Madhya Pradesh High Court
Rajesh Nagpure vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 14 October, 2024
Author: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
Bench: G.S. Ahluwalia
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1 W.P. No.22524/2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE G.S. AHLUWALIA
ON THE 14th OF OCTOBER, 2024
WRIT PETITION No. 22524 of 2024
RAJESH NAGPURE
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
............................................................................................................................................
Appearance:
Shri Pravesh Naveriya - Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Mohan Sausarkar - Government Advocate for the
respondents/State.
............................................................................................................................................
ORDER
Record of externment proceedings has been provided in sealed
cover.
2. This petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India has been
filed seeking following relief(s):-
(i) Issue a writ in the nature of certiorari to quash
and set aside the impugned order dated
29/07/2024 passed by Respondent no.2, i.e.
Annexure P/4.
(ii) Issue a writ in the nature of certiorari to quash
and set aside the impugned order dated
06/04/2024 passed by Respondent no.3, i.e.
Annexure P/2.
(iii) To allow the cost of case in favour of petitioner.
(iv) Any other suitable relief deemed fit in the facts
and circumstances of the case may also kindly
be granted together with the cost of this
petition.
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3. The facts necessary for disposal of present petition in short are
that the Superintendent of Police, Balaghat by his recommendation
dated 17/10/2023 proposed an action against the petitioner under
Section 5 of M.P. Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam. In this recommendation,
it was mentioned that SHO, Police Station Gramin Navegaon has
mentioned that the petitioner is of criminal in nature and is in habit of
abusing and threatening the public along with his companions.
Petitioner is also in habit of threatening the complainant and witnesses,
as a result his activities have created terror in the Society. Although the
Police Station Gramin Navegaon had taken preventive measures from
time to time but could not control the criminal activities. It was also
mentioned that on 17/03/2012, Crime No.46/2012 was registered against
the petitioner for offence under Sections 294, 323, 506, 34 of IPC. On
30/11/2018, Crime No.313/2018 was registered for offence under
Sections 294, 323, 506, 34 of IPC. On 19/02/2020, Crime No.41/2020
was registered for offence under Sections 294, 323, 147, 148, 341, 506,
34 of IPC. On 11/06/2020, Crime No.112/2020 was registered for
offence under Sections 294, 323, 506, 34 of IPC. On 16/08/2022, Crime
No.156/2022 was registered for offence under Sections 294, 323, 506,
34 of IPC and on 09/08/2023, Crime No.169/2023 was registered for
offence under Sections 294, 323, 506, 34 of IPC. Preventive actions
were taken on three occasions and two Ishtagasa No.83/12, 375/22 were
filed under Section 107/116(3) of Cr.P.C. and Ishtagasa No.92/23 was
filed under Section 110 of Cr.P.C.
4. Notices were issued to the petitioner by order dated 18/10/2023.
5. Petitioner appeared before the District Magistrate Balaghat on
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26/10/2023 and his counsel filed his Vakalatnama. On 30/10/2023, last
opportunity was granted to file reply. Thereafter on 06/11/2023, the
statement of SHO, Police Station Gramin Navegaon, District Balaghat
was recorded and thereafter the case was adjourned for examination of
departmental witnesses. It appears that the petitioner did not cross-
examine Kamal Singh Gehlot, SHO, Police Station Gramin Navegaon,
District Balaghat. On 20/11/2023, 30/11/2023, 11/12/2023, 21/12/2023
and 04/01/2024 the case was adjourned for examination of departmental
witness. On 18/01/2024, the petitioner was absent and accordingly,
warrant of arrest was issued and on the very same day the departmental
evidence was closed and the case was fixed for final arguments. On
01/02/2024, petitioner appeared and submitted that the date may be
fixed after 18/02/2024 as his engagement is to be held on 18/02/2024.
On 19/02/2024 and 29/02/2024, the case was adjourned for final
arguments. On 07/03/2024, petitioner made a prayer for cross-
examination of the witnesses, however as the Presiding Officer was to
attend the Government meeting, therefore the case was adjourned. On
14/03/2024 also the case was adjourned because the Presiding Officer
was to attend a Government meeting. On 21/03/2024, 28/03/2024, the
case was adjourned as the Presiding Officer was busy in election work.
On 01/04/2024, final arguments were submitted and on 06/04/2024,
final order was passed.
6. Although the Superintendent of Police, Balaghat had referred to
six criminal cases but the District Magistrate, Balaghat while passing
the final order also considered Crime No.36/2024 which was registered
for offence under Sections 294, 323, 506, 34 of IPC and Ishtagasa
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No.01/24 which was filed under Section 122 of Cr.P.C. Thus, District
Magistrate while passing the final order had considered additional
material.
7. It is submitted by counsel for petitioner that this act of the District
Magistrate has caused serious prejudice to the petitioner. Further, no
opportunity to cross-examine the departmental witness was granted to
the petitioner. In order dated 06/11/2023, it is nowhere mentioned that
petitioner had refused to cross-examine Kamal Singh Gehlot, SHO
Police Station Gramin Navegaon, District Balaghat. Furthermore, in the
statement of Kamal Singh Gehlot, he had not spoken about any offence
which was allegedly committed by the petitioner in the year 2024 but it
appears that SHO Police Station Gramin Navegaon, District Balaghat
sent a letter to the District Magistrate, Balaghat on 02/04/2024
informing the registration of Crime No.36/2024 and Ishtagasa No.1/24
and without giving any opportunity to meet out the said information,
impugned order was passed. Even the copy of said letter was not
provided to the petitioner. The case was finally heard on 01/04/2024 and
it appears that thereafter letter dated 02/04/2024 was taken on record by
District Magistrate and without giving any opportunity, the order of
externment was passed. It is further submitted that the Appellate Court
also did not consider the aforesaid aspect. It is further submitted that
even as per the criminal history, only the offences of trivial in nature
under Sections 294, 323, 506, 34 of IPC were registered against the
petitioner. Some of the offences are stale in nature. It is further
submitted that there is nothing in the statement of Kamal Singh Gehlot
to the effect that witnesses are not turning up. It was simply stated by
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SHO, Police Station Gramin Navegaon that since the elections are to be
conducted, therefore under these circumstances, free movement of
petitioner in the Society is not conducive. Thus, it is submitted that the
proceedings were initiated with an oblique motive to keep the petitioner
away from election proceedings.
8. Per contra, petition is vehemently opposed by counsel for the
State.
9. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
10. The Supreme Court in the case of Deepak Vs. State of
Maharashtra and Others decided on 28/01/2022 in Criminal Appeal
No.139/2022 has held as under:-
―4. We have given careful consideration to the
submissions. Under clause (d) of Article 19(1) of
the Constitution of India, there is a fundamental
right conferred on the citizens to move freely
throughout the territory of India. In view of clause
(5) of Article 19, State is empowered to make a
law enabling the imposition of reasonable
restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred
by clause (d). An order of externment passed under
provisions of Section 56 of the 1951 Act imposes a
restraint on the person against whom the order is
made from entering a particular area. Thus, such
orders infringe the fundamental right guaranteed
under Article 19(1)(d). Hence, the restriction
imposed by passing an order of externment must
stand the test of reasonableness.
* * *
6. As observed earlier, Section 56 makes serious
inroads on the personal liberty of a citizen
guaranteed under Article 19(1)(d) of the
Constitution of India. In the case of Pandharinath
Shridhar Rangnekar v. Dy. Commr. Of Police,
State of Maharashtra (1973) 1 SCC 372 in
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paragraph 9, this Court has held that the reasons
which necessitate or justify the passing of an
extraordinary order of externment arise out of
extraordinary circumstances. In the same decision,
this Court held that care must be taken to ensure
that the requirement of giving a hearing under
Section 59 of the 1951 Act is strictly complied
with. This Court also held that the requirements of
Section 56 must be strictly complied with.
7. There cannot be any manner of doubt that an
order of externment is an extraordinary measure.
The effect of the order of externment is of
depriving a citizen of his fundamental right of free
movement throughout the territory of India. In
practical terms, such an order prevents the person
even from staying in his own house along with his
family members during the period for which this
order is in subsistence. In a given case, such order
may deprive the person of his livelihood. It thus
follows that recourse should be taken to Section 56
very sparingly keeping in mind that it is an
extraordinary measure. For invoking clause (a) of
sub-section (1) of Section 56, there must be
objective material on record on the basis of which
the competent authority must record its subjective
satisfaction that the movements or acts of any
person are causing or calculated to cause alarm,
danger or harm to persons or property. For passing
an order under clause (b), there must be objective
material on the basis of which the competent
authority must record subjective satisfaction that
there are reasonable grounds for believing that
such person is engaged or is about to be engaged
in the commission of an offence involving force or
violence or offences punishable under Chapter XII,
XVI or XVII of the IPC. Offences under Chapter
XII are relating to Coin and Government Stamps.
Offences under Chapter XVI are offences affecting
the human body and offences under Chapter XVII
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are offences relating to the property. In a given
case, even if multiple offences have been
registered which are referred in clause (b) of sub-
section (1) of Section 56 against an individual, that
by itself is not sufficient to pass an order of
externment under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of
Section 56. Moreover, when clause (b) is sought to
be invoked, on the basis of material on record, the
competent authority must be satisfied that
witnesses are not willing to come forward to give
evidence against the person proposed to be
externed by reason of apprehension on their part as
regards their safety or their property. The
recording of such subjective satisfaction by the
competent authority is sine qua non for passing a
valid order of externment under clause (b).‖
11. Thus, it is clear that order of externment imposes a restriction on
fundamental right of a person as enshrined under Article 19(1)(d) of
Constitution of India. It is true that aforesaid fundamental right is not
absolute and can be subjected to reasonable restrictions, therefore order
of externment must pass the test of reasonableness.
12. If the facts of present case are considered, then it is clear that six
criminal cases for offence under Sections 323, 294, 506, 34 of IPC were
registered against the petitioner. One offence was registered in the year
2012, one was registered in the year 2018, two were registered in the
year 2020, one was registered in the year 2022 and the last one was
registered in the year 2023. The recommendation for initiating
proceedings under Section 5 of M.P. Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam was
sent by Superintendent of Police, Balaghat on 17/10/2023.
13. It is well established principle of law that the criminal history
must have close proximity with the proceedings under Section 5 of M.P.
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Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam. By no stretch of imagination, it can be said
that offences registered against the petitioner in the year 2012, 2018,
2020 had any close proximity with the recommendation sent by the
Superintendent of Police, Balaghat for initiating proceedings under
Section 5 of M.P. Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam.
14. So far as the offences under Sections 294, 323, 506, 34 of IPC are
concerned, the same are trivial in nature. No offence of any nature
except under Sections 294, 323, 506, 34 of IPC was ever registered
against the petitioner. There is nothing on record that in which case the
witnesses had not appeared before the Court on account of pressure/
terror of the petitioner. Old and stale cases cannot be taken into
consideration.
15. A Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Gangaram Vs.
Commissioner, Indore Division and Another reported in 2022 (1)
M.P.L.J. 711 has held as under:-
―10. It is also not disputed that in the show cause
notice, reference of only one case was made,
which was registered on 24-9-2018; and the show
cause notice was issued on 11-9-2020 i.e. after
almost two years of the registration of the offence,
whereas the impugned order has been passed by
the District Magistrate, Burhanpur on 7-12-2020.
Thus, it is apparent that not only that the impugned
order has been passed after two years of the case
registered against the petitioner, but it also
contained reference of one more case registered
against the petitioner on 14-10-2020. This Court in
the case of Sudeep Patel v. State of M.P., (2018) 3
MP LJ 413 passed in M.P. No. 904/2017 on 9-1-
2018 has already held that the purpose of initiation
of externment proceedings is to restrain a person
from committing another offence in the near future
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and in such circumstances the order of externment
must be passed within the close proximity of the
offences committed by the petitioner. The relevant
paras of the same are reads as under:--
―8. In the considered opinion of this Court, the
learned District Magistrate while passing the
impugned order was oblivious of the statement
of object and reasons of Madhya Pradesh Rajya
Suraksha Adhiniyam, 1990 which provides as
under:
"STATEMENT OF OBJECT AND
REASONS
For want of adequate enabling provisions
in existing laws for taking effective
preventive action to counteract activities of
anti-social elements Government have been
handicapped to maintain law and order. In
order to take timely and effective
preventive action it is felt that the
Government should be armed with
adequate power to nip the trouble in the
bud so that peace, tranquility and orderly
Government may not be endangered.
(2) xxx xxx xxx
(3) xxx xxx xxx
(4) xxx xxx xxx‖ (emphasis supplied)
9. Even according to section 3 of the Adhiniyam
of 1990 which is in respect of power to make
restriction order, it is for preventing any person
from acting prejudicial to the maintenance of the
public order. Thus the sole purpose of the
Adhiniyam of 1990 is to act timely and
effectively to initiate preventive action against a
wrongdoer, which object, in the considered
opinion of this Court has been totally lost sight
of while passing the impugned order. As is
already observed that the show cause notice was
issued on 11-6-2015, the reply was filed by the
petitioner on 14-7-2015 and thereafter the final
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order was passed by the District Magistrate after
recording the statements of various police
personnel on 23-5-2017, whereas the District
Magistrate ought to have proceeded with the
matter expeditiously without affording any
undue adjournments to either of the parties and
passed the order within a reasonable time but the
matter was kept pending for almost two years.
In such circumstances, although no period of
limitation is provided in the Adhiniyam, but
still, the order should have been passed by the
District Magistrate within a reasonable time
frame. The order in itself was passed by the
District Magistrate within a period of around
two years and during this entire period the
petitioner was roaming around freely and there
is no allegation that during this period also he
committed any offense, thus the application of
the provisions of Adhiniyam appears to be
totally redundant.
10. The District Magistrates, exercising their
powers under the Adhiniyam must understand
that it is not a mere formality which they have to
perform before passing the order of externment
under the Adhiniyam which directly affects a
person's life and liberty guaranteed under
Article 19(1)(d) of the Constitution of India.
This Court is of the opinion that in a way, the
preventive detention is akin to the provisions of
externment under the Adhiniyam for both these
measures are preventive in nature and are
enacted with a view to provide safe environment
to the public at large. The only difference being
that in case of preventive detention, the threat is
imminent and serious whereas in case of
externment, its degree is somewhat obtuse and
mollified and is not as serious as it is in the case
of preventive detention. The necessity to pass an
order of preventive detention has been
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emphasized by the Apex Court in the case of
State of Maharashtra v. Bhaurao Punjabrao
Gawande, (2008) 3 SCC 613 which is equally
applicable to the cases of externment. The
relevant paras of the same read as under:--
―Preventive detention : Meaning and concept
32. There is no authoritative definition of
―preventive detention‖ either in the
Constitution or in any other statute. The
expression, however, is used in
contradistinction to the word ―punitive‖. It is
not a punitive or penal provision but is in the
nature of preventive action or precautionary
measure. The primary object of preventive
detention is not to punish a person for having
done something but to intercept him before he
does it. To put it differently, it is not a penalty
for past activities of an individual but is
intended to pre-empt the person from
indulging in future activities sought to be
prohibited by a relevant law and with a view
to preventing him from doing harm in future.
33. In Haradhan Saha v. State of W B.
explaining the concept of preventive
detention, the Constitution Bench of this
Court, speaking through Ray, C.J. stated :
(SCC p. 205, para 19)
―19. The essential concept of
preventive detention is that the detention
of a person is not to punish him for
something he has done but to prevent
him from doing it. The basis of detention
is die satisfaction of the executive of a
reasonable probability of the likelihood
of the detenu acting in a manner similar
to his past acts and preventing him by
detention from doing the same. A
criminal conviction on the other hand is
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for an act already done which can only
be possible by a trial and legal evidence.
There is no parallel between
prosecution in a Court of law and a
detention order under the Act. One is a
punitive action and the other is a
preventive act. In one case a person is
punished on proof of his guilt and the
standard is proof beyond reasonable
doubt whereas in preventive detention a
man is prevented from doing something
which it is necessary for reasons
mentioned in section 3 of the Act to
prevent.‖
34. In another leading decision in Khudiram
Das v. State of W.B. this Court stated : (SCC
pp. 90-91, para 8)
―8. ... The power of detention is clearly
a preventive measure. It does not partake
in any manner of the nature of
punishment. It is taken by way of
precaution to prevent mischief to the
community. Since every preventive
measure is based on the principle that a
person should be prevented from doing
something which, if left free and
unfettered, it is reasonably probable he
would do, it must necessarily proceed in
all cases, to some extent, on suspicion or
anticipation as distinct from proof.
Patanjali Sastri, C.J. pointed out in State
of Madras v. V.G. Row that preventive
detention is ‗largely precautionary and
based on suspicion' and to these
observations may be added the following
words uttered by the learned Chief
Justice in that case with reference to the
observations of Lord Finlay in R. v.
Halliday, namely, that ‗the Court was the
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least appropriate tribunal to investigate
into circumstances of suspicion on which
such anticipatory action must be largely
based'. This being the nature of the
proceeding, it is impossible to conceive
how it can possibly be regarded as
capable of objective assessment. The
matters which have to be considered by
the detaining authority are whether the
person concerned, having regard to his
past conduct judged in the light of the
surrounding circumstances and other
relevant material, would be likely to act
in a prejudicial manner as contemplated
in any of sub-clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of
Clause (1) of sub-section (1) of section 3,
and if so, whether it is necessary to
detain him with a view to preventing him
from so acting...................‖
35. Recently, in Naresh Kumar Goyal v.
Union of India the Court said : (SCC p. 280,
para 8)
―8. It is trite law that an order of
detention is not a curative or reformative
or punitive action, but a preventive
action, avowed object of which being to
prevent the anti-social and subversive
elements from imperiling the welfare of
the country or the security of the nation
or from disturbing the public tranquility
or from indulging in smuggling activities
or from engaging in illicit traffic in
narcotic drugs and psychotropic
substances, etc. Preventive detention is
devised to afford protection to society.
The authorities on the subject have
consistently taken the view that
preventive detention is devised to afford
protection to society. The object is not to
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punish a man for having done something
but to intercept before he does it, and to
prevent him from doing so. It, therefore,
becomes imperative on the part of the
detaining authority as well as the
executing authority to be very vigilant
and keep their eyes skinned but not to
turn a blind eye in securing the detenu
and executing the detention order
because any indifferent attitude on the
part of the detaining authority or
executing authority will defeat the very
purpose of preventive action and turn the
detention order as a dead letter and
frustrate the entire proceedings.
Inordinate delay, for which no
adequate explanation is furnished, led
to the assumption that the live and
proximate link between the grounds of
detention and the purpose of detention
is snapped. (See P.U. Iqbal v. Union of
India, Ashok Kumar v. Delhi Admn. and
Bhawarlal Ganeshmalji v. State of T.N.)‖
(emphasis supplied)
11. Thus, testing the validity of the impugned
order on the anvil of the principles so laid down
by the Apex Court, it becomes manifestly clear
that the order is flawed and cannot be sustained
as there is an inordinate delay in passing the
impugned order, which has led to loose its
effectiveness.‖
16. A Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Meena Sonkar
Vs. State of M.P. and others reported in 2017 (2) M.P.L.J. 565 has
held as under:-
―16. Division Bench of this Court in the case of
Ashok Kumar Patel v. State of M.P., 2009 (4)
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M.P.L.J. 434 after considering section 5 of the Act
held thus:
―8. The expression is engaged or is about to
be engaged‖ in the commission of offence
involving force or violence or an offence
punishable under Chapter XII, XVI or
XVII or under section 506 or 509 of the
Penal Code, 1860 or in the abetment of any
such offence, shows that the commission of
the offence or the abetment of such offence
by the person must have a very close
proximity to the date on which the order is
proposed to be passed under section 5(b) of
the Act of 1990. Hence, if a person was
engaged in the commission of offence or in
abetment of an offence of the type
mentioned in section 5(b), several years or
several months back, there cannot be any
reasonable ground for believing that the
person is engaged or is about to be engaged
in the commission of such offence.‖
17. In the case of Ramgopal Raghuvanshi v. State
of M.P., 2014 (4) M.P.LJ. 654 this Court after
considering the earlier judgments in respect of
section 5 of the Act held that the order of
externment cannot be passed on the basis of old
and stale cases. A co-ordinate Bench of this Court
at Indore in the case of Bhim @ Vipul v. Home
Department, W.P. No. 4329/2015, decided on 14-
9-2015 [2015 MPLJ Online (Cri.) (S.C.) 4] has
also considered the judgments rendered in the
cases of Ashok Kumar (supra) and Ramgopal
Raghuvanshi (supra) and held that the expression
―engaged or is to be engaged‖ used in section
5(b)(i) shows that commission of offence or the
abetment of such offence by the person must have
close proximity to the date on which the order is
proposed to be passed under section 5(b) of the
Act.
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* * *
19. Under the provision of section 5 of the Act, if a
detention order has to be passed, there has to be
sufficient material for passing the order as
fundamental right of freedom of a person is
involved. The order passed by the appellate
Authority is nothing but repetition of the order
passed by the District Magistrate without any
application of mind.
20. In the case of Sanju @ Sanjay Ben v. State of
M.P., 2005 MPLJ Online 3 : 2005 (4) MPHT 102
while considering the provisions of the
Adhiniyam, 1990, the Court held that the provision
is not punitive in its nature and a person cannot be
externed for his past acts. Although past activities
of a person may afford a guide as to his behaviour
in future, they must be reviewed in the context of
the time when the order is proposed to be made.
The past activities must be related to the situation
existing at the moment when the order is to be
passed. In the present case from the facts it is
noted that the same cases were being repeatedly
considered by the authority and on earlier
occasions, he found that the same material cannot
formed a basis for passing an order of externment
but by the impugned order is passed on the basis of
most of the same cases which are old and stale
which has already been held by this Court in
number of cases as discussed above that the old
and stale activities cannot be grounds of
externment.
21. The opportunity of hearing and application of
mind by the competent authority have been held
essential requirements before passing an order of
externment or detention under the Adhiniyam,
1990 or the Act, 1980. The Division Bench in the
case of Ravi Tiwari v. Union of India, 2003 MPLJ
Online 3 : 2003 (3) MPHT 528 held that the
authorities cannot pass orders or cannot grant
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approval mechanically by filling the gaps in
cyclostyle order. Another Division Bench in the
case of Shri Sayeed alias Aslam v. State of M.P.,
2003 MPLJ Online 4 : 2003 (4) MPHT 312 (DB)
held that in the cases of detention order passed
under the Act, 1980 subjective satisfaction of the
authority cannot be lightly recorded by
reproducing the words and the sentences of the
statute. There has to be proper consideration and
appreciation for recording the satisfaction which
has to be passed on true materials.‖
17. If the facts and circumstances of this case are tested on the anvil
of judgment passed by Supreme Court in the case of Deepak (supra) as
well as judgments passed by Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the
cases of Gangaram (supra) and Meena Sonkar (supra), it is clear that
old and stale cases have been taken into consideration. Another two
offences which were registered in the year 2022 & 2023 are trivial in
nature. There is no material on record to suggest that witnesses were
afraid of the petitioner and were not willing to come forward to depose
against him. Kamal Singh Gehlot, SHO Police Station Gramin
Navegaon in his statement had stated that petitioner has been convicted
in some of the trials which clearly means that witnesses were not afraid
of the petitioner and they were deposing against him. Furthermore, it is
clear from the statement of SHO Police Station Gramin Navegaon,
District Balaghat that the very purpose of initiating proceedings under
Section 5 of M.P. Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam was to keep the petitioner
away from election proceedings.
18. Furthermore, District Magistrate Balaghat has considered the
additional materials which were supplied to him by SHO, Police Station
Gramin Navegaon after the case was finally heard and in that situation,
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the District Magistrate should not have either taken into consideration
the additional material or should have given an opportunity of hearing to
the petitioner to meet out the additional material which was to be relied
upon against him. Once the petitioner had expressed that he wants to
cross-examine the departmental witnesses, then it was obligatory on the
part of the District Magistrate to provide an opportunity to do so but that
was not done. Even in the order-sheet dated 06/11/2023, on which SHO
Police Station Gramin Navegaon was examined, it is nowhere
mentioned that petitioner had refused to cross-examine him.
19. Considering the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case,
this Court is of considered opinion that the order of externment passed
against the petitioner cannot be upheld.
20. Accordingly, order dated 06/04/2023 passed by District
Magistrate, Balaghat in Miscellaneous Criminal Case No.72/
Externment/2023, by which petitioner was directed to remove himself
from the limits of districts Balaghat, Seoni, Mandla, Dindori for a period
of one year as well as order dated 29/07/2024 passed by Commissioner,
Jabalpur Division, Jabalpur in Appeal No.33/Externment/2024, are
hereby quashed.
21. Petition succeeds and is hereby allowed.
(G.S. AHLUWALIA)
JUDGE
S.M.
