Madhya Pradesh High Court
The State Of Madhya Pradesh vs Raj Kumar Singh Bhadoriya on 17 May, 2025
Author: Milind Ramesh Phadke
Bench: Milind Ramesh Phadke
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT G WA L I O R
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE MILIND RAMESH PHADKE
&
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE RAJENDRA KUMAR VANI
WRIT APPEAL No. 908 of 2025
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Versus
RAJ KUMAR SINGH BHADORIYA
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Appearance:
Shri G.K. Agarwal - Govt. Advocate for the petitioners/State.
Shri B.P. Singh - Advocate for the respondent.
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Reserved on : 02/05/2025
Delivered on : 17/05/2025
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This petition having been heard and reserved for orders,
comiing on for pronouncement this day, the Hon'ble Shri Justice
Milind Ramesh Phadke pronounced/passed the following:
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ORDER
Per: Justice Milind Ramesh Phadke:
Heard on I.A. No.3541/2025, which is an application for
condonation of delay of 534 days in preferring the instant appeal.
2. The instant writ appeal under Section 2(1) of Madhya Pradesh
Uchcha Nyayalay (Khand Nyay Peeth ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 is
directed against the order dated 11.07.2023 passed in W.P.
No.15254/2023, whereby the petition was disposed of with a direction
to Tehsildar concerned to execute RRC dated 04.01.2023 within six
months from the date of receiving of certified copy of the said order.
3. Learned counsel for the State on delay had advanced his
argument in similar lines to the contents of the application.
4. On merits, learned counsel for the appellant/State has assailed
the said order on the ground that after amendment in the M.P.
Industrial Relations Act, 1960 its provisions are not applicable to the
Water Resources Department in the light of Section1/A of the Act of
1960.
5. Learned Counsel has also argued that the law, which is not
applicable against the department cannot be enforced by the order of
learned Labour Court and, therefore, direction for executing the RRC
issued by the learned Single Judge, since is bad in law, be set aside.
6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent while
referring to a notification dated 14.08.2007 issued in exercise of
powers confirmed under Section 4 of Section 1 of the Act of 1960 as
well as judgment of this Court in the matter of Om Prakash Sengar
Vs. State of M.P. & another passed in M.P. No.1629/2020 dated
05.04.2022 and the order passed by Division Bench in the matter of
State of M.P. through Public Health Engineering and Others vs.
Balwant Singh Mandloi passed in W.A. No.404/2025 dated
24.02.2025 has argued that the contentions as raised by the counsel for
the appellant are baseless, as the basic order of labour Court, out of
which, the RRC had arose is dated 17.02.1999 much prior to the
amendment in the Act of 1960, which was in the year 2000, by which
provision of Section 1-A of the act of 1960 were inserted in statute
books, thus, when the very order of which execution has been sought
is, prior to the amendment, the insertion of provision of Section 1-A of
the Act of 1960 would not be applicable retrospectively and, therefore,
would not be applicable in the proceedings. It was further argued that
even otherwise, in the light of judgment of Apex Court in the matter of
Bangalore Water-Supply & Sewerage Vs, R. Rajappa & Others
reported in 1978(2) SCC 213, the petitioner/department cannot be said
to be out of purview of definition of industry, therefore, the contention
of the appellant is wholly misconceived. It was, thus, prayed that the
appeal be dismissed.
7. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
8. First and foremost question that would arose in the facts and
circumstances of the case would be whether the delay of 534 days in
preferring the appeal deserves to be condoned or the appeal is liable to
be dismissed as barred by limitation.
9. In the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) By Lrs Vs.
Special Deputy Collector (La) passed by the Apex Court in SLP
(Civil) No. 31248 of 2018 dated 08.04.2024 it has been observed as
under:-
7. The law of limitation is founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the
legal maxim "interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium" i.e. it is for the
general welfare that a period of limitation be put to litigation. The object
is to put an end to every legal remedy and to have a fixed period of life
for every litigation as it is futile to keep any litigation or dispute pending
indefinitely. Even public policy requires that there should be an end to
the litigation otherwise it would be a 5|22 dichotomy if the litigation is
made immortal vis-a-vis the litigating parties i.e. human beings, who are
mortals.
8. The courts have always treated the statutes of limitation and
prescription as statutes of peace and repose. They envisage that a right
not exercised or the remedy not availed for a long time ceases to exist.
This is one way of putting to an end to a litigation by barring the remedy
rather than the right with the passage of time.
9. Section 3 of the Limitation Act in no uncertain terms lays down that
no suit, appeal or application instituted, preferred or made after the
period prescribed shall be entertained rather dismissed even though
limitation has not been set up as a defence subject to the exceptions
contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act.
10. Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act, for the sake of convenience, is
reproduced hereinbelow:
"3. Bar of limitation.- (1) Subject to the provisions contained in sections
4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and
application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed,
although limitation has not been set up as a defence."
11. Though Section 3 of the Act mentions about suit, appeal and
application but since in this case we are concerned with appeal, we
would hereinafter be mentioning about the appeal only in context with
the limitation, it being barred by time, if at all, and if the delay in its
filing is liable to be condoned.
12. In view of the above provision, the appeal which is preferred after
the expiry of the limitation is liable to be dismissed. The use of the word
'shall' in the aforesaid provision connotes that the dismissal is
mandatory subject to the exceptions. Section 3 of the Act is peremptory
and had to be given effect to even though no objection regarding
limitation is taken by the other side or referred to in the pleadings. In
other words, it casts an obligation upon the court to dismiss an appeal
which is presented beyond limitation. This is the general law of
limitation. The exceptions are carved out under Sections 4 to 24
(inclusive) of the Limitation Act but we are concerned only with the
exception contained in Section 5 which empowers the courts to admit an
appeal even if it is preferred after the prescribed period provided the
proposed appellant gives 'sufficient cause' for not preferring the appeal
within the period prescribed. In other words, the courts are conferred
with discretionary powers to admit an appeal even after the expiry of the
prescribed period provided the proposed appellant is able to establish
'sufficient cause' for not filing it within time. The said power to condone
the delay or to admit the appeal preferred after the expiry of time is
discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause
is shown based upon host of other factors such as negligence, failure to
exercise due diligence etc.
13. It is very elementary and well understood that courts should not
adopt an injustice-oriented approach in dealing with the applications for
condonation of the delay in filing appeals and rather follow a pragmatic
line to advance substantial justice.
14. It may also be important to point out that though on one hand,
Section 5 of the Limitation Act is to be construed liberally, but on the
other hand, Section 3 of the Limitation Act, being a substantive law of
mandatory nature has to be interpreted in a strict sense. In Bhag Mal
alias Ram Bux and Ors. vs. Munshi (Dead) by LRs. and Ors.1, it has
been observed that different provisions of Limitation Act may require
different construction, as for example, the court exercises its power in a
given case liberally in condoning the delay in filing the appeal under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, however, the same may not be true while
construing Section 3 of the Limitation Act. It, therefore, follows that
though liberal interpretation has to be given in construing Section 5 of
the Limitation Act but not in applying Section 3 of the Limitation Act,
which has to be construed strictly.
15. It is in the light of the public policy upon which law of limitation is
based, the object behind the law of limitation and the mandatory and the
directory nature of Section 3 and Section 5 of the Limitation Act that we
have to examine and strike a balance between Section 3 and Section 5 of
the Limitation Act in the matters of condoning the delay.
16. Generally, the courts have adopted a very liberal approach in
construing the phrase 'sufficient cause' used in Section 5 of (2007) 11
SCC 285 the Limitation Act in order to condone the delay to enable the
courts to do substantial justice and to apply law in a meaningful manner
which subserves the ends of justice. In Collector, Land Acquisition,
Anantnag and Ors. vs. Katiji and Ors.2, this Court in advocating the
liberal approach in condoning the delay for 'sufficient cause' held that
ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late;
it is not necessary to explain every day's delay in filing the appeal; and
since sometimes refusal to condone delay may result in throwing out a
meritorious matter, it is necessary in the interest of justice that cause of
substantial justice should be allowed to prevail upon technical
considerations and if the delay is not deliberate, it ought to be
condoned. Notwithstanding the above, howsoever, liberal approach is
adopted in condoning the delay, existence of 'sufficient cause' for not
filing the appeal in time, is a condition precedent for exercising the
discretionary power to condone the delay. The phrases 'liberal
approach', 'justice- (1987) 2 SCC 107 = AIR 1987 SC 1353 10 oriented
approach' and cause for the advancement of 'substantial justice' cannot
be employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale matters
or as a matter of fact dead matters to be revived and re-opened by taking
aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
17. It must always be borne in mind that while construing 'sufficient
cause' in deciding application under Section 5 of the Act, that on the
expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for filing an appeal,
substantive right in favour of a decree-holder accrues and this right
ought not to be lightly disturbed. The decree-holder treats the decree to
be binding with the lapse of time and may proceed on such assumption
creating new rights.
18. This Court as far back in 1962 in the case of Ramlal, Motilal And
Chhotelal vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd3 has emphasized that even after
sufficient cause has been shown by a party for not filing an appeal
within time, the said party is not entitled to the condonation of delay as
excusing the delay is A.I.R. 1962 SC 361 the discretionary jurisdiction
vested with the court. The court, despite establishment of a 'sufficient
cause' for various reasons, may refuse to condone the delay depending
upon the bona fides of the party.
19. In Maqbul Ahmad and Ors. vs. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh and
Ors.4, it had been held that the court cannot grant an exemption from
limitation on equitable consideration or on the ground of hardship. The
court has time and again repeated that when mandatory provision is not
complied with and delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly
explained, it ought not to condone the delay on sympathetic grounds
alone.
20. In this connection, a reference may be made to Brijesh Kumar and
Ors. vs. State of Haryana and Ors.5 wherein while observing, as above,
this Court further laid down that if some person has obtained a relief
approaching the court just or immediately when the cause of action had
arisen, other persons cannot take the benefit of the same by A.I.R. 1935
PC 85 2014 (4) SCALE 50 12 approaching the court at a belated stage
simply on the ground of parity, equity, sympathy and compassion.
21. In Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.6, where
the High Court, despite unsatisfactory explanation for the delay of 3703
days, had allowed the applications for condonation of delay, this Court
held that the High Court failed to exercise its discretion in a reasonable
and objective manner. High Court should have exercised the discretion
in a systematic and an informed manner. The liberal approach in
considering sufficiency of cause for delay should not be allowed to
override substantial law of limitation. The Court observed that the
concepts such as 'liberal approach', 'justice-oriented approach' and
'substantial justice' cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of
limitation.
22. It has also been settled vide State of Jharkhand & Ors. vs. Ashok
Kumar Chokhani & Ors.7, that the merits of the (2011) 4 SCC 363 AIR
2009 SC 1927 13 case cannot be considered while dealing with the
application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal.
23. In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer8, this
Court held that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised
judiciously based upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The
expression 'sufficient cause' as occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation
Act cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of
bona fide is writ large. It was also observed that even though limitation
may harshly affect rights of the parties but it has to be applied with all
its rigour as prescribed under the statute as the courts have no choice
but to apply the law as it stands and they have no power to condone the
delay on equitable grounds.
24. It would be beneficial to quote paragraph 12 of the aforesaid
decision which clinches the issue of the manner in which equilibrium
has to be maintained between adopting liberal (2013) 14 SCC 81 14
approach and in implementing the statute as it stands.
Paragraph 12 reads as under:
"12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly
affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when
the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of
limitation on equitable grounds. "A result flowing from a statutory
provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision
to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The
statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular
party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the
same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard
but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently
been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered
while interpreting a statute."
25. This Court in the same breath in the same very decision vide
paragraph 15 went on to observe as under:
"15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a
case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has
to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means
an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the
court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for
want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case,
or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot
be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in
condoning
15 such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The
application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this
Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no
sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time
condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition
whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory
provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the
legislature." (emphasis supplied)
26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as
aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that:
(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an
end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right
itself;
(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a
long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of
time;
(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently,
such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5
has to be construed liberally;
16 (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach,
justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in
mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of
limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;
(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if
sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is
discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause
is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate
delay, negligence and want of due diligence;
(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not
mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not
satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;
(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning
the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on
the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the
delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts
to disregarding the statutory provision.
10. In the light of aforesaid enunciation when the application for
condonation of delay is analyzed, it could be seen that the order
impugned is a bi-parte order dated 11.07.2023. From the very
endorsement made on the certified copy for applying and receiving it,
it would be evident that the application for getting certified copy for
the first time was moved on 26.03.2025 and copy was received on
29.03.2025 but the date on the appeal for its filing is mentioned as
25.03.2025 a day prior to applying for certified copy. This very act
implies that at no point of time the matter was sent for seeking opinion
and permission from the department to file the appeal. Even in the
application for condonation of delay there is no mention of the date
when the opinion was sought and the matter was sent for obtaining
permission from the department to file the appeal and when the
permission was received. When the said query was put to the counsel
for the appellant/State, he was unable to explain as to when permission
was granted by the Department, thus, this Court finds that there is no
explanation for the delay of 534 days in preferring the appeal and also
the appellant/State is not in a position to place before this Court the
very permission of filing the present appeal, therefore, present appeal
in the light of judgement of coordinate Bench in the matter of State of
M.P. through Public Health Engineering and Others vs. Balwant
Singh Mandloi (Supra); is liable to be dismissed on this count alone.
11. Since learned cousnel for the State had also argued on merits,
this Court irrespective of the fact that it had dismissed the appeal on
delay, deems it expeient to address in short on merits.
12. Admittedly the order passed by Labour Court out of which
present proceedings have arisen is dated 17.02.1999. The amendment
in the Act of 1960, by which Section 1-A was inserted in the statute
Books, was in the year 2000. Thus, the very order which was passed
prior to the insertion of Section 1-A of the Act of 1960 would not get
affected by any subsequent amendment in the Act and on its basis it
cannot be said that since provisions of the Act of 1960 is not
applicable to certain Industries under the control of State Government,
the application for execution of the RRC was bad in law.
13. Also,there is no material available before this Court, which
could prove the fact that the Water Resources Department of the State
is out of purview of definition of Industry as defined under Section 2-J
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 rather in the light of judgment
passed by Apex Court in the matter of Bangalore Water Supply
(Supra), the appellant/department can very well said to fall under the
definition of Industry.
14. Accordingly, the present writ appeal herebyfails and is
dismissed.
(MILIND RAMESH PHADKE) (RAJENDRA KUMAR VANI)
JUDGE JUDGE
neetu
NEETU Digitally signed by NEETU SHASHANK
DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF MADHYA
PRADESH BENCH GWALIOR, ou=HIGH
COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH BENCH
SHASH
GWALIOR,
2.5.4.20=36b486bb0d381b950e435ec09e0
66bc6b58cb947c1474b7dc349a1cf27eaa2
ce, postalCode=474001, st=Madhya
Pradesh,
ANK
serialNumber=E60A9BBFC39E0EE500EAAD
E1E0B3B8565CB3A7DC9F5CD048197DF0F
F3149AE58, cn=NEETU SHASHANK
Date: 2025.05.17 14:19:24 +05'30'
