Vijay Ram vs The State Of M.P. Thru Collector
2025 Latest Caselaw 4824 MP

Madhya Pradesh High Court

Vijay Ram vs The State Of M.P. Thru Collector on 27 February, 2025

Author: Milind Ramesh Phadke

Bench: Milind Ramesh Phadke

                                     1

           IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
                                AT G WA L I O R
                                      BEFORE
      HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE MILIND RAMESH PHADKE
                          Writ Petition No.255 of 2006
                               VIJAY RAM & OTHERS
                                           Vs.
                             STATE OF M.P. & OTHERS


APPERANCE
       Shri J.S. Kaurav - Advocate for the petitioner.
       Shri M.S. Jadon - Government Advocate for the State.
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        Reserved on                           :      29/01/2025
        Delivered on                          :      27/2/2025
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        Ther petition having been heard and reserved for orders, coming
on for pronouncement ther day, the Hon'ble Shri Justice Milind
Ramesh Phadke pronounced/passed the following:
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                                        ORDER

The present petition, under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, has been filed by the petitioner seeking following reliefs:

"(i) Writ of Mandamus may kindly be issued against the respondents commanding them and restraining them not to proceed in respect of taking possession of the land from the petitioners because the Principal Act had abated and further Mandamus may kindly be issued against the respondents restraining and commanding not to interfere in the peaceful possession of the land of

the petitioner and further it be ordered commanding the respondents not to take steps beyond the Statutory provisions and otherwise of the Statute;

(ii) Writ of Certiorari may kindly be issued against the respondents ordering to make correction in the revenue papers deleting the entry of ceiling of land and any other writ, order or direction may kindly be issued for the relief as mentioned hereinabove; and

(iii) Any just, proper, adequate and suitable remedy found in favour of the petitioners may kindly be granted."

2. Brief facts of the case are that Budhiabai, W/o Nakturam was the Bhoomiswami of the agricultural land bearing Survey No.47, ad- measuring 1.849 hectares situated at Village Ramtapura, Gwalior. In the year 1991, partition took place between Ramcharan, Lekhram, Ganga, Birkha, Ramkishan, Vijayram and Ghasiram, who got 1/8th share of the said land. Budhiabai also got 1/8th share. The said land in question for past few decades was used for agricultural purpose. The proceedings under Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 were initiated and order dated 18.01.1983 was passed and 355.15 square meter of land was declared as surplus land. Thereafter, the proceedings under Section 10(1) of Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 were initiated and the matter was fixed for further proceedings under Section 10(3) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. Aggrieved by the determination of the land, Budhiabai and Vijayram had filed an appeal

before the Additional Commissioner, Division Gwalior, Gwalior. The said appeal was dismissed vide order dated 29.06.1991, which was never challenged. During the lifetime of Budhiabai, she executed a Will dated 30.09.1978 in favour of Mohanlal and Laxmi Narayan, Ss/o Vijayram and had bequeathed the property in their favour.

3. After passing of the order dated 29.06.1991, a Civil Suit No.6-A of 2004 (Old No.111-A of 1994) was filed by Budhiabai and Vijayram on the ground that master plan scheme came into force in the year 1980 and no master plan was in force when the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 came into force, thus, the land in question cannot be subjected to the provisions of the Act of 1976.

4. During pendency of the suit, an application under Order 23 Rule 1 of CPC was filed by the petitioners for withdrawal of the suit with permission to file fresh on the ground that the Act of 1976 stood repealed by the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 which has been enforcible in the State of Madhya Pradesh w.e.f. 17.02.2000. Vide order dated 08.07.2024, the learned trial Court had allowed the said application with a permission to withdraw the suit with liberty to challenge the same before appropriate Forum.

5. When the petitioners had filed an application for issuance of certified copy of Khasra i.e. Revenue records, the authority concerned issued certified copy of the Khasra on 06.12.2005, in which they found the entry of the land ad-measuring 0.167 hectares as urban land. At that time, the petitioners came to know that no correction had been made by the authority, rather they are trying to take possession of the land in question. Aggrieved by the aforesaid act of the authority, the present petition has been filed.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued before this Court that the petitioner has in fact claimed that in the year 1999 the Act of 1976 stood repealed by the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 which has been enforcible in the State of Madhya Pradesh w.e.f. 17.02.2000 and Section 4 of this Repeal Act provides that all the proceedings relating to any order made by before the core made under the Amending Act of 1976 pending immediately before the commencement of this Principal Act, before any Court, Tribunal or other Authority shall abate, provided that Section 4 would not apply to the proceedings relating to Sections 11, 12, 13 and 14 of the Principal Act so far as such proceedings are relatable to the land, possession of which has been taken over by the State Government and in the present case, as possession has not been taken over by the State Government nor its Authority, under the circumstance, the proceedings pending before the Competent Authority under the Principal Act thus stood abated and all the orders passed by the Competent Authority under Act of 1976 therefore, were liable to be quashed.

7. It was further submitted that no proceedings under Section 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act of 1976 were initiated and the possession of the land was not taken over as per law and, therefore, the proceedings stood abated as per Section 4 of the Repeal Act, 1999. The possession of the land is still with the petitioners and for all those reasons, they are entitled for continuation on thier possession and for recording thier name as Bhumiswami.

8. Per contra, Shri M.S. Jadon, learned Government Advocate for the State has submitted before this Court that the present petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches in filing the

same, as the proceedings of the matter were initiated in the year 1983.

9. While placing relianace on the judgment of this Court in the matter of Gokul Prasad Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and another reported in 2003 (2) M.P.L.J. 270, learned Govt. Advocate for the State has submitted that when the land is vested in the State and possession was taken, repeal of the principal Act will not affect the land so vested in the State as no proceedings was pending. It was, thus, submitted that the present petition be dismissed with costs.

10. Heard counsel for the parties and perused the record.

11. It is not in dispute that the notification under Sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the Act of 1976 was issued. Section 10 of the Act of 1976 is being reproduced as under:-

"10. Acquisition of vacant land in excess of ceiling limit :- (1) As soon as may be after the service of the statement under section 9 on the person concerned, the competent authority shall cause a notification giving the particulars of the vacant land held by such person in excess of the ceiling limit and stating that:-

(i) such vacant land is to be acquired by the concerned State Government; and

(ii) the claims of all persons interested in such vacant land may be made by them personally or by their agents giving particulars of the nature of their interests in such land, to be published for the information of the general public in the

Official Gazette of the State concerned and in such other manner as may be prescribed.

After considering the claims of the persons interested in the vacant land, made to the competent authority in pursuance of the notification published under subsection (1), the competent authority shall determine the nature and extent of such claims and pass such orders as it deems fit.

(3) At any time after the publication of the notification under sub-section (1), the competent authority may, by notification published in the Official Gazette of the State concerned, declare that the excess vacant land referred to in the notification published under sub-section (1) shall, with effect from such date as may be specified in the declaration, be deemed to have been acquired by the State Government and upon the publication of such declaration, such land shall be deemed to have vested absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances with effect from the date so specified.

(4) During the period commencing on the date of publication of the notification under sub-section (1) and ending with the date specified in the declaration made under sub-section (3), (i) no

person shall transfer by way of sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise any excess vacant land (including any part thereof) specified in the notification aforesaid and any such transfer made in contravention of this provision shall be deemed to be null and void; and (ii) no person shall alter or cause to be altered the use of such excess vacant land.

(5) Where any vacant land is vested in the State Government under sub-section (3), the competent authority may, by notice in writing, order any person who may be in possession of it to surrender or deliver possession thereof to the State Government or to any person duly authorised by the State Government in this behalf within thirty days of the service of the notice.

(6) If any person refuses or fails to comply with an order made under sub-section (5), the competent authority may take possession of the vacant land or cause it to be given to the concerned State Government or to any person duly authorised by such State Government in this behalf and may for that purpose use such force as may be necessary.

Explanation. In this section, in sub-section (1) of section 11 and in sections 14 and 23, "State Government", in relation to- (a) any vacant land

owned by the Central Government, means the Central Government; (b) any vacant land owned by any State Government and situated in the Union territory or within the local limits of a cantonment declared as such under section 3 of the Cantonments Act, 1924 (2 of 1924), means that State Government."

12. A perusal of sub-section (3) of Section 10 shows that after publication of the notification under sub-section (1) of Section 10 in the official Gazette, the excess vacant land referred to in the notification, with effect from such date as may be specified in the declaration, be deemed to have been acquired by the State Government and such land shall be deemed to have vested absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances with effect from the date so specified.

13. Sections 3 and 4 of the Repeal Act, 1999 are being reproduced as under:- "

3. Saving. - (1) The repeal of the principal Act shall not affect -

(a) the vesting of any vacant land under sub-section (3) of section 10, possession of which has been taken over by the State Government or any person duly authorised by the State Government in this behalf or by the competent authority;

(b) the validity of any order granting exemption under sub-section (1) of section 20 or any action taken

thereunder, notwithstanding any judgment of any Court to the contrary;

(c) any payment made to the State Government as a condition for granting exemption under sub-section (1) of section 20.

(2) Where -

(a) any land is deemed to have vested in the State Government under sub-section (3) of section 10 of the principal Act but possession of which has not been taken over by the State Government or any person duly authorised by the State Government in this behalf or by the competent authority; and

(b) any amount has been paid by the State Government with respect to such land then, such land shall not be restored unless the amount paid, if any, has been refunded to the State Government."

14. It is clear from the reading of Section 3 which contains savings clause that the repeal of the principal Act shall not affect the vesting of any vacant land under sub-section (3) of section 10, possession of which has been taken over by the State Government or any person duly authorized by the State Government in this behalf or by the competent authority and where any land is deemed to have vested in the State Government under sub-section (3) of section 10 of the principal Act but

possession of which has not been taken over by the State Government or any person duly authorised by the State Government in this behalf and if amount has been paid by the State Government with respect to such land, the such land shall not be restored unless the amount paid, if any, has been refunded to the State Government.

15. In this case, it is not a case of the petitioner that the amount has been refunded to the State Government and even otherwise once the possession of the State is reflected in revenue papers presumption enumerates in favour of the State that it has been taken and vesting as per averment made by the petitioner in the petition has already taken place. Petitioner has not averred that he has applied for restoration on payment of the amount received by him nor it is the pleading that compensation has not been disbursed. In the instant case, no proceedings are pending. The order was passed in the year 1983 and it is not the averment that any proceedings are pending at present, as only those proceedings abate by virtue of section 4 which are pending on the date on which the Repeal Act came into force. On the conjoint reading of sections 3 and 4, it is clear that when no proceedings were pending at the time of repeal of the Principal Act, it cannot be said that the order passed in the year 1988 abates.

16. Herein case, it is clear that no proceedings were pending as on the date on which the Repeal Act, 1999 came into force. The possession was taken over by the State. There is a statutory presumption under Section 117 of the Code of 1959 of correctness of entries made under Chapter IX of the Code of 1959. After taking over the possession, name of the holder was deleted and the name of the State Government was recorded as owner and the same continued without any objection. Under

such circumstances, the proceedings which stood concluded much before came into force of the Repeal Act, 1999, cannot be reopened under the guise of the Repeal Act, 1999 even otherwise.

17. This Court in the matter of Gokul Prasad Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (supra) has held that when the land is vested in the State and possession was taken, repeal of the principal Act will not affect the land so vested in the State as no proceeding was pending.

18. The Constitutional Bench of Supreme Court in the case of Indore Development Authority Vs. Manoharlal and others, reported in (2020) 8 SCC 129 has held as under :-

"148. A similar view has been taken in Market Committee v. 25 W.P. No.4/2000 Krishan Murari [Market Committee v. Krishan Murari, (1996) 1 SCC 311] and PuttuLal v. State of U.P. [PuttuLal v. State of U.P., (1996) 3 SCC 99] The concept of "vesting" was also considered in Fruit & Vegetable Merchants Union v. Delhi Improvement Trust [Fruit & Vegetable Merchants Union v. Delhi Improvement Trust, AIR 1957 SC 344 : 1957 SCR 1] . Once vesting takes place, and is with possession, after which a person who remains in possession is only a trespasser, not in rightful possession and vesting contemplates absolute title, possession in the State. This Court observed thus : (Fruit & Vegetable Merchants Union case [Fruit & Vegetable Merchants Union v. Delhi Improvement Trust, AIR 1957 SC 344 :

1957 SCR 1] , AIR p. 353, para 19)

"19. That the word "vest" is a word of variable import is shown by provisions of Indian statutes also. For example, Section 56 of the Provincial Insolvency Act (5 of 1920) empowers the court at the time of the making of the order of adjudication or thereafter to appoint a receiver for the property of the insolvent and further provides that 'such property shall thereupon vest in such receiver'. The property vests in the receiver for the purpose of administering the estate of the insolvent for the payment of his debts after realising his assets. The property of the insolvent vests in the receiver not for all purposes but only for the purpose of the Insolvency Act and the receiver has no interest of his own in the property. On the other hand, Sections 16 and 17 of the Land Acquisition Act (1 of 1894), provide that the property so acquired, upon the happening of certain events, shall 'vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances'. In the cases contemplated by Sections 16 and 17 the property acquired becomes the property of Government without any conditions or limitations either as to title or possession. The legislature has made it clear that the vesting of the property is not for any limited purpose or limited duration. It would thus appear

that the word "vest" has not got a fixed connotation meaning in all cases that the property is owned by the person or the authority in whom it vests. It may vest in title, or it may vest in possession, or it may vest in a limited sense, as indicated in the context in which it may have been used in a particular piece of legislation. The provisions of the Improvement Act, particularly Sections 45 to 49 and 54 and 54-A when they speak of a certain building or street or square or other land vesting in a municipality or other local body or in a trust, do not necessarily mean that ownership has passed to any of them."

19. Thus, it is clear that once vesting takes place and is with possession, after which a person who is in possession, is only a trespasser and not in rightful possession.

20. It is well established principle of law that any interpretation which may lead to absurdity should be avoided. The Supreme Court in the case of Corporation Bank v. Saraswati Abharansala, reported in (2009) 1 SCC 540 has held as under :

"24. The statute furthermore, it is trite, should be read in a manner so as to do justice to the parties. If it is to be held, without there being any statutory provision that those who have deposited the amount in time would be put to a disadvantageous position and those who were defaulters would be better placed, the same would

give rise to an absurdity. Construction of the statute which leads to confusion must be avoided."

21. The Supreme Court in the case of American Home Products Corporation. vs. Mac Laboratories (P) Ltd., reported in (1986) 1 SCC 465 has held as under:

"66...........It is a well-known principle of interpretation of statutes that a construction should not be put upon a statutory provision which would lead to manifest absurdity or futility, palpable injustice, or absurd inconvenience or anomaly (see: M. Pentiah v.

MuddalaVeeramallappa). The Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court saw the absurdity, inconvenience and hardship resulting from the construction which was placed by it upon Section 48(2), as is shown by the passages from its judgment reproduced earlier..........."

22. Thus, it is clear that if the obvious intention of the statute gives rise to obstacles in implementation, the court must do its best to find ways of overcoming those obstacles, so as to avoid absurd results. It is a well-settled principle of interpretation of statutes that a construction should not be put on a statutory provision which would lead to manifest absurdity, futility, palpable injustice and absurd inconvenience or anomaly.

23. The Supreme Court in the matter of Land & Building Department through Secretary and Another Vs. Attro Devi and

others, decided by judgment dated 11.04.2023 decided in Civil Appeal No.2749/2023 has also held that the vesting of land with the State is with possession. Any person retaining the possession thereafter has to be treated trespasser. When large chunk of land is acquired, the State is not supposed to put some person or police force to retain the possession and start cultivating on the land till it is utilized. The Government is also not supposed to start residing or physically occupying the same once process of the acquisition is complete. If after the process of acquisition is complete and land vest in the State free from all encumbrances with possession, any person retaining the land or any re-entry made by any person is nothing else but trespass on the State land. Thus, once the land has vested in the State Government, then the possession of a person would be that of an encroacher only and he cannot claim adverse possession. Such person cannot be treated as a person in rightful possession.

24. Thus, once the land has vested in the State Government, then the possession of a person would be that of an encroacher only and he cannot claim adverse possession. Such person cannot be treated as a person in rightful possession.

25. For the reasons mentioned above, this Court is of the considered opinion, that no case is made out warranting interference. Accordingly, the petition fails and is hereby dismissed.

(Milind Ramesh Phadke) Judge

pwn* PAWAN DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH BENCH GWALIOR, ou=HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH BENCH GWALIOR, 2.5.4.20=b864d1ab4ace2215bfcf3ab301c34

KUMAR d631287f1b1cdd90b4a49f265f02d9d593f, postalCode=474001, st=Madhya Pradesh, serialNumber=61B9D129971D2EA4FD4455E D49EA436EA65E26164BEEED89153191C56E 98CE21, cn=PAWAN KUMAR Date: 2025.02.27 16:08:02 +05'30'