Madhya Pradesh High Court
Gokul Chand Meena vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 26 October, 2023
Author: Subodh Abhyankar
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT I N D O R E
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SUBODH ABHYANKAR
th
ON THE 26 OF OCTOBER, 2023
CRIMINAL REVISION No. 3036 of 2023
BETWEEN:-
RAGHVENDRA KUMAR S/O SHRI
AWADHESH PRASAD SINHA, AGED
ABOUT 41 YEARS, OCCUPATION:
GOVT. JOB R/O RAM KRISHNA
NAGAR MOTHER TERESA PATH
P.S. RAM KRISHNA NAGAR PATNA
(BIHAR)
.....PETITIONER
(BY SHRI KUNJAN MITTAL - ADVOCATE)
AND
1. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
STATION HOUSE OFFICER THROUGH
POLICE STATION KANWAN DISTRICT
DHAR. (MADHYA PRADESH)
2. BINITA KUMARI W/O RAGHVENDRA
KUMAR SINHA,AGED ABOUT 38YEARS,
OCCUPATION: SERVICE IN BANK BANK
OF INDIA KIDWAI NAGAR, KANPUR
DISTRICT KANPUR (UTTAR PRADESH)
.....RESPONDENTS
(MS. HARSHLATA SONI , G.A. FOR STATE AND
SHRI SUPRIY MISHRA - ADVOCATE FOR RESPONDENT NO.2)
CRIMINAL REVISION No. 142 of 2023
BETWEEN:-
GOKUL CHAND MEENA S/O SHYORAJ
MEENA, AGED ABOUT 38 YEARS,
OCCUPATION: BRANCH MANAGER BANK
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: SHILPA
NAGDEVE
Signing time: 28-10-2023
11:38:14
2
OF INDIA BHANPURA VILLAGE KARELA
DISTRICT: SAWAI MADHOPUR (RAJ) AT
PRESENT: SHIV DHAM COLONY
BHANPURA, DISTRICT: MANDSAUR
(MADHYA PRADESH)
.....PETITIONER
(BY SHRI ANSHUL SHRIVASTAVA - ADVOCATE)
AND
1. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
STATION HOUSE OFFICER THROUGH
POLICE STATION KANWAN DISTRICT
DHAR (MADHYA PRADESH)
2. VINITA KUMARI SINHA W/O
RAGHVENDRA KUMAR SINHA, AGED
ABOUT 35 YEARS, OCCUPATION:ZONAL
OFFICER BANK OF INDIA, KIDWAI
NAGAR KANPUR, KANPUR DEHAT,
DISTRICT KANPUR (UTTAR PRADESH)
.....RESPONDENTS
(MS. HARSHLATA SONI, G.A. FOR STATE AND
SHRI HIMANSHU JAIN, ADVOCATE FOR RESPONDENT NO.2)
___________________________________________________________________________________________
Reserved on : 20.09.2023
Pronounced on : 26.10.2023
___________________________________________________________________________________________
These revisions coming on for admission this day, the court passed
the following:
ORDER
1] This order shall also govern the disposal of Criminal Revision
Nos.3036/2023 and 142/2023 as both the revisions have arisen out of
the order dated 19/10/2022 of framing of charges under Sections 420,
467, 468, 471, 409, 201 and 120-B of the IPC in connection with
offence relating to FIR bearing Crime No.438/2021 registered at P.S.
Kanwan, District Dhar (M.P.), which was lodged on 16.08.2021, in
respect of the incident which took place on 13.01.2014.
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: SHILPA
NAGDEVE
Signing time: 28-10-2023
11:38:14
2] In brief, the story of the prosecution is that the petitioner
Raghvendra Kumar Sinha happens to be the husband of the
complainant Binita Kumari, as their marriage was solemnized in the
year 2009, when both of them were working in the Bank of India. In
her FIR dated 16.08.2021 it is alleged by the complainant wife that on
13.01.2014, a sum of Rs.60,000/- was illegally debited from her
account and credited into the account of the petitioner. After
investigation, the charge-sheet was filed, and charges have been framed
by the trial court as aforesaid. So far as the petitioner Gokul Chand
Meena is concerned, the only charge framed against him is under
Section 120-B of IPC.
3] The following charges have been framed against the petitioner
Raghvendra Kumar Sinha on 19/10/2022 :-
"1. आपने दनांक 13.01.2014 को समय 10.00 से 17.00 बजे के मधय्
बक ऑफ इ डया शाखा कानवन पर फ रयाद के बचत खाता मांक
441011110000067 को पये 60,000/- से डे बट कर उसके खाते से सवयं
् के
खाता ं 980026110000009 म कूटरिचत दसतावे
् ज के ारा पये 60,000/-
से े डट कर आपरािधक नयासभं
् ग कया। इस कार आपका उक् त कृ तय
्
धारा 409 भारतीय दं ड सं हता के अंतगत दं डनीय होकर इस नयायालय
् के
सं ान म है ।
2. आपने उक् त दनांक, समय व सथान
् पर बक ऑफ इ डया शाखा
कानवन पर फ रयाद के बचत खाता मांक 441011110000067 को पये
60,000/- से डे बट कर उसके खाते से सवयं
् के खाता ं . 980026110000009
म कूटरिचत दसतावे
् ज के ारा पये 60,000/- से े डट कर फ रयाद को
बेईमानी से वंिचत कर छल का रत कया गया। इस कार आपका उक् त
कृ तय
् धारा 420 भारतीय दं ड सं हता के अंतगत दं डनीय होकर इस
नयायालय
् के सं ान ् म है ।
3. आपने उक् त दनांक, समय व सथान
् पर फ रयाद बनीता कुमार के
नाम का बक ऑफ इ डया शाखा कानवन डे बट वहाउचर
् दनांक
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: SHILPA
NAGDEVE
Signing time: 28-10-2023
11:38:14
13.01.2014 बनाकर साशय एवं ानपूवक कूटरचना क । इस कार आपका
उक् त कृ तय् धारा 467 भारतीय दं ड सं हता के अंतगत दं डनीय होकर इस
नयायालय
् के सं ान म है ।
4. आपने उक् त दनांक, समय व सथान
् पर फ रयाद बनीता कुमार के
नाम का बक ऑफ इ डया शाखा कानवन डे बट वहाउचर
् दनांक
13.01.2014 बनाकर साशय एवं ानपूवक कूटरचना इस आशय से क , उस
दसतावे
् ज को छल के िलये उपयोग म िलया जाये। इस कार आपका उक् त
कृ तय
् धारा 468 भारतीय दं ड सं हता के अंतगत दं डनीय होकर इस
नयायालय
् के सं ान म है ।
5. आपने उक् त दनांक, समय व सथान
् पर फ रयाद बनीता कुमार के
नाम का बक ऑफ इ डया शाखा कानवन डे बट वहाउचर
् दनांक
13.01.2014 जो क एक कूटरिचत दसतावे
् ज है , उसे कूटरिचत जानते हु ए या
कूटरिचत होने का वशवास
् करने का कारण रखते हु ए उपयोग म िलया। इस
कार आपका उक् त कृ तय
् धारा 471 भारतीय दं ड सं हता के अंतगत दं डनीय
होकर इस नयायालय
् के सं ान म है ।
6. आपने उक् त दनांक, समय व सथान
् पर फ रयाद बनीता कुमार के
नाम का डे बट वहाउचर
् दनांक 13.01.2014 जो क एक कूटरिचत दसतावे
् ज
है एवं उस दसतावे
् ज क रचना क जाने म जो क एक अवैध काय है उसे
करने या करवाने म सहमत हु ए। इस कार आपका उक् त कृ तय
् धारा 120-बी
भारतीय दं ड सं हता के अंतगत दं डनीय होकर इस नयायालय
् के सं ान म है ।
अतएव म आदे िशत करता हू ँ क इस नयायालय
् ारा आपका वचारण
उपरोक् त आरोप हे तु कया जाये।"
4] Following charge has been framed against petitioner Gokul
Chand Meena:-
"आपने दनांक 13-01-2014 को समय 10.00 से 17.00 बजे के
मधय
् बक ऑफ इ डया शाखा कानवन पर फ रयाद बनीता
कुमार के नाम का डे बट वहाउचर
् दनांक 13.01.2014 जो क
एक कूटरिचत दसतावे
् ज है एवं उस दसतावे
् ज क रचना क जाने
म जो क एक अवैध काय है उसे करने या करवाने म सहमत हु ए।
इस कार आपका उक् त कृ तय
् धारा 120-बी भारतीय दं ड सं हता
के अंतगत दं डनीय होकर इस नयायालय
् के सं ान म है।
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: SHILPA
NAGDEVE
Signing time: 28-10-2023
11:38:14
अतएव म आदे िशत करता हू ं क इस नयायालय
् ारा आपका
वचारण उपरोक् त आर प हे तु कया जाये।"
5] Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the dispute
arose between the petitioner/husband and his wife Binita Kumari Sinha,
the complainant, in the year 2014 itself, and the complainant has
already lodged two criminal cases against the petitioner, one under the
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, and another
Section 498-A of IPC, and the third one is the present case, whereas,
the petitioner had also filed an application under Section 9 of the Hindu
Marriage Act, but the same was withdrawn, and subsequently a case for
divorce under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act has been filed. It is
further submitted that the petitioners have been falsely implicated in the
case, and it is a clear case of an afterthought, as in the FIR there is no
reason assigned for lodging the complaint after a lapse of seven years
and seven months. It is also submitted that in the charge-sheet, the only
document relied upon by the prosecution is the authority letter filed
along with charge-sheet at page No.20, and the debit voucher dated
13.01.2014 from which, the amount has been transferred.
6] Counsel for the petitioner has not denied that amount was
credited in the account of the petitioner from the account of the
complainant, however, it is submitted that the aforesaid transaction was
in respect of purchasing a Maruti Car by the petitioner. The documents
in this regard have also been filed on record, that on the same day, i.e.
on 13.01.2014, when the offence is alleged to have been committed, a
loan of Rs.4,47,000/- was also sanctioned to the petitioner on which the
complainant wife had also signed as the Guarantor. It is submitted that
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NAGDEVE
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it is well within the knowledge of the complainant that the aforesaid
amount was transferred from her account to the account of the
petitioner for the aforesaid transaction of loan, obtained to purchase a
car for them, as her account was already having the SMS facility It is
also submitted that the original document of the authority letter from
which the complainant had allowed the aforesaid sum of Rs.60,000/- to
be credited in her husband's account is not available and thus, only on
the basis of the photocopy of the same, coupled with the debit voucher,
no offence as charged are made out and no conviction can be recorded,
as the debit voucher in itself is not sufficient to establish that the
petitioner has committed any offence. In support of his submissions that
the photocopy cannot be admitted in evidence, counsel has relied upon
the decision rendered by the Punjab and Harayana High Court in the
case of Surjit vs. Prem Kumar Khera and others 1995(1)CurLJ 365.
7] It is also submitted that the documents filed by the petitioner can
also be relied upon at this stage and for this purpose he has placed
reliance upon the judgment delivered by the apex Court in the case of
Rukmani Narvekar Vs. Vijay Satardekar and Others reported in
2008 (14) SCC 1.
8] He has further placed reliance upon the judgment delivered by the
Supreme Court in the case of Hasmukhlal D. Vora and Another Vs.
State of Tamil Nadu reported as 2022 SCC OnLine 1732, and to
buttress his arguments that the photocopies of the documents cannot be
relied upon Rashid Khan Vs. State of M.P. reported in 2011(3) MPLJ
575. Lastly, it is also submitted that the petitioner was the Assistant
Branch Manager in Bank of India, already drawing a handsome salary
Signature Not Verified
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NAGDEVE
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at the time of incident, and had no reasons to resort to such
embezzlement of a paltry sum of Rs.60,000/-.
9] Shri Anshul Shrivastava, learned Counsel appearing for the
petitioner Gokul Chand Meena in CR.R.No. Cr.R.No.142/2023, has
submitted that the petitioner has been charged only with Section 120-B
of IPC, and the dispute was between the complainant Binita Kumari
Sinha and her husband, the co-accused Raghvendra Kumar Sinha, and
the petitioner had only signed the voucher in the capacity of a Branch
Manager of Bank of India, at the instance of co-accused Raghvendra
Kumar, who was the then Assistant Branch Manager of the said Bank.
It is submitted that no offence can be attributed to the present petitioner
who is caught in a domestic dispute between the complainant and the
co-accused Raghvendra Kumar. In support of his submissions, learned
counsel has also relied upon judgment delivered by the apex Court in
the case of Yogesh @ Sachin Jagdish Joshi Vs. State of Maharashtra
reported in (2008) 10 SCC 394.
10] On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent no.2 Smt.
Binita Kumari Sinha has vehemently opposed the prayer, and submitted
that the complainant has already been examined in the court, and at this
stage no case for interference is made out. It is submitted that the
judgments submitted by the petitioner(s) cannot be relied upon at this
stage, and even otherwise there is sufficient material available on
record to connect the petitioners with the offence.
11] Counsel for the State has also opposed the prayer.
12] Heard counsel for the parties and perused the record.
13] From the record it is apparent that the date of the alleged
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transaction is 13.01.2014, whereas, the FIR has been lodged only on
16.08.2021. The FIR is totally silent about the delay of 7 years and 7
months in lodging the same and the transaction is not denied by the
petitioners/accused persons. On perusal of the FIR also reveals that the
complainant has only alleged that a fraud has been played on her by her
husband and she has also obtained the Bank Statement, debit and credit
voucher from the said Bank. It is surprising as to how the concerned
police station has straight away lodged the FIR, in a case of
documentary evidence, relating to a dispute between a wife and a
husband, after a period of 7 years and 7 months. This itself gives
reasonable doubt as to the veracity of the case.
14] It is also found that the documents on which the prosecution has
relied upon to bring the charges framed are under Sections 420, 467,
468, 471, 409, 201 and 120-B of the IPC at home, include a photocopy
of the authority letter in the name of the complainant, which, according
to the complainant, is not signed by her, and is forged by the petitioner
Raghvendra Kumar, however, it is an admitted fact that only a
photocopy of the same is available as its original is already lost.
15] It is also a trite law that a photocopy of the document is not
admissible in evidence and thus, in the absence of the original authority
letter dated 13.01.2014, it can never be found out whether it actually
bore the signatures of the complainant, or they have been forged by the
petitioner Raghvendra. So far as the debit and credit vouchers are
concerned, they do not require the signatures of the complainant, hence
they are hardly of any use to the prosecution and cannot be used to
convict the petitioners. In such circumstances, in the considered
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NAGDEVE
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opinion of this court, the petitioners cannot be charged with the
offences alleged against them viz 420 (Cheating and dishonestly), 467
(Forgery of a valuable security), 468 (forgery, intending that the
document or electronic record forged shall be used for the purpose of
cheating, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to seven years, and shall be liable to fine), 471
(fraudulently or dishonestly), 409 (criminal breach of trust by a public
servant, banker, merchant, or agent), 201(Causing disappearance of
evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender) and
120-B (criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable with death)
of the IPC, 1860, only on the basis of debit/credit vouchers which are
not disputed by the petitioners.
16] On perusal of the Charge sheet, this court is also of the
considered opinion that the aforesaid transaction is being used by the
complainant wife only as a tool to settle her personal score with the
petitioner Raghvendra Kumar, whereas the co-accused Gokul Chand
Meena is embroiled in their matrimonial dispute for signing the debit
voucher more than seven years and seven months earlier.
17] It is also found that in the document relied upon by the petitioner
regarding the Car loan dated 14.12.2013, the complainant has stood as a
Guarantor under the 'Staff Vehicle Loan' scheme of the Bank of India,
and has signed the same on its each page on the same day, i.e.,
13.01.2014, when the amount was debited from the account of the
complainant and credited in the account of the petitioner Raghvendra
Kumar. So far as the consideration of the documents filed by the
petitioner by this court is concerned, the Supreme Court, in the case of
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Rukmani Narvekar (supra), has held as under:-
29. In our opinion, therefore, it cannot be said as an absolute
proposition that under no circumstance can the Court look into
the material produced by the defence at the time of framing of
the charges, though this should be done in very rare cases, i.e.
where the defence produces some material which convincingly
demonstrates that the whole prosecution case is totally absurd or
totally concocted. We agree with Shri Lalit that in some very rare
cases the Court is justified in looking into the material produced
by the defence at the time of framing of the charges, if such
material convincingly establishes that the whole prosecution
version is totally absurd, preposterous or concocted.
18] This documents is not disputed by the complainant in the written
arguments submitted on her behalf, in such circumstances, when both
of them were posted in the same branch of Bank of India, at Zonal
Office, Indore, and purchased a car in the name of the petitioner by
obtaining a car loan from the same Bank, with the complainant being
the Guarantor of the loan, it cannot be believed that the complainant
was not aware of this transaction at that time that her account has been
wrongly or fraudulently debited by her husband for which she could
easily have raised a complaint to the Bank authorities at that time only.
19] Although, this court is aware that question of limitation would
not arise in the present case, but the question is whether the
complainant, a senior bank officer herself, can be allowed to allege in
the year 2021, that she was cheated by her husband in the year 2014, in
a bank transaction of her own bank, where she and her husband both
were posted as Bank officers? And the answer is an emphatic no. This
court is of the considered opinion that after the complainant wife
allowed the said car loan transaction to take place on 13.01.2014, and
did not raise any objection at that time, she cannot be allowed to cry
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NAGDEVE
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wolf after seven years and seven months of the said transaction. It is
apparent that the complainant was well aware of the subtleties of this
transaction all along but kept it to herself, only to be used in case any
occasion arises, and, the occasion did arise when a matrimonial dispute
took place between the parties as the complainant has already lodged
cases under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act,
2005, and under Section 498-A of IPC.
20] So far as delay in lodging a criminal case is concerned, the
Supreme Court, the case of Hasmukhlal D. Vora (supra), has held as
under:-
"24. There has been a gap of more than four years between the initial
investigation and the filing of the complaint, and even after lapse of
substantial amount of time, no evidence has been provided to sustain
the claims in the complaint. As held by this Court in Bijoy Singh v.
State Of Bihar, inordinate delay, if not reasonably explained, can be
fatal to the case of the prosecution. The relevant extract from the
judgment is extracted below:--
"Delay wherever found is required to be explained by the prosecution.
If the delay is reasonably explained, no adverse inference can be
drawn, but failure to explain the delay would require the Court to
minutely examine the prosecution version for ensuring itself as to
whether any innocent person has been implicated in the crime or not.
Insisting upon the accused to seek an explanation of the delay is not the
requirement of law. It is always for the prosecution to explain such a
delay and if reasonable, plausible and sufficient explanation is
tendered, no adverse inference can be drawn against it."
25. In the present case, the Respondent has provided no explanation for
the extraordinary delay of more than four years between the initial site
inspection, the show cause notice, and the complaint. In fact, the
absence of such an explanation only prompts the Court to infer some
sinister motive behind initiating the criminal proceedings.
26. While inordinate delay in itself may not be ground for quashing of
a criminal complaint, in such cases, unexplained inordinate delay of
such length must be taken into consideration as a very crucial factor as
grounds for quashing a criminal complaint.
27. While this court does not expect a full-blown investigation at the
stage of a criminal complaint, however, in such cases where the
accused has been subjected to the anxiety of a potential initiation of
criminal proceedings for such a length of time, it is only reasonable for
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NAGDEVE
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the court to expect bare-minimum evidence from the Investigating
Authorities."
(emphasis supplied)
21] This court is of the considered opinion that the process of the
court cannot be used to settle the personal scores of the private parties.
The present case is apparently an offshoot of a matrimonial dispute, and
the complainant wife cannot be allowed to keep the alleged offence in
hibernation, for years together, only to be used it as a leverage over her
husband and the other accused person, who are clearly at a
disadvantage in contesting the case due to lapse of time. This court is
also of the considered opinion that the courts are meant for serious
litigants only, who are seeking redressal of their genuine problems, and
not for those who use it at their leisure and pleasure, at the expense of
needy and victims of serious crimes.
22] This court can also fruitfully rely upon the decision rendered by
the Supreme Court regarding the misuse of the process of the court in the
case of Suryalakshmi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Rajvir Industries Ltd., (2008)
13 SCC 678 in which it is held as under:-
"17. The parameters of jurisdiction of the High Court in exercising its
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is now
well settled. Although it is of wide amplitude, a great deal of caution is
also required in its exercise. What is required is application of the well-
known legal principles involved in the matter.
18. It is neither feasible nor practicable to lay down exhaustively as to
on what ground the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure should be exercised, but some attempts
have been made in that behalf in some of the decisions of this Court as
for example State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, Janata Dal v. H.S.
Chowdhary, Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill and Indian Oil
Corpn. v. NEPC India Ltd.
19. In Bhajan Lal this Court held: (SCC pp. 378-79, para 102)
"102. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or
the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in
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their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a
case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other
materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable
offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section
156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the
purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint
and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the
commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable
offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is
permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd
and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can
ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions
of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is
instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or
where there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned,
providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide
and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior
motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite
him due to private and personal grudge."
20. We may also place on record that criminal proceedings should not be
encouraged when it is found to be mala fide or otherwise abuse of
process of court.
21. In All Cargo Movers (India) (P) Ltd. v. Dhanesh Badarmal Jain it
was opined: (SCC pp. 781-82, para 16)
"16. We are of the opinion that the allegations made in the complaint
petition, even if given face value and taken to be correct in its entirety, do
not disclose an offence. For the said purpose, this Court may not only
take into consideration the admitted facts but it is also permissible to
look into the pleadings of Respondent 1-plaintiff in the suit. No
allegation whatsoever was made against the appellants herein in the
notice. What was contended was negligence and/or breach of contract on
the part of the carriers and their agent. Breach of contract simpliciter
does not constitute an offence. For the said purpose, allegations in the
complaint petition must disclose the necessary ingredients therefore.
Where a civil suit is pending and the complaint petition has been filed
one year after filing of the civil suit, we may for the purpose of finding
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out as to whether the said allegations are prima facie correct, take into
consideration the correspondences exchanged by the parties and other
admitted documents. It is one thing to say that the Court at this juncture
would not consider the defence of the accused but it is another thing to
say that for exercising the inherent jurisdiction of this Court, it is
impermissible also to look to the admitted documents. Criminal
proceedings should not be encouraged, when it is found to be mala fide
or otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. Superior courts while
exercising this power should also strive to serve the ends of justice."
22. Ordinarily, a defence of an accused although appears to be plausible
should not be taken into consideration for exercise of the said
jurisdiction. Yet again, the High Court at that stage would not ordinarily
enter into a disputed question of fact. It, however, does not mean that
documents of unimpeachable character should not be taken into
consideration at any cost for the purpose of finding out as to whether
continuance of the criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of
process of court or that the complaint petition is filed for causing mere
harassment to the accused. While we are not oblivious of the fact that
although a large number of disputes should ordinarily be determined
only by the civil courts, but criminal cases are filed only for achieving
the ultimate goal, namely, to force the accused to pay the amount due to
the complainant immediately. The courts on the one hand should not
encourage such a practice; but, on the other, cannot also travel beyond
its jurisdiction to interfere with the proceeding which is otherwise
genuine. The courts cannot also lose sight of the fact that in certain
matters, both civil proceedings and criminal proceedings would be
maintainable."
(emphasis supplied)
23] Similarly, in the case of Prabhu Chawla v. State of Rajasthan,
(2016) 16 SCC 30 the Supreme Court has reflected upon the situation
where powers u/s.482 and s.397 of Cr.P.C. overlaps, it has been held
as under:-
"5. Mr Goswami also placed strong reliance upon the judgment of
Krishna Iyer, J. in a Division Bench in Raj Kapoor v. State. Relying
upon the judgment of a Bench of three Judges in Madhu Limaye v.
State of Maharashtra and quoting therefrom, Krishna Iyer, J. in his
inimitable style made the law crystal clear in para 10 which runs as
follows : (Raj Kapoor case, SCC pp. 47-48)
"10. The first question is as to whether the inherent power of the High
Court under Section 482 stands repelled when the revisional power
under Section 397 overlaps. The opening words of Section 482
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contradict this contention because nothing of the Code, not even
Section 397, can affect the amplitude of the inherent power preserved
in so many terms by the language of Section 482. Even so, a general
principle pervades this branch of law when a specific provision is
made : easy resort to inherent power is not right except under
compelling circumstances. Not that there is absence of jurisdiction but
that inherent power should not invade areas set apart for specific
power under the same Code. In Madhu Limaye v. State of
Maharashtra this Court has exhaustively and, if I may say so with
great respect, correctly discussed and delineated the law beyond
mistake. While it is true that Section 482 is pervasive it should not
subvert legal interdicts written into the same Code, such, for instance,
in Section 397(2). Apparent conflict may arise in some situations
between the two provisions and a happy solution 'would be to say that
the bar provided in sub-section (2) of Section 397 operates only in
exercise of the revisional power of the High Court, meaning thereby
that the High Court will have no power of revision in relation to any
interlocutory order. Then in accordance with one of the other
principles enunciated above, the inherent power will come into play,
there being no other provision in the Code for the redress of the
grievance of the aggrieved party. But then, if the order assailed is
purely of an interlocutory character which could be corrected in
exercise of the revisional power of the High Court under the 1898
Code, the High Court will refuse to exercise its inherent power. But in
case the impugned order clearly brings about a situation which is an
abuse of the process of the court or for the purpose of securing the
ends of justice interference by the High Court is absolutely necessary,
then nothing contained in Section 397(2) can limit or affect the
exercise of the inherent power by the High Court. But such cases
would be few and far between. The High Court must exercise the
inherent power very sparingly. One such case would be the
desirability of the quashing of a criminal proceeding initiated illegally,
vexatiously or as being without jurisdiction'. (SCC pp. 555-56, para
10)
In short, there is no total ban on the exercise of inherent power where
abuse of the process of the court or other extraordinary situation
excites the Court's jurisdiction. The limitation is self-restraint, nothing
more. The policy of the law is clear that interlocutory orders, pure and
simple, should not be taken up to the High Court resulting in
unnecessary litigation and delay. At the other extreme, final orders are
clearly capable of being considered in exercise of inherent power, if
glaring injustice stares the court in the face. In between is a tertium
quid, as Untwalia, J. has pointed out as for example, where it is more
than a purely interlocutory order and less than a final disposal. The
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present case falls under that category where the accused complain of
harassment through the court's process. Can we state that in this third
category the inherent power can be exercised? In the words of
Untwalia, J. : (SCC p. 556, para 10)
'10. ... The answer is obvious that the bar will not operate to prevent
the abuse of the process of the court and/or to secure the ends of
justice. The label of the petition filed by an aggrieved party is
immaterial. The High Court can examine the matter in an appropriate
case under its inherent powers. The present case undoubtedly falls for
exercise of the power of the High Court in accordance with Section
482 of the 1973 Code, even assuming, although not accepting, that
invoking the revisional power of the High Court is impermissible.'
I am, therefore clear in my mind that the inherent power is not
rebuffed in the case situation before us. Counsel on both sides,
sensitively responding to our allergy for legalistics, rightly agreed that
the fanatical insistence on the formal filing of a copy of the order
under cessation need not take up this Court's time. Our conclusion
concurs with the concession of counsel on both sides that merely
because a copy of the order has not been produced, despite its
presence in the records in the court, it is not possible for me to hold
that the entire revisory power stands frustrated and the inherent power
stultified."
6. In our considered view any attempt to explain the law further as
regards the issue relating to inherent power of the High Court under
Section 482 CrPC is unwarranted. We would simply reiterate that
Section 482 begins with a non obstante clause to state:
"482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court.--Nothing in this
Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the
High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to
any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any
court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice."
A fortiori, there can be no total ban on the exercise of such
wholesome jurisdiction where, in the words of Krishna Iyer, J.
"abuse of the process of the court or other extraordinary situation
excites the Court's jurisdiction. The limitation is self-restraint, nothing
more". (Raj Kapoor case, SCC p. 48, para 10)
We venture to add a further reason in support. Since Section 397
CrPC is attracted against all orders other than interlocutory, a contrary
view would limit the availability of inherent powers under Section
482 CrPC only to petty interlocutory orders! A situation wholly
unwarranted and undesirable.
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24] In the light of the aforesaid discussion and the decisions, this
court has no hesitation to hold that to allow the criminal proceedings
against the petitioner would be sheer misuse of the process of the court.
Thus, this court is inclined to allow these petitions and the impugned
orders dated 19.10.2022 of framing of charges are hereby set aside and
the petitioners are discharged under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 409,
201 and 120-B of the IPC in connection with offence relating to FIR
bearing Crime No.438/2021.
26] Accordingly, the Criminal Revisions stand allowed.
(SUBODH ABHYANKAR)
JUDGE
Shilpa
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