Madhya Pradesh High Court
Pramod Kumar Verma vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 4 October, 2023
Author: Sujoy Paul
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
JUSTICE SUJOY PAUL
ON THE 4th OF OCTOBER, 2023
WRIT PETITION No.11143 OF 2017
BETWEEN :-
PRAMOD KUMAR VERMA S/O SHRI
UMASHANKAR VERMA, AGED ABOUT 31 YEARS,
OCCUPATION - UNEMPLOYED, R/O C-5/60,
POLICE LINE, NEHRU NAGAR, BHOPAL (M.P.)
......PETITIONER
(BY MR. PRAKASH UPADHYAY - ADVOCATE)
AND
1. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH THROUGH
PRINCIPAL SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF
HOME, VALLABH BHAWAN, BHOPAL (M.P.)
2. DIRECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE, POLICE
HEADQUARTERS, BHOPAL (M.P.)
3. ADDITIONAL DIRECTOR GENERAL OF
POLICE (RECRUITMENT), POLICE
HEADQUARTER, BHOPAL (MP)
4. SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, RAISEN,
DISTRICT RAISEN (MP)
.....RESPONDENTS
(BY MR. DEEPAK SAHU -PANEL LAWYER)
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This writ petition coming on for orders this day, JUSTICE
SUJOY PAUL passed the following :
ORDER
With the consent, finally heard.
2. The challenge is mounted in this petition filed under Article 226
of the Constitution is to the order dated 14/04/2014 whereby
petitioner was informed that Screening Committee has found him
unsuitable for appointment in Police Department.
Facts of the case :-
3. The admitted facts between the parties are that petitioner
submitted his candidature for the post of Constable in the Police
Department. The petitioner in 'character verification' form clearly
disclosed about outcome of criminal case instituted against him. The
petitioner was subjected to a trial for allegedly committing offences
under Sections 294, 323, 325 and 506-II of IPC. However, the matter
was compromised and the Court by order dated 11/02/2014 acquitted
the petitioner from charges on the basis of compromise.
Contention of petitioner :-
4. Shri Prakash Upadhyay, learned counsel for the petitioner
submits that the first objection raised by the opposite side is regarding
delay in filing this petition. The rejection order was passed on
14/04/2014 (Annexure P/1) whereas this petition is filed on
24/07/2017. By placing reliance on the judgments of Supreme Court
in (1992) 2 SCC 598 M/s Dehri Rohtas Light Railway Company
Limited v. District Board, Bhojpur and others, (2007) 9 SCC 274
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Shiv Dass v. Union of India and others, (2007) 14 SCC 766
Chairman, Food Corporation of India and others v. Sudarsan Das
and (2010) 12 SCC 471 Shiba Shankar Mohapatra and others v.
State of Orissa and others, it is urged that delay is not fatal.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that there is no
limitation prescribed for filing a petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution. No straight jacket formula can be framed for measuring
the delay. It depends on the facts and circumstances of each case
whether delay is condonable or ignorable. The Apex Court opined
that when no limitation is prescribed, the limitation to file a civil suit
of similar nature can be the basis for measurement of delay. To
challenge a termination order in the civil suit, limitation is three years.
This petition is filed after three years few months and in the
circumstances it is filed, delay may be ignored.
6. On merits, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that this
Court on 13/10/2022 directed the respondents to file the relevant
pages/decision of the Screening Committee. In turn, they have filed
the 'compliance report' and the said documents. By taking this Court
to the note-sheet of Screening Committee dated 19/03/2014, learned
counsel for the petitioner submits that the offences aforesaid were
treated to be involving 'moral turpitude' whereas offences under
Sections 323 & 325 of IPC do not fall within the ambit of 'moral
turpitude'. Reliance is placed on a Circular of State Government
dated 24/07/2018 (Annexure P/6) wherein the list of offences
involving 'moral turpitude' is prepared which does not contain the
offences for which the petitioner was tried.
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7. Shri Prakash Upadhyay, learned counsel for the petitioner
placed reliance on the judgments of Supreme Court in (2016) 8 SCC
471 (Avtar Singh Vs. Union of India) and the recent judgment
reported in (2022) 1 SCC 1 (Union of India and others vs. Methu
Meda) to highlight the need of application of mind by the Screening
Committee.
8. To elaborate, it is submitted that petitioner's candidature is
rejected by holding that offences allegedly committed fall within the
ambit of 'moral turpitude'. The Screening Committee was required to
examine the factual matrix on which edifice of prosecution was
founded upon, the nature of offences and other circumstances.
Without minutely examining these aspects, the rejection order is
passed which shows non-application of mind. Shri Upadhyay,
referred the factual backdrop of the matter in which compromise was
entered into between the parties which ultimately ended into acquittal
based on compromise.
Contention of respondents :-
9. Sounding a contra note, Shri Deepak Sahu, learned Panel
Lawyer for the State raised the question of delay in filing this petition.
In addition, he submits that the petitioner's right of consideration was
taken care of by the Screening Committee. He was given personal
hearing. There is no flaw in the decision making process. The
petitioner's claim was rejected on 14.4.2014 (Annexure P/1) and at
the time of consideration, a circular of State Government issued in the
year 2003 was applicable and as per the then existing circular,
offences under Sections 323, 305, 294 and 506 Part-II of IPC etc.
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were covered within the ambit of 'moral turpitude'. The Circular
dated 24.7.2018 (Annexure P/6) is not retrospective in nature. In
support of his contentions, he placed reliance on a Division Bench
judgment of this Court passed in W.A. No.741 of 2023 (State of M.P.
and others Vs. Santosh Kumar Baghel and others).
10. Learned counsel for the parties confined their arguments to the
extent indicated above.
11. I have heard the parties at length and perused the record.
Delay in filing W.P. :-
12. So far the aspect of delay is concerned, a cumulative reading of
the judgments cited by Shri Prakash Upadhyay, learned counsel for
the petitioner shows that there cannot be any fixed formula for
deciding the aspect of delay. It depends on the facts and
circumstances of each case. In the case of Sudarshan Das (supra),
even delay of thirteen years was ignored. In the case of Shiba
Shankar Mahapatra (supra), the Apex Court held as under :-
"20. In R.S. Makashi v. I.M. Menon [(1982) 1 SCC
379 : 1982 SCC (L&S) 77] this Court considered all
aspects of limitation, delay and laches in filing the writ
petition in respect of inter se seniority of the employees.
The Court referred to its earlier judgment in State of
M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai [AIR 1964 SC 1006] , wherein it
has been observed that the maximum period fixed by the
legislature as the time within which the relief by a suit in
a civil court must be brought, may ordinarily be taken to
be a reasonable standard by which delay in seeking the
remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution can be
measured.
(Emphasis supplied)
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13. A plain reading of above para makes it clear that measurement of
delay can be based on the time limit prescribed for a civil suit, which
can be filed for similar relief. It is not disputed by Shri Deepak Sahu,
learned Panel Lawyer for the State that three years is the limitation to
file a civil suit seeking annulment of an order like impugned one. In
the instant case, delay is little more than three years. In the facts and
circumstances of the present case, I am not inclined to dismiss the
petition on the ground of delay and laches.
Screening of petitioner :-
14. Pursuant to the order of this court dated 13.10.2022, the
respondents have filed the 'compliance report'. Alongwith the
compliance report, the proceeding of Screening Committee is filed.
The relevant entry against the name of the petitioner reads thus :-
**uSfrd v/kksiru dh /kkjk gksus ,oa jkthukek ds vk/kkj ij
nks"keqDr gksus ds dkj.k v;ksX; ik;k x;k A**
15. The language of Sections 323, 325 and 294 of IPC as described
in the IPC remained same right from the date of alleged offences
committed by the petitioner. Different interpretations were given by
the Department in 2003 and 2018 whereby similar offences were
treated as 'moral turpitude' or otherwise.
16. It is clear that the nature of offence as described in the IPC will
determine whether it is 'moral turpitude' or not. If department itself
realized while issuing Circular dated 24.7.2018 that the aforesaid
offences do not fall within the fore-corners of 'moral turpitude', merely
because the previous circular took a different view to some extent will
not improve the case of the employer. Curiously, in AIR 1994 P & H
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242 (Kuldip Singh vs. State of Punjab), the High Court opined that
even offence under Section 302 of IPC does not fall within the ambit of
'moral turpitude'. Relevant portion reads as under :-
"14. Act of killing a person is normally attributed to a
feeling of hurt or revenge; an act of personal vendetta.
Per se an act of murder will not come within the board
concept of 'moral turpitude' as interpreted by
Courts........."
(Emphasis supplied) [[
Judicial review :-
17. The offences aforesaid, cannot be said to be attracting 'moral
turpitude'. It is trite that scope of judicial review in a case of this
nature is limited. This court cannot sit in appeal and interfere into a
plausible decision. What is required to be seen is whether the decision
maker has taken into account the relevant aspects and whether has
taken into account any irrelevant aspect which attracts wednesbury
principle. (See :- (1948) 1 KB 223 : (1947) 2 ALL ER 680], Union of
India vs. G. Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463, Rameshwar prasad
(VI) vs. Union of India, (2006) 2 SCC 1].
18. In the instant case, as noticed above, the Screening Committee
went wrong in forming opinion that the offences fall within the ambit
of 'moral turpitude'. The Screening Committee record nowhere shows
that the nature of allegations, factual foundation of the incident etc.
were considered. Shri Prakash Upadhyay, learned counsel for the
petitioner pointed out that offence was allegedly committed by the
petitioner when he was employed in a colony as a Security Guard. He
wanted to prevent complainant to enter the society unauthorizedly and
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because of that a quarrel had taken place. The petitioner as a Security
Guard was discharging his duties. All these aspects were required to be
looked into by the Screening Committee.
19. In Methu Meda (supra), the Apex Court considered its previous
judgment in Avtar Singh (supra) and opined that it is for the Screening
Committee to examine the relevant aspects. The previous judgment in
Commr. of Police v. Mehar Singh, (2013) 7 SCC 685 was also
considered and followed wherein it was held as under :-
"19. .........................
23............... It is only experienced officers of the
Screening Committee who will be able to judge whether the
acquitted or discharged candidate is likely to revert to
similar activities in future with more strength and vigour, if
appointed, to the post in a police force. The Screening
Committee will have to consider the nature and extent
of such person's involvement in the crime and his
propensity of becoming a cause for worsening the law
and order situation rather than maintaining it. In our
opinion, this policy framed by the Delhi Police does not
merit any interference from this Court as its object appears
to be to ensure that only persons with impeccable character
enter the police force."
(Emphasis supplied)
20. As noticed above, the Screening Committee has committed
following mistakes :-
(i) treated the aforesaid offences as 'moral turpitude',
(ii) the nature and extent of involvement of petitioner was not
considered.
(iii) not examined whether there is any likelihood of committing
similar crime in future by the petitioner.
21. So far judgment of Division Bench in the case of Santosh
Kumar Baghel (supra) is concerned, a plain reading of Para-10 shows
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that it was relating to a subsequent acquittal of the candidate from
criminal case and, therefore, the Court opined that 'mere subsequent
acquittal in the criminal case will not automatically entitle the
candidate to seek appointment to the post in question'. Thus, this
judgment in Santosh Kumar Baghel (supra) cannot be pressed into
service in a case of this nature.
22. In (2003) 2 SCC 111 Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar
Mill (P) Ltd. And others, it was held that a singular different fact may
change the precedential value of a judgment. It will not be out of place
to mention here that this Court is also of the view that it is prerogative
of the employer to examine the 'suitability' of an employee. This court
is not giving any finding about the 'suitability' of the petitioner. The
only reason for interference is because of the flaw in the 'decision
making process' wherein the Screening Committee considered the
certain offences as 'moral turpitude' whereas the said offences do not
fall within the ambit of 'moral turpitude'. Secondly, the factual
backdrop of the matter was not minutely considered. In this view of the
matter, the impugned order dated 14.4.2014 (Annexure P/1) is set
aside. The respondent no. 4 is directed to consider the claim of the
petitioner afresh in accordance with law and take a fresh decision
expeditiously, preferably within 90 days from the date of production of
copy of this order.
23. The petition is allowed to the extent indicated above.
(SUJOY PAUL)
JUDGE
manju/bks
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