Madhya Pradesh High Court
Smt. Indu Parashar vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 27 February, 2025
Author: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
Bench: G. S. Ahluwalia
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1 M.Cr.C. No. 55217 of 2023
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT G WA L I O R
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE G. S. AHLUWALIA
ON THE 27th OF FEBRUARY, 2025
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 55217 of 2023
SMT. INDU PARASHAR AND OTHERS
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Pradhumn Singh Kushwaha - Advocate for applicants.
Dr. Anjali Gyanani- Public Prosecutor for respondent No.1/State.
Shri Pallav Tripathi- Advocate for respondent No.2.
ORDER
This application, under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., has been filed for
quashment of FIR in Crime No.141/2022 registered at Police Station Mahila
Thana, District Gwalior (M.P.) for offences punishable under Sections 498A, 506,
34 of IPC and under Sections 3, 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act.
2. It is submitted by counsel for applicants that respondent No.2 made a
written complaint on 24.05.2022 alleging that she got married to Saurabh
Parashar on 08.05.2014. Her father had given Rs.10,00,000/- in cash, gold and
silver ornaments and house-hold articles as per his financial capacity.
Approximately, Rs.15 lacs were spent. When she came to her matrimonial house,
husband of respondent No.2, namely, Saurabh Parashar, mother-in-law Indu
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Parashar and father-in-law O.P. Parashar started behaving inhumanly and used to
pass taunts by alleging that she has brought less dowry. They were compelling her
to wake up at 4 in the morning and were also compelling her to work like
servants. Their behaviour was cruel. They also used to say that she will have to
bring Rs.20 lacs in dowry from her parents and only then she would be able to
live properly. Whenever she replied that now her father has no financial capacity
to spend more money, then all of them i.e. her husband, mother-in-law and father-
in-law used to beat her. Whenever she talked to her parents on phone, then her
husband used to beat her. Everyday she was being physically and mentally
harassed and they used to turn her out. Then she came back to her parental home
at Gwalior. Her husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law came to her parental
home and demanded Rs.20 lacs in dowry. On 10.11.2014, she went to Mumbai
along with her husband Saurabh, where also her husband abused and tortured her
physically and mentally for non-fulfillment of demand of dowry. However, she
was tolerating all this under the hope and belief that with the passage of time
things would improve, but the behaviour of her husband did not improve. She
gave birth to a premature baby who is handicapped. However, her delivery
charges were not borne by her husband. Again, on 27.11.2019, her husband,
father-in-law and mother-in-law demanded Rs.20 lacs. When she expressed her
inability to fulfill their demand, then after beating her she was ousted from her
matrimonial house by them. Thereafter, her parents came to Indore and tried to
convince her husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law but they did not agree and
accordingly she came back to Gwalior. Whenever, her husband, father-in-law and
mother-in-law came to Gwalior they always demanded Rs.20 lacs and also
threatened that until and unless Rs.20 lacs are given, she should stay back in her
parental home and also threatened that in case she is sent to her matrimonial
house without dowry, then she would be killed. It was further alleged that in spite
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of atrocities, she and her parents tried to convince her husband, father-in-law and
mother-in-law but things did not improve and accordingly, FIR was lodged.
3. Challenging the FIR lodged by respondent No.2, it is submitted by counsel
for applicants that FIR is bad in law being counterblast to the divorce petition
which was filed on 03.12.2021. It is submitted by counsel for applicants that on
05.09.2020 an application under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act was filed by
their son but later on it was withdrawn on 01.12.2021 and divorce petition was
filed on 03.12.2021. Respondent No.2 filed an application under Section 24 of
Cr.P.C. for transfer of case and only thereafter, she lodged an FIR on 24.05.2022
and thus it is submitted that FIR is bad in law. It is further submitted that
respondent No.2 was all the time residing in Mumbai along with her husband and
therefore the allegation that applicants also demanded dowry is false.
4. Per contra, application is vehemently opposed by counsel for the State, as
well as, counsel for complainant. It is submitted that since a married woman
would like to save her marital life therefore generally she does not lodge an FIR,
but only after realizing that chances of reconciliation have gone, if she decides to
lodge an FIR complaining about the misdeeds of her in-laws, then it cannot be
said that it was a counterblast to the petition for divorce. It is further submitted
that even otherwise the findings recorded by Civil Court are not binding on
Criminal Court and vice versa.
5. Heard learned counsel for parties.
6. According to applicants, son of applicants had filed an application under
Section 9 of Hindu Marriage Act on 05.09.2020 and it was withdrawn on
01.12.2021 and thereafter he filed an application for divorce on 03.12.2021. The
FIR was lodged on 24.05.2022. Undisputedly, respondent No.2 was also served
with notice of divorce petition and, therefore, she had filed an application for
transfer before the High Court.
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7. Now, the only question for consideration is as to whether FIR in question
can be said to be lodged by way of counterblast to divorce petition, based on
incorrect and false allegations or not?
The question is no more res integra.
The Supreme Court in the case of Pratibha v. Rameshwari Devi,
reported in (2007) 12 SCC 369 has held as under:-
"14. From a plain reading of the findings arrived at by
the High Court while quashing the FIR, it is apparent
that the High Court had relied on extraneous
considerations and acted beyond the allegations made in
the FIR for quashing the same in exercise of its inherent
powers under Section 482 of the Code. We have already
noted the illustrations enumerated in BhajanLal
case [1992 Supp (1) SCC335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426]
and from a careful reading of these illustrations, we are
of the view that the allegations emerging from the FIR
are not covered by any of the illustrations as noted
hereinabove. For example, we may take up one of the
findings of the High Court as noted hereinabove. The
High Court has drawn an adverse inference on account
of the FIR being lodged on 31-12-2001 while the
appellant was forced out of the matrimonial home on
25-5-2001.
15. In our view, in the facts and circumstances of the
case, the High Court was not justified in drawing an
adverse inference against the appellant wife for lodging
the FIR on 31-12-2001 on the ground that she had left
the matrimonial home at least six months before that.
This is because, in our view, the High Court had failed
to appreciate that the appellant and her family members
were, during this period, making all possible efforts to
enter into a settlement so that Respondent 2 husband
would take her back to the matrimonial home. If any
complaint was made during this period, there was every
possibility of not entering into any settlement with
Respondent 2 husband.
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16. It is pertinent to note that the complaint was filed
only when all efforts to return to the matrimonial home
had failed and Respondent 2 husband had filed a
divorce petition under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage
Act, 1955. That apart, in our view, filing of a divorce
petition in a civil court cannot be a ground to quash
criminal proceedings under Section 482 of the Code as
it is well settled that criminal and civil proceedings are
separate and independent and the pendency of a civil
proceeding cannot bring to an end a criminal
proceeding even if they arise out of the same set of
facts. Such being the position, we are, therefore, of the
view that the High Court while exercising its powers
under Section 482 of the Code has gone beyond the
allegations made in the FIR and has acted in excess of
its jurisdiction and, therefore, the High Court was not
justified in quashing the FIR by going beyond the
allegations made in the FIR or by relying on extraneous
considerations.
22. For the reasons aforesaid, we are inclined to
interfere with the order of the High Court and hold that
the High Court in quashing the FIR in the exercise of its
inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code by
relying on the investigation report and the findings
made therein has acted beyond its jurisdiction. For the
purpose of finding out the commission of a cognizable
offence, the High Court was only required to look into
the allegations made in the complaint or the FIR and to
conclude whether a prima facie offence had been made
out by the complainant in the FIR or the complaint or
not."
8. Furthermore, the findings recorded by the Civil Court are not binding on
the Criminal Court and vice versa.
The Supreme Court in the case of Kishan Singh (Dead) Through LRs.
v. Gurpal Singh and Others, reported in (2010) 8 SCC 775 has held as
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under:-
"16. In Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah this Court
held as under : (SCC pp. 389-90, para 32)
"32. Coming to the last contention that an effort should
be made to avoid conflict of findings between the civil
and criminal courts, it is necessary to point out that the
standard of proof required in the two proceedings is
entirely different. Civil cases are decided on the basis of
preponderance of evidence while in a criminal case the
entire burden lies on the prosecution and proof beyond
reasonable doubt has to be given. There is neither any
statutory provision nor any legal principle that the
findings recorded in one proceeding may be treated as
final or binding in the other, as both the cases have to
be decided on the basis of the evidence adduced
therein."
17. In Syed Askari Hadi Ali Augustine Imam v. State (Delhi
Admn.) this Court considered all the earlier judgments on the
issue and held that while deciding the case in Karam Chand,
this Court failed to take note of the Constitution Bench
judgment in M.S. Sheriff and, therefore, it remains per incuriam
and does not lay down the correct law. A similar view has been
reiterated by this Court in Vishnu Dutt Sharma v. Daya Sapra,
wherein it has been held by this Court that the decision in
Karam Chand stood overruled in K.G. Premshanker.
18. Thus, in view of the above, the law on the issue stands
crystallised to the effect that the findings of fact recorded by the
civil court do not have any bearing so far as the criminal case is
concerned and vice versa. Standard of proof is different in civil
and criminal cases. In civil cases it is preponderance of
probabilities while in criminal cases it is proof beyond
reasonable doubt. There is neither any statutory nor any legal
principle that findings recorded by the court either in civil or
criminal proceedings shall be binding between the same parties
while dealing with the same subject-matter and both the cases
have to be decided on the basis of the evidence adduced
therein. However, there may be cases where the provisions of
Sections 41 to 43 of the Evidence Act, 1872, dealing with the
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relevance of previous judgments in subsequent cases may be
taken into consideration."
The Supreme Court in the case of Syed Askari Hadi Ali Augustine
Imam And Another Vs. State (Delhi Administration) and Another reported
in (2009) 5 SCC 528 has held as under :
"24. If primacy is to be given to a criminal proceeding,
indisputably, the civil suit must be determined on its own merit,
keeping in view the evidence brought before it and not in terms
of the evidence brought in the criminal proceeding. The
question came up for consideration in K.G. Premshanker v.
Inspector of Police wherein this Court inter alia held: (SCC p.
97, paras 30-31)
"30. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is--
(1) the previous judgment which is final can be relied
upon as provided under Sections 40 to 43 of the
Evidence Act; (2) in civil suits between the same
parties, principle of res judicata may apply; (3) in a
criminal case, Section 300 CrPC makes provision that
once a person is convicted or acquitted, he may not be
tried again for the same offence if the conditions
mentioned therein are satisfied; (4) if the criminal case
and the civil proceedings are for the same cause,
judgment of the civil court would be relevant if
conditions of any of Sections 40 to 43 are satisfied, but
it cannot be said that the same would be conclusive
except as provided in Section 41. Section 41 provides
which judgment would be conclusive proof of what is
stated therein.
31. Further, the judgment, order or decree passed in a
previous civil proceeding, if relevant, as provided under
Sections 40 and 42 or other provisions of the Evidence
Act then in each case, the court has to decide to what
extent it is binding or conclusive with regard to the
matter(s) decided therein. Take for illustration, in a case
of alleged trespass by A on B's property, B filed a suit
for declaration of its title and to recover possession
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from A and suit is decreed. Thereafter, in a criminal
prosecution by B against A for trespass, judgment
passed between the parties in civil proceedings would
be relevant and the court may hold that it conclusively
establishes the title as well as possession of B over the
property. In such case, A may be convicted for trespass.
The illustration to Section 42 which is quoted above
makes the position clear. Hence, in each and every case,
the first question which would require consideration is
--whether judgment, order or decree is relevant, if
relevant--its effect. It may be relevant for a limited
purpose, such as, motive or as a fact in issue. This
would depend upon the facts of each case."
25. It is, however, significant to notice that the decision of this
Court in Karam Chand Ganga Prasad v. Union of India,
wherein it was categorically held that the decisions of the civil
courts will be binding on the criminal courts but the converse is
not true, was overruled, stating: (K.G. Premshanker case, SCC
p. 98, para 33)
"33. Hence, the observation made by this Court in V.M.
Shah case that the finding recorded by the criminal
court stands superseded by the finding recorded by the
civil court is not correct enunciation of law. Further, the
general observations made in Karam Chand case are in
context of the facts of the case stated above. The Court
was not required to consider the earlier decision of the
Constitution Bench in M.S. Sheriff case as well as
Sections 40 to 43 of the Evidence Act."
Axiomatically, if judgment of a civil court is not binding on a
criminal court, a judgment of a criminal court will certainly not
be binding on a civil court.
26. We have noticed hereinbefore that Section 43 of the
Evidence Act categorically states that judgments, orders or
decrees, other than those mentioned in Sections 40, 41 and 42
are irrelevant, unless the existence of such judgment, order or
decree, is a fact in issue, or is relevant under some other
provisions of the Act. No other provision of the Evidence Act
or for that matter any other statute has been brought to our
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notice.
27. Another Constitution Bench of this Court had the occasion
to consider a similar question in Iqbal Singh Marwah v.
Meenakshi Marwah wherein it was held: (SCC p. 387, para 24)
"24. There is another consideration which has to be
kept in mind. Sub-section (1) of Section 340 CrPC
contemplates holding of a preliminary enquiry.
Normally, a direction for filing of a complaint is not
made during the pendency of the proceeding before the
court and this is done at the stage when the proceeding
is concluded and the final judgment is rendered. Section
341 provides for an appeal against an order directing
filing of the complaint. The hearing and ultimate
decision of the appeal is bound to take time. Section
343(2) confers a discretion upon a court trying the
complaint to adjourn the hearing of the case if it is
brought to its notice that an appeal is pending against
the decision arrived at in the judicial proceeding out of
which the matter has arisen. In view of these
provisions, the complaint case may not proceed at all
for decades specially in matters arising out of civil suits
where decisions are challenged in successive appellate
fora which are time-consuming. It is also to be noticed
that there is no provision of appeal against an order
passed under Section 343(2), whereby hearing of the
case is adjourned until the decision of the appeal. These
provisions show that, in reality, the procedure
prescribed for filing a complaint by the court is such
that it may not fructify in the actual trial of the offender
for an unusually long period. Delay in prosecution of a
guilty person comes to his advantage as witnesses
become reluctant to give evidence and the evidence gets
lost. This important consideration dissuades us from
accepting the broad interpretation sought to be placed
upon clause (b)(ii)."
28. Relying inter alia on M.S. Sheriff, it was furthermore held:
(Iqbal Singh Marwah case, SCC pp. 389-90, para 32)
"32. Coming to the last contention that an effort should
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be made to avoid conflict of findings between the civil
and criminal courts, it is necessary to point out that the
standard of proof required in the two proceedings are
entirely different. Civil cases are decided on the basis of
preponderance of evidence while in a criminal case the
entire burden lies on the prosecution and proof beyond
reasonable doubt has to be given. There is neither any
statutory provision nor any legal principle that the
findings recorded in one proceeding may be treated as
final or binding in the other, as both the cases have to
be decided on the basis of the evidence adduced
therein."
29. The question yet again came up for consideration in P.
Swaroopa Rani v. M. Hari Narayana, wherein it was
categorically held: (SCC p. 769, para 11)
"11. It is, however, well settled that in a given case,
civil proceedings and criminal proceedings can proceed
simultaneously. Whether civil proceedings or criminal
proceedings shall be stayed depends upon the fact and
circumstances of each case."
The Supreme Court in the case of Prem Raj Vs. Poonamma Menon
and Another decided on 02.04.2024 in S.L.P.(Cr.) No.9778/2018 has held as
under :
"9. In advancing his submissions, Mr. K. Parameshwar,
learned counsel appearing for the appellant, placed reliance on
certain authorities of this Court. In M/s. Karam Chand Ganga
Prasad and Anr. vs. Union of India and Ors.(1970)3 SCC 694,
this Court observed that:
".......It is a well-established principle of law that the
decisions of the civil courts are binding on the
criminal courts. The converse is not true."
In K.G. Premshanker vs. Inspector of Police and Anr,
(2002)8 SCC 87, a Bench of three learned Judges observed that,
following the M.S. Sheriff vs. State of Madras, AIR 1954 SC
397, no straight-jacket formula could be laid down and
conflicting decisions of civil and criminal Courts would not be
a relevant consideration except for the limited purpose of
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sentence or damages.
10. We notice that this Court in Vishnu Dutt Sharma vs.
Daya Sapra (Smt.) (2009)13 SCC 729, had observed as under:
"26. It is, however, significant to notice a
decision of this Court in Karam Chand Ganga
Prasad v. Union of India (1970) 3 SCC 694,
wherein it was categorically held that the
decisions of the civil court will be binding on
the criminal courts but the converse is not true,
was overruled therein..."
This Court in Satish Chander Ahuja vs. Sneha Ahuja (2021)1
SCC 414, considered a numerous precedents, including
Premshanker (supra) and Vishnu Dutt Sharma (supra), to opine
that there is no embargo for a civil court to consider the
evidence led in the criminal proceedings.
The issue has been laid to rest by a Constitution
Bench of this Court in Iqbal Singh Marwah vs.
Meenakshi Marwah, (2005)4 SCC 370 :
"32. Coming to the last contention that an effort
should be made to avoid conflict of findings
between the civil and criminal courts, it is
necessary to point out that the standard of proof
required in the two proceedings are entirely
different. Civil cases are decided on the basis of
preponderance of evidence, while in a criminal
case, the entire burden lies on the prosecution,
and proof beyond reasonable doubt has to be
given. There is neither any statutory provision
nor any legal principle that the findings recorded
in one proceeding may be treated as final or
binding in the other, as both the cases have to be
decided on the basis of the evidence adduced
therein. While examining a similar contention in
an appeal against an order directing filing of a
complaint under Section 476 of the old Code,
the following observations made by a
Constitution Bench in M.S. Sheriff v. State of
Madras [1954 SCR 1144: AIR 1954 SC 397:
1954 Cri LJ 1019] give a complete answer to
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the problem posed: (AIR p. 399, paras 15-16)
"15. As between the civil and the criminal
proceedings, we are of the opinion that the
criminal matters should be given
precedence. There is some difference of
opinion in the High Courts of India on this
point. No hard-and-fast rule can be laid
down but we do not consider that the
possibility of conflicting decisions in the
civil and criminal courts is a relevant
consideration. The law envisages such an
eventuality when it expressly refrains from
making the decision of one court binding
on the other, or even relevant, except for
certain limited purposes, such as sentence
or damages. The only relevant
consideration here is the likelihood of
embarrassment.
16. Another factor which weighs with us is
that a civil suit often drags on for years and
it is undesirable that a criminal prosecution
should wait till everybody concerned has
forgotten all about the crime. The public
interests demand that criminal justice
should be swift and sure; that the guilty
should be punished while the events are
still fresh in the public mind and that the
innocent should be absolved as early as is
consistent with a fair and impartial trial.
Another reason is that it is undesirable to
let things slide till memories have grown
too dim to trust.
This, however, is not a hard-and-fast rule. Special
considerations obtaining in any particular case might
make some other course more expedient and just. For
example, the civil case or the other criminal
proceeding may be so near its end as to make it
inexpedient to stay it in order to give precedence to a
prosecution ordered under Section 476. But in this
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case we are of the view that the civil suits should be
stayed till the criminal proceedings have finished."
(Emphasis Supplied)"
Furthermore, the Supreme Court in the case of Pratibha (supra), in
which it has been held as under:
16. It is pertinent to note that the complaint was filed
only when all efforts to return to the matrimonial home
had failed and Respondent 2 husband had filed a
divorce petition under Section 13 of the Hindu
Marriage Act, 1955. That apart, in our view, filing of a
divorce petition in a civil court cannot be a ground to
quash criminal proceedings under Section 482 of the
Code as it is well settled that criminal and civil
proceedings are separate and independent and the
pendency of a civil proceeding cannot bring to an end a
criminal proceeding even if they arise out of the same
set of facts. Such being the position, we are, therefore,
of the view that the High Court while exercising its
powers under Section 482 of the Code has gone
beyond the allegations made in the FIR and has acted
in excess of its jurisdiction and, therefore, the High
Court was not justified in quashing the FIR by going
beyond the allegations made in the FIR or by relying
on extraneous considerations.
(Underline supplied)
The Supreme Court, in the case of Sh. Vishnu Dutt Sharma vs. Smt.
Daya Sapra, decided on 05-05-2009 in Civil Appeal Number 3238 of 2009, has
held as under :
"30. Another Constitution Bench of this Court had the occasion to
consider the question in Iqbal Singh Marwah & Anr. vs. Meenakshi
Marwah & Anr. [(2005) 4 SCC 370]. Relying on M.S. Sheriff (supra)
as also various other decisions, it was categorically held:
"32. Coming to the last contention that an effort should be
made to avoid conflict of findings between the civil and
criminal courts, it is necessary to point out that the
standard of proof required in the two proceedings are
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entirely different. Civil cases are decided on the basis of
preponderance of evidence while in a criminal case the
entire burden lies on the prosecution and proof beyond
reasonable doubt has to be given."
31. The question yet again came up for consideration in P.
Swaroopa Rani vs. M. Hari Narayana @ Hari Babu [AIR 2008 SC
1884], wherein it was categorically held:
"13. It is, however, well-settled that in a given case, civil
proceedings and criminal proceedings can proceed
simultaneously. Whether civil proceedings or criminal
proceedings shall be stayed depends upon the fact and
circumstances of each case."
9. Even otherwise, it is a matter of common knowledge that a married woman
would not rush to the police immediately after the atrocities are committed. She
would try her level best to save her marital life and if she maintains silence with
that intention and after realizing that her husband has filed a petition for divorce
and there is no possibility of reconciliation, therefore, if she approaches the police
thereby making allegation with regard to commission of cruelty by her in-laws,
then by no stretch of imagination it can be said that patience and silence on the
part of wife was unwarranted.
10. Under these circumstances, this Court is of considered opinion that the FIR
lodged by respondent No.2 cannot be quashed on the ground that it was lodged by
way of counter-blast.
11. So far contention of applicants that since they were residing in Indore and
respondent No.2 was residing along with her husband in Mumbai therefore there
was no occasion for them to commit any kind of cruelty is concerned, the same is
a defence which can be proved by them by leading evidence. Admittedly,
applicants are parents-in-law of respondent No.2. It is not their case that they
were not on talking terms and respondent No.2 and her husband had never visited
their house. There are specific allegations of demand of dowry and cruelty and,
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ultimately, according to respondent No.2 she was ousted by applicants and her
husband on 27.11.2019 on account of non-fulfillment of demand of dowry.
12. Compelling a married woman to live in her parental home on account of
non fulfillment of demand of dowry by itself is a cruelty.
The Supreme Court in the case of Rupali Devi v. State of U.P., reported
in (2019) 5 SCC 384 has held as under:-
"14. "Cruelty" which is the crux of the offence under
Section 498-A IPC is defined in Black's Law
Dictionary to mean "the intentional and malicious
infliction of mental or physical suffering on a living
creature, esp. a human; abusive treatment; outrage
(abuse, inhuman treatment, indignity)". Cruelty can be
both physical or mental cruelty. The impact on the
mental health of the wife by overt acts on the part of the
husband or his relatives; the mental stress and trauma of
being driven away from the matrimonial home and her
helplessness to go back to the same home for fear of
being ill-treated are aspects that cannot be ignored
while understanding the meaning of the expression
"cruelty" appearing in Section 498-A of the Penal Code.
The emotional distress or psychological effect on the
wife, if not the physical injury, is bound to continue to
traumatise the wife even after she leaves the
matrimonial home and takes shelter at the parental
home. Even if the acts of physical cruelty committed in
the matrimonial house may have ceased and such acts
do not occur at the parental home, there can be no doubt
that the mental trauma and the psychological distress
caused by the acts of the husband including verbal
exchanges, if any, that had compelled the wife to leave
the matrimonial home and take shelter with her parents
would continue to persist at the parental home. Mental
cruelty borne out of physical cruelty or abusive and
humiliating verbal exchanges would continue in the
parental home even though there may not be any overt
act of physical cruelty at such place."
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This Court in the case of Amar Singh vs. Smt. Vimla decided on
22.06.2021 in Criminal Revision No.2376/2020 (Gwalior Bench) has held
that compelling a married woman to live in her parental home amounts to
cruelty.
13. No other argument is advanced by counsel for applicants.
14. Considering the totality of facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is
of considered opinion that no case is made out warranting interference.
15. Application fails and is hereby dismissed.
(G.S. Ahluwalia)
Judge
(and)
