"(i) That, the FIR dated 30.10.2024 bearing Crime
no.604/2024 registered at Police Station Kotwali
District- Morena (Annexure P/1) may kindly be quashed
qua present petitioner and other supplementary
proceedings incidental therewith may also be quashed in
the interest of justice so far it relates to present
petitioner.
2. Short facts of the case are that the respondent No.4/complainant
had lodged a complaint alleging that on 09.05.2024, present petitioner
and her husband - Raghvendra Upadhyay (Sharma) had agreed to sell
their Four Wheeler Car (Aura) bearing registration No.MP-06-ZA-2050
to him for consideration amount of Rs.6,10,000/- and Rs.5,000/- as an
advance was given to the petitioner and Rs.2,02,585/- was transferred
by the complainant in petitioner's account through NEFT. In the
complaint, it was also alleged that after getting NOC from concerned
Finance Company, a copy whereof was provided to the complainant by
the petitioner and also promised to go to R.T.O. Office to transfer the
same to him after getting the agreed amount. On 15.05.2024, when the
complainant asked the petitioner to go to RTO Office to transfer the said
Car and accept the remaining amount that the petitioner with an
intention to misappropriate his money refused to sell the vehicle by
stating that they would neither return the money which was paid by the
complainant nor transfer the vehicle in his name, thus, the petitioner had
alleged that an offence of cheating and fraud has been committed
against him. On the basis of the said complaint, F.I.R. vide Crime
No.604 of 2024 was registered at Police Station Kotwali, District
Morena for offence under Sections 420, 406 of IPC against the
petitioner and the investigation is going on. During investigation,
Respondent No.5 in order to exert pressure upon petitioner and her
husband started harassing them by issuing notices under Section 35(3)
of B.N.S.S., without any date and seal thereon. On 22.03.2025, when
the house of the petitioner was locked as they were out, the
Investigating Officer/Respondent No.5 tried to break their house, which
was reflected from the CCTV footage and photographs of the said date.
Aggrieved by the aforesaid, the present petition has been filed.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted before this Court
that the registration of impugned FIR is illegal, arbitrary and contrary to
law as there is no direct or indirect evidence available against the
petitioner with regard to commission of alleged crime. They are
innocent and have been falsely implicated in the case, as the
Investigating Officer is hand in glove with the complainant, notices
under Section 35(3) of B.N.S.S. On 05.03.2025 has been issued but
were not properly communicated to the petitioner and also no seal/date
is affixed thereon.
4. It is further submitted that the Court can quash the criminal
proceeding where the criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with
malafide and where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view
to spite them due to private and personal grudge.
5. It was further submitted that there is no role of the petitioner in
the commission of alleged offence, as the alleged amount, which was
transferred by the complainant, was made in furtherance to loan
borrowed by him from the petitioner.
6. It was further submitted that even if the allegations leveled in the
F.I.R. are taken into consideration in toto, then also, no case of cheating
is made out against petitioner. Even otherwise, it is the case where the
allegations are predominantly of civil in nature, and the said case should
not be permitted to be converted into criminal one.
7. While placing reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in the
matter of Joseph Salvaraja vs. State of Gujrat reported in 2011 (7)
SCC 59, it was submitted that when dispute between the parties
constitute only a civil wrong and not a criminal wrong, the Courts
should not permit a person to be harassed when no case for taking
cognizance of the offence has been made out.
8. It was further submitted that it is well established principle of law
that failure to keep the promise at a later stage would not bring the act
within the purview of Section 420 and 406 of IPC unless and until the
facts indicate that the intention of the accused right from very inception
was to cheat the complainant.
9. Per contra, learned Government Advocate has submitted that at
best the petitioner should have availed the remedy available to him
under Section 482 of the CrPC for quashing the FIR registered against
him and his family members and as such, according to him, this petition
is not maintainable.
10. It was also submitted that if cognizable offence is made out, then
the F.I.R. cannot be said to be illegal, as from the averments made in the
impugned F.I.R. as well as in the complaint which were corroborated
from the oral and documentary evidence collected by IO during
investigation, which had culminated into registration of an F.I.R. against
the present petitioner, it is clear that allegations are sufficient to make
out a prima facie case against her.
11. Heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face
value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie
constitute any offence or make out a case against the
accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information
report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR
do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an
investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the
Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the
purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR
or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the
same do not disclose the commission of any offence and
make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable
offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer
without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated
under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint
are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of
which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion
that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of
the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under
which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution
and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is
a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act,
providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the
aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is
manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive
for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to
spite him due to private and personal grudge.
7. The said position was reiterated by this Court in Pepsi
Foods Ltd. and Anr. v. Special Judicial Magistrate and
Ors.2 This Court held therein that the AIR 1998 SC 128;
1997 INSC 714 High Court could exercise its power of
judicial review in criminal matters and it could exercise
this power either under Article 226 of the Constitution or
under Section 482, Cr. P.C. to prevent abuse of the process
of the Court or to secure the ends of justice. Furthermore,
it was held that exercise of that power would depend upon
the facts and circumstances of each case.
8. In regard to quashing of criminal proceedings at the
investigation stage itself, this Court in Eastern Spg. Mills
v. Rajiv Poddar3, held that the High Court could interfere
with the investigation, if non-interference would result in
miscarriage of justice.
9. In State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy 4, this Court
again held that where an FIR did not disclose the
commission of an offence without anything being added or
subtracted from the recitals thereof, the said FIR could be
quashed."
13. The Supreme Court in the case of Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh
Chander and another reported in (2012) 9 SCC 460 has held as under:
"27. Having discussed the scope of jurisdiction
under these two provisions i.e. Section 397 and
Section 482 of the Code and the fine line of
jurisdictional distinction, now it will be
appropriate for us to enlist the principles with
reference to which the courts should exercise such
jurisdiction. However, it is not only difficult but is
inherently impossible to state with precision such
principles. At best and upon objective analysis of
various judgments of this Court, we are able to
cull out some of the principles to be considered for
proper exercise of jurisdiction, particularly, with
regard to quashing of charge either in exercise of
jurisdiction under Section 397 or Section 482 of
the Code or together, as the case may be:
27.1. Though there are no limits of the powers of
the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the
more the power, the more due care and caution is
to be exercised in invoking these powers. The
power of quashing criminal proceedings,
particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section
228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly
and with circumspection and that too in the rarest
of rare cases.
27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether
the uncontroverted allegations as made from the
record of the case and the documents submitted
therewith prima facie establish the offence or not.
If the allegations are so patently absurd and
inherently improbable that no prudent person can
ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic
ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied
then the Court may interfere.
27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere.
No meticulous examination of the evidence is
needed for considering whether the case would
end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of
charge or quashing of charge.
27.4. Where the exercise of such power is
absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage
of justice and for correcting some grave error that
might be committed by the subordinate courts even
in such cases, the High Court should be loath to
interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the
prosecution in exercise of its inherent powers.
27.5. Where there is an express legal bar enacted
in any of the provisions of the Code or any specific
law in force to the very initiation or institution and
continuance of such criminal proceedings, such a
bar is intended to provide specific protection to an
accused.
27.6. The Court has a duty to balance the freedom
of a person and the right of the complainant or
prosecution to investigate and prosecute the
offender.
27.7. The process of the court cannot be permitted
to be used for an oblique or ultimate/ulterior
purpose.
27.8. Where the allegations made and as they
appeared from the record and documents annexed
therewith to predominantly give rise and constitute
a "civil wrong" with no "element of criminality"
and does not satisfy the basic ingredients of a
criminal offence, the court may be justified in
quashing the charge. Even in such cases, the court
would not embark upon the critical analysis of the
evidence.
27.9. Another very significant caution that the
courts have to observe is that it cannot examine
the facts, evidence and materials on record to
determine whether there is sufficient material on
the basis of which the case would end in a
conviction; the court is concerned primarily with
the allegations taken as a whole whether they will
constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of
the process of court leading to injustice.
27.10. It is neither necessary nor is the court
called upon to hold a full-fledged enquiry or to
appreciate evidence collected by the investigating
agencies to find out whether it is a case of
acquittal or conviction.
27.11. Where allegations give rise to a civil claim
and also amount to an offence, merely because a
civil claim is maintainable, does not mean that a
criminal complaint cannot be maintained.
27.12. In exercise of its jurisdiction under Section
228 and/or under Section 482, the Court cannot
take into consideration external materials given by
an accused for reaching the conclusion that no
offence was disclosed or that there was possibility
of his acquittal. The Court has to consider the
record and documents annexed therewith by the
prosecution.
27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the
rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence
is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more
inclined to permit continuation of prosecution
rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The
Court is not expected to marshal the records with
a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the
documents or records but is an opinion formed
prima facie.
27.14. Where the charge-sheet, report under
Section 173(2) of the Code, suffers from
fundamental legal defects, the Court may be well
within its jurisdiction to frame a charge.
27.15. Coupled with any or all of the above, where
the Court finds that it would amount to abuse of
process of the Code or that the interest of justice
favours, otherwise it may quash the charge. The
power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae i.e. to
do real and substantial justice for administration
of which alone, the courts exist.
[Ref. State of W.B. v. Swapan Kumar
Guha [(1982) 1 SCC 561 : 1982 SCC
(Cri) 283 : AIR 1982 SC 949] ;
Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v.
Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre [(1988)
1 SCC 692 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 234] ;
Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary [(1992) 4
SCC 305 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 36 : AIR 1993
SC 892] ; Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar
Pal Singh Gill [(1995) 6 SCC 194 : 1995
SCC (Cri) 1059] ; G. Sagar Suri v. State
of U.P. [(2000) 2 SCC 636 : 2000 SCC
(Cri) 513] ; Ajay Mitra v. State of M.P.
[(2003) 3 SCC 11 : 2003 SCC (Cri)
703] ; Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special
Judicial Magistrate [(1998) 5 SCC 749 :
1998 SCC (Cri) 1400 : AIR 1998 SC 128]
; State of U.P. v. O.P. Sharma [(1996) 7
SCC 705 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 497] ; Ganesh
Narayan Hegde v. S. Bangarappa [(1995)
4 SCC 41 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 634] ; Zandu
Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd.
Sharaful Haque [(2005) 1 SCC 122 :
2005 SCC (Cri) 283] ; Medchl Chemicals
& Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E. Ltd.
[(2000) 3 SCC 269 : 2000 SCC (Cri)
615 : AIR 2000 SC 1869] ; Shakson
Belthissor v. State of Kerala [(2009) 14
SCC 466 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1412] ;
V.V.S. Rama Sharma v. State of U.P.
[(2009) 7 SCC 234 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri)
356] ; Chunduru Siva Ram Krishna v.
Peddi Ravindra Babu [(2009) 11 SCC
203 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1297] ;
Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar
[(1987) 1 SCC 288 : 1987 SCC (Cri)
82] ; State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma [1992
Supp (1) SCC 222 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 192 :
AIR 1991 SC 1260] ; Lalmuni Devi v.
State of Bihar [(2001) 2 SCC 17 : 2001
SCC (Cri) 275] ; M. Krishnan v. Vijay
Singh [(2001) 8 SCC 645 : 2002 SCC
(Cri) 19] ; Savita v. State of Rajasthan
[(2005) 12 SCC 338 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri)
571] and S.M. Datta v. State of Gujarat
[(2001) 7 SCC 659 : 2001 SCC (Cri)
1361 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 1201]]
27.16. These are the principles which individually
and preferably cumulatively (one or more) be
taken into consideration as precepts to exercise of
extraordinary and wide plenitude and jurisdiction
under Section 482 of the Code by the High Court.
Where the factual foundation for an offence has
been laid down, the courts should be reluctant and
should not hasten to quash the proceedings even
on the premise that one or two ingredients have
not been stated or do not appear to be satisfied if
there is substantial compliance with the
requirements of the offence.
(Emphasis Supplied)
14. From the above enunciation, the inference is that Therefore, if the
complaint involves civil as well as criminal ingredients then the
FIR/prosecution cannot be quashed
15. In the instant case, the first information report has been registered
under Sections 406 and 420 of IPC. The allegations leveled against the
petitioner in the impugned F.I.R. are of cheating and forgery. So far as
the offence of Section 420 of the IPC is concerned, it is a cheating and
dishonestly inducing delivery of property which reads as under:-
'420. Cheating and dishonestly inducing
delivery of property.- Whoever cheats and thereby
dishonestly induces the person deceived to deliver any
property to any person, or to make, alter or destroy
the whole or any part of a valuable security, or
anything which is signed or sealed, and which is
capable of being converted into a valuable security,
shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to seven
years, and shall also be liable to fine.'
16. From the aforesaid provisions, it is clear that the required
ingredients of cheating are; (i) there should be fraudulent or dishonest
inducement of a person by deceiving him, (ii)(a) the person so deceived
should be induced to deliver any property to any person, or to consent
that any person shall retain any property; or (b) the person so deceived
should be intentionally induced to do or omit to do anything which he
would not do or omit if he was not so deceived; and (iii) in cases
covered by (ii)(b), the act of omission should be one which causes or is
likely to cause damage or harm to the person induced in body, mind,
reputation or property as has been observed by the Supreme Court in a
case reported in (2002) 1 SCC 241 [S.W. Palanitkar and others Vs. State
of Bihar and another].
17. In the matter of Neeharika Infrastructure v. State of
Maharashtra (2021) 19 SCC 401, a three-Judge Bench of Hon'ble
Supreme Court analyzed the precedent and culled out the relevant
principles that govern the law on quashing of a First Information Report
under Section 482 of the CrPC as under:-
"13. From the aforesaid decisions of this Court, right
from the decision of the Privy Council in the case of
Khawaja Nazir Ahmad (supra), the following principles
of law emerge:
13.1. Police has the statutory right and duty under the
relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure
contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into
cognizable offences;
13.2. Courts would not thwart any investigation into the
cognizable offences;
13.3. However, in cases where no cognizable offence or
offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information
report the Court will not permit an investigation to go on;
13.4. The power of quashing should be exercised
sparingly with circumspection, in the 'rarest of rare
cases'. (The rarest of rare cases standard in its
application for quashing under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is not
to be confused with the norm which has been formulated
in the context of the death penalty, as explained
previously by this Court);
13.5. While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of
which is sought, the court cannot embark upon an
enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise
of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint;
13.6. Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the
initial stage;
13.7. Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an
exception and a rarity than an ordinary rule;
13.8. Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the
jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the
State operate in two specific spheres of activities. The
inherent power of the court is, however, recognised to
secure the ends of justice or prevent the above of the
process by Section 482 Cr.P.C.
13.9. The functions of the judiciary and the police are
complementary, not overlapping;
13.10. Save in exceptional cases where non-interference
would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the
judicial process should not interfere at the stage of
investigation of offences;
13.11. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do
not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act
according to its whims or caprice;
13.12. The first information report is not an
encyclopaedia which must disclose all facts and details
relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the
investigation by the police is in progress, the court
should not go into the merits of the allegations in the
FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the
investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the
conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR
does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to
abuse of process of law. During or after investigation, if
the investigating officer finds that there is no substance
in the application made by the complainant, the
investigating officer may file an appropriate
report/summary before the learned Magistrate which may
be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance
with the known procedure;
13.13. The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide,
but conferment of wide power requires the court to be
cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on
the court;
13.14. However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks
fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and
the self-restraint imposed by law, more particularly the
parameters laid down by this Court in the cases of R.P.
Kapur (supra) and Bhajan Lal(supra), has the jurisdiction
to quash the FIR/complaint; and
13.15. When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by
the alleged accused, the court when it exercises the
power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., only has to consider
whether or not the allegations in the FIR disclose the
commission of a cognizable offence and is not required
to consider on merits whether the allegations make out a
cognizable offence or not and the court has to permit the
investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations
in the FIR."
18. Admittedly, in the present case, on 30.10.2024, First Information
Report was lodged by respondent No.4 and the entire First Information
report as well as the statement of the complainant, if perused
meticulously, would reveal that there are specific allegations against the
present petitioner regarding misappropriation of certain funds of the
complainant. If the First Information Report as well as the aforesaid
complaint are subjected to cogitative scrutiny and if an effort is made to
read between the lines, it could safely be said that in the present case,
there are specific allegations against the present petitioner in the First
Information Report as well as the aforesaid statement of the
complainant, which could prima facie attract the provisions of Sections
420 and 406 of IPC.
19. In view of the aforesaid and taking into consideration the law laid
down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the above cited judgments as well
as the allegations leveled against the petitioner in the impugned F.I.R.,
this Court doesn't find any justifiable reason warranting interference
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to quash the impugned
F.I.R., as it has to be exercised for the ends of the justice and should not
be arbitrarily exercised to cut short the normal process of a criminal trial
and if any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the
notice of the Court, then the Court would be justified in preventing
injustice.
20. Accordingly, no case of interference with the impugned F.I.R. has
been made out by the petitioner. Hence, the instant petition being sans
merit is hereby dismissed. No costs.
(Milind Ramesh Phadke)
Judge
PAWAN
DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF MADHYA
PRADESH BENCH GWALIOR, ou=HIGH
pwn*
COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH BENCH
GWALIOR,
2.5.4.20=b864d1ab4ace2215bfcf3ab301c34
KUMAR
d631287f1b1cdd90b4a49f265f02d9d593f,
postalCode=474001, st=Madhya Pradesh,
serialNumber=61B9D129971D2EA4FD4455
ED49EA436EA65E26164BEEED89153191C56
E98CE21, cn=PAWAN KUMAR
Date: 2025.05.14 10:37:27 +05'30'
