Madhya Pradesh High Court
Mahant Raghuveerdas vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 7 May, 2025
Author: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
Bench: G. S. Ahluwalia
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE G. S. AHLUWALIA
ON THE 7 th OF MAY, 2025
WRIT PETITION No. 15837 of 2025
MAHANT RAGHUVEERDAS
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Mr. Sanjay Kumar Sharma - Advocate for petitioner.
Mr. Ravindra Dixit - Govt. Advocate for State.
ORDER
This petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India has been filed
seeking the following reliefs :-
"(i) That, the impugned order dated 21.04.2025 (Annexure P/1) passed by
Respondent No. 2, Collector, District Bhind (M.P.) may kindly be
quashed /set aside.
(ii) That, the Respondents may kindly be restrained from taking any
further steps to interfere with the hereditary management of the temple by
the Petitioner.
(iii) Any other writ, order or direction as this Hon'ble Court may deems fit
in the facts and circumstances of the case be granted to petitioner doing
justice in the matter. Costs be also awarded."
2. It is submitted by counsel for petitioner that by impugned order
dated 21.04.2025, Collector, Bhind has constituted a committee for
management of Shri Rishi Dev, Gautam Rishi, Golmeshwar Mahadev
Mandir. It is submitted that petitioner is a Pujari of the said temple. Without
issuing any notice to the petitioner, aforesaid managing committee has been
constituted. It is further submitted that property is a private property. It was
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allotted by Officer Mafi, Gwalior Government by order dated 26.07.1932
which has been filed as Annexure P/2. It is further submitted that the name
of Chunnilal, legal representative of Ramchand was also mutated in the
revenue records. Petitioner is the Chela / disciple of Ramsnehidas. It is
submitted that once the petitioner is in possession of the temple in question
in the capacity of Chela / disciple of Ramsnehidas, then he was a necessary
party and he should have been heard before the managing committee was
constituted. However, it is fairly conceded by counsel for petitioner that even
petitioner is not in possession of any document to show that he was ever
accepted by Ramsnehidas as his Chela / disciple. Petitioner has claimed
himself to be the Pujari. However, it is fairly conceded by counsel for
petitioner that there is nothing on record to show that Ramsnehidas was the
legal representative of Chunnilal.
3. Heard counsel for petitioner.
4. The rights of Pujari have already been explained by the Supreme
Court in the cases of Sri Ganapathi Dev Temple Trust Vs. Balakrishna Bhat ,
reported in (2019) 9 SCC 495 , and M. Siddique (D) Thr. Lrs Vs. Mahant
Suresh Das and others reported in (2020) 1 SCC 1 has held as under :-
"435. A final point may be made with respect to shebaits. A pujari who
conducts worship at a temple is not merely, by offering worship to the
idol, elevated to the status of a shebait. A pujari is a servant or appointee
of a shebait and gains no independent right as a shebait despite having
conducted the ceremonies for a long period of time. Thus, the mere
presence of pujaris does not vest in them any right to be shebaits. In Gauri
Shankar v. Ambika Dutt, the plaintiff was the descendant of a person
appointed as a pujari on property dedicated for the worship of an idol. A
suit was instituted for claiming partition of the right to worship in the
temple and a division of the offerings. A Division Bench of the Patna
High Court held that the relevant question is whether the debutter
appointed the pujari as a shebait. Ramaswami, J. held : (SCC OnLine Pat
para 7)
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"7. ... It is important to state that a pujari or archak is not a shebait.
A pujari is appointed by the Shebait as the purohit to conduct the
worship. But that does not transfer the rights and obligations of the
Shebait to the purohit. He is not entitled to be continued as a matter
of right in his office as pujari. He is merely a servant appointed by
the Shebait for the performance of ceremonies. Where the
appointment of a purohit has been at the will of the founder the mere
fact that the appointees have performed the worship for several
generations, will not confer an independent right upon the members
of the family so appointed and will not entitle them as of right to be
continued in office as priest."
436. A shebait is vested with the authority to manage the properties of the
deity and ensure the fulfilment of the purpose for which the property was
dedicated. As a necessary adjunct of this managerial role, a shebait may
hire pujaris for the performance of worship. This does not confer upon the
appointed pujaris the status of a shebait. As appointees of the shebait, they
are liable to be removed from office and cannot claim a right to continue
in office. The distinction between a shebait and a pujari was recognised by
this Court in Sree Sree Kalimata Thakurani of Kalighat v. Jibandhan
Mukherjee. A suit was instituted under Section 92 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 for the framing of a scheme for the proper management
of the seva-puja of the Sree Sree Kali Mata Thakurani and her associated
deities. A Constitution Bench of this Court, speaking through J.R.
Mudholkar, J. held : (AIR p. 1333, para 10)
"10. ... It is wrong to call shebaits mere pujaris or archakas. A
shebait as has been pointed out by Mukherjea, J. (as he then was), in
his Tagore Law Lectures on Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable
Trusts, is a human ministrant of the deity while a pujari is appointed
by the founder or the shebait to conduct worship. Pujari thus is a
servant of the shebait. Shebaitship is not mere office, it is property
as well."
437. A pujari is appointed by the founder or by a shebait to conduct
worship. This appointment does not confer upon the pujari the status of a
shebait. They are liable to be removed for any act of mismanagement or
indiscipline which is inconsistent with the performance of their duties.
Further, where the appointment of a pujari has been at the will of the
testator, the fact that appointees have performed the worship for several
generations does not confer an independent right upon the appointee or
members of their family and will not entitle them as of right to be
continued in office as priests. Nor does the mere performance of the work
of a pujari in and of itself render a person a shebait."
5. The Supreme Court in the case of Sree Kalimata Thakurani of
Kalighat Vs. Jibandhan Mukherjee and Others reported in AIR 1962 SC
1329 has held as under :-
"10. ... It is wrong to call shebaits as mere pujaris or archakas. A shebait as
has been pointed out by Mukherjea J. (as he then was), in his Tagore Law
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Lectures on Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts, is a human
ministrant of the deity while a pujari is appointed by the founder or the
shebait to conduct worship. Pujari thus is a servant of the shebait. ..."
Thus, Pujari is servant of deity and has no right over the property.
6. The land in question was allotted to Ramchand by Madhochand who
was working as Officer Mafi , Gwalior Government at the relevant time. It is
really surprising that the said piece of paper which was filed at page 14 also
contains the blood lineage of Ramchand. The names of five predecessors of
Ramchand have also been mentioned in the aforesaid document. What was
the need for the Officer Mafi to mention the names of five predecessors of
Ramchand is beyond the understanding and even counsel for petitioner could
not explain this. Once the property was being allotted to Ramchand, then his
predecessors had no role to play.
7. Be that whatever it may.
8. It is submitted by counsel for petitioner that name of Ramchand was
recorded in the revenue records and, accordingly, he has filed the Khasra
Panchasala at pages 22 and 23 and in Column 8 of the aforesaid Khasra, it is
mentioned as under :-
"रामचंद जती व म पनालाल जती कौ. वैरागी सा. िभंड (पा ह)
दे व थान फ़ौत वा रस चु नीलाल जती"
9. Accordingly, counsel for petitioner was directed to explain that if
the person has expired and name of his successor was recorded, then what
was the need for the authority to mention the name of Ramchand in the
revenue record even after his death? Counsel for petitioner could not explain
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the aforesaid entry.
10. Be that whatever it may.
11. Petitioner has claimed himself to be a disciple of Ramsnehidas.
Whether the disciple would inherit the property of his Guru could not be
explained by counsel for petitioner. Even otherwise, counsel for petitioner
could not explain the relationship between Ramsnehidas and Chunnilal.
Therefore, it is clear that petitioner has miserably failed in establishing his
title in the property. Even petitioner is working as Pujari, then he cannot
assert his right to manage the property.
12. So far as nature of property is concerned, petitioner has failed to
prove that it is a private property. Under these circumstances, even if the
managing committee is constituted, this Court is of the considered opinion
that no mistake was committed by the authorities by not issuing any prior
notice to the petitioner. Right of hearing is not an absolute right and is
subject to any prejudice which may be caused to a person. No order can be
quashed merely on the ground that previous opportunity of hearing was not
given unless and until the aggrieved person successfully pleads and proves
that a prejudice has been caused on account of non-extension of opportunity
of hearing.
13. The Supreme Court in the case of Nirma Industries Limited and
another Vs. Securities and Exchange Board of India reported in (2013) 8
SCC 20 has held as under :-
"30. In B. Karunakar [(1993) 4 SCC 727 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184 : (1993)
25 ATC 704] , having defined the meaning of "civil consequences", this
Court reiterated the principle that the Court/Tribunal should not
mechanically set aside the order of punishment on the ground that the
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report was not furnished to the employee. It is only if the Court or
Tribunal finds that the furnishing of the report would have made a
difference to the result in the case that it should set aside the order of
punishment. In other words, the Court reiterated that the person
challenging the order on the basis that it is causing civil consequences
would have to prove the prejudice that has been caused by the non- grant
of opportunity of hearing............
35. Mr Venugopal has further pointed out that apart from the appellants,
even the merchant bankers did not make a request for a personal hearing.
He submitted that grant of an opportunity for a personal hearing cannot be
insisted upon in all circumstances. In support of this submission, he relied
on the judgment of this Court in Union of India v. Jesus Sales Corpn.
[(1996) 4 SCC 69] The submission cannot be brushed aside in view of the
observations made by this Court in the aforesaid judgment, which are as
under: (SCC pp. 74-75, para 5)
"5. The High Court has primarily considered the question as to
whether denying an opportunity to the appellant to be heard before
his prayer to dispense with the deposit of the penalty is rejected,
violates and contravenes the principles of natural justice. In that
connection, several judgments of this Court have been referred to. It
need not be pointed out that under different situations and conditions
the requirement of compliance with the principle of natural justice
vary. The courts cannot insist that under all circumstances and under
different statutory provisions personal hearings have to be afforded
to the persons concerned. If this principle of affording personal
hearing is extended whenever statutory authorities are vested with
the power to exercise discretion in connection with statutory appeals,
it shall lead to chaotic conditions. Many statutory appeals and
applications are disposed of by the competent authorities who have
been vested with powers to dispose of the same. Such authorities
which shall be deemed to be quasi- judicial authorities are expected
to apply their judicial mind over the grievances made by the
appellants or applicants concerned, but it cannot be held that before
dismissing such appeals or applications in all events the quasi-
judicial authorities must hear the appellants or the applicants, as the
case may be. When principles of natural justice require an
opportunity to be heard before an adverse order is passed on any
appeal or application, it does not in all circumstances mean a
personal hearing. The requirement is complied with by affording an
opportunity to the person concerned to present his case before such
quasi-judicial authority who is expected to apply his judicial mind to
the issues involved. Of course, if in his own discretion if he requires
the appellant or the applicant to be heard because of special facts and
circumstances of the case, then certainly it is always open to such
authority to decide the appeal or the application only after affording
a personal hearing. But any order passed after taking into
consideration the points raised in the appeal or the application shall
not be held to be invalid merely on the ground that no personal
hearing had been afforded."
14. The Supreme Court in the case of Chairman, State Bank of India
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and another Vs. M.J. James reported in (2022) 2 SCC 301 has held as under
:-
"31. In State of U.P. v. Sudhir Kumar Singh [State of U.P. v. Sudhir
Kumar Singh, (2021) 19 SCC 706 : 2020 SCC OnLine SC 847] referring
to the aforesaid cases and several other decisions of this Court, the law
was crystallised as under : (SCC para 42)
"42. An analysis of the aforesaid judgments thus reveals:
42.1. Natural justice is a flexible tool in the hands of the
judiciary to reach out in fit cases to remedy injustice. The
breach of the audi alteram partem rule cannot by itself, without
more, lead to the conclusion that prejudice is thereby caused.
42.2. Where procedural and/or substantive provisions of law
embody the principles of natural justice, their infraction per se
does not lead to invalidity of the orders passed. Here again,
prejudice must be caused to the litigant, except in the case of a
mandatory provision of law which is conceived not only in
individual interest, but also in public interest.
42.3. No prejudice is caused to the person complaining of the
breach of natural justice where such person does not dispute
the case against him or it. This can happen by reason of
estoppel, acquiescence, waiver and by way of non-challenge or
non-denial or admission of facts, in cases in which the Court
finds on facts that no real prejudice can therefore be said to
have been caused to the person complaining of the breach of
natural justice.
42.4. In cases where facts can be stated to be admitted or
indisputable, and only one conclusion is possible, the Court
does not pass futile orders of setting aside or remand when
there is, in fact, no prejudice caused. This conclusion must be
drawn by the Court on an appraisal of the facts of a case, and
not by the authority who denies natural justice to a person.
42.5. The "prejudice" exception must be more than a mere
apprehension or even a reasonable suspicion of a litigant. It
should exist as a matter of fact, or be based upon a definite
inference of likelihood of prejudice flowing from the non-
observance of natural justice."
15. The Supreme Court in the case of Dharampal Satyapal Limited Vs.
Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise, Gauhati and others reported in
(2015) 8 SCC 519 has held as under :-
"20. Natural justice is an expression of English Common Law. Natural
justice is not a single theory--it is a family of views. In one sense
administering justice itself is treated as natural virtue and, therefore, a part
of natural justice. It is also called "naturalist" approach to the phrase
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"natural justice" and is related to "moral naturalism". Moral naturalism
captures the essence of commonsense morality--that good and evil, right
and wrong, are the real features of the natural world that human reason
can comprehend. In this sense, it may comprehend virtue ethics and virtue
jurisprudence in relation to justice as all these are attributes of natural
justice. We are not addressing ourselves with this connotation of natural
justice here.
21. In Common Law, the concept and doctrine of natural justice,
particularly which is made applicable in the decision-making by judicial
and quasi-judicial bodies, has assumed a different connotation. It is
developed with this fundamental in mind that those whose duty is to
decide, must act judicially. They must deal with the question referred both
without bias and they must give (sic an opportunity) to each of the parties
to adequately present the case made. It is perceived that the practice of
aforesaid attributes in mind only would lead to doing justice. Since these
attributes are treated as natural or fundamental, it is known as "natural
justice". The principles of natural justice developed over a period of time
and which is still in vogue and valid even today are: (i) rule against bias
i.e. nemo debet esse judex in propria sua causa; and (ii) opportunity of
being heard to the party concerned i.e. audi alteram partem. These are
known as principles of natural justice. To these principles a third principle
is added, which is of recent origin. It is the duty to give reasons in support
of decision, namely, passing of a "reasoned order".
***
38. But that is not the end of the matter. While the law on the principle of
audi alteram partem has progressed in the manner mentioned above, at the
same time, the courts have also repeatedly remarked that the principles of
natural justice are very flexible principles. They cannot be applied in any
straitjacket formula. It all depends upon the kind of functions performed
and to the extent to which a person is likely to be affected. For this reason,
certain exceptions to the aforesaid principles have been invoked under
certain circumstances. For example, the courts have held that it would be
sufficient to allow a person to make a representation and oral hearing may
not be necessary in all cases, though in some matters, depending upon the
nature of the case, not only full-fledged oral hearing but even cross-
examination of witnesses is treated as a necessary concomitant of the
principles of natural justice. Likewise, in service matters relating to major
punishment by way of disciplinary action, the requirement is very strict
and full-fledged opportunity is envisaged under the statutory rules as well.
On the other hand, in those cases where there is an admission of charge,
even when no such formal inquiry is held, the punishment based on such
admission is upheld. It is for this reason, in certain circumstances, even
post- decisional hearing is held to be permissible. Further, the courts have
held that under certain circumstances principles of natural justice may
even be excluded by reason of diverse factors like time, place, the
apprehended danger and so on.
40. In this behalf, we need to notice one other exception which has been
carved out to the aforesaid principle by the courts. Even if it is found by
the court that there is a violation of principles of natural justice, the courts
have held that it may not be necessary to strike down the action and refer
the matter back to the authorities to take fresh decision after complying
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with the procedural requirement in those cases where non-grant of hearing
has not caused any prejudice to the person against whom the action is
taken. Therefore, every violation of a facet of natural justice may not lead
to the conclusion that the order passed is always null and void. The
validity of the order has to be decided on the touchstone of "prejudice".
The ultimate test is always the same viz. the test of prejudice or the test of
fair hearing.
41. In ECIL [(1993) 4 SCC 727 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184 : (1993) 25 ATC
704] , the majority opinion, penned down by Sawant, J., while summing
up the discussion and answering the various questions posed, had to say as
under qua the prejudice principle: (SCC pp. 756-58, para 30)
"30. Hence the incidental questions raised above may be answered
as follows:
***
(v) The next question to be answered is what is the effect on
the order of punishment when the report of the enquiry officer
is not furnished to the employee and what relief should be
granted to him in such cases. The answer to this question has
to be relative to the punishment awarded. When the employee
is dismissed or removed from service and the inquiry is set
aside because the report is not furnished to him, in some cases
the non- furnishing of the report may have prejudiced him
gravely while in other cases it may have made no difference to
the ultimate punishment awarded to him. Hence to direct
reinstatement of the employee with back wages in all cases is
to reduce the rules of justice to a mechanical ritual. The theory
of reasonable opportunity and the principles of natural justice
have been evolved to uphold the rule of law and to assist the
individual to vindicate his just rights. They are not incantations
to be invoked nor rites to be performed on all and sundry
occasions. Whether in fact, prejudice has been caused to the
employee or not on account of the denial to him of the report,
has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each
case. Where, therefore, even after the furnishing of the report,
no different consequence would have followed, it would be a
perversion of justice to permit the employee to resume duty
and to get all the consequential benefits. It amounts to
rewarding the dishonest and the guilty and thus to stretching
the concept of justice to illogical and exasperating limits. It
amounts to an 'unnatural expansion of natural justice' which in
itself is antithetical to justice."
44. At the same time, it cannot be denied that as far as courts are
concerned, they are empowered to consider as to whether any purpose
would be served in remanding the case keeping in mind whether any
prejudice is caused to the person against whom the action is taken. This
was so clarified in ECIL [(1993) 4 SCC 727 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184 :
(1993) 25 ATC 704] itself in the following words: (SCC p. 758, para 31)
"31. Hence, in all cases where the enquiry officer's report is not
furnished to the delinquent employee in the disciplinary proceedings,
the courts and tribunals should cause the copy of the report to be
furnished to the aggrieved employee if he has not already secured it
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before coming to the court/tribunal and given the employee an
opportunity to show how his or her case was prejudiced because of
the non-supply of the report. If after hearing the parties, the
court/tribunal comes to the conclusion that the non-supply of the
report would have made no difference to the ultimate findings and
the punishment given, the court/tribunal should not interfere with
the order of punishment. The court/tribunal should not mechanically
set aside the order of punishment on the ground that the report was
not furnished as is regrettably being done at present. The courts
should avoid resorting to short cuts. Since it is the courts/tribunals
which will apply their judicial mind to the question and give their
reasons for setting aside or not setting aside the order of punishment,
(and not any internal appellate or revisional authority), there would
be neither a breach of the principles of natural justice nor a denial of
the reasonable opportunity. It is only if the court/tribunal finds that
the furnishing of the report would have made a difference to the
result in the case that it should set aside the order of punishment."
16. The Supreme Court in the case of Canara Bank and others v.
Debasis Das and others reported in (2003) 4 SCC 557 has held as under :-
"22. What is known as "useless formality theory" has received
consideration of this Court in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India [(1999) 6
SCC 237] . It was observed as under: (SCC pp. 245-47, paras 22-23)
"22. Before we go into the final aspects of this contention, we would
like to state that cases relating to breach of natural justice do also
occur where all facts are not admitted or are not all beyond dispute.
In the context of those cases there is a considerable case-law and
literature as to whether relief can be refused even if the court thinks
that the case of the applicant is not one of 'real substance' or that
there is no substantial possibility of his success or that the result will
not be different, even if natural justice is followed see Malloch v.
Aberdeen Corpn. [(1971) 2 All ER 1278 : (1971) 1 WLR 1578
(HL)] (per Lord Reid and Lord Wilberforce), Glynn v. Keele
University [(1971) 2 All ER 89 : (1971) 1 WLR 487] , Cinnamond
v. British Airports Authority [(1980) 2 All ER 368 : (1980) 1 WLR
582 (CA)] and other cases where such a view has been held. The
latest addition to this view is R. v. Ealing Magistrates' Court, ex p
Fannaran [(1996) 8 Admn LR 351] (Admn LR at p. 358) [see de
Smith, Suppl. p. 89 (1998)] where Straughton, L.J. held that there
must be 'demonstrable beyond doubt' that the result would have
been different. Lord Woolf in Lloyd v. McMahon [(1987) 1 All ER
1118 : 1987 AC 625 : (1987) 2 WLR 821 (CA)] has also not
disfavoured refusal of discretion in certain cases of breach of natural
justice. The New Zealand Court in McCarthy v. Grant [1959 NZLR
1014] however goes halfway when it says that (as in the case of
bias), it is sufficient for the applicant to show that there is 'real
likelihood -- not certainty -- of prejudice'. On the other hand,
Garner's Administrative Law (8th Edn., 1996, pp. 271-72) says that
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slight proof that the result would have been different is sufficient.
On the other side of the argument, we have apart from Ridge v.
Baldwin [1964 AC 40 : (1963) 2 All ER 66 : (1963) 2 WLR 935
(HL)] , Megarry, J. in John v. Rees [(1969) 2 All ER 274 : 1970 Ch
345 : (1969) 2 WLR 1294] stating that there are always 'open and
shut cases' and no absolute rule of proof of prejudice can be laid
down. Merits are not for the court but for the authority to consider.
Ackner, J. has said that the 'useless formality theory' is a dangerous
one and, however inconvenient, natural justice must be followed.
His Lordship observed that 'convenience and justice are often not
on speaking terms'. More recently, Lord Bingham has deprecated
the 'useless formality theory' in R. v. Chief Constable of the Thames
Valley Police Forces, ex p Cotton [1990 IRLR 344] by giving six
reasons. (See also his article 'Should Public Law Remedies be
Discretionary?' 1991 PL, p. 64.) A detailed and emphatic criticism
of the 'useless formality theory' has been made much earlier in
'Natural Justice, Substance or Shadow' by Prof. D.H. Clark of
Canada (see 1975 PL, pp. 27-63) contending that Malloch [(1971) 2
All ER 1278 : (1971) 1 WLR 1578 (HL)] and Glynn [(1971) 2 All
ER 89 : (1971) 1 WLR 487] were wrongly decided. Foulkes
(Administrative Law, 8th Edn., 1996, p. 323), Craig (Administrative
Law, 3rd Edn., p. 596) and others say that the court cannot prejudge
what is to be decided by the decision-making authority. de Smith
(5th Edn., 1994, paras 10.031 to 10.036) says courts have not yet
committed themselves to any one view though discretion is always
with the court. Wade (Administrative Law, 5th Edn., 1994, pp. 526-
30) says that while futile writs may not be issued, a distinction has
to be made according to the nature of the decision. Thus, in relation
to cases other than those relating to admitted or indisputable facts,
there is a considerable divergence of opinion whether the applicant
can be compelled to prove that the outcome will be in his favour or
he has to prove a case of substance or if he can prove a 'real
likelihood' of success or if he is entitled to relief even if there is
some remote chance of success. We may, however, point out that
even in cases where the facts are not all admitted or beyond dispute,
there is a considerable unanimity that the courts can, in exercise of
their 'discretion', refuse certiorari, prohibition, mandamus or
injunction even though natural justice is not followed. We may also
state that there is yet another line of cases as in State Bank of Patiala
v. S.K. Sharma [(1996) 3 SCC 364 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 717] ,
Rajendra Singh v. State of M.P. [(1996) 5 SCC 460] that even in
relation to statutory provisions requiring notice, a distinction is to be
made between cases where the provision is intended for individual
benefit and where a provision is intended to protect public interest.
In the former case, it can be waived while in the case of the latter, it
cannot be waived.
23. We do not propose to express any opinion on the correctness or
otherwise of the 'useless formality' theory and leave the matter for
decision in an appropriate case, inasmuch as in the case before us,
'admitted and indisputable' facts show that grant of a writ will be in
vain as pointed out by Chinnappa Reddy, J."
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23. As was observed by this Court we need not go into "useless formality
theory" in detail; in view of the fact that no prejudice has been shown. As
is rightly pointed out by learned counsel for the appellants, unless failure
of justice is occasioned or that it would not be in public interest to dismiss
a petition on the fact situation of a case, this Court may refuse to exercise
the said jurisdiction (see Gadde Venkateswara Rao v. Govt. of A.P. [AIR
1966 SC 828] ). It is to be noted that legal formulations cannot be
divorced from the fact situation of the case. Personal hearing was granted
by the Appellate Authority, though not statutorily prescribed. In a given
case post-decisional hearing can obliterate the procedural deficiency of a
pre-decisional hearing. (See Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India [(1990) 1
SCC 613 : AIR 1990 SC 1480] .)"
17. This Court has already held that petitioner had no right or title in
the property in dispute and even in the capacity of Pujari, he had no right to
manage the property of the deity. This Court has also held that petitioner has
failed to prove that the property in dispute was private property. Under these
circumstances, even if no opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner,
still said order cannot be said to be bad and no prejudice was caused to the
petitioner.
18. Accordingly, this petition fails and is hereby dismissed.
(G. S. AHLUWALIA)
JUDGE
AKS
