Madhya Pradesh High Court
Keshav Prasad Mishra vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 14 August, 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:38701
1 WP-19355-2018
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VIVEK JAIN
WRIT PETITION No. 19355 of 2018
KESHAV PRASAD MISHRA
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
WITH
WRIT PETITION No. 20615 of 2018
SHRIKANT MISHRA
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
WRIT PETITION No. 20708 of 2018
BHAGWANDEEN TIWARI
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
WRIT PETITION No. 20709 of 2018
HANUMANSHARN TIWARI
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Rakesh Kumar Sahu along with Shri Darshit Jain, learned
counsel for the petitioner.
Shri Hitendra Singh, learned Government Advocate for
respondent/State..
ORDER
(Reserved on: 07/08/2025)
(Pronounced on: 14/08/2025)
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:38701
2 WP-19355-2018
The present cases have been filed on identical issues and on identical facts,
hence they are being taken up and decided by this common order. For the
sake of convenience facts shall be taken from WP No.20615/2018, unless
otherwise mentioned.
2. The present petitions have been filed by employees who state to have been
appointed as Teachers in Tribal Welfare department and the appointment
order has been placed on record as Annex.P/2. In some of the cases as the
appointment orders are not there, therefore, the petitioners have relied on
service books filed along with the rejoinder.
3. It is common ground of all the petitioners that they were appointed in the
year 1989 by the order passed by the Additional Commissioner, Tribal
Welfare, Shahdol as Assistant Teachers and posted in various schools being
run by the said department in District Shahdol.
4. The petitioners have further contended that the initial appointment on the
fixed salary was Rs.300/- p.m. and later on, they were even regularized in the
service by certain orders passed by the Additional Commissioner, Tribal
Welfare in the year 1990.
5. It is further contended that there were certain complaints in the matter of
recruitment process carried out in the year 1989-90 when one Assistant
Commissioner namely Shri S.S. Mishra was posted at district Shahdol and
Shri Triveni Singh, Shri K.K. Singh and Shri R.B. Verma were posted as
clerks in the said office. There were allegations that they issued a number of
forged orders and appointed a number of Teachers, it was alleged that the
dispatch numbers mentioned are not available in the original record
maintained in the office of Assistant Commissioner and all the appointment
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:38701
3 WP-19355-2018
orders are forged appointment orders. A trial was conducted against certain
persons in the matter and ultimately the JMFC, Shahdol in RCT
No.221/2010 has acquitted all the accused persons by judgment dated
10/01/2014 and therefore, now nothing remains in the matter and these
petitioners ought to have been reinstated in service. It is contended that work
was taken from them only upto the year 1992 and they have not been
allowed to work thereafter and hence, they should be allowed to work and
get salary and salary of entire intervening period should be paid to them as
they have been validly appointed.
6. Per contra, counsel for the State has contended that there were large scale
irregularities in the matter as evident from enquiry report Annex.R/1 filed
along with the reply. He further submits that the petitioners claim to be
appointed in the year 1989 and claim to have worked up to the year 1992 but
no explanation for delay has been offered as the petition has been filed in the
year 2018 which is with a delay of 26 years when most of the petitioners
were approaching the age of retirement.
7. Heard.
8. In the present case, the petitioners claim to be appointed by various orders
issued in the year 1989. An order Annex.P/8 is on record as per which
instructions were issued to lodge FIR in the matter and a number of orders
have been mentioned in the letter Annex.P/8 indicating that which of the
appointment letters are forged. The appointment letters which the petitioners
are relying upon have been mentioned in the said letter Annex.P/8 to be
forged letter. The petitioners have only relied on the findings of the Criminal
Court vide judgment Annex.P/17. It is contended by the petitioners that they
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:38701
4 WP-19355-2018
were not the accused persons in the case and even otherwise there has been
acquittal and therefore, they should be held entitled to hold the post and get
salary and entire arrears of salary since 1992 onwards till date.
9. Upon perusal of the judgment of acquittal it is seen that in para 38 thereof,
the Trial Court has given benefit of doubt to the accused persons. The
prosecution was in the matter of issuance of forged appointment orders.
None of the candidates have been impleaded as accused in the said case and
all the accused persons are the official persons like the Assistant
Commissioner, his Office colleagues, Ministerial staff and other staff, etc.
There is no finding of the Criminal Court that there has been no forgery in
the matter nor it has been held that there has been no fraud in the matter. The
Trial Court in para 35 of the aforesaid judgment has held that only on the
basis of documents, it cannot be held that which accused has committed
which part of the crime, unless it is established that which accused prepared
which document and with what intention and which employee committed
which misconduct. The Criminal Court has acquitted the accused persons
only because in criminal case the standard of proof is strict, i.e. proof of
crime beyond reasonable doubt and role required to be assigned in each
accused person in terms of the provisions of IPC, which could not be done in
the criminal trial in the present matter.
10. The letter Annex.P/8 is very specific in mentioning that there were
forged appointment letters issued and this enquiry was conducted in the year
1992 itself. The petitioners are not working since the year 1992 itself and this
petition has been filed 26 years after their services are not continued. No
explanation has been offered in para 4 of the petition for the delay caused
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:38701
5 WP-19355-2018
and even at any another place in the body of petition, no explanation has
been offered.
11. Counsel for the petitioner stated that once this Court has issued the
notices and admitted the petition, therefore, it is being inferred that the
objection of limitation has been waived off. The said assertion is not a
correct exposition of law because this Court has simply issued notices and
thereafter with the reply objection as to delay has been raised. Merely,
because the petition has been admitted it cannot be inferred that the legal
objection as to delay has been waived off by this Court or has come to an
end. In the case of Roopsingh Devisingh v. Sanchalak Panchayat , AIR 1962
MP 50, the Division Bench of this Court held that whether the party does or
does not raise it, the Court is bound to satisfy itself that the petitioner for
extra ordinary relief has himself not been wanting in diligence. It was also
held that though it is desirable to investigate all preliminary matters
including the effect of delay at the time of admission, it does happen very
often that this is not done, and applications are admitted not because the
Court is fully satisfied of the manifest error and illegality and non-
jurisdiction of the order complained against, but because it finds some prima
facie case. Thus, simply because an application has been admitted for
hearing, it cannot be said that the ground of unexplained delay cannot be
canvassed during the hearing. In the present case, even the admission order
was in absence of counsel for the petitioner and only on the ground that the
pleadings are complete and matter is to be heard finally.
12. It is settled in law that delay defeats the remedy and the long delay of
26 years cannot be inferred to be condoned only because this Court issued
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:38701
6 WP-19355-2018
the notices and admitted the petition. Though, there is no limitation period
for filing writ petition but it is settled in law that the parties have to approach
the Court within some reasonable period.
13. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of reported in the case of State of
Orissa v. Mamata Mohanty reported in (2011) 3 SCC 436 has held as under:
53. Needless to say that the Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply in
writ jurisdiction. However, the doctrine of limitation being based
on public policy, the principles enshrined therein are applicable
and writ petitions are dismissed at initial stage on the ground of
delay and laches. In a case like at hand, getting a particular pay
scale may give rise to a recurring cause of action. In such an
eventuality, the petition may be dismissed on the ground of delay
and laches and the court may refuse to grant relief for the initial
period in case of an unexplained and inordinate delay. In the
instant case, the respondent claimed the relief from 1-1-1986 by
filing a petition on 11-11-2005 but the High Court for some
unexplained reason granted the relief w.e.f. 1-6-1984, though even
the Notification dated 6-10-1989 makes it applicable w.e.f. 1-1-
1986.
14. In the case of Mrinmoy Maity Vs. Chhanda Koley reported in 2024
SCC Online SC 551, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:-
11. For filing of a writ petition, there is no doubt that no fixed
period of limitation is prescribed. However, when the
extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ court is invoked, it has to be
seen as to whether within a reasonable time same has been
invoked and even submitting of memorials would not revive the
dead cause of action or resurrect the cause of action which has had
a natural death. In such circumstances on the ground of delay and
latches alone, the appeal ought to be dismissed or the applicant
ought to be non-suited. If it is found that the writ petitioner is
guilty of delay and latches, the High Court ought to dismiss the
petition on that sole ground itself, in as much as the writ courts are
not to indulge in permitting such indolent litigant to take
advantage of his own wrong. It is true that there cannot be any
waiver of fundamental right but while exercising discretionary
jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court will have to
necessarily take into consideration the delay and latches on the
part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. This Court in the
case of Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of W.B., (2009) 1 SCC
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:38701
7 WP-19355-2018
768 has held to the following effect:
"56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no doubt true
that there can be no waiver of fundamental right. But while
exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226, 227
or 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes into account certain
factors and one of such considerations is delay and laches on the
part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. It is well settled
that power to issue a writ is discretionary. One of the grounds for
refusing reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution is that
the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches.
57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a writ court, he
should come to the Court at the earliest reasonably possible
opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ will
indeed be a good ground for refusing to exercise such
discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying object of this principle is
not to encourage agitation of stale claims and exhume matters
which have already been disposed of or settled or where the rights
of third parties have accrued in the meantime (vide State of
M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai, [AIR 1964 SC 1006 : (1964) 6 SCR
261], Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court, [AIR 1967 SC 1450]
and Bhoop Singh v. Union of India, [(1992) 3 SCC 136 : (1992)
21 ATC 675 : (1992) 2 SCR 969]). This principle applies even in
case of an infringement of fundamental right (vide Tilokchand
Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, [(1969) 1 SCC 110], Durga
Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports & Exports, [(1969) 1 SCC
185] and Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India, [(1970) 1 SCC
84]).
58. There is no upper limit and there is no lower limit as to when a
person can approach a court. The question is one of discretion and
has to be decided on the basis of facts before the court depending
on and varying from case to case. It will depend upon what the
breach of fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and when
and how the delay arose."
12. It is apposite to take note of the dicta laid down by this Court
in Karnataka Power Corportion Ltd. v. K. Thangappan, (2006) 4
SCC 322 whereunder it has been held that the High Court may
refuse to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction if there is negligence
or omissions on the part of the applicant to assert his right. It has
been further held thereunder:
"6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in
mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary
powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate
case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers
if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant
to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time
and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party.
Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within
the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga
Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, [(1969) 1
SCC 185 : AIR 1970 SC 769]. Of course, the discretion has to be
exercised judicially and reasonably.
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:38701
8 WP-19355-2018
7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay
Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, [[L.R.] 5 P.C. 221 : 22
WR 492] (PC at p. 239) was approved by this Court in Moon
Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher, [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Maharashtra
SRTC v. Shri Balwant Regular Motor Service, [(1969) 1 SCR
808 : AIR 1969 SC 329]. Sir Barnes had stated:
"Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an arbitrary
or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to
give a remedy either because the party has, by his conduct done
that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it,
or where by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not
waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which
it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were
afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time
and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument
against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon
mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any
statute of limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried
upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances always
important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature
of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party
and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course
or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy."
8. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of this Court in
which this aspect has been dealt with in relation to Article 32 of
the Constitution. It is apparent that what has been stated as regards
that article would apply, a fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed
in Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India, [(1970) 1 SCC 84 : AIR
1970 SC 470] that no relief can be given to the petitioner who
without any reasonable explanation approaches this Court under
Article 32 after inordinate delay. It was stated that though Article
32 is itself a guaranteed right, it does not follow from this that it
was the intention of the Constitution-makers that this Court should
disregard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after
inordinate delay.
9. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, [(1986) 4 SCC
566 : AIR 1987 SC 251] that the High Court in exercise of its
discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or
the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the
part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained,
the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in
exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is
premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not
ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy
because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience
and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is
exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of
inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice
on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is
invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third-
party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:38701
9 WP-19355-2018
weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise
such jurisdiction."
13. Reiterating the aspect of delay and latches would disentitle the
discretionary relief being granted, this Court in the case
of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T.
Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 has held:
"16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly
brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation
offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in
mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable
jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the
rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to
the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without
adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or
pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinise
whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be
it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain
circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most
circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the
litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reflects
inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant -- a litigant who
has forgotten the basic norms, namely, "procrastination is the
greatest thief of time" and second, law does not permit one to
sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and
causes injury to the lis."
15. As an argument in desperation, the counsel for the petitioner then
submitted that since criminal case was going on till 2014, and their counsel
did not suggest them to file writ petition, hence, they cannot be penalized for
ill-advise given by counsel. This argument is totally misconceived because
the petitioners were not accused in criminal case, and even they had been
accused, then also, they could have litigated in the matter of their
employment by relying on the appointment letters. However, they did not
choose to do so and suddenly woke up in the year 2018 though they had
been discontinued in the year 1992.
16. On merits too, the petitioner's appointment letters have been found to
be forged and nothing has been placed on record, that what was the selection
process the petitioners had faced, how they had applied, what was the
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:38701
10 WP-19355-2018
advertisement, etc. From perusal of the document annexure P-8, there is
nothing left to doubt that the appointment of the petitioners was a fraud upon
the State.
17. In view of the above, no grounds are made out to interfere in the matter.
The petition fails and is dismissed on merits as well as on delay and laches.
(VIVEK JAIN)
JUDGE
RS
