[Cites 15, Cited by 0]
Madhya Pradesh High Court
Devendra Joshi Unsound Mind Through ... vs Cholamandalam M.S. General Insurance ... on 3 December, 2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT INDORE
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE PAVAN KUMAR DWIVEDI
ON THE 3 rd OF DECEMBER, 2025
MISC. APPEAL No. 5965 of 2019
DEVENDRA JOSHI UNSOUND MIND THROUGH MOTHER SMT.
JAYSHREE
Versus
CHOLAMANDALAM M.S. GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. AND
OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Pravin Kumar Bhatt, Advocate with Shri Anshul Shrivastava,
learned counsel for the appellant.
Shri Manoj Jain, learned counsel for the respondent / Insurance
Company.
WITH
MISC. APPEAL No. 5967 of 2019
SMT. ANITA AND OTHERS
Versus
CHOLAMANDALAM M.S. GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. AND
OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Pravin Kumar Bhatt, Advocate with Shri Anshul Shrivastava, learned counsel
for the appellants.
Shri Manoj Jain, learned counsel for the respondent / Insurance Company.
ORDER
Both these Misc. Appeals have been filed under Section 173 of Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988 being aggrieved by the common award dated 06.02.2019
passed by the 12th Additional District Judge, Indore (M.P.) in Claim Case
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Nos.163/2016 and 430/2016.
1.1 M.A. No.5965/2019 has been filed by Devendra through his
mother as he is in coma and M.A. No.5967/2019 has been filed by the legal
heirs of Ashutosh.
1.2 The appeals call into question the findings of the Claims Tribunal,
which held that the involvement of the offending insured vehicle in the
accident resulting in the death of Ashutosh Pathak and injuries leading to
Devendra's coma was not proved.
2. The facts relevant to the present case are that on 14.05.2010 at
around 11:30 PM, Ashutosh and Devendra were going on a motorcycle
bearing registration number MP-13-JF-3351 on Nanak Nagar, Ring Road on
their way to a Dhaba for dinner. When they reached near Nanak Nagar, a
tractor-tanker bearing registration number MP-09-HF-5208 was found
standing on the wrong side of the road without any signage or indicators. As
a result, the motorcycle on which Ashutosh and Devendra were riding
rammed into the stationary vehicle, causing grievous injuries to both of
them. Ashutosh was admitted to the Civil Hospital, Ujjain and Devendra was
rushed to Bombay Hospital, Indore. Ashutosh succumbed to the injuries
sustained by him and Devendra despite prolonged treatment, could not fully
recover. The death of Ashutosh occurred on 30.06.2010. Devendra received
treatment at Choithram Hosptial from 14.05.2010 to 05.06.2010 at Bombay
Hospital from 05.06.2010 to 05.07.2010 and again from 29.08.2010 to
30.08.2010 under the care of Dr.Sachin Adhikari, Dr.Atul Tapadia and
Dr.Rajnish Neuro Surgeon. Devendra's treatment may continue in future as
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well as he has sustained permanent disability due to the accident.
2.1 At the time of the accident, the deceased Ashutosh was 21 years of
age and was giving tuition to students. He had completed the first semester of
MBA. Devendra was 28 years of age had completed BCA and was preparing
for MBA. He had also cleared the MET examination.
2.2 Devendra through next friend his mother and the legal
representatives of Ashutosh, filed separate claim petitions as stated above
under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act claiming compensation for the
death of Ashutosh and the permanent disability caused to Devendra in the
said accident.
2.3 The Claims Tribunal after recording the evidence, considered the
question of the involvement of the insured vehicle in the accident. Upon
discussing the evidence on record, the Claims Tribunal concluded in para 15
that the testimony of the eye witness Abhishek Chaddha (AW-4) did not
inspire confidence in view of the responses elicited from him during cross
examination. Consequently, the Claims Tribunal having disbelieved the
claim that the insured vehicle was involved in the accident, rejected both
claim petitions. It is also noteworthy that while rejecting the claim on the
ground of lack of proof regarding the involvement of the insured vehicle, the
Claims Tribunal did not quantify the compensation in either case.
3. Challenging this finding of the Claims Tribunal, learned counsel for
the appellants in both appeals submitted that the facts relied upon by the
Claims Tribunal were that the FIR was lodged on 11.08.2010, although the
accident occurred on 14.05.2010. On this basis, the Claims Tribunal was of
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the view that the delay in the registration of FIR created suspicion regarding
the claimant's version that the accident was caused by the insured vehicle.
Learned counsel pointed out that this conclusion was based on an incorrect
assumption namely that before 11.08.2010 no information regarding the
accident had been given which is contrary to the material available on record
before the Claims Tribunal. He highlighted that Ex. P-5, the MLC sent by
Choithram Hospital to Police Station Bhawarkua on 15.05.2010 i.e.
immediately after the accident (which occurred during the night of
14.05.2010), was very much on record.
3.1 He points out that in the said MLC, it is clearly mentioned that the
accident occurred with a standing vehicle at Nanak Nagar Road. He further
submits that the cross-examination of the eye witness Abhishek Chaddha
shows that there was nothing to discredit his testimony. He submits that the
said witness, in his examination-in-chief clearly stated that the deceased
Ashutosh and Devendra were riding a separate motorcycle and that he was
accompanying them on another motorcycle. He also stated that the insured
vehicle was standing without any signage because of which the motorcycle
of Ashutosh and Devendra rammed into it. In cross examination, nothing
emerged that could shake the version of the eye witness. He remained firm
and in fact stated in para 3 of his cross-examination that when the police
came to the hospital the next day, he informed them of the vehicle number.
He further stated that in para 5 of his cross examination that he inquired
about the status of the police investigation from the parents of Ashutosh,
who informed him that they had approached the police and were told that the
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investigation was ongoing.
3.2 Thus, it is his submission that his cross examination far from
weakening his testimony, actually supports the statements made in his
examination-in-chief. He further submits that although the Claims Tribunal
recorded a finding that the involvement of the insured vehicle was not
proved, it nevertheless held the occurrence of the accident to be established
as reflected in para 22 of the impugned award. Therefore, he submits that the
Tribunal has selectively believed certain parts of the deposition and contents
of the FIR, while disbelieving other parts, which is impermissible in law. He
accordingly submits that the impugned award be set aside and the
compensation be quantified in both the appeals.
4. Per contra, learned counsel for the Insurance Company submits that
in Ex. P-5, the MLC sent by Choithram Hospital, the term "standing truck"
has been used, whereas the insured vehicle is a tanker and not a truck, which
creates suspicion regarding the involvement of the insured vehicle. He
further points out that in Exs. P-5 and P-14, the doctor has recorded that the
deceased was under the influence of alcohol. According to him, the real
cause of the accident was that the rider of the motorcycle Ashutosh was
intoxicated and this intoxication led to the accident. He further submits that
none of the documents mentioned the vehicle number until the registration of
the FIR even though the eye-witness was present in the hospital and, as per
the testimony of PW-4 had met the police on the next day itself. He therefore
submits that the conclusions drawn by the Claims Tribunal are correct.
5. Heard learned counsel for the respective parties and perused the
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record.
6. A perusal of the Ex. P-5, the MLC shows the following
endorsement: "While going on motorcycle at Nanak Nagar, Khandwa Road,
hit with standing truck at about 11:30 p.m. in the midnight." This report was
sent by Choithram Hospital to Police Station Bhawarkua on 15.05.2010,
whereas the accident had occurred on the night of 14.05.2010. Thus, it is
clear that prompt intimation of the accident was given, and the description
therein matches the version given by the eye-witness, Abhishek Chaddha,
inasmuch as it refers to a standing vehicle. The contention of the learned
counsel for the Insurance Company that the MLC mentions a "truck" and not
a "tanker" does not hold much substance, considering the fact that, as per the
claimants' version, the vehicle was standing with its front portion on the road
and its rear portion off the road, which would give the impression of a truck
when viewed only from the front.
7. Considering the prompt information and the statement of the eye-
witness particularly paras 3 and 5 of his cross-examination, it is evident that
he informed the police about the vehicle on the very next day i.e. 15.05.2010.
He clearly stated in para 3 of his cross-examination that he told the police
vehicle number when they came to the hospital the next day. In para 5, he
further stated that he inquired about the progress of the investigation from
the parents of Ashutosh, who informed him that they had contacted the police
and were told that the investigation was underway. It is thus evident that both
the eye-witness and the parents of the deceased Ashutosh were actively
pursuing the matter and the information about the vehicle number was
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promptly provided. It was for the Insurance Company to produce the
investigating officer as a witness and have him cross-examined to controvert
the statements of the eye-witness and of AW-1, the father of the deceased.
This, however, was not done. It must be borne in mind that the degree of
proof required in motor accident claims under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988,
is the preponderance of probability and not proof beyond reasonable doubt.
8. This Court while considering this issue in M.A. No.6776/2023
discussed various decisions in detail in para 6, which reads as under :
"6. Before adverting to the facts of the present case, it would
be profitable to refer the law regarding the degree of proof
required in a claim case. The Division Bench of this court in
the case of Mohd. Nasir vs. Angad Prasad reported in 2003
(4) MPLJ 95 (D.B.) has held in para 3 as under :
"3. Through this appeal, findings of the Claims Tribunal have
been challenged. Substance of evidence clearly points out
that the claimant was travelling by tourist bus No. MP 09-
S/0125 from Sagar to Bhopal. The Claimant states that it was
being driven rashly and negligently, therefore, caused
accident. He is corroborated by Mahendra Kumar (AW 2),
co-passenger in this bus, sitting by side of the driver. Read
carefully, he states that the bus was being driven rashly and
negligently at a speed of 60/70 kms. per hour. He further says
that there was collision between two vehicles. He also states
that the truck was being driven as a normal speed. Therefore,
it can be understood clearly from the evidence what he
intends to say is that the bus was being driven rashly and
negligently at a high speed of 60/70 kms. per hour and the
accident took place, otherwise the truck was moving at a
normal speed. The truck driven, who could say otherwise,
has not appeared in evidence. Therefore, it can be concluded
that he had no defence against the allegation of rash and
negligent driving of the bus. Two FIRs were lodged by the
drivers against each other, namely, 78/93 (Criminal Case No.
221/93) and 79/93 (Criminal Case No. 224/93). The Claims
Tribunal has not analysed and appreciated the evidence in
correct perspectives. It seems to be under erroneous belief
that the case has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt,
principle applicable in criminal trials forgetting that claim
cases are to be proved and decided on preponderance of
probabilities and strict rules of evidence are not applicable to
trial of claim cases. Therefore, finding is set aside and it is
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held that driver of bus No. MP 09-S/0125 was responsible for
committing the accident." (Emphasis supplied)
6.1 Again another Division Bench of this Court in the case of
Manful vs. Mehmood reported in 2003 (4) MPLJ 174 (D.B.)
held in para 19 as under :
"19. As has already been held by long catena of cases that in
the case of motor accident strict rule of evidence is not
applicable. It is to be established prima facie that accident
had taken place with a motor vehicle and out of the use of
said motor vehicle, either injury has been caused, or, it had
resulted into death of a victim. If this much is established by
the claimants, then, nothing more is required to be proved.
The underlying purpose of this is, that innocent victims of
road accidents should not suffer for want of strict proof of
accident and drivers and owners do not go scot-free on
account of this. If some doubt or obscurity is there, then,
benefit should accrue to the victims. In the case in hand, it
has been quite successfully established that it was aforesaid
Tanker only, which, had caused the accident on account of its
rash and negligent driving, thus, cutting short life of a young
Army Officer. Thus, it would be fairly reasonable to infer the
culpability by the driver, in the sequence of events mentioned
above."
6.2 The Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the
dispute regarding proof of evidence in an accident in the case
of N.K.V. Bros (P) Ltd. vs. M. Karumai Ammal and Others
reported in (1980) 3 SCC 457 has held in para 3 as under :
" 3 . Road accidents are one of the top killers in our country,
specially when truck and bus drivers operate nocturnally.
This proverbial recklessness often persuades the courts, as
has been observed by us earlier in other cases, to draw an
initial presumption in several cases based on the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur. Accidents Tribunals must take special care
to see that innocent victims do not suffer and drivers and
owners do not escape liability merely because of some doubt
here or some obscurity there. Save in plain cases, culpability
must be inferred from the circumstances where it is fairly
reasonable. The court should not succumb to niceties,
technicalities and mystic maybes. We are emphasizing this
aspect because we are often distressed by transport operators
getting away with it thanks to judicial laxity, despite the fact
that they do not exercise sufficient disciplinary control over
the drivers in the matter of careful driving. The heavy
economic impact of culpable driving of public transport must
bring owner and driver to their responsibility to their
neighbour. Indeed, the State must seriously consider no-fault
liability by legislation. A second aspect which pains us is the
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inadequacy of the compensation or undue parsimony
practised by tribunals. We must remember that judicial
tribunals are State organs and Article 41 of the Constitution
lays the jurisprudential foundation for State relief against
accidental disablement of citizens. There is no justification
for niggardliness in compensation. A third factor which is
harrowing is the enormous delay in disposal of accident
cases resulting in compensation, even if awarded, being
postponed by several years. The States must appoint
sufficient number of tribunals and the High Courts should
insist upon quick disposals so that the trauma and tragedy
already sustained may not be
magnified by the injustice of delayed justice. Many States are
unjustly indifferent in this regard."
6.3 Again while considering the question of delay in lodging
the FIR, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ravi vs
Badrinarayan and Others reported in (2011) 4 SCC 693 has
held in para 17 to 19 as under : -
"17. It is well settled that delay in lodging the FIR cannot be
a ground to doubt the claimant's case. Knowing the Indian
conditions as they are, we cannot expect a common man to
first rush to the police station immediately after an accident.
Human nature and family responsibilities occupy the mind of
kith and kin to such an extent that they give more importance
to get the victim treated rather than to rush to the police
station. Under such circumstances, they are not expected to
act mechanically with promptitude in lodging the FIR with
the police. Delay in lodging the FIR thus, cannot be the
ground to deny justice to the victim.
18 . In cases of delay, the courts are required to examine the
evidence with a closer scrutiny and in doing so the contents
of the FIR should also be scrutinised more carefully. If the
court finds that there is no indication of fabrication or it has
not been concocted or engineered to implicate innocent
persons then, even if there is a delay in lodging the FIR, the
claim case cannot be dismissed merely on that ground. The
purpose of lodging the FIR in such type of cases is primarily
to intimate the police to initiate investigation of criminal
offences.
19. Lodging of FIR certainly proves the factum of accident
so that the victim is able to lodge a case for compensation but
delay in doing so cannot be the main ground for rejecting the
claim petition. In other words, although lodging of FIR is
vital in deciding motor accident claim cases, delay in lodging
the same should not be treated as fatal for such proceedings,
if claimant has been able to demonstrate satisfactory and
cogent reasons for it. There could be a variety of reasons in
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genuine cases for delayed lodgement of FIR. Unless kith and
kin of the victim are able to regain a certain level of
tranquillity of mind and are composed to lodge it, even if,
there is delay, the same deserves to be condoned. In such
circumstances, the authenticity of the FIR assumes much
more significance than delay in lodging thereof supported by
cogent reasons."
6.4 The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Asha Devi and
Others vs. Assistant Director, State Insurance and Provident
Fund Department and Others reported in 2021 ACJ 2679 has
held in para 4 as under :
"4. The deceased - Ummed Singh was an employee of the
Municipal Council. As per the appellant, the accident
occurred due to the negligent driving of the Tractor.
However, the driver of the tractor namely, Hariprakash was
not produced as a witness. He was the witness who could
depose in respect of the manner of accident and to prove that
he was not negligent in driving tractor. The doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur will come into play as the respondents have
failed to discharge onus on them to prove that the accident
was not on account of any negligent driving of the Tractor.
This Court in Shyam Sunder v. State of Rajasthan, (1974)
1 SCC 690 held that the maxim res ipsa loquitur is resorted to
when an accident is shown to have occurred and the cause of
the accident is primarily within the knowledge of the
defendant."
6.5 Recently the Honble Apex Court in the case of Geeta
Dubey & Ors. vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors.
reported in I (2025) ACC 74 (SC) in para 19 to 23 has held
as under :
"19. Except for a bare assertion that the vehicle has been
wrongly involved, the insurance company which has setup a
plea of collusion has done nothing to make good its case. We
find that the judgment of the High Court is wholly untenable.
We say so for the following reasons.
20. Firstly, it is well settled that in claim cases, in case the
accident is disputed or the involvement of the vehicle
concerned is put in issue, the claimant is only expected to
prove the same on a preponderance of probability and not
beyond reasonable doubt. [See Sajeena Ikhbal and Others, V.
Mini Babu George and Others, (2024) SCC OnLine SC
2883]. We also deem it appropriate to extract the following
paragraphs from the judgment of this Court in Bimla Devi &
Ors. V. Himachal Road Transport Corporation & Ors.,
(2009) 13 SCC 530. Repelling similar contentions raised
challenging the accident and the involvement of the vehicle
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in question, this Court held as follows: (Emphasis supplied)
"14. Some discrepancies in the evidence of the
claimant's witnesses might have occurred but the core
question before the Tribunal and consequently before
the High Court was as to whether the bus in question
was involved in the accident or not. For the purpose of
determining the said issue, the Court was required to
apply the principle underlying the burden of proof in
terms of the provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence
Act, 1872 as to whether a dead body wrapped in a
blanket had been found at the spot at such an early hour,
which was required to be proved by Respondents 2 and
15. In a situation of this nature, the Tribunal has rightly taken
a holistic view of the matter. It was necessary to be borne in
mind that strict proof of an accident caused by a particular
bus in a particular manner may not be possible to be done by
the claimants. The claimants were merely to establish their
case on the touchstone of preponderance of probability. The
standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not
have been applied. For the said purpose, the High Court
should have taken into consideration the respective stories set
forth by both the parties. (Emphasis supplied)
16. The judgment of the High Court to a great extent is based
on conjectures and surmises. While holding that the police
might have implicated the respondents, no reason has been
assigned in support thereof. No material brought on record
has been referred to for the said purpose."
21. Secondly, applying the test of preponderance of probability,
we find that the claimants have established their case that it was
the truck bearing registration no. MP-19-HA-1197 which was
involved in the accident with car bearing no. MP-19-CB-5879
wherein the deceased was travelling. We say so for the following
reasons:-
a. The accident occurred on 18.06.2018 and the FIR was
lodged on 21.06.2018 clearly giving the date, time and
the place where the accident happened. It was also
mentioned that it was an unknown truck which came
from behind in high speed and hit the car as at that point
the claimants were unaware of the number of the truck.
It referred to the injuries suffered by the deceased.
b. It is also beyond dispute that the husband of the
claimant no. 1, the deceased Chakradhar Dubey was
treated at Nagpur Arneja Institute of Cardiology Private
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Limited and he died on 28.06.2018.
c. The claimants have explained the delay by clearly
stating that after the death, they took time to regroup
themselves and set about investigating and collecting
information about the accident.
d. No sooner they obtained information, the claimant
no. 1 submitted an application to the Superintendent of
Police giving the list of persons including the name of
PW-2 Sonu Shukla who had witnessed the accident.
e. Based on the application, the investigation which was
originally closed was taken up again as per the order of
S.D.O.P., Maihar and after recording the statements of
witnesses, a charge-sheet was filed for offences under
Sections 279, 337, 338 & 304A, and the case is still
pending against respondent no. 2- the driver.
f. It is also on record that after the application was given
by claimant no. 1, a notice under Section 133 of the
Motor Vehicles Act was issued to the owner and the
vehicle was seized under Exh.P-16 by the police. It has
also come on record that the truck was thereafter given
on supurdnama by the court to the owner.
g. Sonu Shukla was examined as PW-2 and he has
clearly deposed that on 18.06.2018, when he was going
from Sarlanagar to Maihar with his colleague Kapil
Pandey when respondent no. 2, who was driving the
truck bearing registration no. MP-19-HA-1197 in a rash
and negligent manner, at around 08:15 PM hit the car
bearing registration no. MP-19-CB-5879 in which the
deceased was travelling. No doubt, the witness states
that he gave the information to claimant no. 1. The
witness also states that he had taken Chakradhar Dubey
to Civil Hospital, Maihar and on the same day informed
the claimant's family about the incident. However, he
states that he did not inform the police and went back
home. The witness admits that his statement was
recorded only on 20.04.2019. The witness, however,
does not mention that he mentioned the truck number to
the family when he conveyed the news of the accident.
The witness was cross-examined but he stood by his
statement. The witness also stated that on a specific
question in cross that the front part of the vehicle
bearing registration no. MP-19-HA-1197 was of white
colour and the body was of red colour and the vehicle
was of 12 wheels. The witness also stated that the truck
belonged to Sanjeev Kumar Vyasi and denied that the
said owner was his relative.
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h. The insurance company examined Op.W.-1 Raj
Kumar Kachhwah who admitted that till the date of his
deposition, no information or complaint was given to
the senior police officers stating that an attempt is being
made by the claimants and the owner and driver of the
vehicle to wrongly include the vehicle bearing No. MP-
19-HA-1197 in the case. The witness also admitted that
no steps to cancel the investigation of the police has
been taken and no enquiry has been done into the
veracity of the claim.
i. The MACT, on appreciation of the overall
conspectus, particularly impressed by the fact that the
insurance company did not lodge any complaint of
collusion and about the involvement of the truck in an
illegal manner concluded that it was truck bearing
registration no. MP-19-HA-1197 which hit the car
bearing no. MP-19-CB-5879 from behind.
22. Thirdly, the claimants having discharged the initial onus, if the
insurance company had a case that there was collusion between the
driver/owner of the truck and the claimants, it ought to discharge
that burden. It is candidly admitted by the witness Raj Kumar
Kachhwah that they had taken no steps in this regard. (Emphasis
supplied)
23. As held in Sajeena Ikhbal (supra) and Bimla Devi (supra), we
are convinced that on the principle of preponderance of
probability, the claimants have established the involvement of
vehicle bearing registration no. MP-19-HA-1197. The insurance
company having set up a specific plea of collusion has not
established the same. As was held in Bimla Devi (supra), here too,
we feel that there was no reason for the police to falsely implicate
the vehicle concerned in the matter and launch prosecution against
the driver. If the insurance company had suspected collusion, they
would have taken steps to file appropriate complaints including
moving the higher police authorities or the court to order an
investigation into the alleged wrongful involvement of the vehicle.
There is no case for the insurance company that the police officer
also colluded. The investigation by the police has resulted in
charge-sheet being filed."
9. Returning back to the facts of the present case in the back drop of
above position of law. A perusal of Exs. P-5 and P-14, however, shows that
the testimony of the witness Abhishek Chaddha not only proves the
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involvement of the insured vehicle in the accident, but also establishes that
the rider of the motorcycle, the deceased Ashutosh was under the influence
of liquor. As such, this is clearly a case of contributory negligence. In Ex.P-
5, the doctor opined that the deceased was under the influence of alcohol and
this finding is supported by the information furnished by the eye witness
Abhishek Chaddha which is recorded in Ex. P-14. It is, therefore, held that
the deceased Ashutosh was also a contributory negligent party in the
accident. Consequently, it is held that the insured vehicle i.e. the tanker
bearing registration number MP-09-HF-5208 was involved in the accident,
though the deceased Ashutosh also contributed to its occurrence.
10. Considering the fact that the Claims Tribunal while rejecting the
claim did not quantify the amount of compensation, the matter is required to
be remanded to the Claims Tribunal particularly since this Court has held
that the involvement of the insured vehicle is proved. Accordingly, the
matter is remanded back to the Claims Tribunal for determining the
following issues :
"(i) The quantum of compensation in the case of Ashutosh, keeping in
mind that he was a contributory negligent party to the accident.
(ii) The quantum of compensation payable to Devendra, who was the
pillion rider and against whom no contributory negligence is attributable.
(iii) The interest on the amount that may be quantified by the Claims
Tribunal shall be payable up to the date of this order i.e. 03.12.2025.
(iv) The entire exercise shall be completed by the Claims Tribunal
within an outer limit of three months from the date of appearance, keeping in
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view that the matter relates to the year of 2010."
11. The parties shall appear before the Claims Tribunal on 07.01.2026
and on such subsequent dates as may be fixed by the Claims Tribunal.
12. In above terms, both the appeals are disposed of.
Certified copy as per rules.
(PAVAN KUMAR DWIVEDI)
JUDGE
Anushree
