Madhya Pradesh High Court
Smt. Shandhya Singh vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 8 May, 2025
Author: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
Bench: G. S. Ahluwalia
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:10488
1 WP. No. 16201 of 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE G. S. AHLUWALIA
ON THE 8th OF MAY, 2025
WRIT PETITION No. 16201 of 2025
SMT. SHANDHYA SINGH
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Sanjeev Goyal - Advocate for petitioner.
Shri Jitesh Sharma - Government Advocate for respondent/State.
ORDER
This petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, has been
filed seeking the following relief (s):-
1- çfroknh çkf/kdkfj;ksa dks vkns'k fn;k tkos ftlls os
;kfpdkdrkZ dk in Je vf/kdkjh] ij inksUufr ds fy, 1998 fjO;q
Mhihlh cqykbZ tkos-
2- ;kfpdkdrkZ dk vkt fnukad rd dk dqy ,fjvj 641300 gS
ftldk Hkqxrku vukosnd ds }kjk U;wure 6 % O;kt lfgr djsA
,slk vkns'k ikfjr djus dh --ik djsA
2. By this petition, petitioner is seeking promotion on the post of Labour
Officer which, according to petitioner, became due in the year 1998. The
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present petition has been filed on 21/05/2025. In paragraph 4 of the writ
petition, following declaration has been made:
4- ;kfpdk çLrqr djus esa gqvk foyEc ;fn gqvk gks rks mldk
fooj.k&
;kfpdk çLrqr djus esa dksbZ foyEc ugha gqvk gS ;kfpdk vUnj vof/k
çLrqr gSA
3. It is the case of petitioner that petitioner was promoted in the year 2003
whereas he should have been granted promotion in the year 1998.
4. The moot question for consideration is as to whether this petition suffers
from delay and laches or not?
5. According to petitioner, he became due for promotion in the year 1998
and accordingly this petition has been filed after 27 years. Furthermore, he was
promoted as Labour Officer in the year 2003 and if petitioner was of the view
that he was entitled for promotion in the year 1998, then he should have
approached this Court in the year 2003 itself. In promotion matters, delay and
laches assume importance. The delay in challenging promotion has legal
implications. The longer an employee waits to challenge the promotion, the
more is the possibility of dismissal on the ground of delay and laches.
6. The Supreme Court in the case of Ghulam Rasool Lone v. State of
J&K reported in (2009) 15 SCC 321 has held as under:-
"11. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that keeping in
view the equal protection clause contained in Article 14 of
the Constitution of India as also Article 16 thereof, all the
employees should be treated equally. Equality clause,
however, must be enforced in legality and not illegality.
12.There cannot furthermore be any doubt that Article 14 is
a positive concept. The Constitution does not envisage
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enforcement of the equality clause where a person has got
an undue benefit by reason of an illegal act. In Panchi
Devi v. State of Rajasthan [(2009) 2 SCC 589 : (2009) 1
SCC (L&S) 408] this Court held: (SCC p. 591, para 9)
"9. ... Article 14 of the Constitution of India has a
positive concept. Equality, it is trite, cannot be claimed
in illegality. Even otherwise the writ petition as also the
review petition have rightly not been entertained on the
ground of delay and laches on the part of the
appellant."
13. The Court in a given case may be inclined to pass
similar order as has been done in the earlier case on the
basis of equality or otherwise. The discretionary
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution may,
however, be denied on the ground of delay and laches.
14. It is now well settled that who claims equity must
enforce his claim within a reasonable time. For the said
proposition, amongst others, we may notice a decision of a
three-Judge Bench of this Court in Govt. of W.B. v.
Tarun K. Roy [(2004) 1 SCC 347 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 225] ,
wherein it has been opined: (SCC pp. 359-60, para 34)
"34. The respondents furthermore are not even entitled
to any relief on the ground of gross delay and laches on
their part in filing the writ petition. The first two writ
petitions were filed in the year 1976 wherein the
respondents herein approached the High Court in 1992.
In between 1976 and 1992 not only two writ petitions
had been decided, but one way or the other, even the
matter had been considered by this Court in Debdas
Kumar [State of W.B. v. Debdas Kumar, 1991 Supp
(1) SCC 138 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 841 : (1991) 17 ATC
261] . The plea of delay, which Mr Krishnamani
states, should be a ground for denying the relief to the
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other persons similarly situated would operate against
the respondents. Furthermore, the other employees not
being before this Court although they are ventilating
their grievances before appropriate courts of law, no
order should be passed which would prejudice their
cause. In such a situation, we are not prepared to make
any observation only for the purpose of grant of some
relief to the respondents to which they are not legally
entitled to so as to deprive others therefrom who may
be found to be entitled thereto by a court of law."
(emphasis supplied)
15. The question yet again came up for consideration
before this Court in NDMC v. Pan Singh [(2007) 9 SCC
278 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 398] wherein it has been
observed: (SCC p. 283, para 16)
"16. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot
be lost sight of. The respondents herein filed a writ
petition after 17 years. They did not agitate their
grievances for a long time. They, as noticed herein, did
not claim parity with the 17 workmen at the earliest
possible opportunity. They did not implead themselves
as parties even in the reference made by the State
before the Industrial Tribunal. It is not their case that
after 1982, those employees who were employed or
who were recruited after the cut-off date have been
granted the said scale of pay. After such a long time,
therefore, the writ petitions could not have been
entertained even if they are similarly situated. It is trite
that the discretionary jurisdiction may not be exercised
in favour of those who approach the court after a long
time. Delay and laches are relevant factors for exercise
of equitable jurisdiction."(underlining [Ed.: Herein
italicised.] is mine)
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(See also Virender Chaudhary v. Bharat Petroleum
Corpn. [(2009) 1 SCC 297] )
16. The said principle was reiterated in S.S. Balu v. State
of Kerala [(2009) 2 SCC 479 : (2009) 1 SCC (L&S) 388]
in the following terms: (SCC p. 485, para 17)
"17. It is also well-settled principle of law that 'delay
defeats equity'. The Government Order was issued on
15-1-2002. The appellants did not file any writ
application questioning the legality and validity
thereof. Only after the writ petitions filed by others
were allowed and the State of Kerala preferred an
appeal thereagainst, they impleaded themselves as
party-respondents. It is now a trite law that where the
writ petitioner approaches the High Court after a long
delay, reliefs prayed for may be denied to them on the
ground of delay and laches irrespective of the fact that
they are similarly situated to the other candidates who
obtain the benefit of the judgment. It is, thus, not
possible for us to issue any direction to the State of
Kerala or the Commission to appoint the appellants at
this stage."
19. It is beyond any cavil of doubt that the remedy under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India is a discretionary
one. For sufficient or cogent reasons a court may in a given
case refuse to exercise its jurisdiction; delay and laches
being one of them. While considering the question of delay
and laches on the part of the petitioner, the court must also
consider the effect thereof.
22. If at this late juncture the petitioner is directed to be
promoted to the post of Sub-Inspector even above Abdul
Rashid Rather, the seniority of those who had been
promoted in the meantime or have been directly recruited
would be affected. The State would also have to pay the
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back wages to him which would be a drainage of public
funds. Whereas an employee cannot be denied his
promotion in terms of the rules, the same cannot be granted
out of the way as a result whereof the rights of third parties
are affected. The aspect of public interest as also the
general administration must, therefore, be kept in mind
while granting equitable relief.
23. We understand that there would be a heart burning
insofar as the petitioner is concerned, but then he is to
thank himself therefor. If those five persons, who were
seniors to Hamiddulah Dar filed writ petitions immediately,
the High Court might have directed cancellation of his
illegal promotion. This Court in Maharaj Krishan Bhatt
[Maharaj Krishan Bhatt v. State of J&K, (2008) 9 SCC 24
: (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 783] did not take into consideration
all these aspects of the matter and the binding decision of a
three-Judge Bench of this Court in Govt. of W.B. v.
Tarun K. Roy [(2004) 1 SCC 347 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 225] .
The Division Bench of the High Court, therefore, in our
opinion was right in opining that it was not necessary for it
to follow Maharaj Krishan Bhatt [Maharaj Krishan Bhatt
v. State of J&K, (2008) 9 SCC 24 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S)
783] ."
7. The Supreme Court in the case of P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N.
reported in (1975) 1 SCC 152 has held as under:-
"............Not only Respondent 2 but also Respondents 3
and 4 who were the appellant's juniors became
Divisional Engineers in 1957, apparently on the ground
that their merits deserved their promotion over the head
of the appellant. He did not question it. Nor did he
question the promotion of his juniors as Superintending
Engineers over his head. He could have come to the
Court on every one of these three occasions. A person
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aggrieved by an order of promoting a junior over his
head should approach the Court at least within six
months or at the most a year of such promotion. It is not
that there is any period of limitation for the Courts to
exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that
there can never be a case where the Courts cannot
interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length
of time. But it would be a sound and wise exercise of
discretion for the Courts to refuse to exercise their
extraordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of
persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief
and who stand by and allow things to happen and then
approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try
to unsettle settled matters. The petitioner's petition
should, therefore, have been dismissed in limine.
Entertaining such petitions is a waste of time of the
Court. It clogs the work of the Court and impedes the
work of the Court in considering legitimate grievances
as also its normal work. We consider that the High
Court was right in dismissing the appellant's petition as
well as the appeal."
8. The Supreme Court in the case of Gian Singh Mann v. High Court of
P&H reported in (1980) 4 SCC 266 has held as under:-
"3. In regard to the petitioner's claim for promotion to
the Selection Grade post in the Punjab Civil Service
(Judicial Branch) with effect from November 1, 1966,
and to a post in the Punjab Superior Judicial Service
with effect from May 1, 1967 on the basis that a post
had been reserved in each of the services for a member
of the scheduled castes, it seems to us that the claim is
grossly belated. The writ petition was filed in this Court
in 1978, about eleven years after the dates from which
the promotions are claimed. There is no valid
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explanation for the delay. That the petitioner was
making successive representations during this period
can hardly justify our overlooking the inordinate delay.
Relief must be refused on that ground. It is not
necessary, in the circumstances, to consider the further
submission of the respondents that the provision on
which the petitioner relies as the basis of his claim is
concerned with the appointment only of members of the
scheduled castes to posts in the Punjab Superior
Judicial Service and not to recruitment by promotion to
that service."
9. The Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. S.S. Kothiyal
reported in (1998) 8 SCC 682 has held as under:-
"3. In our opinion, the admitted facts of this case alone
are sufficient to reverse the judgment of the learned
Single Judge as well as that of the Division Bench of
the High Court. According to the version of
Respondent 1 himself, his representation against non-
promotion as Deputy Commandant was rejected on 10-
6-1971, the second such representation made on 19-8-
1971 was rejected on 4-11-1974 and the third
representation made on 12-4-1977 was rejected on 11-
7-1977. It is obvious that on rejection of his
representation in June 1971, there was no occasion for
Respondent 1 to wait any longer to challenge his non-
promotion and, therefore, the filing of the writ petition
8 years thereafter in December 1978, was highly
belated and deserved to be rejected on the ground of
laches alone in view of the settled principles relating to
interference in service matters of this kind in exercise
of the power of judicial review. The learned Single
Judge as well as the Division Bench of the High Court
completely overlooked this aspect. The fact that
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Respondent 1 waited for several years till he was
actually promoted as Deputy Commandant in 1972 and
even as Commandant in 1975 and more than three
years elapsed even thereafter before he had filed the
writ petition, is itself sufficient for the rejection of the
writ petition."
10. The Supreme Court in the case of Nadia Distt. Primary School Council
v. Sristidhar Biswas reported in (2007) 12 SCC 779 has held as under:-
"11. In the present case, the panel was prepared in
1980 and the petitioners approached the court in 1989
after the decision [Ed.: After disposal of the contempt
petition in Dibakar Pal case on 23-6-1999.] in
Dibakar Pal [ C.O. No. 11154 (W) of 1989, decided on
13-3-1991] . Such persons should not be given any
benefit by the court when they allowed more than nine
years to elapse. Delay is very significant in matters of
granting relief and courts cannot come to the rescue of
the persons who are not vigilant of their rights.
Therefore, the view taken by the High Court condoning
the delay of nine years cannot be countenanced."
11. The Supreme Court in the case of U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh
reported in (2006) 11 SCC 464 has held as under:-
"12. The statement of law has also been summarised in
Halsbury's Laws of England, para 911, p. 395 as follows:
"In determining whether there has been such delay as to
amount to laches, the chief points to be considered are:
(i) acquiescence on the claimant's part; and
(ii) any change of position that has occurred on the
defendant's part.
Acquiescence in this sense does not mean standing by
while the violation of a right is in progress, but assent after
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the violation has been completed and the claimant has
become aware of it. It is unjust to give the claimant a
remedy where, by his conduct, he has done that which
might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it; or
where by his conduct and neglect, though not waiving the
remedy, he has put the other party in a position in which it
would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were
afterwards to be asserted. In such cases lapse of time and
delay are most material. Upon these considerations rests the
doctrine of laches.""
12. The Supreme Court in the case of Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana
reported in (1997) 6 SCC 538 has held as under:-
"18. That apart, as this Court has repeatedly held, the
delay disentitles the party to the discretionary relief
under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution. It is
not necessary to reiterate all the catena of precedents in
this behalf. Suffice it to state that the appellants kept
sleeping over their rights for long and elected to wake
up when they had the impetus from Virpal Chauhan
[Union of India v. Virpal Singh Chauhan, (1995) 6
SCC 684 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 1 : (1995) 31 ATC 813]
and Ajit Singh [(1996) 2 SCC 715 : 1996 SCC (L&S)
540 : (1996) 33 ATC 239 : JT (1996) 2 SC 727] ratios.
But Virpal Chauhan [Union of India v. Virpal Singh
Chauhan, (1995) 6 SCC 684 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 1 :
(1995) 31 ATC 813] and Sabharwal [R.K. Sabharwal
v. State of Punjab, (1995) 2 SCC 745 : 1995 SCC
(L&S) 548 : (1995) 29 ATC 481] cases, kept at rest the
promotion already made by that date, and declared
them as valid; they were limited to the question of
future promotions given by applying the rule of
reservation to all the persons prior to the date of
judgment in Sabharwal case [R.K. Sabharwal v.
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State of Punjab, (1995) 2 SCC 745 : 1995 SCC (L&S)
548 : (1995) 29 ATC 481] which required to be
examined in the light of the law laid in Sabharwal
case [R.K. Sabharwal v. State of Punjab, (1995) 2
SCC 745 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 548 : (1995) 29 ATC
481] . Thus earlier promotions cannot be reopened.
Only those cases arising after that date would be
examined in the light of the law laid down in
Sabharwal case [R.K. Sabharwal v. State of Punjab,
(1995) 2 SCC 745 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 548 : (1995) 29
ATC 481] and Virpal Chauhan case [Union of India
v. Virpal Singh Chauhan, (1995) 6 SCC 684 : 1996
SCC (L&S) 1 : (1995) 31 ATC 813] and equally Ajit
Singh case [(1996) 2 SCC 715 : 1996 SCC (L&S)
540 : (1996) 33 ATC 239 : JT (1996) 2 SC 727] . If the
candidate has already been further promoted to the
higher echelons of service, his seniority is not open to
be reviewed. In A.B.S. Karamchari Sangh case [Akhil
Bhartiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh v. Union of India,
(1996) 6 SCC 65 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 1346] a Bench of
two Judges to which two of us, K. Ramaswamy and
G.B. Pattanaik, JJ. were members, had reiterated the
above view and it was also held that all the prior
promotions are not open to judicial review. In Chander
Pal v. State of Haryana [(1997) 10 SCC 474] a Bench
of two Judges consisting of S.C. Agrawal and G.T.
Nanavati, JJ. considered the effect of Virpal Chauhan
[Union of India v. Virpal Singh Chauhan, (1995) 6
SCC 684 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 1 : (1995) 31 ATC 813] ,
Ajit Singh [(1996) 2 SCC 715 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 540 :
(1996) 33 ATC 239 : JT (1996) 2 SC 727] ,
Sabharwal [R.K. Sabharwal v. State of Punjab,
(1995) 2 SCC 745 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 548 : (1995) 29
ATC 481] and A.B.S. Karamchari Sangh [Akhil
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Bhartiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh v. Union of India,
(1996) 6 SCC 65 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 1346] cases and
held that the seniority of those respondents who had
already retired or had been promoted to higher posts
could not be disturbed. The seniority of the petitioner
therein and the respondents who were holding the post
in the same level or in the same cadre would be
adjusted keeping in view the ratio in Virpal Chauhan
[Union of India v. Virpal Singh Chauhan, (1995) 6
SCC 684 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 1 : (1995) 31 ATC 813]
and Ajit Singh [(1996) 2 SCC 715 : 1996 SCC (L&S)
540 : (1996) 33 ATC 239 : JT (1996) 2 SC 727] ; but
promotion, if any, had been given to any of them during
the pendency of this writ petition was directed not to be
disturbed. Therein, the candidates appointed on the
basis of economic backwardness, social status or
occupation etc. were eligible for appointment against
the post reserved for backward classes if their income
did not exceed Rs 18,000 per annum and they were
given accelerated promotions on the basis of
reservation. In that backdrop, the above directions came
to be issued. In fact, it did not touch upon Article 16(4)
or 16(4-A). Therefore, desperate attempts of the
appellants to redo the seniority had by them in various
cadres/grades though in the same services according to
the 1974 Rules or 1980 Rules, are not amenable to
judicial review at this belated stage. The High Court,
therefore, has rightly dismissed the writ petition on the
ground of delay as well."
13. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Uttaranchal v. Shiv Charan
Singh Bhandari reported in (2013) 12 SCC 179 has held as under:-
"19. From the aforesaid authorities it is clear as crystal
that even if the court or tribunal directs for
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consideration of representations relating to a stale claim
or dead grievance it does not give rise to a fresh cause
of action. The dead cause of action cannot rise like a
phoenix. Similarly, a mere submission of representation
to the competent authority does not arrest time.
28. Remaining oblivious to the factum of delay and
laches and granting relief is contrary to all settled
principles and even would not remotely attract the
concept of discretion. We may hasten to add that the
same may not be applicable in all circumstances where
certain categories of fundamental rights are infringed.
But, a stale claim of getting promotional benefits
definitely should not have been entertained by the
Tribunal and accepted by the High Court."
14. Even if the petitioner has made successive representations, that would
not give any fresh cause of action. Since in paragraph 4 of the writ petition, no
explanation has been given for delay, which according to this Court is of 27
years as petitioner claims promotion with effect from 1998 or 22 years as
petitioner was promoted to the post of Labour Officer in the year 2003, this
Court is of considered opinion that since this petition suffers from delay and
laches, therefore, it cannot be entertained.
15. Accordingly, petition fails and is hereby dismissed on the ground of
delay and laches.
(G. S. AHLUWALIA)
JUDGE
(and)
