Madhya Pradesh High Court
Dr. Mukesh Swaroop Johri vs Central Bureau Of Investigation on 11 November, 2025
Author: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
Bench: G. S. Ahluwalia
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MCRC No.18259/2025
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT G WA L I O R
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE G. S. AHLUWALIA
&
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE PUSHPENDRA YADAV
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 18259 of 2025
DR. MUKESH SWAROOP JOHRI AND OTHERS
Versus
CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Appearance:
Mr. Surendra Singh - Senior Advocate through video conferencing
assisted by Shri Deependra Singh Raghuwanshi - Advocate for applicants.
Mr. Raju Sharma - Advocate for respondent.
________________________________________________________________
Reserved on : 04.11.2025
Pronounced on : 11.11.2025
ORDER
Per: Justice Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
1. This application under Section 482 of Cr.P.C has been filed for quashment
of criminal proceedings pending against the applicants in S.T. No.728/2014 in
the Court of Special Judge (CBI), (Vyapam) cum Fourth Additional Sessions
Judge, Gwalior.
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2. It is not out of place to mention here that applicant No.1 had filed
Criminal Revision No.1865/2020 and applicant No.2 had filed Criminal
Revision No.1916/2020 against the order framing charges. On 17.10.2024,
applicants, after arguing the criminal revisions at length, sought permission to
raise all the grounds before the appropriate Court at appropriate stage in
accordance with law, and accordingly, the Division Bench of this Court on
17.10.2024 passed the following orders :
Cr.R. No.1865/2020 :
"1. The present revision petition under Section 397 and 401 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is preferred by the petitioner
seeking the following reliefs:
"It is, therefore, prayed
i. That, record of the trial court may be called.
ii. That, the revision petition may be allowed.
iii. That, impugned order may be set aside.
iv. That, the application u/s 227 may be allowed.
v. That, impugned charges may be quashed.
vi. That, petitioners may be discharged.
vii. That, any other order as may be deemed fit may kindly be
passed."
2. After arguing at length, learned counsel for the petitioner seeks
withdrawal of this petition with liberty to raise all the grounds
before the appropriate Court at appropriate stage in accordance with
law.
3. Prayer allowed.
4. Petition is dismissed as withdrawn with the aforesaid liberty."
"1. The present revision petition under Section 397 and 401 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is preferred by the petitioner
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seeking the following reliefs:
"It is, therefore, prayed
i. That, record of the trial court may be called.
ii. That, the revision petition may be allowed.
iii. That, impugned order may be set aside.
iv. That, the application u/s 227 may be allowed.
v. That, impugned charges may be quashed.
vi. That, petitioners may be discharged.
vii. That, any other order as may be deemed fit may kindly be
passed."
2. After arguing at length, learned senior counsel for the petitioner
seeks withdrawal of this petition with liberty to raise all the grounds
before the appropriate Court at appropriate stage in accordance with
law.
3. Prayer allowed.
4. Petition is dismissed as withdrawn with the aforesaid liberty."
3. The counsel for applicants referred to judgment passed by the Supreme
Court in the case of Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West
Bengal vs. Mohan Singh and others, reported in (1975) 3 SCC 706, and
submitted that this application for quashment of proceedings on the changed
circumstances is maintainable. It is submitted that criminal trial has not reached
to a logical end. It is submitted that the revisions which were filed by the
applicants were withdrawn, and since they were not decided on merits, therefore,
the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Mohan Singh (supra) is
squarely applicable to the facts of this case, and accordingly, it is submitted that
this second application for quashment of proceedings is maintainable.
4. Per contra, counsel for respondent/CBI, submitted that this second
application is not maintainable, but in spite of repeated requests by the Court, he
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did not cite any judgment in this regard.
5. Before considering the merits of the case, this Court is of the considered
opinion that it is necessary for this Court to consider as to whether the second
application for the similar relief is maintainable or not ?
6. In the case of Mohan Singh (supra), the first application filed by the
aspirant under Section 561-A of CrPC, 1898, was dismissed in limine by merely
mentioning that the points raised by the applicants depend on certain questions
of fact which have to be ascertained on evidence by the Court of facts.
Accordingly, the Division Bench did not propose, to interfere with the
proceedings against the petitioner at that stage.
7. In the case of Mohan Singh (supra), the applicants had argued the matter
on merits, but instead of deciding the case on merits, the Division Bench chose
to dismiss the application filed under Section 561-A of CrPC, 1898, merely on
the ground that there are certain questions of fact which are to be ascertained on
evidence by the Court of facts. Under those circumstances, it was held that the
second application under Section 561-A of CrPC, 1898, was maintainable, as the
criminal case had dragged on for a period of about one and a half years without
any progress at all, and it was held that the facts and circumstances obtaining at
the time of the subsequent application were clearly different from what they
were at the time of the earlier application because despite the rejection of earlier
application, the prosecution had failed to make out any progress in the criminal
case even though it was filed as far back as 1965, and the criminal case rested
where it was for a period of over one and a half years.
8. In the present case, the matter was argued at length by the counsel for the
applicants, and when this Court was not inclined to pass a favorable order and
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was ready to pass an order on merits, then it was the applicants who decided to
withdraw their revisions, and did not invite orders on merits.
9. It is fairly conceded by counsel for the applicants that the trial is in
progress and six prosecution witnesses have already been examined.
10. The applicants have not filed the complete order sheets of the trial Court
to show that, despite the cooperation by all the co-accused persons, the
prosecution has failed to move at a swift pace. In the case of Mohan Singh
(supra), there was a complete halt in the trial, whereas in the present case, the
trial is in progress. Once the applicants have decided not to place the complete
order sheets of the trial Court on record to show that neither they nor any of the
accused is responsible for the delay, this Court is of the considered opinion that
it cannot be held that the trial is not in progress.
11. Furthermore, the second question for consideration is whether successive
applications under Section 482 of Cr.P.C for quashment of the proceedings are
maintainable or not ?
12. In the present case, initially, the applicants had filed criminal revisions
against the order framing charges; for the similar relief that the material
available against them do not make out an offence, and accordingly, the trial
Court should not have framed charges and in fact trial Court should have
discharged them.
13. Now, by filing an application under a different provision of law, i.e., under
Section 482 of Cr.P.C, the applicants are again relying upon the same charge-
sheet to allege that the material collected against them is not sufficient to
prosecute them. Thus, it is clear that although the applications, i.e., the criminal
revisions and the present application, might have been filed under different
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provisions of law, but in both the cases, the charge-sheet which has been filed by
the prosecution is the material on the basis of which it is to be decided by this
Court as to whether there is sufficient material against the applicants for their
prosecution or not.
14. Under these circumstances, it is held that although this application might
have been filed under the provisions of Section 482 of Cr.P.C, but the same
would not be maintainable unless and until some additional grounds or material
are placed by the applicants which were not available at the time of framing of
charge.
15. During the course of arguments, the counsel for the applicants has only
relied upon the charge-sheet filed by the prosecution and submitted that, so far
as the confessional statement of Yogesh Chandra Uprit is concerned, it is not
admissible for the following three reasons: (i.) that the confessional statement
was recorded by the Magistrate, Ghaziabad, after administering oath to the co-
accused Uprit, (ii.) the said confessional statement is not in question-and-answer
form and (iii.) the co-accused was not informed about the consequences of the
confessional statement.
16. It is further submitted by counsel for applicants that although Vinay
Srivastava has stated that he was informed by his brother, Vijay Srivastava, that
he had arranged for securing a seat for applicant No. 2 in the P.G. exam, but
since Vijay Srivastava has neither been impleaded as co-accused nor has been
cited as a witness, therefore, the statement of Vinay Srivastava would be that of
a hearsay witness, and in absence of substantive evidence, the evidence of a
hearsay witness will have no consequence. It is further submitted that another
prosecution witness, Vedaraj, has already expired in the year 2017, but fairly
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conceded that his death certificate has neither been filed along with this
application nor it has been filed before the trial Court. It is further submitted that
the confessional statements of the applicants, which never led to discovery, are
not admissible in light of the bar as contained under Sections 25 and 26 of the
Evidence Act, and therefore, there is no sufficient admissible material against the
applicants warranting their prosecution.
17. The aforesaid submissions have been reproduced in order to show that
whatever grounds were raised by the applicants were available at the time of
arguments on the question of framing of charge. Thus, it is held that the present
application has also been filed on the basis of material which was available at
the time of arguments on the question of framing of charge.
18. The Supreme Court, in the case of Bhisham Lal Verma v. State of U.P. ,
reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1399 has held as under:
9. Mr S. Nagamuthu, learned Amicus Curiae, would however point
out that entertainment of the second petition in Mohan Singh [State
of W.B. v. Mohan Singh, (1975) 3 SCC 706 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 156]
was held permissible as the circumstances obtaining at the time of
the subsequent petition were clearly different from what they were
at the time of the earlier one and that was the distinguishing factor
which saved the second petition. He would further point out that, in
Simrikhia v. Dolley Mukherjee [Simrikhia v. Dolley Mukherjee,
(1990) 2 SCC 437 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 327] , this Court cautioned that
the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC cannot be invoked
to override the bar of review under Section 362CrPC. Reference
was made to Sooraj Devi v. Pyare Lal [Sooraj Devi v. Pyare Lal,
(1981) 1 SCC 500 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 188] which held that the
inherent power of the Court could not be exercised for doing that
which is specifically prohibited by the Criminal Procedure Code,
1973. He also drew our attention to R. Annapurna v. Ramadugu
Anantha Krishna Sastry [R. Annapurna v. Ramadugu Anantha
Krishna Sastry, (2002) 10 SCC 401 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1135] ,
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wherein a quash petition under Section 482CrPC was dismissed on
28-1-1995 and without mentioning the same, another petition was
filed under Section 482CrPC with a similar prayer. Noting that the
second petition was not made on the strength of anything which
had developed after 28-1-1995 but only on the facts which
subsisted prior to that date, this Court held that the second petition
was not maintainable, as the High Court did not have the power to
upset the order dated 28-1-1995 which had attained finality.
10. In S. Madan Kumar v. K. Arjunan [S. Madan Kumar v. K.
Arjunan, 2006 SCC OnLine Mad 94 : (2006) 1 MWN (Cri) DCC 1]
, the Madras High Court observed that a person who invokes
Section 482CrPC should honestly come before the Court raising all
the pleas available to him at that point of time and he is not
supposed to approach the Court with instalment pleas. It was
further observed that there may be a change of circumstances
during the course of criminal proceedings which would give scope
for the person aggrieved to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the
Court, but when he is posted with all the facts and circumstances of
a case, he cannot withhold part of it for the purpose of filing yet
another petition seeking the same relief.
11. We are in complete agreement with these observations of the
Madras High Court. Though it is clear that there can be no blanket
rule that a second petition under Section 482CrPC would not lie in
any situation and it would depend upon the facts and circumstances
of the individual case, it is not open to a person aggrieved to raise
one plea after the other, by invoking the jurisdiction of the High
Court under Section 482CrPC, though all such pleas were very
much available even at the first instance. Permitting the filing of
successive petitions under Section 482CrPC ignoring this principle
would enable an ingenious accused to effectively stall the
proceedings against him to suit his own interest and convenience,
by filing one petition after another under Section 482CrPC,
irrespective of when the cause therefor arose. Such abuse of
process cannot be permitted.
12. In the case on hand, the filing of the charge-sheet and the
cognizance thereof by the court concerned were well before the
filing of the first petition under Section 482CrPC, wherein
challenge was made only to the sanction order. That being so, the
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petitioner was not at liberty to again invoke the inherent
jurisdiction of the High Court in relation to the charge-sheet and
the cognizance order at a later point of time. The impugned order
[Bhisham Lal Verma v. State of U.P., 2023 SCC OnLine All 2290]
passed by the Allahabad High Court holding to this effect is,
therefore, incontrovertible on all counts and does not warrant
interference.
19. The Supreme Court in the case of M.C. Ravikumar vs. D.S. Velmurugan
and others, decided on 23rd of July 2025 in SLP (Criminal) No.12715/2022,
has been held as under,
"Discussion and Analysis: -
10. We have heard the submissions advanced at the bar and have
gone through the impugned order and material placed on record.
11. The short question that arises for our consideration is "Whether
a second quashing petition under Section 482 CrPC would be
maintainable on the grounds/pleas that were available to be raised
even at the time of filing/decision of the first quashing petition?"
12. At the outset, we may like to note that the submission advanced
by the learned counsel for the accused-respondents that the second
quashing petition came to be filed based on new grounds/pleas, is
not tenable on the face of it. From the bare perusal of the record, it
is evident that the second quashing petition raised no such
grounds/pleas which were unavailable to the accused-respondents
at the time of adjudication of the first quashing petition. The failure
of the accusedrespondents to raise a pertinent ground/plea which
was tangibly available to them at the time of adjudication of the
first quashing petition can in no circumstance grant a right to the
said accused persons to file a subsequent quashing petition as it
would amount to seeking review on pre-existing material.
13. This Court in catena of judgments has held that it is not open to
an accused person to raise one plea after the other, by repeatedly
invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section
482 CrPC, though all such pleas were very much available to him
even at the first instance. We may hasten to add that there is no
sweeping rule to the effect that a second quashing petition under
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Section 482 CrPC is not maintainable and its maintainability will
depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. However, the
onus to show that there arose a change in circumstances warranting
entertainment of a subsequent quashing petition would be on the
person filing the said petition. In this regard, we may gainfully
refer to the observations made by this Court in the case of
Bhisham Lal Verma v. State of UP & Anr., which are extracted
below for ready reference:-
"11. ...... Though it is clear that there can be no blanket
rule that a second petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. would
not lie in any situation and it would depend upon the facts
and circumstances of the individual case, it is not open to a
person aggrieved to raise one plea after the other, by
invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under
Section 482 Cr.P.C., though all such pleas were very
much available even at the first instance. Permitting the
filing of successive petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
ignoring this principle would enable an ingenious
accused to effectively stall the proceedings against him
to suit his own interest and convenience, by filing one
petition after another under Section 482 Cr.P.C.,
irrespective of when the cause therefor arose. Such
abuse of process cannot be permitted."
(Emphasis Supplied)
14. Furthermore, we are of the opinion that the order passed by the
High Court in the second quashing petition amounted to review
(plain and simple) of the earlier order passed by the co-ordinate
bench of the High Court in the first quashing petition, since there
was admittedly no change in circumstances and no new
grounds/pleas became available to the accused-respondents, after
passing of the order of dismissal in the first quashing petition. The
order passed by the High Court is in gross disregard to all tenets of
law as Section 362 CrPC expressly bars review of a judgment or
final order disposing of a case except to correct some clerical or
arithmetical error.
15. This Court has time and again held that the High Courts while
exercising their inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC
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cannot override a specific bar laid down by other provisions of
CrPC, i.e., to say that the High Court is not empowered to review
its own decision under the purported exercise of its inherent
powers. To fortify the aforesaid conclusion, we may gainfully refer
to the observations made by this Court in the case of Simrikhia v.
Dolley Mukherjee and Chhabi Mukherjee and Anr., the relevant
portions whereof are quoted below for ease of reference:
"6. In Superintendent & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs
v. Mohan Singh, (1975) 3 SCC 706, this Court held that
Section 561A preserves the inherent power of the High
Court to make such orders as it deems fit to prevent abuse
of the process of the Court or to secure the ends of justice
and the High Court must therefore exercise its inherent
powers having regard to the situation prevailing at the
particular point of time when its inherent jurisdiction is
sought to be invoked. In that case the facts and
circumstances obtaining at the time of the subsequent
application were clearly different from what they were at
the time of the earlier application. The question as to the
scope and ambit of the inherent power of the High Court
vis-a-vis an earlier order made by it was, therefore, not
concluded by this decision.
7. The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be
invoked to override bar of review u/s 362. It is clearly
stated in Sooraj Devi v. Pyare Lal, (1981) 1 SCC 50 that
the inherent power of the Court cannot be exercised for
doing that which is specifically prohibited by the Code.
The law is therefore clear that the inherent power
cannot be exercised for doing that which cannot be done
on account of the bar under other provisions of the
Code. The court is not empowered to review its own
decision under the purported exercise of inherent
power. We find that the impugned order in this case is in
effect one reviewing the earlier order on a reconsideration
of the same materials. The High Court has grievously erred
in doing so. Even on merits, we do not find any compelling
reasons to quash the proceedings at that stage."
(Emphasis supplied)
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16. In the instant case, the quashing by the High Court of a similar
complaint, i.e., Criminal Complaint No. 41 of 2015 filed by the
complainant against the accused-respondents in respect of
properties situated at Thanjavur vide order dated 9th March, 2020
was an event that happened well before the dismissal of the first
quashing petition under Section 482 CrPC and the said ground/plea
was manifestly available to the accused-respondents while seeking
adjudication of the first quashing petition. That being the situation,
the accused-respondents were not at liberty to invoke the inherent
jurisdiction of the High Court raising the aforesaid ground/plea at a
later point of time by filing the second quashing petition.
17. As an upshot of the above discussion, we have no hesitation in
holding that the impugned order passed by the High Court is
unjustified on the face of the record and cannot be affirmed. Hence,
the impugned order dated 13th September, 2022 passed by the High
Court in Criminal Original Petition No. 16241 of 2022 is quashed
and set aside. As a result, thereof, the Criminal Complaint No. 1828
of 2019 filed by the appellant-complainant against the accused-
respondents is restored to the file of the learned IX Metropolitan
Judicial Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai."
20. Thus, it is clear that since the present application under Section 482 of
Cr.P.C has been filed on the same grounds which were pressed into service while
arguing the criminal revisions filed against the order of framing charges, and in
absence of any change in the circumstances, this Court is of the considered
opinion that this application is not maintainable.
21. It is, accordingly, dismissed on the ground of maintainability.
(G. S. AHLUWALIA) (PUSHPENDRA YADAV)
JUDGE JUDGE
Aman
