Madhya Pradesh High Court
Arun vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 25 August, 2025
Author: Avanindra Kumar Singh
Bench: Vivek Agarwal, Avanindra Kumar Singh
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:40242
1 CRA-4460-2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VIVEK AGARWAL
&
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE AVANINDRA KUMAR SINGH
ON THE 25th OF AUGUST, 2025
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 4460 of 2024
ARUN
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Manoj Kumar Singh - Advocate for the appellant.
Shri Ajay Tamrakar - Public Prosecutor for the respondent/State.
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 6196 of 2024
JITENDRA TANNDEKAR
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Yashowardhan Shukla - Advocate for the appellant.
Shri Ajay Tamrakar - Public Prosecutor for the respondent/State.
JUDGMENT
Per: Justice Avanindra Kumar Singh
The above mentioned two criminal appeals arise out of judgment of
conviction dated 05.3.2024 passed by the learned Special Judge (POCSO
Act), Chhindwara in SC No.07/2023 [State of M.P. Vs. Jitendra and
another], therefore, they were heard analogously and are being disposed by
this common judgment.
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:40242
2 CRA-4460-2024
2. In brief, the case of the prosecution is that prosecutrix (PW.1)
lodged repot on 03.1.2023 (Exhibit-P/1) that on 31.12.2022 at about 05.00
pm she was in her maternal grandmother's house. Her father, mother, brother
and sister had gone to the field. She knew Sahil Bhallavi for last one year. At
about 07.00 pm Sahil called her on phone and asked her to accompany her to
see 'Kabaddi' match at Jamuniya Jethu. Then she went with Sahil Bhallavi.
At about 01.00 am Sahil took her to Mahavir Dhana and there he did wrong
with her in a under constructed house situated behind the home of
accused/Jitendra and thereafter left her alone at Mahavir Dhana and ran
away. At about 09.00 am in the morning of 01.1.2023 accused/Jitendra
called her on phone and then she told him that she is hiding near Mahavir
Dhana. Then accused/Jitendra asked her to stay there. At about 7.30 p.m.
accused persons (Jitendra & Arun) took her on motorcycle to hut situated in
Arun Pawar's field where accused/Jitendra did wrong with her. Thereafter,
accused/Arun came and did wrong with her. Thereafter, accused-Jitendra
took her on motorcycle and left her at Karaboha. From where she called
Sagar (her brother in relation) to come there, Sagar came and took her to his
home. Next day Sagar dropped her to her house. She told the entire incident
to her family members.
3. FIR (Exhibit-P/1) was recorded by the Police Officer Ms.Deepa
Thakur (PW.10), who obtained permission for medical examination from
prosecutrix and her father. Alongwith Constable Suvita Markam (PW.6) she
sent prosecutrix to Primary Health Centre, Parasia. Dr.Shashi Atulkar
(PW.12) on 03.1.2023 examined her medically and prepared two vaginal
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:40242
3 CRA-4460-2024
slides and handed-over them to Constable, Constable-Suvita Markam (PW.6)
handed over the slides to K.C.Patle who prepared seizure memo (Exhibit-
P/47). Police Officer Anil Shukla (PW.11) during investigation inspected the
spot and prepared spot map (Exhibit-P/2). Statements of father, mother,
Sagar & Raghuveer were recorded. Accused-Jitendra was taken into custody
and his memorandum u/s 27 of Evidence Act was recorded vide Exhibit-P/9
and on that basis vide seizure memo (Exhibit-P/10) motorcycle bearing
registration MP-28/NB-1681 was seized. Accused/Arun was arrested vide
Arrest Memo (Exhibit-P/12). Both the accused persons were medically
examined on the basis of forms (Exhibits-P/28 & P/29) by Dr.Navdeep
Borkar (PW.9). Two semen slides were prepared, sealed and handed over to
the concerned Constable Jai Prakash Inwati (PW.8) who seized slides and
prepared seizure memo (Exhibits-P18 & 19). Police Officer Anil Shukla
(PW.11) for blood samples of accused persons prepared medical
examination forms (Exhibits-P/33 & P/34) and sent the same for
examination through Constable No.733 Anil to Doctor Almuaaz Ahmad
(PW.7) posted in District Hospital, Chhindwara who prepared identification
forms (Exhibits-P/14 & P/16) and took blood samples, preserved the same in
vial and handed over to the concerned Constable from whom PW.11 (Anil
Shukla) seized them, prepared seizure memo (Exhibit-P/17) and alongwith
other material, as narrated above, prepared draft (Exhibit-P/35) for sending
material through Superintendent of Police for chemical investigation to FSL,
Bhopal vide letter (Exhibit-P/37). Caste certificate (Exhibit-P/42) and proof
of date of birth of prosecutrix Exhibit-P/44 was obtained and after
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:40242
4 CRA-4460-2024
completing the investigation charge-sheet was filed.
4. Case was put up for trial. Learned trial Court charged the
accused under sections 363, 366(a) of IPC and sections 3 r/w 4 of POCSO
Act, 376(DA) IPC read with sections 5(g) r/w 6 of POCSO Act and sections
3(1)(w)(i), 3(1)(w)(ii), 3(2)(v) of SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act,
1989. The accused denied the charges and sought trial.
5. After prosecution evidence, in which prosecution has examined
13 witnesses and exhibited 50 documents, when accused persons were
examined under section 313 Cr.P.C. they denied the prosecution case and
submitted that they are innocent and have been falsely implicated due to
enmity. The defence has not given any defence evidence.
6. Learned trial Court in paragraph 25 of the judgment found that
on the date of offence the prosecutrix was less than 16 years of age. In
paragraph 32 it found that prosecutrix and accused/Jitendra are members of
scheduled caste community whereas accused/Arun Pawar is not the member
of scheduled castes or scheduled tribes. In paragraph 71 the learned trial
Court found that charge for abduction is not proved and while acquitting
accused-Jitendra from charge under sections 363, 366 of IPC and section
3(2)(v) of SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 and also acquitted
accused/Arun Pawar from charges under sections 363 & 366 of IPC but
convicted the accused-Jitendra under section 376(3), 376(DA) of IPC and
section 3 /4 (2), 5(g)/6 of POCSO Act and convicted accused-Arun Pawar
under sections 3 /4 (2), 5(g)/6 of POCSO Act and section 3(2)(v) of SC/ST
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:40242
5 CRA-4460-2024
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 and they have been sentenced as under:-
Accused/ Section Imprisonment Fine In default of
payment of
Appellant fine
Jitendra 376(DA) Life Rs.2,000/- Additional
Tanndekar IPC/5(g)/6 of Imprisonment R.I. for 06
POCSO Act months
376(3) IPC Life Rs.2,000/- Additional
imprisonment R.I. for 06
3/4 (2) of months
POCSO Act
Arun Pawar 376(DA) Life Rs.2,000/- Additional
IPC/5(g)/6 of Imprisonment R.I. for 06
POCSO Act months
376(3) IPC Life Rs.2,000/- Additional
imprisonment R.I. for 06
3/4 (2) of months
POCSO Act
3(2)(v) of Life Rs.2,000/- Additional
SC/ST imprisonment R.I. for 06
(Prevention months
of Atrocities)
Act, 1989
7. Against the impugned judgment appeal has been filed by
accused-Arun on the ground that prosecution has failed to prove the charges.
The prosecution evidence is full of contradictions and omissions. It was a
matter of consent. Prosecutrix went on her own volition with the appellant
and was usually taking with him on phone. She was in love with the
appellant. DNA report is against the prosecution. In Exhibit-D/1 FIR
statement the name of appellant/Arun was not mentioned. Hence,
accused/appellant should be acquitted.
8. On the other hand, appellant/Jitendra has filed an appeal on the
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:40242
6 CRA-4460-2024
ground that prosecution has failed to prove the case beyond reasonable
doubt. DNA report is against the prosecution. Phone call details have not
been proved. Therefore, appellant should be acquitted.
9. On the other hand, learned Government Advocate for the
respondent/State supports the impugned judgment and seeks dismissal of the
appeals.
10. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
record.
11. Regarding age of the prosecutrix, while PW.1 (prosecutrix) has
mentioned her date of birth to be 17.8.2008 and thereafter submits that her
age is 14 years but in cross-examination paragraph 27 she stated that she
gave her date of birth on the basis of birth certificate.
12. PW.2 (mother of the prosecutrix) while stating that her daughter
(prosecutrix) is aged 14 years further said that she does not know the date of
birth of the prosecutrix. She is not literate. In paragraph 5 of her cross-
examination she has stated that her marriage was performed about 25 years
ago. All the three children were born at a interval of one-two years. After
her eldest son there is younger daughter and thereafter prosecutrix was born.
She does not remember her date of marriage. She does not remember the
dates of birth of any of her children. Father of the prosecutrix had gone for
admission of the prosecutrix in school.
13. PW.3 (father of the prosecutrix) has given statements on similar
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:40242
7 CRA-4460-2024
lines regarding age of the prosecutrix, as has been given by PW.2 (mother of
the prosecutrix). In paragraph 4 of cross-examination this witness has stated
that he was married about 25-26 years ago. His three children were born at a
interval of 1 to 1 ½ years. He had gone to get the prosecutrix admitted in a
school. She was admitted in school at an age of 6-7 years.
14. PW.4 (Reena Dhurve) who is Headmaster of the School has
stated that 'Dakhil Kharij' register is Exhibit-P/7 and certificate of date of
birth is Exhibit-P/8. In school record the date of birth of the prosecutrix is
mentioned as 17.8.2008. In paragraph 4 of her cross-examination she has
stated that it is not mentioned in record (Exhibit-P/7), as to on what basis the
date of birth of the prosecutrix is recorded.
15. PW.12 (Dr.Shashi Atulkar) who examined the prosecutrix has
stated that secondary sexual characters of the prosecutrix were fully
developed.
16. On perusal of the evidence on record, regarding age of the
prosecutrix it is seen that that mother and father of the prosecutrix have failed
to state with precision regarding the basis/document on which they have
recorded the age of the prosecutrix in school. In fact, they were unable to
give the date of marriage of father and mother of the prosecutrix as also the
dates of birth of elder brother and sister of the prosecutrix. Therefore, it is
found that date of birth recorded in the school is by estimation.
17. In the case of Jitendra Jatav Vs. State of M.P. [Criminal Appeal
No.11320/2022 decided on 13.1.2023] in a case involving offences under
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:40242
8 CRA-4460-2024
sections 363, 366 of IPC and section 3 /4, r(j)(II) r/w 6 of the POCSO Act
on a appeal by the accused the Division Bench of this Court in paragraphs 2
6 & 27 has referred to the decision in the case of Vishnu Vs. State of
Maharashtra, (2006) 1 SCC 283 and observed as under:-
26. In Vishnu v. State of Maharashtra [(2006) 1 SCC 283 :
(2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 217] while dealing with a similar issue,
this Court observed that very often parents furnish incorrect
date of birth to the school authorities to make up the age in
order to secure admission for their children. For determining
the age of the child, the best evidence is of his/her parents, if it
is supported by unimpeccable documents. In case the date of
birth depicted in the school register/certificate stands belied by
the unimpeccable evidence of reliable persons and
contemporaneous documents like the date of birth register of
the municipal corporation, government hospital/nursing home,
etc., the entry in the school register is to be discarded.
27. Thus, the entry in respect of age of the child seeking
admission, made in the school register by semi-literate
chowkidar at the instance of a person who came along with the
child having no personal knowledge of the correct date of
birth, cannot be relied upon."
18. In P.Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police,
2023 SCC Online SC 846 in a case under section 366 IPC and section 6 of
the POCSO Act Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 17 has referred to
judgment of three-judge Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain Vs. State of West Bengal , (2012) 9 SCR
224, in which it was held that burden of proving that someone is a juvenile
(or below the prescribed age) is upon the person claiming it.
In the appeal at hand before this Court it is the prosecution on behalf of
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:40242
9 CRA-4460-2024
the prosecutrix who is claiming that prosecutrix was less than 18 years at the
time of incident.
19. In Birka Shiva Vs. State of Telangana [Criminal Appeal arising
out of SLP (Crl.) 1445/2025] in a case under sections 376, 366, 342 of IPC in
paragraph 8.1 Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to Birad Mal Singhvi Vs.
Anand Purohit, 1988 Supp SCC 604, relevant paragraphs 14 & 15 are
reproduced below:-
"14. ... If entry regarding date of birth in the scholar's register is
made on the information given by parents or someone having special
knowledge of the fact, the same would have probative value. ... The
date of birth mentioned in the scholars' register has no evidentiary
value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of
birth is examined. The entry contained in the admission form or the
scholar's register must be shown to be made on the basis of
information given by the parents or a person having special
knowledge about the date of birth of the person concerned. If the
entry in the scholar's register regarding date of birth is made on the
basis of information given by parents, the entry would have
evidentiary value, but if it is given by a stranger or by someone else
who had no special means of knowledge of the date of birth, such an
entry will have no evidentiary value. ...
15. Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act lays down that entry in any
public, official book, register, record stating a fact in issue or relevant
fact and made by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty
specially enjoined by the law of the country is itself the relevant fact.
To render a document admissible under Section 35, three conditions
must be satisfied, firstly, entry that is (2003) 8 SCC 745 1988 Supp
SCC 604 relied on must be one in a public or other official book,
register or record; secondly, it must be an entry stating a fact in issue
or relevant fact; and thirdly, it must be made by a public servant in
discharge of his official duty, or any other person in performance of a
duty specially enjoined by law. An entry relating to the date of birth
made in the school register is relevant and admissible under Section
35 of the Act, but the entry regarding the age of a person in a school
register is of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the
person in the absence of the material on which the age was recorded.
... The courts have consistently held that the date of birth mentioned
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:40242
10 CRA-4460-2024
in the scholar's register or secondary school certificate has no
probative value unless either the parents are examined or the person
on whose information the entry may have been made is examined..."
In paragraph 8.5 of same judgment Hon'ble Supreme Court referred
to the judgment of Alamelu Vs. State (2011) 2 SCC 385, paragraph 40:-
"40...........However, the admissibility of such a document
would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of
the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which
the age was recorded. The date of birth mentioned in the
transfer certificate would have no evidentiary value unless
the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth
is examined."
In the same judgment of Birka Shiva (supra) Hon'ble Supreme Court
in paragraph 12 has observed thus:-
"12. Well, suffice it to say that Courts of law cannot
make a determination of guilt in thin air, based on
estimations. In the present facts and circumstances, the
proof submitted by the prosecution in the form of
Ex.P11 (birth certificate issued by the school) was not
sufficient to arrive at a finding that the prosecutrix was
less than sixteen/eighteen years of age, especially when
such a document was not sufficiently corroborated.
Therefore, it was neither safe nor fair to convict the
appellant based on it, particularly in the context where
the age of the victim was such a pivotal factor."
20. The learned trial Court while considering the factum of age of
the prosecutrix has failed to consider all the relevant facts. There is no
ossification test regarding age of the prosecutrix. The learned trial Court in
paragraph 16 of the judgment has mentioned that date of birth recorded in
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:40242
11 CRA-4460-2024
school should be accepted unless it is found to be proved or forged. But in
the citations referred to by the learned trial Court in paragraphs 15, 16, 17,
18 & 19 no specific paragraph of judgments have been mentioned no brief
details of the cases referred is mentioned.
21. In the State of Rajasthan Vs. Ganeshi Lal , (2008) 2 SCC 533 the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraphs 11 & 12 has held as under:-
"11. "12. ... Reliance on the decision without looking into the factual
background of the case before it, is clearly impermissible. A decision is
a precedent on its own facts. Each case presents its own features. It is
not everything said by a Judge while giving judgment that constitutes a
precedent. The only thing in a Judge's decision binding a party is the
principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is
important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi.
According to the well-settled theory of precedents, every decision
contains three basic postulates: (i) findings of material facts, direct and
inferential. An inferential finding of facts is the inference which the
Judge draws from the direct, or perceptible facts; (ii) statements of the
principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the
facts; and (iii) judgment based on the combined effect of the above. A
decision is an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the
essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found
therein nor what logically flows from the various observations made in
the judgment. The enunciation of the reason or principle on which a
question before a court has been decided is alone binding as a
precedent. (See State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra AIR 1968
SC 647 and Union of India v. Dhanwanti Devi (1996) 6 SCC 44.) A
case is a precedent and binding for what it explicitly decides and no
more. The words used by Judges in their judgments are not to be read
as if they are words in an Act of Parliament. In Quinn v. Leathem 1901
AC 495, (1900-1903) All ER Rep 1 (HL) Earl of Halsbury, L.C
observed that every judgment must be read as applicable to the
particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the generality of
the expressions which are found there are not intended to be the
exposition of the whole law but governed and qualified by the
particular facts of the case in which such expressions are found and a
case is only an authority for what it actually decides."
12. "15. ... Courts should not place reliance on decisions without
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:40242
12 CRA-4460-2024
discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation
of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of courts are
neither to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of the statute
and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read
in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of
courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases
and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for Judges to
embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain
and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret
judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be
interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. v.
Horton 1951 AC 737, (1951) 2 All ER 1 (HL) (at p. 761 ) Lord
MacDermott observed: (All ER p. 14 C-D)
'The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the
ipsissima verba of Willes, J., as though they were part of an Act of
Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto.
This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language
actually used by that most distinguished Judge....'
16. In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd. 1970 AC 1004, (1970) 2
WLR 1140, (1970) 2 All ER 294 (HL ) Lord Reid said (at All ER p.
297g-h), 'Lord Atkin's speech ... is not to be treated as if it were a
statutory definition. It will require qualification in new circumstances'.
Megarry, J. in Shepherd Homes Ltd. v. Sandham (No. 2) (1971) 1
WLR 1062, (1971) 2 All ER 1267 observed: (All ER p. 1274d-e) 'One
must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of even Russell,
L.J as if it were an Act of Parliament;' And, in British Railways Board
v. Herrington 1972 AC 877, (1972) 2 WLR 537, (1972) 1 All ER 749
(HL) Lord Morris said: (All ER p. 761c)
'There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgment as
though they are words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be
remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts
of a particular case.'
17. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make
a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of
cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper.
18. The following words of Hidayatullah, J. in the matter of applying
precedents have become locus classicus: (Abdul Kayoom v. CIT AIR
1962 SC 680, AIR p. 688, para 19)
'19. ... Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:40242
13 CRA-4460-2024
between one case and another is not enough because even a single
significant detail may alter the entire aspect. In deciding such cases,
one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cardozo)
by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To
decide therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad
resemblance to another case is not at all decisive'.
'Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of
justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches
else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to
keep the path to justice clear of obstructions which could impede it.' "
22. Any Court while referring to the judgments of Hon'ble Supreme
Court or the Hon'ble High Court should refer specific paragraphs where the
dictum of law has been laid down. One has to be careful to see what were the
facts of the case, and does the facts of citation match with the case at hand,
as a little change in facts of the case may change the precedential value of
the judgment.
23. In Bhavnagar University Vs. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. and
others, (2003) 2 SCC 111 wherein in paragraph 59 the Hon'ble Supreme
Court has held as under:-
"59. A decision, as is well-known, is an authority for which it is
decided and not what can logically be deduced therefrom. It is also
well-settled that a little difference in facts or additional facts may
make a lot of difference in the precedential value of a decision.
[See Smt. Ram Rakhi v. Union of India & Ors. [AIR 2002 Delhi
458], Delhi Administration (NCT of Delhi) v. Manoharlal [AIR
2002 SC 3088], Haryana Financial Corporation. v. M/s Jagdamba
Oil Mills. [JT 2002 (1) SC 482] and Dr. Nalini Mahajan etc. v.
Director of Income Tax (Investigation) [(2002) 257 ITR 123].(Del)"
24. Therefore, after considering the facts and reasons given by this
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:40242
14 CRA-4460-2024
Court, we are of the considered opinion that prosecution has failed to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that on the date of offence prosecutrix was minor
being less than 18 years of age. Therefore, finding of the learned trial Court
in this regard is set aside.
25. In DNA report (Exhibit-P/39) Y-male DNA of
appellant/Jitendra and appellant-Arun Pawar is not found on the vaginal slide
(A) and underwear (Article-B) and public hair (Article-C) of the prosecutrix
(PW.1). PW.12 (Dr.Shashi Atulkar) has opined that secondary sexual
characters of the prosecutrix were fully developed. She had one abrasion of
½ x ½ cm in her right knee joint, which was of general nature. Her hymen
was old torn. There is no sign of immediate injury and on the basis of
medical examination no information can be given about recent intercourse,
Medial report is Exhibit-P/48. In paragraph 7 of her cross-examination she
has stated that in report she mentioned the age of the prosecutrix as 14 years
on the basis of Police application form for medical examination but Police
had not brought any document regarding age of the prosecutrix.
26. Therefore, looking to the finding of age of prosecutrix by this
Court and medical evidence it can be said that prosecution has failed to prove
the charges under which learned trial Court found the accused persons guilty
and convicted & sentenced them as stated hereinabove.
27. Accordingly, the appeals are allowed. The appellants are
acquitted of the charges levelled. The order of compensation as per
paragraph 93 of the judgment of learned trial Court is not interfered with. If
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:40242
15 CRA-4460-2024
the custody of accused/appellants are not required in any other case, they
may be released immediately from jail. The disposal of the property shall be
as per paragraph 91 of the judgment of trial Court, unless any case is pending
about same incident regarding accused-Sahil.
(VIVEK AGARWAL) (AVANINDRA KUMAR SINGH)
JUDGE JUDGE
RM
