Madhya Pradesh High Court

Rajendra Kumar Shah vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 22 February, 2024

Author: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia

Bench: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia

                            1


 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
             AT JABALPUR
                         BEFORE
     HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE GURPAL SINGH AHLUWALIA
              ON THE 22nd OF FEBRUARY, 2024
            MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 20135 of 2022

BETWEEN:-
1.   RAJENDRA KUMAR SHAH S/O
     LATE SHRI BABAI SHAH, AGED
     ABOUT 31 YEARS, OCCUPATION:
     SERVICE R/O DEVRA POLICE
     STATION BAIDHAN DISTRICT
     SINGRAULI (M.P.) (MADHYA
     PRADESH)
2.   KEVALA PATI SHAH W/O LATE
     SHRI BABAI SHAH, AGED ABOUT
     52    YEARS,   OCCUPATION:
     HOUSEWIFE R/O DEVRA POLICE
     STATION BAIDHAN DISTRICT
     SINGRAULI (M.P.) (MADHYA
     PRADESH)
                                             .....PETITIONER
(BY SHRI SANJAY KUMAR PATEL - ADVOCATE)

AND
1.   THE   STATE  OF    MADHYA
     PRADESH THRUGH P.S. MAHILA
     POLICE STATION SINGRAULI
     DISTRICT SINGRAULI (M.P.)
     (MADHYA PRADESH)
2.   SMT. REENA SHAH W/O SHRI
     RAJENDRA SHAH D/O RAM
     LAKHAN SHAH, AGED ABOUT 31
     YEARS, OCCUPATION: PRIVATE
     SERVICE R/O VILLAGE DEVRA
     POST PACHAUR P.S. BAIDHAN
     TEHSIL     AND      DISTRICT
     SINGRAULI (M.P.) AT PRESENT
                                       2


        R/O    VILLAGE     GANIYARI
        BAIDHAN      TEHSIL     AND
        DISTRICT   SINGRAULI    M.P.
        (MADHYA PRADESH)
                                                           .....RESPONDENTS
    (RESPONDENT NO.1 BY SHRI ANUBHAV JAIN - GOVT. ADVOCATE)
    (RESPONDENT NO.2 BY SHRI GANGA RAM SAKET - ADVOCATE)

          This application coming on for admission this day, the court passed
   the following:
                                     ORDER

1. This application under section 482 of Cr.P.C. has been filed for quashment of FIR in Crime No.16/2021 registered at Police Station Mahila Thana Singrauli District Singrauli as well as Criminal Case No. 1635/2021 pending in the Court of J.M.F.C. Waidhen, District Singrauli.

2. It is the case of the applicants that they are facing trial for offences under section 498-A, 294, 323, 506, 34 IPC and section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.

3. The undisputed facts are that applicant No.1 is husband and applicant No.2 is mother-in-law of respondent No.2. It is the case of the applicants that respondent No.2 was living in live-in-relationship with applicant No.1 and accordingly, she was pressurizing him to marry. When applicant did not agree for marriage, then respondent No.2 made a complaint to the police. Under the pressure of the police and against his wishes, the applicant agreed for compromise and accordingly, a compromise application was filed before the authorities. Under pressure, the applicant No.1 performed marriage with respondent No.2 on 30.6.2021. Immediately after marriage, respondent No.2 insisted that applicant No.1 should reside separately with respondent No.2. But since

applicant No.2 was all alone after the death of her husband, therefore, it was not possible for the applicant to separate himself from his mother. Thereafter, respondent No.2 started harassing him mentally and accordingly applicant No.1 made a complaint to Energy Women's Help Desk In-charge Bargawan, District Singrauli with a request to take appropriate action against his wife and family members. However, the harassment by the respondent No.2 continued, and she also extended a threat to implicate the applicant No.1 in a false case. This information was also given to the police. On the complaint made by applicant No.1, when respondent No.2 was called in the police station, she immediately made allegations of demand of dowry and cruelty as a result FIR was registered immediately for offence under section 498-A, 294, 323, 506 IPC and section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. After completion of investigation, the Police has filed the charge sheet.

4. It is submitted by counsel for the applicants that entire allegations are false and have been made with malafide intention. Applicant No.1 had also made a complaint to the police with regard to the atrocities committed by the respondent No.2 and her family members.

5. Heard the learned counsel for the parties.

6. Before considering the allegations made in the FIR, this Court would like to consider the scope of interference of this Court in exercise of power under section 482 Cr.P.C.

7. The Supreme Court in the case of XYZ v. State of Gujarat reported in (2019) 10 SCC 337 has held as under :

14. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and after perusing the impugned order and other material

placed on record, we are of the view that the High Court exceeded the scope of its jurisdiction conferred under Section 482 CrPC, and quashed the proceedings. Even before the investigation is completed by the investigating agency, the High Court entertained the writ petition, and by virtue of interim order granted by the High Court, further investigation was stalled. Having regard to the allegations made by the appellant/informant, whether the 2nd respondent by clicking inappropriate pictures of the appellant has blackmailed her or not, and further the 2nd respondent has continued to interfere by calling Shoukin Malik or not are the matters for investigation. In view of the serious allegations made in the complaint, we are of the view that the High Court should not have made a roving inquiry while considering the application filed under Section 482 CrPC. Though the learned counsel have made elaborate submissions on various contentious issues, as we are of the view that any observation or findings by this Court, will affect the investigation and trial, we refrain from recording any findings on such issues. From a perusal of the order of the High Court, it is evident that the High Court has got carried away by the agreement/settlement arrived at, between the parties, and recorded a finding that the physical relationship of the appellant with the 2nd respondent was consensual. When it is the allegation of the appellant, that such document itself is obtained under threat and coercion, it is a matter to be investigated. Further, the complaint of the appellant about interference by the 2nd respondent by calling Shoukin Malik and further interference is also a matter for investigation. By looking at the contents of the complaint and the serious allegations made against 2nd respondent, we are of the view that the High Court has committed error in quashing the proceedings.

(Underline supplied)

8. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Tamil Nadu Vs. S. Martin & Ors. reported in (2018) 5 SCC 718 has held as under:-

"7. In our view the assessment made by the High Court at a stage when the investigation was yet to be completed, is completely incorrect and uncalled for ..........."

9. The Supreme Court in the case of Ajay Kumar Das v. State of Jharkhand, reported in (2011) 12 SCC 319 has held as under :

12. The counsel appearing for the appellant also drew our attention to the same decision which is relied upon in the impugned judgment by the High Court i.e. State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal. In the said decision, this Court held that it may not be possible to lay down any specific guidelines or watertight compartment as to when the power under Section 482 CrPC could be or is to be exercised. This Court, however, gave an exhaustive list of various kinds of cases wherein such power could be exercised. In para 103 of the said judgment, this Court, however, hastened to add that as a note of caution it must be stated that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases for the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an inquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the first information report or in the complaint and that the extraordinary or the inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whim or caprice.

10. The Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Akram Siddiqui v. State of Bihar reported in (2019) 13 SCC 350 has held as under :

5. Ordinarily and in the normal course, the High Court when approached for quashing of a criminal proceeding will not appreciate the defence of the accused; neither would it consider the veracity of the document(s) on which the accused relies. However an exception has been carved out by this Court in Yin Cheng Hsiung v. Essem Chemical Industries; State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal and

Harshendra Kumar D. v. Rebatilata Koley to the effect that in an appropriate case where the document relied upon is a public document or where veracity thereof is not disputed by the complainant, the same can be considered.

11. The Supreme Court in the case of State of A.P. v. Gourishetty Mahesh reported in (2010) 11 SCC 226 has held as under :

18. While exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge/Court. It is true that the Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process, otherwise, it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time, Section 482 is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and brings about its closure without full-fledged enquiry.

19. Though the High Court may exercise its power relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, the power should be exercised sparingly. For example, where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused or allegations in the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence or do not disclose commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused or where there is express legal bar provided in any of the provisions of the Code or in any other enactment under which a criminal proceeding is initiated or sufficient material to show that the criminal proceeding is maliciously instituted with an

ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused due to private and personal grudge, the High Court may step in.

20. Though the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 are wide, however, such power requires care/caution in its exercise. The interference must be on sound principles and the inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution.

We make it clear that if the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of inherent powers under Section 482.

12. The Supreme Court in the case of M. Srikanth v. State of Telangana, reported in (2019) 10 SCC 373 has held as under :

17. It could thus be seen, that this Court has held, that where the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute a case against the accused, the High Court would be justified in quashing the proceedings. Further, it has been held that where the uncontroverted allegations in the FIR and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose any offence and make out a case against the accused, the Court would be justified in quashing the proceedings.

13. The Supreme Court in the case of CBI v. Arvind Khanna reported in (2019) 10 SCC 686 has held as under :

17. After perusing the impugned order and on hearing the submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel on both sides, we are of the view that the impugned order passed by the High Court is not sustainable. In a petition filed under Section 482 CrPC, the High Court has recorded findings on several disputed facts and allowed the petition. Defence of the accused is to be

tested after appreciating the evidence during trial. The very fact that the High Court, in this case, went into the most minute details, on the allegations made by the appellant CBI, and the defence put forth by the respondent, led us to a conclusion that the High Court has exceeded its power, while exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC.

18. In our view, the assessment made by the High Court at this stage, when the matter has been taken cognizance of by the competent court, is completely incorrect and uncalled for."

14. Further, the Supreme Court in the case of State of MP Vs. Kunwar Singh by order dated 30.06.2021 passed in Cr.A. No.709/2021 has held that a detailed and meticulous appreciation of evidence at the stage of 482 of CrPC is not permissible and should not be done. In the case of Kunwar Singh (supra), the Supreme Court held as under:-

"8........At this stage, the High Court ought not to be scrutinizing the material in the manner in which the trial court would do in the course of the criminal trial after evidence is adduced. In doing so, the High Court has exceeded the well-settled limits on the exercise of the jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC. A detailed enquiry into the merits of the allegations was not warranted. The FIR is not expected to be an encyclopedia..........."

15. Similar view has been taken by Supreme Court in the cases of Munshiram Vs. State of Rajasthan reported in (2018) 5 SCC 678, Teeja Devi Vs. State of Rajasthan reported in (2014) 15 SCC 221, State of Orissa Vs. Ujjal Kumar Burdhan reported in (2012) 4 SCC 547, S. Khushboo Vs. Kanniammal reported in (2010) 5 SCC 600, Sangeeta Agrawal Vs. State of U.P. reported in (2019) 2 SCC 336,

Amit Kapoor Vs. Ramesh Chander reported in (2012) 9 SCC 460, Padal Venkata Rama Reddy Vs. Kovuri Satyanarayana Reddy reported in (2012) 12 SCC 437, M.N. Ojha Vs. Alok Kumar Srivastav reported in (2009) 9 SCC 682.

16. Thus, it is clear that in case if uncontroverted allegations do not make out an offence, then this Court can quash the proceedings. The defence of the accused cannot be taken into consideration at this stage. This Court cannot adjudicate upon the correctness of the allegations made in the FIR. The allegations made in the FIR are required to be taken as gospel truth and only then this Court can quash the FIR if uncontroverted allegations do not make out an offence.

17. The Supreme Court in the case of Taramani Parakh Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others reported in (2015) 11 SCC 260 has held as under:-

"10. The law relating to quashing is well settled. If the allegations are absurd or do not make out any case or if it can be held that there is abuse of process of law, the proceedings can be quashed but if there is a triable case the court does not go into reliability or otherwise of the version or the counter-version. In matrimonial cases, the courts have to be cautious when omnibus allegations are made particularly against relatives who are not generally concerned with the affairs of the couple. We may refer to the decisions of this Court dealing with the issue.

11. Referring to earlier decisions, in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 :

(2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687, it was observed : (SCC pp. 482-84, para 27)

"27.1. Though there are no limits of the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases.

27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere.

27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge.

27.4. Where the exercise of such power is absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might be committed by the subordinate courts even in such cases,

the High Court should be loath to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in exercise of its inherent powers.

27.5. Where there is an express legal bar enacted in any of the provisions of the Code or any specific law in force to the very initiation or institution and continuance of such criminal proceedings, such a bar is intended to provide specific protection to an accused.

27.6. The Court has a duty to balance the freedom of a person and the right of the complainant or prosecution to investigate and prosecute the offender.

27.7. The process of the court cannot be permitted to be used for an oblique or ultimate/ulterior purpose.

27.8. Where the allegations made and as they appeared from the record and documents annexed therewith to predominantly give rise and constitute a 'civil wrong' with no 'element of criminality' and does not satisfy the basic ingredients of a criminal offence, the court may be justified in quashing the charge. Even in such cases, the court would not embark upon the critical analysis of the evidence.

27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end

in a conviction; the court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice.

27.10. It is neither necessary nor is the court called upon to hold a full-

fledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by the investigating agencies to find out whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction.

27.11. Where allegations give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence, merely because a civil claim is maintainable, does not mean that a criminal complaint cannot be maintained.

27.12. In exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 228 and/or under Section 482, the Court cannot take into consideration external materials given by an accused for reaching the conclusion that no offence was disclosed or that there was possibility of his acquittal. The Court has to consider the record and documents annexed therewith by the prosecution. 27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide

admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie.

27.14. Where the charge-sheet, report under Section 173(2) of the Code, suffers from fundamental legal defects, the Court may be well within its jurisdiction to frame a charge.

27.15. Coupled with any or all of the above, where the Court finds that it would amount to abuse of process of the Code or that the interest of justice favours, otherwise it may quash the charge. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae i.e. to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone, the courts exist.

[Ref. State of State of W.B. v. Swapan Kumar Guha, (1982) 1 SCC 561 :

1982 SCC (Cri) 283, Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre, (1988) 1 SCC 692 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 234, Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary, (1992) 4 SCC 305 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 36, Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill, (1995) 6 SCC 194 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 1059, G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P. , Ajay Mitra v. State of M.P., (2003) 3 SCC 11 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 703, Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Judicial Magistrate, (1998) 5 SCC 749 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1400, State of U.P. v. O.P. Sharma, (1996) 7 SCC 705 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 497, Ganesh Narayan Hegde v. S. Bangarappa, (1995) 4 SCC 41 : 1995

SCC (Cri) 634, Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd.

Sharaful Haque, (2005) 1 SCC 122 :

2005 SCC (Cri) 283, Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E. Ltd., (2000) 3 SCC 269 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 615, Shakson Belthissor v. State of Kerala, (2009) 14 SCC 466 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1412, V.V.S. Rama Sharma v. State of U.P., (2009) 7 SCC 234 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 356, Chunduru Siva Ram Krishna v. Peddi Ravindra Babu, (2009) 11 SCC 203 :

(2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1297, Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar, (1987) 1 SCC 288 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 82, State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 222 :

1992 SCC (Cri) 192, Lalmuni Devi v. State of Bihar, (2001) 2 SCC 17 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 275, M. Krishnan v. Vijay Singh, (2001) 8 SCC 645 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 19, Savita v. State of Rajasthan, (2005) 12 SCC 338 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 571 and S.M. Datta v. State of Gujarat, (2001) 7 SCC 659 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1361 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 1201.] 27.16. These are the principles which individually and preferably cumulatively (one or more) be taken into consideration as precepts to exercise of extraordinary and wide plenitude and jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code by the High Court. Where the factual foundation

for an offence has been laid down, the courts should be reluctant and should not hasten to quash the proceedings even on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated or do not appear to be satisfied if there is substantial compliance with the requirements of the offence."

* * *

14. From a reading of the complaint, it cannot be held that even if the allegations are taken as proved no case is made out. There are allegations against Respondent 2 and his parents for harassing the complainant which forced her to leave the matrimonial home. Even now she continues to be separated from the matrimonial home as she apprehends lack of security and safety and proper environment in the matrimonial home. The question whether the appellant has in fact been harassed and treated with cruelty is a matter of trial but at this stage, it cannot be said that no case is made out. Thus, quashing of proceedings before the trial is not permissible.

15. The decisions referred to in the judgment of the High Court are distinguishable. In Neelu Neelu Chopra v. Bharti, (2009) 10 SCC 184 :

(2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 286, the parents of the husband were too old. The husband Rajesh had died and main allegations were only against him.

This Court found no cogent material against the other accused. In Manoj Mahavir Prasad Khaitan v. Ram Gopal Poddar, (2010) 10 SCC 673 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 94, the appellant before this Court was the brother of the daughter-in-law of the accused who lodged the case against the accused for theft of jewellery during pendency of earlier Section 498-A IPC case. This Court found the said case to be absurd. In Geeta

Mehrotra v. State of U.P., (2012) 10 SCC 741 :

(2013) 1 SCC (Civ) 212 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 120, case was against brother and sister of the husband.

Divorce had taken place between the parties. The said cases neither purport to nor can be read as laying down any inflexible rule beyond the principles of quashing which have been mentioned above and applied to the facts of the cases therein which are distinguishable. In the present case the factual matrix is different from the said cases. Applying the settled principles, it cannot be held that there is no triable case against the accused."

18. Thus, it is held that un-controverted allegations made in the FIR do make out a cognizable offence. Whether those allegations are correct, credible or reliable, cannot be judged by this Court at this stage. Even otherwise, this application has been filed merely on the ground of defences which are required to be proved by applicants during the trial.

19. Further, when the uncontroverted allegations make out an offence, then malafides of the informant becomes secondary.

20. The Supreme Court in the case of Renu Kumari Vs. Sanjay Kumar

and Others, reported in (2008) 12 SCC 346, has held as under :-

"9. "8. Exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC in a case of this nature is the exception and not the rule. The section does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of CrPC. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under CrPC, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent

jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. The courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognises and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in the course of administration of justice on the principle of quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsae esse non potest (when the law gives a person anything, it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising the powers under the section, the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision.

Inherent jurisdiction under the section, though wide, has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has the power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers the court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the report, the court may examine the question of fact. When a report is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the report has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto. 9. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [AIR 1960 SC 866 : (1960) 3 SCR 388] this Court summarised

some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings:

(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction;

(ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged;

(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. (AIR p. 869)

10. In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. Judicial process should not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment. The court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death. The scope of exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC and the categories of cases where the High Court may exercise its power under it relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice were set out in some detail by this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426 : AIR 1992 SC 604] . A note of caution was, however, added that the power should be exercised sparingly and that too in the rarest

of rare cases. The illustrative categories indicated by this Court are as follows : (SCC pp. 378-79, para 102) '(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.'

11. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 CrPC are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. The court must be careful to see that its decision, in exercise of this power, is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate 28 prosecution. The High Court being the highest court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. [See Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary [(1992) 4 SCC 305 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 36 : AIR 1993 SC 892] and Raghubir Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar [AIR 1964 SC 1 :

(1964) 1 Cri LJ 1] .] It would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on such premises arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. When an information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in the court which decides the fate of the accused person.

The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by themselves be the basis for quashing the proceedings. [See Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar [1990 Supp SCC 686 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 142] , State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma [1992 Supp (1) SCC 222 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 192] , Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill [(1995) 6 SCC 194 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 1059] , State of Kerala v. O.C. Kuttan [(1999) 2 29 SCC 651 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 304] , State of U.P. v. O.P. Sharma [(1996) 7 SCC 705 : 1996 SCC

(Cri) 497] , Rashmi Kumar v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada [(1997) 2 SCC 397 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 415] , Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) [(1999) 8 SCC 728 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1503] and Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi [(1999) 3 SCC 259 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 401] .]" The above position was again reiterated in State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa [(2002) 3 SCC 89 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 539] , State of M.P. v. Awadh Kishore Gupta [(2004) 1 SCC 691 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 353] and State of Orissa v. Saroj Kumar Sahoo [(2005) 13 SCC 540 :