Madhya Pradesh High Court
Jugraj Singh vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 13 March, 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:12961
1 MCRC-54925-2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE DEVNARAYAN MISHRA
ON THE 13th OF MARCH, 2025
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 54925 of 2024
JUGRAJ SINGH
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
Appearance:
Shri Pramendra Singh Thakur - Advocate for the applicant.
Ms. Manisha Singh - Panel Lawyer for the respondent-State.
ORDER
This is the compulsive bail application filed by the applicant under
Section 167(2) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973/ Section 187(3) of
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (B.N.S.S.) for grant of default bail
relating to Crime No.245/2024 registered at Police Station-Chorhata, Rewa
(M.P.) for the offences punishable under Sections 8/20B, 25, 25(a) of NDPS
Act. The applicant is in jail since 07.05.2024.
2. Learned counsel for the applicant by filing an application under
Section 167(2) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973/ Section 187(3) of
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 has submitted that he has filed
bail application on the ground that the charge sheet was not submitted within
180 days as per the provision of Section 36-A of NDPS Act. Hence, the
applicant is entitled for bail. That application was dismissed by the Trial
Court appreciating that on 26.10.2024, SHO Chorhata had filed an
application for extension of time. On that basis, additional 30 days' time was
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granted to file the charge sheet. By additional 30 days' time, the prosecution
agency was having 210 days to investigate the matter and file the charge
sheet.
3. Learned counsel for the applicant relying on the judgment of
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sanjay Kumar Kedia @ Sanjay Kedia v.
Intelligence Officer, Narcotics Control Bureau and another (2009) 17 SCC
631 has submitted that in paragraphs no.12, 13, 15 and 16 of the judgment, it
has been clearly dealt with the matter and interpreting the Section 36-A(4) of
the Act that " if it is not possible to complete the investigation within the said
period of one hundred and eighty days, the Special Court may extend the said
period up to one year on the report of the Public Prosecutor indicating the
progress of the investigation and the specific reasons for the detention of the
accused beyond the said period of one hundred and eighty days" and he has
submitted on relying this judgment that the time was extended only on the
application of SHO, Chorhata, District-Rewa. There is no report of Public
Prosecutor stating the reasons and the progress of the investigation. Hence,
only on that basis, the time could not have been extended. Hon'ble Apex
Court in paragraphs no.12, 13, 15 and 16 of the judgment has elaborately
discussed the provisions which are held as under:-
"12. The maximum period of 90 days fixed under Section 167(2) of the Code
has been increased to 180 days for several categories of offences under the Act
but the proviso authorises a yet further period of detention which may in total
go up to one year, provided the stringent conditions provided therein are
satisfied and are complied with. The conditions provided are:
(1) a report of the Public Prosecutor,
(2) which indicates the progress of the investigation, and
(3) specifies the compelling reasons for seeking the detention of
the accused beyond the period of 180 days, and
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(4) after notice to the accused.
13. The question to be noticed at this stage is as to whether the two
applications for extension that had been filed by the Public Prosecutor seeking
an extension beyond 180 days met the necessary conditions. We find that the
matter need not detain us as it is no longer res integra and is completely
covered by the judgment of this Court in Hitendra Vishnu case [(1994) 4 SCC
602 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1087] . In this case, the Bench was dealing with the
proviso inserted as clause (bb) in sub-section (4) of Section 20 of TADA,
which is in pari materia with the proviso to sub-section (4) of Section 36-A of
the Act. This Court accepted the argument of the accused that an extension
beyond 180 days could be granted but laid a rider that it could be so after
certain conditions were satisfied.
**** ***** **** ****
15. Mr Lalit has further contended that the two applications for extension of
time could not, by any stretch of imagination, be said to be reports of the Public
Prosecutor as envisaged under Section 36-A(4) and has again referred us to the
case ibidem : (Hitendra Vishnu case [(1994) 4 SCC 602 : 1994 SCC (Cri)
1087] , SCC pp. 630-31, para 23)
"23. ... A Public Prosecutor is an important officer of the State
Government and is appointed by the State under the Code of
Criminal Procedure. He is not a part of the investigating agency.
He is an independent statutory authority. The Public Prosecutor is
expected to independently apply his mind to the request of the
investigating agency before submitting a report to the court for
extension of time with a view to enable the investigating agency to
complete the investigation. He is not merely a post office or a
forwarding agency. A Public Prosecutor may or may not agree
with the reasons given by the investigating officer for seeking
extension of time and may find that the investigation had not
progressed in the proper manner or that there has been
unnecessary, deliberate or avoidable delay in completing the
investigation. In that event, he may not submit any report to the
court under clause (bb) to seek extension of time. Thus, for
seeking extension of time under clause (bb), the Public Prosecutor
after an independent application of his mind to the request of the
investigating agency is required to make a report to the Designated
Court indicating therein the progress of the investigation and
disclosing justification for keeping the accused in further custody
to enable the investigating agency to complete the investigation.
The Public Prosecutor may attach the request of the investigating
officer along with his request or application and report, but his
report, as envisaged under clause (bb), must disclose on the face of
it that he has applied his mind and was satisfied with the progress
of the investigation and considered grant of further time to
complete the investigation necessary. The use of the expression
'on the report of the Public Prosecutor indicating the progress of
the investigation and the specific reasons for the detention of the
accused beyond the said period' as occurring in clause (bb) in sub-
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section (2) of Section 167 as amended by Section 20(4) are
important and indicative of the legislative intent not to keep an
accused in custody unreasonably and to grant extension only on
the report of the Public Prosecutor. The report of the Public
Prosecutor, therefore, is not merely a formality but a very vital
report, because the consequence of its acceptance affects the
liberty of an accused and it must, therefore, strictly comply with
the requirements as contained in clause (bb). The request of an
investigating officer for extension of time is no substitute for the
report of the Public Prosecutor."
16. The Court further went on to say that even if the application for extension
of time was either routed through the Public Prosecutor or supported by him
would not make the said application a report of the Public Prosecutor. Mr
Bhattacharjee has, however, pointed out that the applications for extension
filed by the Public Prosecutor under Section 36-A(4) of the Act did satisfy the
aforesaid conditions and merely because an independent report had not been
tendered would not change the nature of the application.
4. Learned counsel for the applicant relying on the judgment of Jigar
@ Jimmy Pravinchandra Adatiya v. State of Gujarat (2023) 6 SCC 484 has
submitted that it is mandatory to serve the notice when the report for
application for extension of time is produced and the accused be also heard.
On that basis, the Trial Court has not complied the above directions and
provisions of law. Hence, the applicant is entitled for default bail.
5. Learned counsel for the State has opposed the bail application on
the ground that commercial quantity of the contraband/cannabis has been
recovered from the possession of the applicant. There is no doubt regarding
the implication of the applicant. The time was extended by the Court. Hence,
no case of default bail is made out.
6. Heard the parties and perused the record.
7. From the report and the remand papers submitted before this Court,
it is clear that the applicant-Jugraj Singh was arrested in Crime No.245/2024
under Sections 8/20B, 25, 25(a) of NDPS Act and produced before the Trial
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Court on 07.05.2024 for further remand. It is alleged that 500 kg of the
contraband Ganja has been recovered from the possession of the applicant.
Remand of the applicant was granted time and again. The application for
extension of time was filed by SHO, Chorhata on 26.10.2024 and 30 days'
time was granted by the Trial Court. The applicant filed an application for
default bail on 20.11.2024 (after 180 days from the date of first remand)
which was decided by the Trial Court on 27.11.2024. The charge sheet was
submitted on 02.12.2024. Thus, the charge sheet was filed after 207 days
from the first remand of the applicant.
8. I have specifically called the remand papers of concerned Special
Court, Rewa regarding Crime No.245/2024 registered under Section 8(20),
25-A of NDPS Act registered at Police Station-Chorhata, District-Rewa and
perused the application that was filed before the Special Court for extension
of time. The application is signed by SHO, Chorhata dated 26.10.2024 and it
is also stated that the case diary is annexed herewith. No report of prosecutor
is submitted alongwith that application. Though, the prosecutor was present
before the Court but this fact has also been considered by the Hon'ble Apex
Court in para no.16 of the judgment Sanjay Kumar Kedia (supra) has held
that ".......... if the application for extension of time was either routed through
the Public Prosecutor or supported by him would not make the said
application as report of the Public Prosecutor".
9. Thus, it is clear that the time was extended by the Trial Court
without following the principles laid down in Section 36-A of NDPS Act and
as per the judgment of Sanjay Kumar Kedia (supra) . In this situation, the
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applicant is entitled for default bail (before the filing the charge sheet which
was filed on 02.12.2024). The application was filed on 20.11.2024. Thus, the
charge sheet was submitted after filing of the application before the Trial
Court. Thus, the right does not extinguish in this case.
10. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is
inclined to enlarge the applicant on bail and in pursuance to the provision of
Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C./Section 187(3) of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha
Sanhita, 2023 r/w Section 36-A of NDPS Act, the applicant is entitled to be
released on default bail. The default bail application is allowed.
11. It is directed that applicant-Jugraj Singh shall be released on bail
on his furnishing a personal bond in a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees Five
Lakhs Only) with two solvent sureties of the like amount to the satisfaction
of the trial Court concerned for his appearance before the said Court on all
such dates as may be fixed by that Court in this regard during the pendency
of trial.
12. The applicant shall comply with the provisions of Section 480(3)
of BNSS.
13. Accordingly, this M.Cr.C. stands disposed of.
C.C. as per rules.
(DEVNARAYAN MISHRA)
JUDGE
HK
