Ravi Singh Sakhwar (Gehlot) vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 18 February, 2026

           NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:6556




                                                             1                           MCRC-9003-2025
                             IN     THE      HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
                                                   AT GWALIOR
                                                       BEFORE
                                      HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE RAJESH KUMAR GUPTA
                                               ON THE 18th OF FEBRUARY, 2026
                                           MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 9003 of 2025
                                           RAVI SINGH SAKHWAR (GEHLOT)
                                                       Versus
                                     THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
                          Appearance:
                                  Shri Pramod Kumar Pachori - Advocate for the petitioner.

                                  Shri Satendra Singh Sikarwar - PP for the State.
                                  None for respondent No.2/ complainant, though served.

                                                                 ORDER

1. The present petition has been filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeking quashment of FIR bearing Crime No. 543/2023 registered at Police Station Ambah, District Morena for offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 323, 294, 506, 34 of the IPC and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, along with all consequential proceedings including RCT No. 17/2024 pending before the competent Court.

2. As per the prosecution case, the complainant Rekha Devi lodged a written complaint alleging demand of dowry in the form of a motorcycle and Rs. 50,000/- by her husband and in-laws. It is specifically alleged that upon refusal, she was subjected to physical assault, abuse and criminal intimidation, and ultimately left at her parental home with threats that she would not be taken back unless the demanded dowry was fulfilled. After

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2 MCRC-9003-2025 investigation, statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. were recorded, spot map prepared, and upon finding prima facie material, charge-sheet was filed against the accused persons including the present petitioner (brother-in-law).

3. The petitioner has primarily contended that the petitioner has been falsely implicated and is living separately. He is a student preparing for competitive examinations. FIR is fabricated. The police failed to comply with the directions issued in Rajesh Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2017) SCC Online 821 . His name has been included arbitrarily without specific allegations. Continuation of proceedings would prejudice his future. Only omnibus allegations have been levelled against the petitioner. He is a very laborious and studious person. He is also meritorious. No specific role or date of alleged incident has been mentioned. Even, he lives separately and a

rent agreement has also been produced before this Court. Now-a-days, it is a general tendency to falsely implicate all the family members of in-laws just to exert undue pressure. The whole carrier of the petitioner is at stake. Hence, the present petition may be allowed and the aforementioned FIR may be quashed.

4. Learned counsel for the respondent/State opposed the prayer and prayed for its rejection.

5. Heard counsel for the rival parties and perused the entire record with due care.

6. The law relating to quashing of FIR is well settled. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal ,1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down illustrative categories where quashing may be permissible.

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3 MCRC-9003-2025 However, it was simultaneously cautioned that the power is to be exercised sparingly and in rarest of rare cases. The principles were reiterated in Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (2021) 19 SCC 401, wherein the Supreme Court held that at the stage of investigation or charge-sheet, the Court cannot conduct a mini-trial and FIR must be read as a whole. If prima facie offence is disclosed, proceedings should not be quashed. Defence of the accused cannot be considered at this stage. Further, i n R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866, the Supreme Court clarified that inherent jurisdiction cannot be invoked where allegations prima facie constitute an offence. Thus, the jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is not meant to assess the reliability or sufficiency of evidence.

7. In the present case, the petitioner is named in the FIR. Allegations of dowry demand and harassment are attributed to all accused collectively. The FIR also narrates continuous harassment and specific date of assault i.e. 20/05/2023.

8. The petitioner has relied upon a rent agreement dated 21.01.2025 to establish separate residence at Gwalior. However, The incident pertains to May 2023. FIR was registered in 2023 but, the rent agreement is of January 2025 which is much subsequent to incident and registration of FIR. Therefore, the document does not establish separate residence at the relevant time. Moreover, whether the petitioner was residing separately or participating in harassment is a matter of evidence.

9. In State of Tamil Nadu v. Thirukkural Perumal (1995) 2 SCC 449 ,

the Supreme Court held that defence documents cannot ordinarily be relied

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4 MCRC-9003-2025 upon at quashing stage. The plea of alibi or separate residence is a matter of trial.

10. It is also pertinent to note that the offence of cruelty under Section 498-A IPC has been consistently held to be a continuing offence so long as the acts of cruelty and harassment persist. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Arun Vyas v. Anita Vyas , (1999) 4 SCC 690, observed that cruelty within the meaning of Section 498-A IPC is a continuing offence and limitation would commence from the last act of cruelty. Similarly, in Suvetha v. State , (2009) 6 SCC 757, it was reiterated that matrimonial cruelty may consist of a series of acts spread over a period of time. Therefore, the complaint cannot be discarded at the threshold on the ground of delay, if the allegations indicate continued harassment culminating prior to the lodging of FIR.

11. The contention that the petitioner was residing separately cannot, by itself, be a ground for quashing proceedings. The Supreme Court in K. Subba Rao v. State of Telangana, (2018) 14 SCC 452 , held that:

"Physical absence from the matrimonial home does not ipso facto exonerate a relative from the offence of cruelty if allegations of instigation or active participation exist."

12. The offence under Section 498-A IPC is a continuing offence. The Supreme Court in Vanka Radhamanohari v. Vanka Venkata Reddy , (1993) 3 SCC 4, held that cruelty to a married woman is a continuing offence and limitation does not bar prosecution if cruelty continues.

13. Applying the settled principles of law to the facts of the present case, this Court finds that the FIR discloses cognizable offences. Specific

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5 MCRC-9003-2025

allegations and overt acts are mentioned. Ingredients of offences are prima facie satisfied. The grounds raised by petitioners pertain to defence and disputed facts. The case does not fall within the exceptional categories enumerated in Bhajan Lal (Supra).

14. The petitioner contends that he has been falsely implicated as a relative. It is true that in certain cases, the Supreme Court has cautioned against roping in distant relatives. In Kahkashan Kausar v. State of Bihar (2022) 6 SCC 599, the Supreme Court quashed proceedings where omnibus and vague allegations were made against distant relatives without specific role. Similarly, in Geeta Mehrotra v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2012) 10 SCC 741, proceedings were quashed where allegations were bald and general. However, those decisions apply where the accused are distant relatives or no specific allegations exist or, accused were residing separately or FIR is purely omnibus.

15. But, in the present case, petitioner is brother-in-law residing in the same village. Allegations are not completely vague. Specific dowry demand is attributed to "all accused". Investigation resulted in filing of charge-sheet. And even the present petitioner is an immediate in-law of the complainant. Thus, the present case does not fall within the exceptional category carved out in Kahkashan Kausar (supra).

16. Petitioner has relied on Rajesh Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh (supra) However, it is pertinent to note that the directions issued in Rajesh Sharma (supra) were subsequently modified by the Constitution Bench in Social Action Forum for Manav Adhikar v. Union of India (2018) 10 SCC

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6 MCRC-9003-2025 443, wherein it was held that no Family Welfare Committee approval is mandatory before registration of FIR. Police cannot be restrained from registering FIR in cognizable offences. Therefore, the argument of non- compliance with Rajesh Sharma is misconceived.

17. It is not a case of mere FIR. Investigation has been completed and charge-sheet has been filed after recording statements and collecting material. In CBI v. Arvind Khanna (2019) 10 SCC 686, the Supreme Court held that once charge-sheet is filed, High Court should refrain from evaluating sufficiency of evidence.

18. Similarly, in Niharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (2021) 19 SCC 401, it was reiterated that criminal proceedings should not be scuttled at threshold when prima facie case exists.

19. The contention that petitioner is a student and his future may be affected cannot be a ground for quashing. Criminal law cannot be set aside merely on the ground of future prospects. In Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander (2012) 9 SCC 460 , it was held that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the Court must see whether allegations disclose offence and not consider hardship of accused.

20. Upon careful consideration this court finds that petitioner is specifically named in FIR. Allegations disclose prima facie commission of cognizable offences. Investigation culminated in charge-sheet. Defence of

separate residence is unsupported at relevant time. Grounds raised involve disputed questions of fact. Case does not fall within parameters laid down in Bhajan Lal (supra). Accordingly, this Court finds no ground to exercise

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7 MCRC-9003-2025 inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

21. In Kamal Shivaji Pokarnekar v. State of Maharashtra (2019) 14 SCC 350, the Supreme Court held that at the stage of quashing, meticulous examination of evidence is impermissible and even if allegations appear improbable, proceedings should not be stifled and the Court cannot sift evidence as if conducting trial. Thus, since petitioner is specifically named and allegations disclose ingredients of Section 498-A IPC and Dowry Prohibition Act, quashing is unwarranted.

22. Resultantly, the petition being devoid of merit is hereby dismissed. However, it is clarified that any observations made herein are only for the purpose of deciding this petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and shall not prejudice the trial. Trial Court is directed to proceed in accordance with law.

(RAJESH KUMAR GUPTA ) JUDGE

Vishal