Madhya Pradesh High Court
Kamlesh vs Aman Singh on 30 May, 2024
Author: Vivek Rusia
Bench: Vivek Rusia
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT G WA L I O R
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VIVEK RUSIA
&
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE RAJENDRA KUMAR VANI
CRIMINAL REVISION No. 97 of 2005
BETWEEN:-
KAMLESH S/O HIMMAT SINGH, AGED ABOUT 33
YEARS, OCCUPATION: AGRICULTURE R/O
BERKEDI BUJURG, DISTRICT VIDISHA
(MADHYA PRADESH)
.....PETITIONER
(NONE )
AND
1. AMAN SINGH S/O SHRI PRAHLAD SINGH
BAGEL, AGED ABOUT 59 YEARS, R/O GRAM
BERKHEDI BUJURG P.S. SATPADA, DISTRICT
VIDISHA (MADHYA PRADESH)
2. JAIRAM S/O PRAHLAD SINGH BAGHEL, AGED
ABOUT 52 YEARS, R/O GRAM BERKHEDI
BUJURG P.S. SATPADA, DISTRICT VIDISHA
(MADHYA PRADESH)
3. RANVEER S/O AMAN SINGH BAGHEL, AGED
ABOUT 26 YEARS, R/O GRAM BERKHEDI
BUJURG P.S. SATPADA, DISTRICT VIDISHA
(MADHYA PRADESH)
4. JITENDRA SINGH S/O AMAN SINGH BAGHEL,
AGED ABOUT 22 YEARS, R/O GRAM
BERKHEDI BUJURG P.S. SATPADA, DISTRICT
VIDISHA (MADHYA PRADESH)
5. KALYAN SINGH S/O SANMAN SINGH BAGHEL,
AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS, R/O GRAM
2
BERKHEDI BUJURG P.S. SATPADA, DISTRICT
VIDISHA (MADHYA PRADESH)
6. PADAM SINGH S/O SANMAN SINGH BAGHEL,
AGED ABOUT 28 YEARS, R/O GRAM
BERKHEDI BUJURG P.S. SATPADA, DISTRICT
VIDISHA (MADHYA PRADESH)
KOMAL SINGH S/O TARAN SINGH BAGHEL,
7.
AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS, R/O GRAM
BERKHEDI BUJURG P.S. SATPADA, DISTRICT
VIDISHA (MADHYA PRADESH)
8. TARAN SINGH S/O BALDEV SINGH BAGHEL,
AGED ABOUT 57 YEARS, R/O GRAM
BERKHEDI BUJURG P.S. SATPADA, DISTRICT
VIDISHA (MADHYA PRADESH)
SARDAR SINGH S/O SARMAN SINGH
9.
BAGHEL, AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS, R/O GRAM
BERKHEDI BUJURG P.S. SATPADA, DISTRICT
VIDISHA (MADHYA PRADESH)
10. THROUGH INCHARGE THE STATE OF
MADHYA PRADESH POLICE STATION
SATPADA, DISTRICT VIDISHA (MADHYA
PRADESH)
.....RESPONDENTS
(SHRI SANJAY GUPTA - LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT
NOS. 1 TO 9).
(SHRI RAJESH SHUKLA - ADDITIONAL ADVOCATE GENERAL FOR THE
RESPONDENT NO.10/STATE).
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reserved on : 28.5.2024
Pronounced on : 30.5.2024
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
This Criminal Revision having been heard and reserved for order,
coming on for pronouncement this day, Hon'ble Shri Justice Rajendra
Kumar Vani pronounced the following :
ORDER
This criminal revision has been preferred by the petitioner under
section 397 r/w section 401 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 against
acquittal of respondents of offence under Sections 148, 324, 307, 307/149
of the I.P.C. from the Court of First Additional Sessions Judge, Vidisha in
Sessions Trial No.195/2002 vide judgment dated 5.10.2004.
2. As per prosecution story, complainant- Kamlesh Singh (PW-2) lodged
an oral complaint to the effect that on 4.4.2002 when he was going with his
brother Virendra Singh in a tractor towards agricultural field of Nadiyare
and when he reached near the agriculture field of Aman Singh, Aman Singh,
Jairam, Ranveer Singh, Jitendra Singh came and Aman Singh told them that
he will not allow to pass the tractor through his agricultural field; however,
there was no crop in his agricultural field. The complainant party said that
there is way in his agricultural field allow us to go through the field and on
this Aman Singh and other co-accused persons started quarreling him. Aman
Singh assaulted his brother Virendra Singh on head by means of pharsa,
Ranvir Singh assaulted him by means of katarna which hit him on his right
hand. Jairam assaulted him by means of katarna which hit him on his back,
as a result of which, he fell down. His brothers Badam Singh and Thakur
Singh, his nephew Ranjit and Brijendra Singh who were storing gram in
threshing floor came to rescue them then Sardar Singh, Kalyan Singh,
Padam Singh, Taran Singh, Komal Singh came armed with pharsa and
katarna along with Aman Singh, Jairam Singh, Ranvir Singh, Jitendra
Singh with common intention started marpeet as a result of which Thakur
Singh, Badam Singh, Ranjit Singh, Brijendra Singh received grievous
injuries. Bihari Singh, Jeevan Singh, Gyan Singh, Babu Lal were witnessed
of the incident and when these people reached on the spot, all the accused
persons left the place. Before six months, the complainant party and the
accused persons have a dispute over a land and due to this previous enmity,
the aforesaid accused persons assaulted the complainant party. On the basis
of the aforesaid, an FIR has been registered at police station Khamkheda,
District Vidisha bearing Crime No. 0/2 for the offence punishable under
Sections 147, 148, 149 and 307 of the I.P.C. On lodging of F.I.R, criminal
law was triggered and set in motion and after completion of investigation,
the charge sheet were submitted before the competent court.
3. The learned trial Court framed the charges against the respondents
for the offence punishable under Sections 148, 324, 307 and 307/149 of
I.P.C, which were denied by them. The learned trial Court after hearing
learned counsel for the rival parties and after appreciating the evidence
available on record, vide judgment dated 5/10/2004 acquitted the
respondents from the offence punishable under Sections 148, 324, 307 and
307/149 IPC, against which, the present revision is filed.
4. The present revision petition has been filed on the ground that the
impugned judgment passed by the learned Sessions Court is illegal and
deserves to be set aside. It was further pleaded that to prove the offence
against the respondents sufficient evidence was on record. The findings of
the learned Sessions Court is perverse and deserves to be set aside. In such
circumstances, the revision filed by the petitioner be allowed and the
impugned judgment passed by the learned Sessions Court be set aside and
the respondents be convicted.
5. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that there was no
evidence to prove the offence alleged to have been committed by the
respondents. It is submitted that after due appreciation of evidence, the
learned Sessions Court found that prosecution has failed to prove the case
against the respondents beyond reasonable doubt. It is submitted that in the
facts and circumstances of the case, no case is made out for interference,
hence revision filed by the petitioner deserves to be dismissed.
6. Having regard to the arguments addressed by the learned
Additional Advocate General, evidence on record and reasoning giving
upon the acquittal of the accused persons it is found that there was
previous enmity between the accused party and the complainant party and
various criminal and civil cases were pending amongst them. On the date
of incident complainant party Kamlesh and Virendra were tried to pass
the tractor through the field of Aman Singh. When Aman Singh stopped
them, the complainant party themselves started beating Aman Singh due
to which Aman Singh has also sustained injuries on head. It also
transpires from the evidence on record that there was a separate way
available for the complainant party for reaching their field but they
forcibly wants to pass the tractor through the field of Aman Singh in
pursuance of their previous enmity. The injuries on the body of the
complainant party Virendra Singh, Kamlesh, Badam Singh, Ranjit and
Brijendra were found to be simple in nature and it was also not proved
from the ocular as well as medical evidence that it is a case of attempt to
murder of aforesaid accused persons and complainant party.
7. It is also found from the evidence that only accused Aman Singh
Ranveer and Jitendra Singh has caused injuries to the complainant party
and no involvement of the other accused persons were found proved in
the incident and so far as the act of these three accused persons are
concerned, it also proved that they acted in their defence while stopping
the complaint party to pass the tractor through their field and to avoid the
encroachment of complainant party to the field of Aman Singh.
Undisputedly, the place of incident is the field of accused Aman Singh.
Complainant party reached there and thereafter incident took place. The
injury on the body of Aman Singh has not satisfactorily been explained
by the prosecution.
8. In the case of Vajrapu Sambayya Naidu and others vs. State of
A.P. And others 2004 SCC 1768 (in para 19 and 20), the Hon'ble Apex
Court has held as under:-
19. Once it is held that it was the defence party
which was in possession of the land in question, the
complexion of the entire case changes because in
such event the appellants cannot be held to be the
aggressors. In fact, the trial court also found that the
appellants were only defending their possession
against the deceased and his family members. The
defence case is, therefore, probabilised, that they
were defending their possession when members of
the prosecution party sought to dispossess them by
use of force. It was not disputed before us, and it
cannot be disputed in view of the clear evidence on
record, that three of the appellants, namely, A-2, A-9
and A-12 also received injuries in the same incident
and they were also got medically examined by the
investigating officer the same day. It was found that
they had also suffered several injuries caused by
sharp cutting weapons. These injuries have not been
explained by the prosecution, which further
probabilises the case of the defence that the
prosecution party was the aggressor. If the defence
party was in possession of the land in question, there
was really no reason for it to commit the aggression,
and if at all it was the prosecution party which could
have attempted to dispossess the appellants herein by
use of force.
It is laid down in the case of Vajrapu Sambayaya Naidu supra that
when it is found that complainant party was aggressor and land is in
possession of the accused then accused party while stopping the
complainant party has a right of defence by causing injuries to them.
9. In the case of Bhagwan Swaroop v. State of M.P AIR 1992 SC
675 (in para-9) the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:-
9. We do not agree with the Courts below. It is
established on the record that Ram Swaroop was
being given lathi blows by the complainant party
and it was at that time that gun-shot was fired by
Bhagwan Swaroop to save his father from further
blows. A lathi is capable of causing a simple as well
as a fatal injury. Whether in fact the injuries actually
caused were simple or grievous is of no
consequence. It is the scenario of a father being
given lathi blows which has to be kept in mind and
we are of the view that in such a situation a son
could reasonably apprehend danger to the life of his
father and his firing a gun-shot at that point of time
in defence of his father is justified. We, therefore, set
aside the finding of the Courts below on this point
and hold that Bhagwan Swaroop fired the gunshot to
defend the person of his father.
In the case of Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab, (2010) 2 SCC
333 (in para-30, 31, 34, 40 and 56) the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as
under:-
30. The right to protect one's own person and
property against the unlawful aggressions of others
is a right inherent in man. The duty of protecting the
person and property of others is a duty which a man
owes to society of which he is a member and the
preservation of which is both his interest and duty. It
is, indeed, a duty which flows from human sympathy.
As Bentham said:
"It is a noble movement of the heart, that
indignation which kindles at the sight of the
feeble injured by the strong. It is a noble
movement which makes us forget our danger at
the first cry of distress.... It concerns the public
safety that every honest man should consider
himself as the natural protector of every
other."
But such protection must not be extended beyond the
necessities of the case, otherwise it will encourage a
spirit or lawlessness and disorder. The right has,
therefore, been restricted to offences against the
human body and those relating to aggression on
property.
31. When there is real apprehension that the
aggressor might cause death or grievous hurt, in
that event the right of private defence of the
defender could even extend to causing of death. A
mere reasonable apprehension is enough to put the
right of self-defence into operation, but it is also a
settled position of law that a right of self-defence is
only a right to defend oneself and not to retaliate. It
is not a right to take revenge.
34. The basic principle underlying the doctrine of
the right of private defence is that when an
individual or his property is faced with a danger and
immediate aid from the State machinery is not
readily available, that individual is entitled to
protect himself and his property. The right of private
defence is available only to one who is suddenly
confronted with the necessity of averting an
impending danger not of self-creation. That being
so, the necessary corollary is that the violence which
the citizen defending himself or his property is
entitled to use must not be unduly disproportionate
to the injury which is sought to be averted or which
is reasonably apprehended and should not exceed its
legitimate purpose.
40. The law clearly spells out that the right of
private defence is available only when there is
reasonable apprehension of receiving the injury. The
law makes it clear that it is necessary that the extent
of right of private defence is that the force used must
bear a reasonable proportion of the injury to be
averted, that is, the injury inflicted on the assailant
must not be greater than is necessary for the
protection of the person assaulted. A person in fear
of his life is not expected to modulate his defence
step by step, but at the same time it should not be
totally disproportionate.
56. In order to find out whether the right of private
defence is available or not, the injuries received by
the accused, the imminence of threat to his safety, the
injuries caused by the accused and the circumstances
whether the accused had time to have recourse to
public authorities are all relevant factors to be
considered.
10. In the light of the aforesaid dictums coupled with the facts and
circumstances of the case as well as evidence on record, the conclusion of
acquittal does not seem to be perverse or illegal.
11. Even otherwise, it is well settled in law that the revisional powers
can be exercise only if there is a flagrant miscarriage of justice in the
sense that the findings are against evidence and facts, but where the
acquittal is recorded after due appreciation on the evidence on record,
interference by the revisional court normally is not warranted.
12. Testing the reasonings of acquittal on the touchstone of the said
settled principles of law, the approach of the appellate court seems to be
reasonable, plausible and possible from the evidence recorded. The
judgment assailed in the revision, therefore, does not call for any
interference.
13. Resultantly, the revision fails and is hereby dismissed for want of
substance.
(VIVEK RUSIA) (RAJENDRA KUMAR VANI)
JUDGE JUDGE
Ahmad*
DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH BENCH GWALIOR,
MOHD AHMAD
ou=HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH BENCH GWALIOR,
2.5.4.20=76cd720db57b34b7642c70ed7eaf9b624f80d89cea07317bb14d
87e882cf0d0f, postalCode=474001, st=Madhya Pradesh,
serialNumber=F3F56CD397D8CD6A76865A062F285CC6010CB90C4A13
B78A9AEC4BA8C65B56BA, cn=MOHD AHMAD
Date: 2024.05.31 11:37:27 +05'30'
