Madhya Pradesh High Court
Mohan & Ors. vs Dharamshala Shri Ramchandra ... on 12 September, 2025
Author: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
Bench: G. S. Ahluwalia
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1 S.A. No. 158/2002
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT G WA L I O R
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE G. S. AHLUWALIA
SECOND APPEAL No. 158 of 2002
MOHAN & OTHERS
Versus
DHARAMSHALA SHRI RAMCHANDRA PHOOLCHAND & OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Akshat Kumar Jain, Advocate for appellants.
Shri Ankur Mody, Advocate for respondent Nos. 1 and 3.
Shri Kunal Suryavanshi, Advocate for respondent No.2.
Reserved on : 10/09/2025
Pronounced on : 12/09/2025
JUDGMENT
This second appeal, under Section 100 of CPC, has been filed against
the judgment and decree dated 11/12/2001 passed by IV Additional District
Judge (Fast Track Court), Shivpuri in Civil Appeal No. 6A/2001, by which
the judgment and decree dated 24/4/1995 passed by II Civil Judge Class II,
Shivpuri in Civil Suit No.37A/91 has been reversed.
2. Appellants are defendants, who have lost their case from the first
appellate Court.
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3. The facts necessary for disposal of present appeal, in short, are that
plaintiff/respondent filed a suit for removal of encroachment, nuisance and
dirt as well as for opening the street and for closing down the boiler, chimney
etc. The case of the plaintiff was that plaintiff/Trust has a building situated in
front of Dharamshala Shri Ramchand Phoolchand Agarwal, Shivpuri.
Manager/Trustee of the Trust has been authorised by resolution dated
19/02/1978 to take legal action. On the back side of the building a street is
situated which opens towards Upbhokta Bhandar and Sarai. Towards this
street, big gate of building as well as windows of the Building are situated
and the street is used for passage purposes. Except this street there is no other
passage for approaching the building. The building and street have been
shown as A, B, C, D in the plaint map and doors and windows have been
shown as Ka, Kha and Ga. Defendant Nos. 1,2 and 3 are father and sons and
they carry out joint business and reside jointly. Plaintiff/Trust had inducted
the defendants as tenants of a Hall situated in this street for a period of 8
years on monthly rent of ₹150. Rent Receipts are issued in the name of
Mahesh Kumar Anand Kumar. Without the permission of Trust as well as
without the consent of Municipal Council/defendant no. 4, defendants
installed a tin shed and a boiler and also constructed a Godown which is
marked in green ink in the plaint map. The chimney and boiler were installed
just adjoining to the building of the trust, as a result, the smoke comes out and
dirt also gets spread. The kitchen of the Trust building as well as the passage
to the trust has been closed and the windows have become useless. It was
pleaded that the aforesaid act of defendants came to the knowledge of
plaintiff in September 1985. Plaintiff requested the defendants to remove the
goods and open the street but defendants avoided. It was further pleaded that
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on account of activities of defendants, fresh air and light has stopped coming
into the building. Even the passage to building has been closed, and because
of emission of smoke and spreading of dirt, nuisance is being created against
the Trust. It was further pleaded that there is every possibility that a blast may
take place in the boiler as well as chimney, thereby putting lives of people in
jeopardy. On account of act of defendants, Trust is not in a position to use the
kitchen in a hygienic and proper manner and the street is also blocked,
whereas defendants have no right to block the street. Accordingly, a
registered notice was sent to defendants on 05/10/1985 for removal of goods
as well as boiler and chimney, which was received by defendants on
07/10/1985, but no action was taken by defendants. Accordingly, the suit was
filed for a decree that the defendants be directed to remove all their
belongings and to open the street as well as to remove the boiler and chimney
so that trust can use its doors and windows in a proper manner and
permanent injunction was also sought that defendants should not spread dirt
in future. By way of amendment, it was pleaded that on 21/05/1991, fire
broke out on account of negligent act of defendants, as a result, damage was
caused to Trust building and in future also similar damage may be caused. It
was further pleaded that 1-2 months prior to amendment of plaint, defendants
have raised permanent construction after removing temporary construction as
a result of which street as well as doors and windows of the building of the
Trust have been permanently closed. By amendment plaintiffs also impleaded
remaining trustees of the Trust as defendants and pleaded that now all the
Trustees are on record, therefore the suit filed by manager/Trustee of the trust
is maintainable.
4. Defendant Nos. 1-3 filed their written statement and admitted that the
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building of the trust is situated and they are the tenants of a hall which was let
out to the defendants Nos. 2 and 3. However, it was pleaded that
manager/Trustee of the trust was not competent to file the suit on his own. It
was further pleaded that machines were installed and construction was raised
with oral permission of plaintiffs. However, it was admitted that no
permission was taken from defendant no. 4/Municipal Council. It was further
pleaded that machines were installed in 1982 and became operational since
then, whereas the suit was filed on 13/11/1986, therefore the suit is barred by
time. It was further pleaded that the street in question is not a public street. It
was pleaded that main door of building is not towards the street and it is not a
road. It was further pleaded that since all trustees were not impleaded as
plaintiffs, therefore the suit is not maintainable.
5. Defendant No. 4 filed its written statement and claimed that
construction was raised and machines were installed without permission of
defendant no. 4.
6. The trial Court after framing issues and recording evidence dismissed
the suit.
7. Being aggrieved by judgment and decree passed by the trial court,
plaintiffs preferred an appeal which has been decreed by appellate court.
8. By order dated 14/2/2006, this appeal was admitted on substantial
questions of law:-
(i) Whether the suit by plaintiff trust is not maintainable for
want of juristic personality and instituted by unauthorized
trustee ?
(ii) Whether the suit filed in contravention of provisions under
Section 91 C.P.C. is not maintainable ?
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(iii) Whether learned both the courts below erred in holding
that suit is within limitation ?
9. Challenging the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate
Court, it is submitted by counsel for appellants that the mandatory provisions
of Section 91 CPC were not complied with and leave of the Court was not
taken, because it is the case of plaintiff that public nuisance is being caused. It
is further submitted that the suit filed by plaintiff was barred by time. It is
also submitted that since the suit was filed by Madan Lal, who was the
Manager/Trustee of the trust without authorisation by all the trustees,
therefore the suit by Madan Lal on his own, was not maintainable. It is
further submitted that although at a later stage the remaining two trustees
were impleaded as defendants, however, merely because they did not file
written statement it cannot be said that they had given silent consent for
institution of the suit on behalf of the Trust. It is further submitted that Trust
is not a juristic personality and therefore the suit should have been filed either
by all Trustees or by one Trustee with authorization of the remaining
Trustees. Thus it is submitted that the suit filed by the Trust through its
Manager/Trustee without any proper authorization by all trustees is not
maintainable.
10. Per contra, the appeal is vehemently opposed by counsel for
respondents. It is submitted that defendants no. 1-3/appellants themselves
claimed that the nuisance is not a public nuisance and that the street in
question is not a public road. Thus it is submitted by Shri Ankur Modi that
the provisions of Section 91 CPC would not apply. It is further submitted that
since it is the case of private nuisance and emission of smoke and spreading
of dirt coupled with blockage of street, therefore everyday new cause of
action arises and thus it cannot be said that the suit filed on 13/11/1986 was
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barred by limitation. It is further submitted that since all trustees were later on
impleaded as defendants, therefore the suit was maintainable and the first
appellate court did not commit any mistake in holding the suit to be
maintainable.
11. Heard, learned counsel for the parties.
Whether the suit is barred by limitation or not ?
12. It is the case of plaintiff that because of installation of boiler and
chimney there is emission of smoke and on account of business activities of
defendants 1-3, dirt spreads over the area causing nuisance to the Trust.
Therefore everyday new cause of action arises. Even assuming machines
became operational in 1982, still it cannot be said that the suit filed on
13/11/1986 was barred by limitation because everyday fresh cause of action
arises.
13. Under these circumstances, the third substantial question of law framed
by this Court is answered in negative and it is held that the suit filed by
plaintiff was within limitation.
Whether provisions of Section 91 CPC are applicable or not ?
14. Section 91 CPC reads as under:-
Public nuisances and other wrongful acts affecting the public
(1) in the case of a public nuisance or other wrongful act
affecting, or likely to affect, the public, a suit for a
declaration and injunction or for such other relief as may be
appropriate in the circumstances of the case, may be
instituted :-
(a) by the Advocate General, or
(b) with the leave of the Court, by two or more
persons, even though no special damage has been caused to
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such persons by reason of such public nuisance or other
wrongful act.
(2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to limit or
otherwise affect any right of suit which may exist
independently of its provisions.
In case of public nuisance either the permission of Advocate General is
necessary or the case may be filed by two or more persons with the leave of
the Court. In the present case admittedly, neither any consent from Advocate
General was obtained, nor the suit was filed by two persons, nor leave of
Court was taken.
15. Now, the only question for consideration is whether emission of smoke,
spreading of dirt, and blockage of street can be said to be a public nuisance
requiring compliance of Section 91 CPC or not ?
16. Although defendants had claimed that the street in question is not a
public street, but Madan Lal (PW-1) has specifically stated that disputed
street is a public street which is in ownership of Municipal Council. However,
he also admitted in cross-examination that other tenants never made any
complaint on account of installation of boiler and chimney by the defendants.
In paragraph six of his cross examination, Madanlal (PW1) has stated that on
account of closure of street, the general public is getting harassed and
nuisance is being caused.
17. Mahesh Chandra (DW-1) stated that the street is not being used by
general public. In cross-examination he admitted that the street is about 6 feet
wide and 35-40 feet long. He admitted that before Oil Mill was made
operational, the street was lying vacant and the street had opening from both
sides. The street goes towards Dharamshala Road and he admitted that shops
are situated in the street. He denied that Mill is situated in the street and
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claimed the street is still open. He claimed that he is tenant of Hall
admeasuring 16×16 sq. ft. and Mill is situated in this hall itself. He claimed
that boiler and chimney are not installed in the Mill and the Mill is
operational with electricity. He admitted that notice was given by plaintiff but
was not replied by defendants.
18. Mahesh Kumar Sharma, Assistant Engineer, who also appeared as
DW-2, admitted that disputed street is a public street which is in the
ownership of Municipal Council and is being used for public purpose, which
has been obstructed by some persons by installing tin shades. On one side of
the street a Dharamshala is situated and defendants have closed down the
street illegally by tin shades. Defendant no. 4 had not granted any permission
to defendants to close down public street.
19. So far as evidence of Mahesh Chand (DW1) that boiler and chimney
are not installed and Mill is operational with electricity is concerned, the
same cannot be accepted in light of categorical admission made by
defendants 1-3 in written statement. In para 5 of the written statement, it has
been pleaded by defendant Nos. 1 to 3 as under:-
वादी ने नगर पालिका परिषद शिवपुरी को अनापत्ति प्रमाण पत्र दिया था , उस
समय भी वादी को यह भली भांति ज्ञान था कि मशीन चलाने के लिए प्रतिवादी गण को
बाइलर, चिमनी आदि लगानी ही पड़ेगी एवं चिमनी से धुआं निकलेगा। वादी की स्वीकृ ति से
ही जब मशीन फिट की गई है , उस दशा में वादी अन्यथा कहने से एस्टॉप्ड है।
.........
प्रतिवादीगण द्वारा मशीनें चलाने के लिए जो बॉयलर व चिमनी लगाई गई है , वह
सन 1982 में ही लगाई गई है एवं तब से ही मशीनें चालू हैं , जिसका कि प्रतिवादी को
प्रारंभ से ही ज्ञान है। .....गली पूर्ण रूप से प्रतिवादी गण के उपयोग में ही आती है। इस
कारण से वादी ने गली में टीनशेड डालते समय कभी भी कोई आपत्ति नहीं की है
20. Thus it is clear that there there are two sets of evidences. The plaintiff
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had stated that it is a public street which is used by the general public, but he
admitted in his cross examination that his other tenants had never made any
complaint about the inconvenience caused on account of the activities of the
defendants, whereas it is the specific stand of the defendants that the street in
question is not a public street and no public nuisance is being caused.
21. Now the only question for consideration is as to whether on account of
setting up of the Mill, whether any public nuisance is being caused thereby
affecting the general public at large or not.
22. Admittedly defendants are not owners of the street. The street belongs
to defendant no. 4/Municipal Council. Mahesh Kumar Sharma (DW2), who is
Engineer of Municipal Council Shivpuri has specifically stated that street has
been blocked by defendants by putting temporary tin shades and no
permission was taken from the Municipal Council by the defendants.
Although Mahesh Chand (DW1) has stated in his cross examination that the
Mill has been installed in a Hall which was let out to it and claimed that no
construction has been raised over the public street, but the said evidence
cannot be accepted for the reason that he has stated that no chimney or boiler
has been installed and the Mill is operational with the help of electricity. As
already pointed out, the aforesaid evidence of Mahesh Chand (DW1) that no
chimney or boiler has been installed is just contrary to the written statement
in which it was categorically admitted by the defendants that boiler and
chimney has been installed and the smoke would naturally come out of the
chimney.
23. Under these circumstances, it is held that the defendants Nos. 1-3 have
encroached upon the public street and have raised construction thereby
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setting up a Mill as well as have also installed boiler and chimney.
24. So far as the question of public nuisance is concerned, a specific
question was put by the defendants to the plaintiff as to whether any
complaint was ever made by other tenants about the inconvenience on
account of installation of boiler and chimney or not and it was specifically
stated by Madanlal (PW1) that the other tenants have never raised any
objection with regard to the installation of boiler and chimney by the
defendants and never alleged that they are facing any inconvenience on
account of that. Thus it is clear that on account of emission of smoke from the
chimney, the air at large is not getting polluted. Pollution of air may be a
public nuisance or a private nuisance. If the emission of smoke pollutes the
air at large, thereby affecting the general public, then it would be a public
nuisance, but where it affects the plaintiff only then it would be a private
nuisance. The defendants themselves had given a suggestion to the plaintiff
that the installation of boiler and chimney is not causing any inconvenience to
the other tenants i.e. public at large. Thus, it is clear that emission of smoke
from the chimney cannot be treated as a public nuisance under the facts and
circumstances of the case. Although the plaintiff in his cross examination has
stated that the defendant Nos. 1 to 3 by blocking the street have caused public
nuisance, but the said allegation can be viewed from a different angle also.
From the plaint map, it is clear that the street in question has opening on its
both the sides i.e. on one side the street merges with the Dharamshala road
and on another side the street merges with the public road and the entire street
has been blocked by the defendant Nos. 1 to 3. Admittedly, the said street is
in the ownership of Municipal Council. Whether the blockage of street is
causing public nuisance or a private nuisance is not material because it is not
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the case of the parties that the street in question belongs to defendant Nos. 1-
3. By raising illegal construction over the street in question, defendant Nos.
1-3 have encroached upon the public street which is in the ownership of the
Municipal Council/ defendant No.4. When defendant No.4 did not take any
action for removal of encroachment from the public street, then interpleader
suit can always be filed. Therefore, although the plaintiff had claimed in his
cross examination that blockage of the street is causing inconvenience to the
general public, but in the considered opinion of this court, encroachment
upon the public street resulting in blockage is not only a nuisance (may be
public or private), but it is also a case of encroachment over the land
belonging to the Municipal Council, Shivpuri. Since Municipal Council,
Shivpuri did not take any action to remove the encroachment done by the
defendant Nos.1-3, therefore, an interpleader suit can be maintained.
25. Under these circumstances, this Court is of considered opinion that the
defendants have failed to prove that the smoke which is released from the
chimney is causing any public nuisance and the plaintiff is right in submitting
that the smoke which is emitted from the chimney is causing private nuisance
to the plaintiff and blockage of the street amounts to encroachment which
cannot be termed as a public nuisance requiring compliance of provision of
section 91 of CPC. Under these circumstances, this Court is of considered
opinion that the mandatory provisions of section 91 of CPC are not applicable
to the facts and circumstances of the case and accordingly, the substantial
question of law No.2 is answered in negative.
Whether the suit filed by the Trust through Manager/Trustee Madanlal
is maintainable or not?
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26. The plaintiffs have relied upon a resolution dated 16/2/1978 (Ex.P/2) to
claim that Madanlal was authorized by the Trust to present all the disputes
pertaining to Dharamshala in the Court. The plaintiffs themselves have filed
the registration deed (Ex.P/1) which shows that Jamunadas, Madanlal and
Shri Prakash were three trustees. The trust deed has not been placed on the
record by the plaintiffs. Madanlal (PW1) in paragraph 4 of his cross
examination has admitted that Jamunadas had expired in the year 1984 and
Deendayal was made trustee in his place. At the time of institution of suit,
Madanlal and Shri Prakash were the trustees and at that time, no other trustee
in place of Jamunadas was appointed. He further admitted that Shri Prakash is
still trustee of the Trust. He further admitted that after the death of
Jamunadas, no fresh resolution of authorisation was passed by remaining two
trustees namely manager of the trust Madanlal and Shri Prakash. During the
pendency of the suit, Shri Prakash and Deendayal were impleaded as
defendants. They did not file their written statement. Thus neither they
supported nor they objected to the suit filed by the trust. The plaintiff in his
reply to an application filed by the defendant under order 6 rule 17 CPC dated
2/9/1993 had pleaded as under:-
1- यहकि, प्रतिवादीगण का सम्पूर्ण आवेदन पत्र गलत तथ्यों पर
आधारित होने से स्वीकार नहीं । प्रतिवादीगण की यह आपत्ति की सभी ट्रस्टीयों को
पक्षकार नहीं बनाया है , श्रीप्रकाश एवं दीनदयाल वादी नहीं बनना चाहते थे, अत:
उन्
हें प्रतिवादी बनाया गया है । दावा दायरी के वक्त श्री मदनलाल धर्मशाला ट्रस्ट
के अध्यक्ष नहीं थे, बाद में रजिस्ट्रार पब्लिक द्वारा उन्
हे अघ्यक्ष बनाया गया ।
अत: श्री मदनलाल को अध्यक्ष एवं प्रबंधक लिखा गया है , प्रतिवादीगण द्वारा चाहा
गया पारिणामिक संशोधन सही नहीं है ।
अत: प्रतिवादीगण का आवेदन निरस्त करने की कृ पा करे ।
दिनांक - 2-9-93 वादी
धर्मशाला रामचन् द अग्रवाल,
द्र फू लचन्
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द्वारा
अभिाभाषक
Thus it is clear that it is the case of the plaintiff himself that Shri
Prakash and Deendayal were not interested to join the suit as plaintiffs.
Merely because the defendants had not filed the written statement, would not
mean that by default they were interested in acting like plaintiff, specifically
in the light of the aforesaid reply filed by the plaintiff himself that Shri
Prakash and Deendayal were not intending to join the suit as plaintiffs. Thus,
it is held that mere impleadment of Shri Prakash and Deendayal as defendants
would not make them a plaintiff.
27. A coordinate bench of this court in the case of Idol Shriji v. Gappulal
and Anr., reported in 1978 JLJ 208 has held that as remaining trustees were
made the defendants and later on they were transposed as plaintiffs, therefore
the defect in the representation stood cured, and it was held that transposition
of the defendant as plaintiff at a later stage would not invite the provisions of
section 21 of limitation act.
However, in the present case, the remaining two trustees who were
later on impleaded as defendants were never transposed as plaintiffs. On the
contrary, as already pointed out, the plaintiff had specifically stated in their
reply to the application filed by defendants under order order 6 rule 17 CPC
that the remaining two plaintiffs are not intending to join the suit as plaintiffs.
28. The Mysore High Court in the case of Kolagada Poranna Vs. Palthur
Vishweshwarayya reported in AIR 1962 Mysore 71 has held that "it is well
settled law that if there are more than one trustee who are in management of
the trust property, and even if it can be said that all those trustees are the
landlords of a particular tenant, the tenant will not be entitled to continue to
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be in possession of property leased to him which belongs to the trust, even if
any one of the landlords, namely trustees, is unwilling to continue the tenancy
and brings about its termination by issuing a notice to quit".
29. Since trust is not a legal entity/juristic person, therefore, the trustees,
for the limited purpose of ownership, are to be treated as co-owners. Merely
because some of trustees were not intending to join the suit as plainitff, would
not mean that the suit filed by trust through Manager/one of the trustee would
be incompetent. In fact all trustees were parties, either as plaintiffs or as
defendants.
30. The High Court of Gujarat in the case of Atmaram Rachodbhai Vs.
Gulamhusein Gulam Mohiyaddin and Ors. decided on 2/3/1972 in SCA
No. 762/1965 has held as under:-
"11. We are, therefore, of the view that unless the
instrument of trust otherwise provides, all co-trustees must join in
filing a suit to recover possession of the property from the tenant
after determination of the lease. No one single co-trustee, even he
be a managing trustee unanimously chosen by the co-trustees, can
maintain such a suit against the tenant without joining the other
co-trustees. All co-trustees must be joined in the suit and if any
one or more of them are unwilling to be joined in the suit as
plaintiffs or for some reason or the other it is not possible to join
them as plaintiffs, they must be impleaded as defendants so that all
co-trustees are before the Court."
31. The High Court of Delhi in the case of Golesh Kumar Vs. Ganesh
Dass Chawla Charitable Trust (Regd.) reported in 2006 SCC OnLine Del
487 has held as under:-
"6. The Courts have insisted upon due compliance to the
provisions of Order XXXI Rule 2 of the Court. Even where suits
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are instituted by and on behalf of the trust, it was held that willing
trustees should be joined as plaintiffs while all other unwilling
trustees should be joined as defendants. Thus, the suit without
inclusion of all the trustees members of the trust would not be
maintainable where either a suit is instituted or is filed against the
trust."
32. The High Court of Calcutta in the case of Kokilasari Dasi Vs.
Mohunt Rudranand Goswami decided on 12/12/1906 in Appeal from
Appellate Decree No.667 of 1905 has held as under:-
"11. In support of his first contention, it was argued by the
learned vakil for the appellant, that the original plaintiff, as one of
several shebaits, was not entitled to maintain the action. It was
suggested, on the other hand, that as the other shebaits had been
made parties defendants, the frame of the suit was not defective
in view of the decision of a Full Bench of this Court in Pyari
Mohun Bose v. Kedar Nath Roy MANU/WB/0175/1899: (1899)
1.L.R. 26 Calc. 409. In my opinion, the contention advanced on
behalf of the appellant is well founded and must prevail. It cannot
be disputed, that where property belonging to an endowment is
sought to be recovered from a third party, who asserts that he is
the owner thereof, all the trustees of the endowment should be
made parties to the suit, and such of them as refuse to join as
plaintiff, should be made defendants: see Bechu Lal v. Oliullah
MANU/WB/0137/1885: (1885) I.L.R. 11 Calc. 338, which is
based on the principle laid down in the cases of Luke v. South
Kensington Hotel Co. (1879) 11 Ch. D 121 and Rajendranath
Dutt v. Shaik Mahomed Lal MANU/PR/0010/1881: (1881) L.R.
8 I.A. 135: I.L.R. 8 Calc. 42. All the trustees should ordinarily be
co-plaintiffs, and only such of them should be made defendants,
as are unwilling to be joined as co-plaintiffs, or have done some
act precluding them from being plaintiffs, because where the
administration of the trust is vested in several trustees, they all
form, as it were, but one collective trustee and they must exercise
the powers of their office in their joint capacity. Their interests
and authority being equal and undivided, they cannot act
separately, but all must join [McGeorge v. Bigstone (1898) 88
Fed. Rep. 599]. The decision of the Full Bench in Pyar Mohun
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Kedarnath MANU/WB/0175/1899: (1899) 1.L.R. 26 Calc. 409, is
clearly distinguishable. In that case it was observed that if all the
proper parties are on the record, it is open to the contesting
defendant to ask the Court to transfer some of the defendants to
the category of plaintiffs; if they consent, they may be shifted
from the rank of defendants to the side of the plaintiffs and be
made co-plaintiffs; if they refuse, the trial must proceed with
them as co-defendants. In the case before us, the adoption of such
a course was rendered impossible by the conduct of the plaintiff.
He did not admit that there were any joint shebaits; he set up an
exclusive title to the office of shebait; and he brought his brothers
on the record, not for the purpose of giving them an opportunity
to join him as co-plaintiffs, if they so desired, but for the
precisely opposite purpose of challenging their title, and
obtaining a declaration of his own alleged exclusive title as
against them. This question was litigated between the parties and
resulted in the defeat of the plaintiff. He cannot now be heard to
say, that his brothers who were on the record might have been
made co-plaintiffs for the purpose of validating the proceedings.
The first point taken on behalf of the appellant must,
consequently, be answered in her favor."
(Emphasis supplied)
33. Thus, it is held that since all the remaining trustees were impleaded as
defendants, therefore, the defect stood cured. Accordingly, it is held that Trust
is not a juristic person, but as all the Trustees were impleaded as defendants
as they were not willing to join as plaintiffs, therefore, the suit was
maintainable.
34. Accordingly, the first substantial question of law is answered in
negative.
35. No other argument is advanced by the parties.
36. Ex consequenti, the judgment and decree dated 11/12/2001 passed by
IV Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court), Shivpuri in Civil Appeal No.
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:21530
6A/2001 is hereby affirmed.
37. Appeal fails and is, hereby, dismissed.
(G.S.Ahluwalia)
Judge
(and)
