Madhya Pradesh High Court
Sajid Shah vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 19 November, 2025
Author: Hirdesh
Bench: G. S. Ahluwalia, Hirdesh
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:29842
1 CRA-5948-2018
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE G. S. AHLUWALIA
&
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE HIRDESH
ON THE 19th OF NOVEMBER, 2025
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 5948 of 2018
SAJID SHAH
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
Appearance:
Shri Dheeraj Kumar Budholiya - learned Counsel for appellant.
Shri Deependra Singh Kushwah- learned Additional Advocate
General for respondent- State.
ORDER
Per: Justice Hirdesh
The matter was listed for hearing on IA No. 19577/2025, the
appellant's second application under Section 389(1) of the CrPC seeking
suspension of sentence and grant of bail.
2. On perusal of the previous order dated 21.04.2025 passed by the
Coordinate Bench, it is evident that the earlier suspension application i.e., IA
No. 1656/2025, was dismissed as withdrawn with a direction to prepare the
paper book. The paper book has now been duly prepared and placed on
record.
3. At the joint request of learned counsel for the parties, the appeal
was taken up for final hearing. Consequently, IA No. 19577/2025 requires
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:29842
2 CRA-5948-2018
no separate consideration and stands closed.
4. Heard finally.
5. This Criminal Appeal under Section 374 of the CrPC has been
preferred by the appellant challenging the judgment dated 11.07.2018 passed
by the Special Judge [SC/ST (POA) Act], Vidisha in Sessions Trial No. 305
of 2015, whereby the appellant was convicted under Section 302 of IPC and
sentenced to life imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 5,000/-.
6. In brief, the prosecution case is that on 08.04.2015 at about 22:30
hours, a Dehati Nalishi (Ex. P-24) was recorded from injured Samreen (since
deceased) at Hamidia Hospital, Bhopal. She alleged that on 04.04.2015 at
about 08:00 a.m., while she was preparing chapatis on the stove, her
husband, the appellant, poured kerosene oil on her and pushed her towards
the burning stove, causing extensive burn injuries. Her mother-in-law
allegedly extinguished the flames. Villagers gathered, and the appellant took
her to the hospital. FIR (Ex. P-25) was thereafter registered. After
investigation, charges under Sections 498-A, 302, and in the alternative 304-
B of IPC were framed. The appellant abjured guilt. Eighteen prosecution
witnesses were examined; no defence evidence was adduced. The Trial
Court relied principally on the subsequent dying declarations to convict the
appellant under Section 302 IPC.
7. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the conviction is
contrary to law and unsupported by reliable evidence. The Trial Court
overlooked the fact that most material witnesses, including the deceased's
mother (PW-1) and other independent witnesses, turned hostile. PW-1
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:29842
3 CRA-5948-2018
categorically stated that her daughter was well-treated at her matrimonial
home and that there was no dowry demand or cruelty. Medical witnesses,
including Dr. Himanshu Jain (PW-6) and Dr. (Smt.) N. Ahirwar (PW-14),
deposed that the deceased did not allege that the appellant had burnt her.
PW-14 specifically stated that the deceased reported accidental burns while
cooking; she was fully conscious; there was no smell of kerosene; and her
injuries were consistent with accidental burns. The Trial Court acquitted the
appellant of offences under Sections 498-A and 304-B. The conviction under
Section 302 IPC, based solely on dying declarations recorded four days later,
is unsustainable as the same are inconsistent with the earliest version. Hence,
the appellant is entitled to acquittal.
8. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State supported the
impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence and submitted that
the dying declarations were voluntary and reliable. It is argued that there is
no infirmity or illegality in the findings recorded by the Trial Court. Hence,
the appeal deserves to be dismissed.
9. The main question for determination is whether the dying
declarations relied upon by the Trial Court are credible, voluntary,
consistent, and trustworthy so as to sustain a conviction under Section 302
IPC.
10. When multiple dying declarations are inconsistent, the Court must
scrutinize which version is true. If the earliest version is natural and
consistent with medical evidence, it must be preferred. The Hon'ble Apex
Court relying on the judgment of Paniben (Smt.) vs. State of Gujarat
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:29842
4 CRA-5948-2018
reported in (1992) 2 SCC 474 in the case of P.V. Radhkrishna vs. State of
Karnataka reported in (2003) 6 SCC 443 has held as under:-
"12. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is
worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of cross-
examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as an
obligation of oath could be. This is the reason the Court also
insists that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to
inspire full confidence of the Court in its correctness. The Court
has to be on guard that the statement of deceased was not as a
result of either tutoring, or prompting or a product of imagination.
The Court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit
state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the
assailant. Once the Court is satisfied that the declaration was true
and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any
further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of
law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of
conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring
corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. This Court has laid
down in several judgments the principles governing dying
declaration, which could be summed up as under as indicated in
Smt. Paniben v. State of Gujarat (AIR 1992 SC 1817):
(i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying
declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration. [See
Munnu Raja & Anr. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (1976)
2 SCR 764)]
(ii) If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true
and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without
corroboration. [See State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Sagar
Yadav and Ors. (AIR 1985 SC 416) and Ramavati Devi v.
State of Bihar (AIR 1983 SC 164)]
(iii) The Court has to scrutinize the dying declaration
carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result
of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased had an
opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in
a fit state to make the declaration. [See K. Ramachandra
Reddy and Anr. v. The Public Prosecutor (AIR 1976 SC
1994)]
(iv) Where dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be
acted upon without corroborative evidence. [See Rasheed
Beg v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1974 (4) SCC 264)]
(v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never
make any dying declaration the evidence with regard to it is
to be rejected. [See Kaka Singh v State of M.P. (AIR 1982
SC 1021)]
(vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot
form the basis of conviction. [See Ram Manorath and Ors. v.
State of U.P. (1981 (2) SCC 654)
(vii) Merely because a dying declaration does contain the
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:29842
5 CRA-5948-2018
details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. [See State
of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurthi Laxmipati Naidu (AIR
1981 SC 617)]
(viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not
to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the
statement itself guarantees truth. [See Surajdeo Oza and Ors.
v. State of Bihar (AIR 1979 SC 1505)
(ix) Normally the Court in order to satisfy whether deceased
was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration
look up to the medical opinion. But where the eye-witness
said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to
make the dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot
prevail. [See Nanahau Ram and Anr. v. State of Madhya
Pradesh (AIR 1988 SC 912)]
(x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version as
given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be
acted upon. [See State of U.P. v. Madan Mohan and Ors.
(AIR 1989 SC 1519)]
(xi) Where there are more than one statement in the nature of
dying declaration, one first in point of time must be
preferred. Of course, if the plurality of dying declaration
could be held to be trustworthy and reliable, it has to be
accepted. [See Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v.State of
Maharashtra (AIR 1982 SC 839)].
13. In the light of the above principles, the acceptability of alleged
dying declaration in the instant case has to be considered. The
dying declaration is only a piece of untested evidence and must
like any other evidence, satisfy the Court that what is stated therein
is the unalloyed truth and that it is absolutely safe to act upon it. If
after careful scrutiny the Court is satisfied that it is true and free
from any effort to induce the deceased to make a false statement
and if it is coherent and consistent, there shall be no legal
impediment to make it basis of conviction, even if there is no
corroboration. [See Gangotri Singh v. State of U.P.{JT 1992
(2)SC 417), Goverdhan Raoji Ghyare v. State of Maharashtra (JT
1993 (5) SC 87), Meesala Ramakrishan v. State of Andhra
Pradesh (JT 1994 (3) SC 232) and State of Rajasthan v. Kishore
(JT 1996 (2) SC 595)].
14. There is no material to show that dying declaration was result
of product of imagination, tutoring or prompting. On the contrary,
the same appears to have been made by the deceased voluntarily.
It is trustworthy and has credibility. "
11. The Supreme Court in the case of Suresh vs. State represented by
Inspector of Police, 2025 INSC 318 has held as under:-
"14. As discussed above, in cases where the dying declaration is
suspicious, it is not safe to convict an accused in the absence of
corroborative evidence. In a case like the present one, where the
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:29842
6 CRA-5948-2018
deceased has been changing her stance and has completely turned
around her statements, such a dying declaration cannot become the
sole basis for the conviction in the absence of any other
corroborative evidence."
12. So far as the question whether a Dehati Nalishi can be treated as a
dying declaration is concerned, the settled principle of law laid down by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court is that a Dehati Nalishi or any First Information
recorded from an injured person may operate as a dying declaration if the
maker subsequently dies.
13. In the present case, deceased Samreen was brought to PHC,
Haidergarh on 04.04.2015 at around 10:00 a.m. by her husband. Before Dr.
(Smt.) N. Ahirwar (PW-14), she clearly stated that she had suffered burns
accidentally while cooking. This first oral dying declaration is recorded
contemporaneously in the shape of medical report (Ex. P-20). Four days
later, two further dying declarations were recorded--first, the Dehati Nalishi
(Ex. P-24) at 22:30 hrs on 08.04.2015; and second, the written dying
declaration (Ex.P-23) at 23:38 hrs on the same day at Kamla Nehru Hospital.
In these later statements, allegations of kerosene pouring and pushing were
introduced for the first time.
14. This Court deems it appropriate to first consider in detail the first
dying declaration recorded by Dr. (Smt.) N. Ahirwar (PW-14) as well as the
Dehati Nalishi (Ex.P24) and the written dying declaration (Ex. P-23).
15. Dr. (Smt.) N. Ahirwar (PW-14), in her examination-in-chief,
deposed that on 04.04.2015 she was posted as a Medical Officer at PHC,
Haidergarh. At about 10:00 a.m., injured Samreen, aged 18 years, was
brought for treatment by her husband Sajid. The deceased stated before her
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:29842
7 CRA-5948-2018
that she had suffered burns while cooking at home between 8 and 9 a.m.
Upon examination, the doctor found bandages on both wrists and ankles, and
burn injuries on the chest with blisters on both breasts. The general condition
of the injured was satisfactory. According to Dr.Ahirwar, the deceased had
sustained 45-50% burns, and these injuries appeared normal but could have
been life-threatening if not treated. She referred the deceased to the District
Hospital, Vidisha. In cross-examination, this witness deposed that the
deceased was talking normally, gave a history of heat burns while cooking,
and that there was no smell of kerosene on her body. Her mental balance,
breathing, and circulation were normal. The medical report is Ex. P-20.
16. In the Dehati Nalishi (Ex. P-24) recorded on 08.04.2015 at around
22:30 hours, after four days of the incident, the deceased alleged that her
husband poured kerosene on her and pushed her towards the burning stove,
setting her ablaze. She further stated that her mother-in-law, Jahida Bee (PW-
12), extinguished the fire by means of water, and thereafter her husband
brought her to Hamidia Hospital, Bhopal. In the written dying declaration
(Ex. P-23), similar allegations were recorded. Upon perusal of the evidence
of Dr. (Smt.) N. Ahirwar (PW-14) and medical report (Ex. P-20), it is clear
that the deceased initially stated that she was burnt while cooking. She was
fully conscious and oriented. There was no smell of kerosene on her body.
Bandages were already present on her wrists and ankles. The first treating
doctor was not examined by the prosecution. The subsequent dying
declarations, (Ex. P-23 and Ex. P-24) recorded after four days, materially
conflict with the earliest oral dying declaration given to Dr. (Smt.) N.
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:29842
8 CRA-5948-2018
Ahirwar (PW-14). The deceased also did not explain to Dr. Ahirwar the
absence of kerosene smell, which is inconsistent with later allegations. This
inconsistency does not reconcile with the testimony of PW-12 Jahida Bee.
On going through the settled principles of law as laid down by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the above-cited cases, it is clear that dying declarations
must be wholly reliable and consistent to form the sole basis of conviction,
and when contradictory, the benefit of doubt must go to the accused.
17. Most of the prosecution witnesses, including PW-12 Jahida Bee
(mother-in-law of the deceased), did not support the prosecution version.
This witness deposed that the deceased caught fire while cooking and she
extinguished the flames. Although hostility does not render the testimony
wholly inadmissible, it substantially weakens the prosecution case.
18. On perusal of the record, it is also evident that the Trial Court itself
found no evidence of cruelty, harassment, or dowry demand against the
appellant and accordingly acquitted him of charges under Sections 498-A
and 304-B of IPC. This reduces the probability of homicidal intent. The
earliest and spontaneous oral statement to Dr. (Smt.) N. Ahirwar (PW-14)
supports accidental burns. The later dying declarations suffer from material
inconsistencies. The hostile witnesses further weaken the prosecution
version. Thus, the essential ingredients of murder as enshrined under Section
302 IPC are not proved beyond reasonable doubt. The Hon'ble Apex Court
in the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra , (1984) 4
SCC 116 has also held that when two views are possible, the one favourable
to the accused must be adopted.
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:29842
9 CRA-5948-2018
19. In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeal filed by the
appellant deserves to be allowed and is accordingly allowed. The judgment
of conviction and order of sentence dated 11.07.2018 passed by the Special
Judge [SC/ST (POA) Act], Vidisha in Sessions Trial No. 305/2015
convicting the appellant under Section 302 IPC is hereby set aside. Appellant
Sajid Shah is acquitted of the charge under Section 302 IPC. He shall be
released forthwith, if not required in any other case. The fine amount, if
deposited, shall be refunded.
20. Let the trial court record be returned along with a copy of this
judgment to the concerned Trial Court as well as a copy to the Jail Authority.
(G. S. AHLUWALIA) (HIRDESH)
JUDGE JUDGE
*AVI*
