Balram Ruhela vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh
2024 Latest Caselaw 3087 MP

Madhya Pradesh High Court

Balram Ruhela vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 2 February, 2024

Author: Vivek Rusia

Bench: Vivek Rusia

                                                             1
                            IN    THE       HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
                                                  AT INDORE
                                                       BEFORE
                                           HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VIVEK RUSIA
                                              ON THE 2 nd OF FEBRUARY, 2024
                                              WRIT PETITION No. 8171 of 2023

                           BETWEEN:-
                           BALRAM RUHELA S/O LATE SHRI BADRILAL RUHELA,
                           AGED ABOUT 44 YEARS, OCCUPATION: SERVICE R/O
                           VILLAGE PANANLI POST BHILWARA TEHSIL BIAORA
                           DISTT. RAJGARH (MADHYA PRADESH)

                                                                                         .....PETITIONER
                           (BY SHRI RAVINDRA SINGH CHHABRA, SENIOR ADVOCATE ASSISTED
                           BY SHRI AMAN ARORA, ADVOCATE)

                           AND
                           1.    THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH PRINCIPAL
                                 SECRETARY VALLABH    BHAWAN,  BHOPAL
                                 (MADHYA PRADESH)

                           2.    DISTRICT EDUCATION OFFICER DIST. RAJGARH
                                 (BIORA) (MADHYA PRADESH)

                           3.    C O M M I S S I O N E R HIGHER EDUCATION
                                 DEPARTMENT BHOPAL (MADHYA PRADESH)

                           4.    CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER JANPAD PANCHAYAT
                                 BIORA DIST. RAJGARH (MADHYA PRADESH)

                           5.    C O L L E C T O R DIST.   RAJGARH        (MADHYA
                                 PRADESH)

                                                                                      .....RESPONDENTS
                           (BY SHRI BHUWAN GAUTAM, GOVERNMENT ADVOCATE)

                                 This petition coming on for admission this day, th e court passed the
                           following:
                                                              ORDER

The petitioner has filed by the present petition under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India being aggrieved by the order dated 15.03.2023 passed by the District Education Officer, District - Rajgarh, whereby he has been terminated from service on account of conviction in criminal case vide judgment dated 31.12.2022.

02. Draped in brevity, the relevant facts are that the petitioner was appointed as Guruji in the year 2001. Thereafter, vide order dated 16.05.2013, he was merged in the cadre of Assistant Teacher, Grade - III. Thereafter, he was promoted to the post of Primary Teacher vide order dated 05.10.2018. So far as his service carrier is concerned, the same is unblemished.

03. On 29.05.2019, three persons namely Pappu, Ashok and Kalu started

dispute with Jagdish, brother of the petitioner in front of his house. Upon hearing the noise, father of the petitioner, Badrilal came out of the house. Thereafter, he was assaulted by aforesaid three persons by wooden stick which resulted in his death. An F.I.R. at Crime No.72/2019 was lodged by Jagdish against the aforesaid three persons for commission of offence punishable under Section 147, 148, 149, 294, 302, 307, 323 & 326 of the Indian Penal Code.

04. As a counter blast, they also lodged an F.I.R. against the petitioner and his brothers namely Indra Singh Ruhela and Jagdish for commission of offence punishable under Sections 294, 323, 324, 325 & 506 of the IPC at Crime No.82/2019. A trial was conducted against the petitioner and vide judgment of conviction and sentence dated 31.12.2022 passed in Sessions Trial No.71/2019, he has been convicted for commission of offence punishable under Sections 323/34, 324/34 & 325 of the IPC and sentenced to undergo 06 months' rigorous imprisonment along with fine of Rs.500/-, 10 months' rigorous imprisonment along with fine of Rs.500/- and 01 year's rigorous imprisonment along with fine of Rs.1,000/- respectively. Against the said judgment, the

petitioner preferred Criminal Appeal No.547 of 2023 and vide order dated 17.01.2023, his remaining jail sentence has been suspended by this Court.

05. On account of conviction of the petitioner, vide order dated 15.03.2023, the District Education Officer directly issued an order of termination in exercise of power conferred under Rules 10 & 19 r/w rule 14 of the Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1966 (in short the Rules of 1966) and Article 311(2)(a) of the Constitution of India. Hence, present petition is before this Court.

06. Shri R.S. Chhabra, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submits that under Rule 19 of the Rules of 1966, the Disciplinary Authority may make such order where any penalty is imposed on a Government servant on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charges. But this rules nowhere contemplate that the penalty of dismissal alone is liable to be imposed upon conviction of a Government servant in a criminal case. The Disciplinary Officer must consider the circumstances of the case and then make such orders thereon as it deems fit. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, even minor penalty can be imposed under the provisions of Rules 14 to 18 of the Rules of 1966. Shri Chhabra further submits that the similar issue came up for consideration before the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Rajendra Prasad v/s Union of India & Others (Writ Petition No.1605 of

2018) decided on 27.01.2023, whereby the Division Bench of this Court in similar facts and circumstances has set aside the punishment order and remanded the case back to the disciplinary authority to afford reasonable opportunity of being heard to the petitioner on the question of quantum of penalty before passing the reasoned order in accordance with law.

07. The respondents filed a reply by submitting that the petitioner has been convicted for commission of offence punishable under Sections 323/34, 324/34 & 325 of the IPC and sentenced to undergo 06 months' rigorous imprisonment along with fine of Rs.500/-, 10 months' rigorous imprisonment along with fine of Rs.500/- and 01 year's rigorous imprisonment along with fine of Rs.1,000/- respectively and in criminal appeal only the jail sentence of the petitioner has been suspended, therefore, the District Education Officer was justified in taking action against the petitioner. Hence, no case for interference is made out in the matter.

08. Heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record.

09. It is correct that a criminal case was registered against the petitioner under Sections 294, 323, 324, 325 & 506 of the IPC on account of commission of crime on 29.05.2019. Another criminal case was registered against the complainant's side under Sections 147, 148, 149, 294, 302, 307, 323 & 326 of the IPC on account of murder of the father of petitioner. The petitioner has been convicted under Sections 323/34, 324/34 & 325 of the IPC, which does not come under the category of 'moral turpitude'. Apart from this conviction, the petitioner is having no criminal antecedent.

10. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Rajendra Prasad (supra) has held as under:-

"6.1. The said Rule 19 was amended on 28.3.1987 to incorporate the first proviso which confers discretion upon the disciplinary authority to afford opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed to be imposed in all cases where penalty is proposed based on conviction of criminal charge, as is the case herein. 6.2. Though the expression used in the first proviso to Rule 19 is 'may be given opportunity' but the same has to be read as mandatory provision since substantive part of Rule 19 obliges the disciplinary authority to consider the circumstances of the case and make such orders thereon as it deems fit. The expression 'consider'

inheres the concept of enquiry which in turn includes the principle of reasonable opportunity of being heard as enunciated by the Apex Court in Khem Chand Vs. Union of India and others, AIR 1958 SC 300, the relevant extract of which is reproduced below:

"(19) To summarise : the reasonable opportunity envisaged by the provision under consideration includes-(a) An opportunity to deny his guilt and establish his innocence, which he can only do if he is told what the charges levelled against him are and the allegations on which such charges are based; (b) an opportunity to defend himself by cross examining the witnesses produced against him and by examining himself or any other witnesses in support of his defence; and finally (c) an opportunity to make his representation as to why the proposed punishment should not be inflicted on him, which he can only do if the competent authority, after the enquiry is over and after applying his mind to the gravity or otherwise of the charges proved against the government servant tentatively proposes to inflict one of the three punishments and communicates the same to the government servant.

7. It is now well settled that even if the terminology used in Rule 19 did not expressly provide for grant of reasonable opportunity of being heard prior to passing of the penalty order, the principle of natural justice - audi alterem partem, has to be read into the said provision to prevent it from being sacrificed at the alter of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.

8. The cut short of the above said discussion is that since the concept of enquiry is involved in Rule 19, it is obvious that the petitioner before being imposed penalty was required to be afforded opportunity of being heard on the question of quantum of penalty.

8.1. Cases may arise where conviction may be for less grave or more grave offence, but in both such cases, the orders of penalty under Rule 19 cannot be the same. In conviction for graver offence involving moral turpitude, any of the major penalties under Rule 11 of the CCS Rules would suffice. However for less grave offences which are outcome of heated discussion or where the element of mense rea is not palpable, lesser penalty may suffice. Thus, the disciplinary authority has to take into account these attending facts and circumstances while deciding the question of quantum of penalty after hearing delinquent employee.

9. For example, a government servant is sentenced to RI of 3 year/7 years and convicted for offence punishable under Sections 324/325 which are not one of the grave offences and the case is attended with extenuating circumstances of single blow or the assault being outcome of heated discussion or allegation alleged with the aid of Section 149/34 of the IPC or the rival parties being related to each other and having settled their scores during pendency of the criminal prosecution etc., the disciplinary authority has to apply its mind to all these and other extenuating circumstances so as to arrive at the appropriate penalty which can be inflicted upon the government servant under Rule 19 so as to remain within the bounds of proportionality.

9.1 The punishment under Rule 19 need not be always removal or dismissal but can be any of the lesser major penalties."

11. Although Rule 19 of the Rules of 1966 does not contemplate any provision for opportunity of hearing as provided under Rule 19(1) Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965 which has been considered by the Division Bench in the aforesaid case but Rule 19 of the Rules of 1966 provides that despite containing anything in Rules 14 to 18, where any penalty is imposed on a Government servant on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge. Still the disciplinary authority may consider the circumstances of the case and make such order thereon as it deems fit. Therefore, the disciplinary authority is required to apply his mind whether the penalty of dismissal only, is available to be imposed on a Government employee looking to his conduct and conviction on criminal charges.

12. In the present case, the disciplinary authority has passed the order of termination mechanically only on account of conviction of the petitioner. Though the opportunity of hearing is not provided in the rule but the principle

of natural justice also plays an important role which is a fundamental right of every citizen. An opportunity of hearing ought to have been given to the petitioner to explain the circumstances under which he has been convicted.

13. In view of the above, the impugned order dated 15.03.2023 is set aside. The matter is remitted back to the disciplinary authority to consider it afresh and take a decision in accordance with Rule 19 of the Rules of 1966 after giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner.

14. With the aforesaid, Writ Petition stands allowed.

(VIVEK RUSIA)

JUDGE Ravi