22. PW-13, Dr. Vijay Singh, who conducted the post-mortem of
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deceased Naveen, opined in his report that Naveen died due to strangulation
and thereafter, some inflammable substance was poured on the body in an
attempt to destroy the evidence. In his deposition before the trial Court, he
affirmed that the cause of death was strangulation.
23. PW-16 Kailash Narware was examined before the trial court. In
his deposition, he admitted that the deceased, Lalita, was his legally wedded
wife. However, about one year prior to the incident, the deceased left his
house along with their son and started residing with Umesh.
24. The testimony of PW-16 was corroborated by Dinesh Narware,
who is the brother of Kailash Narware and the brother-in-law of the
deceased. He admitted that the marriage between Kailash and the deceased
had been solemnized and a son Naveen was born out of their wedlock. He
further stated that the deceased had left Kailash's house along with her son
approximately one year prior to the date of the incident.
25. Dipak Soni (PW-9), in his deposition before the trial court, stated
in his examination-in-chief that the deceased, Lalita had taken his house on
rent along with her son. Naveen. Naveen was studying at Unique School,
Betul. He further deposed that the husband of the deceased came in a Maxico
car and got the house vacated. Lalita and her son resided in the rented house
for about 5-6 months, during which period the appellant used to visit
regularly and sometimes reside there.
26. Dr. L.N. Sahu (PW-21), who medically examined the deceased,
deposed that upon enquiring about the burn injuries and their cause, the
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deceased informed him that she had sustained the burns because of her
husband. She stated that when she restrained him from consuming liquor, he
poured acid or some inflammable substance upon her. He further stated that
at the time of recording the dying declaration, he medically examined the
deceased and found that she was in a fit and stable mental condition to give
her statement.
27. In defence, the appellant examined his wife, Kaushalya, as DW-
1. She stated before the trial court that her husband had not solemnized any
second marriage and on the date of the incident, he was present at his house.
28. Yuvraj Pawar, Up-Sarpanch of concerned Gram Panchayat was
examined as DW-2. He stated on oath that on the date of the incident, i.e.,
14/04/2013, the appellant's vehicle had been hired for transporting persons
to attend a programme of the Chief Minister.
29. DW-3 Jaidev Kawde, who is the Secretary of the concerned
village, supported the version of DW-2. He also proved documents Exhibits
D-1 and D-2, which indicate that the appellant's vehicle had been engaged
for transporting passengers to attend the programme of the Chief Minister.
30. A bare perusal of the record clearly demonstrates that the
medical evidence, read conjointly with the dying declaration, unequivocally
establishes that the deceased succumbed to burn injuries sustained as a result
of acid or some other inflammable substance allegedly poured upon her by
her husband, Umesh, the present appellant.
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31. During the course of investigation, the police recorded the
memorandum statement of the appellant under Section 27 of the Evidence
Act. Pursuant to the information furnished by the appellant, the dead body of
a six-years'-old child was recovered from a forest area in a highly
decomposed condition.
32. Upon an overall consideration of the matter, this Court is of the
considered view that the judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the
appellant, and the principles of law enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court therein, are clearly distinguishable on facts and are not applicable to
the present case. Consequently, no benefit can be extended to the accused on
the basis of the said authorities. The evidence available on record
unequivocally establishes that the appellant committed the offence with
premeditation and in furtherance of a deliberate and well-hatched conspiracy.
33. The appellant took the deceased and her son, Naveen, to the
place of occurrence. He first poured acid or some other inflammable
substance upon the deceased, set her on fire, and thereafter threw her into a
ditch. Further, the appellant also took the minor son of the deceased from the
spot and committed his murder by strangulation. After strangulating the
child, he poured an inflammable substance on the body and set it ablaze. At
the instance of the appellant, the dead body of the minor child, Naveen, was
subsequently recovered.
34. We do not find any material on record, nor any substantive merit
in the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the appellant, warranting
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interference with the impugned judgment. The prosecution properly
established its case beyond any reasonable doubt. Thus, instant criminal
appeal is devoid of merit and deserves to be dismissed.
Record of the trial court be sent back.
A typed copy of this order be kept in the record of trial court.
Copy of this order be sent to concerned jail authorities for ensuring the
remaining jail sentence of appellant.
All pending applications, if any, be disposed of accordingly.
(VIVEK KUMAR SINGH) (AJAY KUMAR NIRANKARI)
JUDGE JUDGE
S /-
