Citation : 2024 Latest Caselaw 15090 MP
Judgement Date : 21 May, 2024
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ACHAL KUMAR PALIWAL
ON THE 21 st OF MAY, 2024
SECOND APPEAL No. 2980 of 2022
BETWEEN:-
1. LAYAK MIRZA S/O LATE MIRZA SADIQ ALI, AGED
ABOUT 63 YEARS, R/O LOHARA, TAHSIL
BARGHAT, DISTRICT SEONI (MADHYA PRADESH)
2. SABIK MIRZA S/O LATE MIRZA SADIQ ALI, AGED
ABOUT 54 YEARS, R/O LOHARA, TAHSIL
BARGHAT, DISTRICT SEONI (MADHYA PRADESH)
3. DAFIQ MIRZA S/O LATE MIRZA SADIQ ALI BEG,
AGED ABOUT 59 YEARS, R/O LOHARA, TAHSIL
BARGHAT, DISTRICT SEONI (MADHYA PRADESH)
4. MIRZA TEJAK ALI BEG S/O LATE HAJIK ALI BEG,
AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS, R/O DIWANJIPURA
CHHINDWARA TAHSIL AND DISTRICT
CHHINDWARA (MADHYA PRADESH)
5. GASIQ MIRZA S/O MIRZA HAJIK ALI BEG, AGED
ABOUT 40 YEARS, R/O DIWANJIPURA
CHHINDWARA TAHSIL AND DISTRICT
CHHINDWARA (MADHYA PRADESH)
6. MAHAZAVIN BANO W/O MUBIN AHMED, AGED
ABOUT 52 YEARS, R/O DEVIPURA PUSAD
DISTRICT YAVATMAL (MAHARASHTRA)
7. NAZNIN W/O AKHTAR KHAN, AGED ABOUT 64
YEAR S , R/O GONA POST BANDOL DISTRICT
SEONI (MADHYA PRADESH)
8. TUVIN BANO W/O MUHIBBURREHMAN, AGED
ABOUT 66 YEARS, R/O CHAMANPURI AMARVATI
(MAHARASHTRA)
.....APPELLANTS
(BY SHRI JAIDEEP SIRPURKAR - ADVOCATE)
AND
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: SARSWATI
MEHRA
Signing time: 5/24/2024
10:11:09 AM
2
1. TAHSILDAR TAHSIL OFFICE CHHINDWARA
CHHINDWARA (MADHYA PRADESH)
2. COLLECTOR COLLECTORATE OFFICE DISTRICT
CHHINDWARA (MADHYA PRADESH)
3. SECRETARY REVENUE DEPARTMENT MADHYA
PRADESH BHOPAL (MADHYA PRADESH)
4. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH THROUGH
C O L L E C T O R CHHINDWARA DISTRICT
CHHINDWARA (MADHYA PRADESH)
5. TEHSILDAR TAHSIL OFFICE MOHKHED DISTRICT
CHHINDWARA (MADHYA PRADESH)
6. SARPANCH GRAM PANCHAYAT
KHUNAJHIRKALA TAHSIL MOHKHED DISTRICT
CHHINDWARA (MADHYA PRADESH)
7. SMT. SHAHIDA MIRZA W/O SHAVAQ MIRZA,
AGED ABOUT 70 YEARS, R/O LOHARA POST
KHOOT TAHSIL BARGHAT DISTRICT SEONI
(MADHYA PRADESH)
8. MOHAMMAD ALI S/O SHAVAQ MIRZA, AGED
ABOUT 54 YEARS, R/O LOHARA POST KHOOT
TAHSIL BARGHAT DISTRICT SEONI (MADHYA
PRADESH)
9. SHOUQAT ALI S/O SHAVAQ MIRZA, AGED ABOUT
50 YEARS, R/O LOHARA POST KHOOT TAHSIL
BARGHAT DISTRICT SEONI (MADHYA PRADESH)
10. SMT. JAHIN W/O ABDUL REHMAN, AGED ABOUT
48 YEARS, R/O VILLAGE DAHEGAON
(MAHARASHTRA)
11. SMT. SHAHEEN W/O JHULFEQUAR ALI, AGED
ABOUT 46 YEARS, R/O VILLAGE KAMTHI
(MAHARASHTRA)
12. SMT. NASREEN W/O AZAD, AGED ABOUT 44
Y E A R S , R/O VILLAGE DAHEGAON
(MAHARASHTRA)
13. MIRZA NASHIK ALI BEG S/O WASIK ALI BEG,
AGED ABOUT 69 YEARS, R/O BEHIND TRIBAL
MUSEUM CHAKKAR ROAD CHHINDWARA
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: SARSWATI
MEHRA
Signing time: 5/24/2024
10:11:09 AM
3
(MADHYA PRADESH)
14. MUS. SHAHIDA MIRZA W/O MIRZA TARIK ALI
BEG, AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS, R/O BEHIND
TRIBAL MUSEUM CHAKKAR ROAD
CHHINDWARA (MADHYA PRADESH)
15. MU ZAREEN MIRZA D/O MIRZA TARIK ALI BEG
R/O BEHIND TRIBAL MUSEUM CHAKKAR ROAD
CHHINDWARA (MADHYA PRADESH)
16. GAJFAR MIRZA S/O TARIK ALI BEG, AGED ABOUT
33 YEARS, R/O BEHIND TRIBAL MUSEUM
CHAKKAR ROAD CHHINDWARA (MADHYA
PRADESH)
17. MUJFAR MIRZA S/O TARIK ALI BEG, AGED
ABOUT 32 YEARS, R/O BEHIND TRIBAL MUSEUM
CHAKKAR ROAD CHHINDWARA (MADHYA
PRADESH)
18. MIRZA WASIK ALI S/O MIRZA WASIK ALI BEG,
AGED ABOUT 66 YEARS, R/O BEHIND TRIBAL
MUSEUM CHAKKAR ROAD CHHINDWARA
(MADHYA PRADESH)
19. TAHIR MIRZA S/O ARIF MIRZA, AGED ABOUT 38
Y E A R S , R/O LOHARA, TAHSIL BARGHAT,
DISTRICT SEONI (MADHYA PRADESH)
20. SEHNAAZ MIRZA D/O SHARIF MIRZA, AGED
ABOUT 36 YEARS, R/O LOHARA, TAHSIL
BARGHAT, DISTRICT SEONI (MADHYA PRADESH)
21. MUS. AASHIFA JAHAN BEGUM W/O SHARIQ
MIRZA, AGED ABOUT 66 YEARS, R/O LOHARA,
TAHSIL BARGHAT, DISTRICT SEONI (MADHYA
PRADESH)
22. MOHAMMAD AKHBAR PASHA S/O MOHAMMAD
ANWAR PASHA, AGED ABOUT 79 YEARS, R/O
PASHA CAMPUS CHIKHLA MINES TAHSIL
TUMSAR DISTRICT BHANDARA (MAHARASHTRA)
23. MOHAMMAD ATHAR PASHA S/O MOHAMMAD
AKWAR PASHA, AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS, R/O 19/A
REDCROSS ROAD OPPOSITE PARMANAND
APATMENTS SADAR GANDHI CHOWK NAGPUR
TAHSIL AND DISTRICT NAGPUR
(MAHARASHTRA)
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: SARSWATI
MEHRA
Signing time: 5/24/2024
10:11:09 AM
4
.....RESPONDENTS
( BY SHRI SHAILENDRA MISHRA - P.L. APPEARING ON BEHALF OF
ADVOCATE GENERAL)
This appeal coming on for admission this day, th e court passed the
following:
ORDER
This second appeal has been filed under Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, against the judgment and decree dated 28/10/2022 passed by IInd Additional District Judge, Chhindwara (MP) in RCA No.79-A of 2018, arising out of judgment and decree dated 25.08.2018 passed in C.S.No.70-A of 2014, by IVth Civil Judge, Class I, Chhindwara.
2. Brief facts of the case are that plaintiff filed a suit for declaration of title and for recovery of possession and for mense profit and mandatory injunction on the ground the suit property was owned by ancestors of plaintiffs and plaintiffs have inherited the same from their ancestors. Therefore, plaintiffs are owner of the suit property later on suit land was recorded in grass head/name of state. Plaintiff came to know about above entries in the year 2011. Thereafter, present suit has been filed.
3. Learned counsel for the appellant submit that name of Mirza Mohammad Ali Beg grand father of plaintiff was recorded in revenue records as owner. But later on suit land was recorded in grass head/in the name of state without informing plaintiffs/their ancestors. After recording land in grass head/in the name of state, State started granting lease of the same to other persons. Defendants have filed written statements but they have not adduced any evidence in rebuttal. It is also urged that Appellate Court has made out a new case which was neither pleaded by plaintiffs nor by defendants. It is also urged that no notification issued under Section 3 in M.P.Abolition of Proprietary
Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act,1950 has been filed on record. Learned counsel for the appellant also submits that plaintiffs are in possession of part of the suit property. On above grounds, it is urged that in the instant appeal, substantial question of law as mentioned in the appeal memo, arises for determination. Therefore, appeal be admitted for final hearing.
4. Heard. Perused record of the case.
5. Learned trial Court vide judgment dated 25.08.2018 passed in RCS No.70-A/2011 dismissed plaintiff's suit and appellate Court vide judgement dated 28.10.2022 passed in RCA No.79-A/2018 dismissed appeal filed by the plaintiff and affirmed trial Courts findings.
6. Therefore, question arises as to when this Court can interfere with the findings of facts arrived at by the first appellate court/trial court. In this connection, I would like to refer to the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Chandrabhan (Deceased) through Lrs. And Others vs. Saraswati and Others reported in AIR 2022 SC 4601, wherein Hon'ble Apex Court in para 33(iii) has held as under:-
" 3 3 (iii) The general rule is that the High Court will not interfere with findings of facts arrived at by the courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well - recognized exceptions are where (i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. When we refer to "decision" based on no evidence", it not only refers to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to any case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding."
7. Similarly in the case of Gurnam Singh (Dead) by legal
representatives and Others vs. Lehna Singh (Dead) by legal representatives, Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:-
"13.1.......However, in Second Appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, the High Court, by impugned judgment and order has interfered with the Judgment and Decree passed by the First Appellate Court. While interfering with the judgment and order passed by the first Appellate Court, it appears that while upsetting the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court, the High Court has again appreciated the entire evidence on record, which in exercise of powers under Section 100 CPC is not permissible. While passing the impugned judgment and order, it appears that High Court has not at all appreciated the fact that the High Court was deciding the Second Appeal under Section 100 of the CPC and not first appeal under Section 96 of the CPC. As per the law laid down by this Court in a catena of decisions, the jurisdiction of High Court to entertain second appeal under Section 100 CPC after the 1976 Amendment, is confined only when the second appeal involves a substantial question of law. The existence of 'a substantial question of law' is a sine qua non for the exercise of the jurisdiction under Section 100 of the CPC. As observed and held by this Court in the case of Kondiba Dagadu Kadam (Supra), in a second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, the High Court cannot substitute its own opinion for that of the First Appellate Court, unless it finds that the conclusions drawn by the lower Court were erroneous being:
(i) Contrary to the mandatory provisions of the applicable law; OR
(ii) Contrary to the law as pronounced by the Apex Court; OR
(iii) Based on inadmissible evidence or no evidence It is further observed by this Court in the aforesaid decision that if First Appellate Court has exercised its discretion in a judicial manner, its decision cannot be recorded as suffering from an error either of law or of procedure requiring interference in second appeal. It is further observed that the Trial Court could
have decided differently is not a question of law justifying interference in second appeal".
8. In this connection, Ishwar Dass Jain (Dead) through Lrs vs. Sohan Lal (Dead) by LRs reported in (2000) 1 Supreme Court Cases 434 may also be referred to. Paras 11 and 12 of the said judgment is relevant and is under:-
"11. There are two situations in which interference with findings of fact is permissible. The first one is when material or relevant evidence is not considered which, if considered would have led to an opposite conclusion. This principle has been laid down in a series of judgments of this Court in relation to section 100 CPC after the 1976 amendment. In Dilbagrai Punjabi vs. Sharad Chandra [1988 Supple. SCC 710], while dealing with a Second Appeal of 1978 decided by the Madhya Pradesh High Court on 20.8.81, L.M.Sharma, J.(as he then was) observed that "The Court (the first appellate Court) is under a duty to examine the entire relevant evidence on record and if it refuses to consider important evidence having direct bearing on the disputed issue and the error which arises as of a magnitude that it gives birth to a substantial question of law, the High Court is fully authorised to set aside the finding. This is the situation in the present case."
In that case, an admission by the defendant-tenant in the reply notice in regard to the plaintiff's title and the description of the plaintiff as `owner' of the property signed by the defendant were not considered by the first appellate Court while holding that the plaintiff had not proved his title. The High Court interfered with the finding on the ground of non- consideration of vital evidence and this Court affirmed the said decision. That was upheld. In Jagdish Singh vs. Nathu Singh [1992 (1) SCC 647], with reference to a Second Appeal of 1978 disposed of on 5.4.1991. Venkatachaliah, J. (as he then was) held:
"where the findings by the Court of facts is vitiated by non- consideration of relevant evidence or by an essentially erroneous approach to the matter, the High Court is not precluded from recording proper findings."
Again in Sundra Naicka Vadiyar vs. Ramaswami Ayyar
[1995 Suppl. (4) SCC 534], it was held that where certain vital documents for deciding the question of possession were ignored - such as a compromise, an order of the revenue Court
- reliance on oral evidence was unjustified. In yet another case in Mehrunissa vs. Visham Kumari [1998 (2) SCC 295] arising out of Second appeal of 1988 decided on 15.1.1996, it was held by Venkataswami, J. that a finding arrived at by ignoring the second notice issued by the landlady and without noticing that the suit was not based on earlier notices, was vitiated finding. This was in Second Appeal of 1988 decided on 15.1.1996.
12. The second situation in which interference with findings of fact is permissible is where a finding has been arrived at by the appellate Court by placing reliance on inadmissible evidence which if it was omitted, an opposite conclusion was possible. In Sri Chand Gupta vs. Gulzar Singh [1992 (1) SCC 143], it was held that the High Court was right in interfering in Second Appeal where the lower appellate Court relied upon an admission of a third party treating it as binding on the defendant. The admission was inadmissible as against the defendant. This was also a Second Appeal of 1981 disposed of on 24.9.1985".
9. Perusal of plaint averments reveal that plaintiffs have filed present suit for declaration of title, recovery of possession, permanent injunction and for mense profit for survey numbers mentioned in para 3 to 7 on the ground that plaintiffs ancestors were owner and thereafter plaintiffs have inherited suit property.
10. Perusal of para 17(a) of plaint reveals that plaintiffs have sought relief of declaration of title and no declaration with respect to possession i.e. that suit property or any part of suit property is in possession of plaintiffs has been sought therein. Instead, in pare 17(b) of plaint, plaintiffs have sought recovery of land 285.62 acre as mentioned in para 7 of plaint. Further, in para 17(d) of
plaint, plaintiffs have sought relief of means profits with respect to whole of the agricultural land.
11. Further, perusal of revenue records, comprising khasra etc., reveal that on various survey numbers, as mentioned in plaint, other persons are recorded in possession. There is no specific pleading in plaint that plaintiffs are in possession of suit property or any part thereof, mentioning specific survey number/numbers. Further, no specific date of dispossession has been mentioned in the plaint as to when plaintiffs were dispossessed and whether plaintiffs were dispossessed from whole of the suit property or any part of the suit property, if so, then, specific survey number/numbers and area thereof. This aspect has been dealt by trial court in para 25 of appellate court has also dealt with above aspect of matter in para 40 of the appellate Court judgment. It is also evident from record of the case, that persons in actual possessions of suit property has not been joined as defendants in the instant suit. Thus, present suit is not maintainable and it cannot be said that plaintiff's suit is within limitations.
12. Therefore, no interference is required in the findings recorded by Courts below especially with respect to absence of pleadings and evidence pertaining to date of dispossession and on the point of limitation and non joinder of necessary party etc. Therefore, other submissions of learned counsel for the appellant need not required to be discussed, in view of discussion in the forgoing paras.
13. If pleadings and evidence adduced by the parties and the impugned judgment passed by the first appellate court/trial court is considered, in the light of above legal principles/legal provisions reiterated in aforesaid judgments, then, in this Court's considered opinion, the findings of facts recorded by the
first appellate court/trial court are not liable to be interfered with in the instant case and it cannot be said that first appellate court/trial court has ignored any material evidence or has acted on no evidence or first appellate court/trial court has drawn wrong inferences from the proved facts etc. Further, it cannot be said that evidence taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the findings. It can also be not said that the findings of first appellate court/trial court are based on inadmissible evidence.
14. A perusal of the impugned judgment and decree passed by the first appellate court/trial court reveals that it is well reasoned and has been passed after due consideration of oral as well as documentary evidence on record. Learned counsel for the appellant has failed to show that how the findings of facts recorded by the first appellate court/trial court are illegal, perverse and based on no evidence etc. The learned first appellate court/trial court has legally and rightly dealt with the issues involved in the matter and has recorded correct findings of fact.
15. For the reasons aforesaid, I find no merit in the instant second appeal. Findings recorded by the first appellate court/trial court are fully justified by the evidence on record. Findings recorded by the first appellate court/trial court are not based on misreading or mis-appreciation of evidence nor it is shown to be illegal or perverse in any manner so as to call for interference in second appeal. No question of law, much less substantial question of law, arises for adjudication in the instant appeal. Hence, appeal is dismissed in limine.
16. A copy of this order along with record be sent back to the first appellate court/trial court for information and its compliance.
(ACHAL KUMAR PALIWAL) JUDGE sm
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