Citation : 2024 Latest Caselaw 12110 MP
Judgement Date : 1 May, 2024
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT INDORE
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VIVEK RUSIA
&
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ANIL VERMA
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 26 of 2015
BETWEEN:-
CHAIN SINGH S/O LALJI SONDHYA, AGED ABOUT 30
Y E A R S , OCCUPATION: AGRICULTURE CHANDERI
THANA SUTHALIYA (MADHYA PRADESH)
.....APPELLANT
(BY SHRI ASHISH VYAS-ADVOCATE)
AND
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH STATION HOUSE
OFFICER THRU.P.S.SUTHALIYA (MADHYA PRADESH)
.....RESPONDENTS
(BY MS. VARSHA THAKUR-ADVOCATE)
This appeal coming on for orders this day, Justice Vivek Rusia passed
the following:
JUDGMENT
Heard on : 25.04.2024
Judgment pronounced on : 01.05.2024.
The appellant has filed the present Criminal Appeal under Section 374 of Cr.P.C. against the judgment dated 24.11.2014 passed in Session Trial No.25/2014 by 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Biora, District Rajgarh whereby he has been convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302, 307 and 332 of IPC and sentenced to undergo Life Imprisonment, 4 Years R.I. and 1 Year R.I. with fine of Rs. 1,000/- with default stipulation.
Facts of the case ;-
[2] On 05.12.2013, Umesh Vishwakarma, Assistant Engineer alongwith Umesh Pratap Singh Singh, Assistant Engineer, deceased Badrilal Yadav, Lineman, Ramprasad Yadav, Lineman, Shourya Tiwari, Kanwarlal, Lineman, Helper and Driver Azhar went to the Village Chanderi to catch the electricity theft and to seize the motor used by this appellant to take water from well. Two teams were formed headed by; one Umesh Pratap Singh, Assistant Engineer with Sourya Tiwari, Ramprasad Lineman, second Umesh Vishwakarma, Assistant Engineer, with Badrilal Yadav, Lineman, Helper Kanwarlal Yadav. Both teams reached to the Village to catch the electricity theft. Umesh Vishwakarma prepared Panchnama as Chainsingh was found indulging into theft
electricity. When Ramprasad Lineman was coming to vehicle with starter. Chain Singh immediately came with iron road in his hand and started abusing Ramprasad and others with filthy language, suddenly gave a blow of rod on head of Badrilal who started bleeding. Ramprasad, Lineman and Driver Azhar Ali tried to save the Badrilal. The Chain Singh assaulted them by means of stick and stones. They also sustained injuries. Umesh Vishwakarma and others intervened in the matter. The Badrilal was referred to Hospital at Bhopal for treatment. Umesh Vishwakarma (PW-1) lodged report at Police Station Biora which was registered as Crime No.0/13 for the offence punishable under Section 353, 294, 332 and 506-B of IPC Ex.P/1. The FIR was transferred to the Police Station Suthaliya where it was registered at Crime No.252/2013 by Ashok Kumar Raghuwanshi (PW-21) as Ex.P/27.
[3]. PW-21 conducted the spot inspection and draw Spot Map Ex.P/2. He collected blood contained soil and plan soil etc. After recording the statement of witnesses, Chain Singh was arrested vide Ex.P/7. His memo was
prepared Ex.P/8 and iron road was seized vide Ex.P/9. Seized articles were sent
to FSL, Bhopal vide Ex.P/35. After completing the investigation, charge sheet was filed under Section 294, 332, 353, 506-B, 307 and 302 of IPC.
[4]. The Trial was committed to the Sessions Court on 20.01.2014 where the charges were framed, the appellant denied the charges and pleaded for trial. The charges under Section 302 of IPC was framed on account of murder of Badrilal. Under Section 332 of IPC was framed for assaulting to Ramprasad and Azhar, while discharging the public duty. The appellant was charged with section 307 of IPC causing injury to Ramprasad and Azhar by means of iron road and stone. Section 506-B was framed for threatening to Umesh Vishwakarma, Ramprasad and Azhar.
[5]. The prosecution examined 27 witnesses but in defence the appellant has not examined any witnesses. After appreciating the evidence, the appellant has been convicted and sentenced mentioned in para 1 of the judgment.
[6] At the very outset, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant is in jail since 17.12.2013 hence completed more than 10 years of jail sentence. Except sentence under Section 302 of IPC, he has undergone all the sentenced. So far as conviction under Section 302 of IPC is concerned, it is not the case of the prosecution that the appellant caused the injury with intention to kill the deceased. All of sudden, when he saw that the team of electricity company disconnected the supply and seized the starter, he become annoyed
and gave blow by means of rod. He gave single blow to the deceased without intention to kill him, therefore, at the most, he is liable to be convicted under Section 304 (part -II) of IPC instead of under Section 302 of IPC. He is poor agriculturist with no criminal record. This is first offence committed by him, thus one opportunity should be given to reform him.
[7]. Government Advocate submits that it is correct that initially an FIR was registered under Section 353, 294, 332 and 506-B of IPC in which there is no allegation that he caused the injury with intention to kill.
We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the entire record.
[8] Umesh Vishwakarma, (PW-1) Assistant Engineer deposed that he formed two team to prevent the electricity theft. They reached to Ghodha Pachar River and prepared a Panchnama. Chain Singh was found illegally drawing the electricity from the starter. The Ramprasad discontented the starter and prepared the Panchnama. When they were standing near the vehicle, Chain Singh came with iron rod and said that how they dared to seize his starter and gave blow on head of lineman, thereafter he assaulted to others. He had not stated that the appellant have previous enmity with Badri. He randomly gave blow to Badrilal amongst other employees were standing there, hence, it cannot be aid that he assaulted the deceased with intention to kill.
[9] The Apex Court in a recent judgement in the case of Anbazhagan vs. The State represented by the Inspector of Police reported in 2023 onlineSC 857 has defined the context of the true test to be adopted to find out the intention or knowledge of the accused in doing the act as under:
"60. Few important principles of law discernible from the aforesaid discussion may be summed up thus:
(1) When the court is confronted with the question, what offence the accused could be said to have committed, the true test is to find out the intention or knowledge of the accused in doing the act. If the intention or knowledge was such as is described in Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act will be murder even though only a single injury was caused. To illustrate: 'A' is bound hand and foot.
'B' comes and placing his revolver against the head of 'A',
shoots 'A' in his head killing him instantaneously. Here, there will be no difficulty in holding that the intention of 'B' in shooting 'A' was to kill him, though only single injury was caused. The case would, therefore, be of murder falling within Clause (1) of Section 300 of the IPC. Taking another instance, 'B' sneaks into the bed room of his enemy 'A' while the latter is asleep on his bed. Taking aim at the left chest of 'A', 'B' forcibly plunges a sword in the left chest of 'A' and runs away. 'A' dies shortly thereafter. The injury to 'A' was found to be sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. There may be no difficulty in holding that 'B' intentionally inflicted the particular injury found to be caused and that the said injury was objectively sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. This would bring the act of 'B' within Clause (3) of Section 300 of the IPC and render him guilty of the offence of murder although only single injury was caused. (2) Even when the intention or knowledge of the accused may fall within Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act of the accused which would otherwise be murder, will be taken out of the purview of murder, if the accused's case attracts any one of the five exceptions enumerated in that section. In the event of the case falling within any of those exceptions, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder, falling within Part 1 of Section 304 of the IPC, if the case of the accused is such as to fall within Clauses (1) to (3) of Section 300 of the IPC. It would be offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case is such as to fall within Clause (4) of Section 300 of the IPC. Again, the intention or knowledge of the accused may be such that only 2nd or 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC, may be attracted but not any of the clauses of Section 300 of the IPC. In that situation also, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 of the IPC. It would be an offence under Part I of that section, if the case fall within 2nd part of Section 299, while it would be an offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case fall within 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC.
(3) To put it in other words, if the act of an accused person falls within the first two clauses of cases of culpable homicide as described in Section 299 of the IPC it is punishable under
the first part of Section 304. If, however, it falls within the third clause, it is punishable under the second part of Section
304. In effect, therefore, the first part of this section would apply when there is 'guilty intention,' whereas the second part would apply when there is no such intention, but there is 'guilty knowledge'.
(4) Even if single injury is inflicted, if that particular injury was intended, and objectively that injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the requirements of Clause 3rdly to Section 300 of the IPC, are fulfilled and the offence would be murder.
(5) Section 304 of the IPC will apply to the following classes of cases : (i) when the case falls under one or the other of the clauses of Section 300, but it is covered by one of the exceptions to that Section, (ii) when the injury caused is not of the higher degree of likelihood which is covered by the expression 'sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death' but is of a lower degree of likelihood which is generally spoken of as an injury 'likely to cause death' and the case does not fall under Clause (2) of Section 300 of the IPC, (iii) when the act is done with the knowledge that death is likely to ensue but without intention to cause death or an injury likely to cause death.
To put it more succinctly, the difference between the two parts of Section 304 of the IPC is that under the first part, the crime of murder is first established and the accused is then given the benefit of one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC, while under the second part, the crime of murder is never established at all. Therefore, for the purpose of holding an accused guilty of the offence punishable under the second part of Section 304 of the IPC, the accused need not bring his case within one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC.
(6) The word 'likely' means probably and it is distinguished from more 'possibly'. When chances of happening are even or greater than its not happening, we may say that the thing will 'probably happen'. In reaching the conclusion, the court has to place itself in the situation of the accused and then judge whether the accused had the knowledge that by the act he was likely to cause death.
(7) The distinction between culpable homicide (Section 299 of the IPC) and murder (Section 300 of the IPC) has always to be carefully borne in mind while dealing with a charge under Section 302 of the IPC. Under the category of unlawful homicides, both, the cases of culpable homicide amounting to murder and those not amounting to murder would fall. Culpable homicide is not murder when the case is brought within the five exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC. But, even though none of the said five exceptions are pleaded or prima facie established on the evidence on record, the prosecution must still be required under the law to bring the case under any of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC t o sustain the charge of murder. If the prosecution fails to discharge this onus in establishing any one of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC, namely, 1stly to 4thly, the charge of murder would not be made out and the case may be one of culpable homicide not amounting to murder as described under Section 299 of the IPC.
(8) The court must address itself to the question of mens rea. If Clause thirdly of Section 300 is to be applied, the assailant must intend the particular injury inflicted on the deceased. This ingredient could rarely be proved by direct evidence. Inevitably, it is a matter of inference to be drawn from the proved circumstances of the case. The court must necessarily have regard to the nature of the weapon used, part of the body injured, extent of the injury, degree of force used in causing the injury, the manner of attack, the circumstances preceding and attendant on the attack.
(9) Intention to kill is not the only intention that makes a culpable homicide a murder. The intention to cause injury or injuries sufficient in the ordinary cause of nature to cause death also makes a culpable homicide a murder if death has actually been caused and intention to cause such injury or injuries is to be inferred from the act or acts resulting in the injury or injuries.
(10) When single injury inflicted by the accused results in the death of the victim, no inference, as a general principle, can be drawn that the accused did not have the intention to cause the death or that particular injury which resulted in the death of the victim. Whether an accused had the required guilty intention or not, is a question of fact which has to be
determined on the facts of each case.
(11) Where the prosecution proves that the accused had the intention to cause death of any person or to cause bodily injury to him and the intended injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, then, even if he inflicts a single injury which results in the death of the victim, the offence squarely falls under Clause thirdly of Section 300 of the IPC unless one of the exceptions applies.
(12) In determining the question, whether an accused had guilty intention or guilty knowledge in a case where only a single injury is inflicted by him and that injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the fact that the act is done without premeditation in a sudden fight or quarrel, or that the circumstances justify that the injury was accidental or unintentional, or that he only intended a simple injury, would lead to the inference of guilty knowledge, and the offence would be one under Section 304 Part II of the IPC." [10] In view of above, the Criminal Appeal is partly allowed. The conviction is altered from under Section 302 of IPC to 304 (Part-II) and sentence is reduced Life Imprisonment to the period already undergone by maintaining the fine amount. The conviction and sentenced in other offence are hereby upheld and and undergone other sentence. Appellant be released from jail if he is not required in any other case.
Let copy of this judgment be sent to Court concerned alongwith record. Certified copy as per rules.
(VIVEK RUSIA) (ANIL VERMA)
JUDGE JUDGE
Praveen
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