Madhya Pradesh High Court
Jagat Singh vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 24 February, 2025
Author: Milind Ramesh Phadke
Bench: Milind Ramesh Phadke
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE MILIND RAMESH PHADKE
ON THE 24th OF FEBRUARY, 2025
WRIT PETITION No. 5576 of 2025
JAGAT SINGH AND OTHERS
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Tara Chandra Narvaria - Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Deepak Khot - G.A. for the respondent/State.
ORDER
The present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is
preferred against the order dated 29.03.2023 passed in Revision No.26/22/23
whereby while hearing revision against the order 07.03.2022 passed in first
appeal No.82/21-22 as well as order dated 30.09.1997 passed in case
No.253/96-97/A-19 whereby land bearing survey No.47/2/3 admeasuring
1.00 hectare was settled in favour of respondents, were challenged but the
revision was dismissed holding it to be time-barred from the date of the order
passed in appeal i.e. 07.03.2022.
2. At the outset, learned counsel for the State appearing on the
advance copy while referring to application u/S.5 of Limitation Act filed
along with revision has submitted that delay for filing the present revision
has been reckoned from the date of passing of the order by the Appellate
Authority i.e. 07.03.2022, which was dismissed on the ground of
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maintainability as well as delay and merits and as no cause for delay in
preferring the present revision from the date of the original order of
settlement dated 30.09.1997 was explained, the very revision in the wake of
huge delay of more than 24 years in the absence of any explanation thereto
could have been dismissed which though mentioning the delay of five
months from the date of passing of appellate order has been dismissed. Thus,
no interference is required in the matter.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner, on the other hand, submits that in
the revision alongwith the order dated 07.03.2022, the original order of
settlement dated 30.09.1997 has also been challenged. As the said order was
passed on the basis of misrepresentation and fraud and there is no entry with
regard to said order in the revenue records, the delay in preferring the
revision ought to have been condoned and the matter be remitted back to be
heard on its own merits but not doing so, the learned Revisional Authority
had erred in dismissing the revision on the point of limitation which needs to
be set aside.
4. Heard counsel for the parties and perused the record.
5. Law as regards scope and jurisdiction of the concerned Court in the
matter of condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is well
settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court and the various High Courts.
6. In the case of Ramlal Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. AIR 1962 SC 361,
Hon. Supreme Court in para 7 has held as under:-
"7. In construing Section 5 (of the Limitation Act) it is relevant to
bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration
is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for
making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-
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holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other
words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the
decree-holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to
treat the decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has
accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be light-
heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be
ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay in shown
discretion is given to the court to condone delay and admit the
appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the
court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf
should be exercised to advance substantial justice."
7. Hon. Supreme Court in the case of P.K. Ramachandran Vs. State of
Kerala, (1997) 7 SCC 556, has held in para 6 as under:-
"6. Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it
has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes
and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on
equitable grounds."
8. As regards meaning, scope and rationale of the law of limitation, the
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil (Dead) by Lrs. Vs.
Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project and another, (2008) 17 SCC
448 has held as under:
"26. Basically the laws of Limitation are founded on public policy.
In Halsbury's Laws of England,4th Ed., Vol.28,p.266,para 605, the
policy of the Limitation Acts is laid down as follows:
"605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.- The courts have expressed at
least three different reasons supporting the existence of statutes of
limitation, namely,(i) that long dormant claims have more of
cruelty than justice in them, (ii) that a defendant might have lost
the evidence to dispute the stated claim, (iii) that persons with
good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable
diligence."
27. Statutes of limitation are sometimes described as 'statutes of
peace'. An unlimited and perpetual threat of limitation creates
insecurity and uncertainty; some kind of limitation is essential for
public order. This court in Rajender Singh and others. vs. Santa
Singh and orthers [(1973) 2 SCC 705] has observed : (SCC p.712,
para 18) "18. The object of law of Limitation is to prevent
disturbance and deprivation of what may have been acquired in
equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost
by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches".
28. In Motichand Vs. Munshi [AIR 1970 SC 898], this court
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observed that this principle is based on the maxim"interest
reipublicae ut sit finis litium, that is, the interest of the State
requires that there should be end to litigation but at the same time
law of Limitation are a means to ensuring private justice
suppressing fraud and perjury, quickening diligence and
preventing oppression.
29. It needs no restatement at our hands that the object for fixing
time limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a life span
for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are
meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but
avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his jurisprudence
states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not
of the sleepy."
9. While dealing with the scope of jurisdiction under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, as regards condonation of delay, the Hon'ble Apex Court in
the case of Lanka Venkateshwarlu (dead) by Lrs Vs. State of Andra Pradesh
and others, (2011) 4 SCC 363 has observed as under:
"19. We have considered the submissions made by the learned
counsel. At the outset, it needs to be stated that generally
speaking, the courts in this country, including this Court, adopt a
liberal approach in considering the application for condonation of
delay on the ground of sufficient cause under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act. This principle is well settled and has been set out
succinctly in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag &
Ors. Vs. Katiji & Ors. (1987) 2 SCC 107.
23. The concepts of liberal approach and reasonableness in
exercise of the discretion by the Courts in condoning delay, have
been again stated by this Court in the case of Balwant Singh Vs.
Jagdish Singh, (2010) 8 SCC 685, as follows:-
"25. We may state that even if the term "sufficient cause" has to
receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the
concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party
concerned. The purpose of introducing liberal construction
normally is to introduce the concept of "reasonableness" as it is
understood in its general connotation."
26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite
consequences on the right and obligation of party to arise. These
principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately
depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a
valuable right has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the
failure of the other party to explain the delay by
showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be
unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the
applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of
negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done
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to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be
achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in
implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to
deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in
law as a result of his acting vigilantly."
28. We are at a loss to fathom any logic or rationale, which could
have impelled the High Court to condone the delay after holding
the same to be unjustifiable. The concepts such as "liberal
approach", "justice oriented approach", "substantial justice" can
not be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation.
Especially, in cases where the Court concludes that there is no
justification for the delay. In our opinion, the approach adopted by
the High Court tends to show the absence of judicial balance and
restraint, which a Judge is required to maintain whilst adjudicating
any lis between the parties. We are rather pained to notice that in
this case, not being satisfied with the use of mere intemperate
language, the High Court resorted to blatant sarcasms.
29. The use of unduly strong intemperate or extravagant language
in a judgment has been repeatedly disapproved by this Court in a
number of cases. Whilst considering applications for condonation
of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Courts do not
enjoy unlimited and unbridled discretionary powers. All
discretionary powers, especially judicial powers, have to be
exercised within reasonable bounds, known to the law. The
discretion has to be exercised in a systematic manner informed by
reason. Whims or fancies; prejudices or predilections can not and
should not form the basis of exercising discretionary powers. "
10. Hon. Supreme Court in a decision Maniben Devraj Shah Vs.
Municipal Corporation of Brihan, Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157 has held in
para 24 as under:-
"24. What colour the expression "sufficient cause" would get in
the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona
fide nature of the explanation. If the Court finds that there has
been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause
shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone
the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the
applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in
prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of
discretion not to condone the delay."
11. In view of the aforesaid authoritative pronouncements of law as
regards object, scope, extent, limitation and the discretion power to be
exercised under Section 5 of the Limitation Act laid down by the Hon'ble
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Apex Court, in the opinion of this Court, no illegality or jurisdictional error
is crept in the orders impugned warranting interference by this Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
12. Writ petition sans merit and is hereby dismissed.
(MILIND RAMESH PHADKE)
JUDGE
ojha
