Munni Mishra vs Ramesh Singh
2023 Latest Caselaw 2 MP

                                   1                    S.A. No.1216/2018



IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
           AT JABALPUR
                        BEFORE
    HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE GURPAL SINGH AHLUWALIA
              ON THE 2nd OF JANUARY, 2023
             SECOND APPEAL No. 1216 of 2018
BETWEEN:-

MUNNI MISHRA W/O LATE RAMNARESH
MISHRA,   AGED   ABOUT   50  YEARS,
OCCUPATION: HOUSE WIFER/O ANUPPUR
BASTI, TEHSIL AND DISTRICT ANUPPUR
(MADHYA PRADESH)



                                                       .....APPELLANT
(BY SHRI SHAKTI PRASAD PANDEY - ADVOCATE )

AND

RAMESH SINGH S/O SADHU SINGH, AGED
ABOUT 45 YEARS R/O ANUPPUR BASTI, TEHSIL
AND DISTRICT ANUPPUR (MADHYA PRADESH)



                                                     .....RESPONDENT
(NONE FOR THE RESPONDENT)
........................................................................................................
      This appeal coming on for admission this day, the court passed the

following:

                               ORDER

This Second Appeal under Section 100 of CPC has been filed against

the judgment and decree dated 01.05.2018 passed by the District Judge,

Anuppur (M.P.) in Regular Civil Appeal Noa.34-A/2017 arising out of

judgment and decree dated 07.10.2017 passed by the First Civil Judge,

Class-I, Anuppur, District Anuppur (M.P.) in civil suit No.53-A/2017, by

which the suit filed by the appellant for declaration of title, for possession,

permanent injunction as well as to declare the registered sale deed dated

13.07.1998 as null and void has been dismissed.

2. The facts necessary for disposal of the present appeal, in short, are

that the appellant filed a suit for declaration of title, permanent injunction as

well as for declaration of sale deed dated 13.07.1998 as null and void as well

as for possession in respect of Khasra No.571 area 0.305 hectares and

Khasra No.574 area 0.275 hectares situated in village Anuppur, Tahsil and

District Anuppur. It is the case of the appellant that the land in dispute

originally belonged to her husband late Ramnaresh Mishra and the appellant

is in possession of the same after the death of her husband. The appellant is

a widow and illiterate lady and she can only write her name in Hindi. The

eucalyptus trees were planted on the earthen boundary of the land and the

appellant was taking the crop of rice. The defendant No.1 is the resident of

the area and was having visiting terms and therefore, the plaintiff had a blind

faith on the defendant No.1. On 22.01.2013, the defendant No.1 without

giving any information to the plaintiff, started cutting eucalyptus trees,

which was objected by the appellant. For the first time the defendant No.1

informed the plaintiff that he has already purchased the said land from the

plaintiff and therefore, he is the Bhumiswami. The appellant got shocked

because she had never alienated the property in favour of the defendant

No.1. Thereafter, the plaintiff made an oral report to the Police and

accordingly, the Police verbally instructed the defendant No.1 not to

interfere with the peaceful possession of the appellant and not to cut the

trees. Accordingly, the defendant No.1 stopped cutting the trees but the

appellant has an apprehension that taking advantage of her precarious

condition, the defendant No.1 can cut the trees in future. It was further

alleged that in the year 1998, the defendant No.1 had requested the appellant

that since his brother is not permitting him to reside in his ancestral house,

therefore, she may alienate 0.03 acres of land so that he can construct a

house. Accordingly, the appellant agreed for that and executed a registered

sale deed in respect of 0.03 acres of land for a consideration amount of

Rs.3,000/-. However, it was further claimed that the appellant had never

executed the sale deed in respect of 0.73 hectares of land and never got the

consideration amount of Rs.40,000/-. Since the defendant No.1 was out-and-

out to cut the trees, therefore, she obtained the copy of the sale deed executed

in the year 1998 and then she came to know that instead of 0.03 acres of

land, the defendant No.1 has got the sale deed in respect of entire disputed

land i.e. 0.34 acres of Khasra No.574 and 0.39 acres of Khasra No.571/2.

Thus, it is submitted that now the defendant No.1 is threatening the appellant

that he would forcibly take possession of the land and accordingly, suit for

declaration of title, permanent injunction, for declaration of sale deed dated

13.07.1998 as null and void as well as for possession was filed.

3. The defendant No.1 filed his written statement and claimed that the

land in dispute was purchased by Ramdev Mishra, who was the father-in-

law of the appellant. The said land was purchased in the name of his

daughter Booti Bai Misra. About 18 years back, as per family settlement,

the land in dispute was transferred by Smt.Booti Bai Mishra in favour of the

appellant. Accordingly, it was claimed that the appellant had got the

property from her sister-in-law (Nanand)- Smt.Booti Bai Mishra. It was

further claimed that 0.73 acres of land forming part of Khasra No.571/2 and

Khasra No.574 was alienated by the appellant to the defendant No.1 by

registered sale deed dated 13.07.1998 and thereafter, he was placed in

possession. The appellant is a clever and literate lady. She is using her two

names i.e. Smt. Munni Bai Mishra and Smt. Ahilya Bai Mishra and by using

two different names, she is taking advantage of the Government schemes. It

was claimed that the eucalyptus trees were planted by the defendant No.1

after purchasing the land and now he is cultivating and taking the crop of

rice. It was denied that any fraud was played. It was claimed that the sale

deed was executed after taking a consideration amount of Rs.40,000/-. It

was further claimed that the Sub Registrar, Anuppur had also made an

endorsement in the original Rin Pustika. Even the appellant had executed an

affidavit in the mutation proceedings and accordingly, after issuing a public

notice, the name of the defendant No.1 was mutated in the revenue records

by order dated 27.08.1998.

4. The trial court after framing issues and recording the evidence,

dismissed the suit by holding that the appellant had executed the sale deed

in respect of the entire land i.e. 0.73 acres and thereafter, the defendant No.1

was also placed in possession. By appreciating the evidence, the trial Court

also came to a conclusion that the eucalyptus trees were planted by the

defendant No.1 and the claim of the appellant that the eucalyptus trees were

already standing was disbelieved. It was also held that the affidavit was

voluntarily given by the appellant in the mutation proceedings and no

objection was raised in response to the public notice issued by the revenue

authorities.

5. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the trial court,

the appellant preferred an appeal, which was dismissed by the District Judge,

Anuppur by judgment dated 01.05.2018 passed in Civil Appeal No.34-

A/2017.

6. Challenging the judgment and decree passed by the courts below, it

is submitted by the counsel for the appellant that the courts below have not

appreciated the evidence in its true prospective and since the appellant is in

possession of the land in dispute, therefore, the decree for permanent

injunction should have been granted and accordingly, proposed the

following substantial questions of law:

"(3.1) Whether, facts and circumstances of the case judgment and decree passed by both the courts below is perverse?

(3.2) Whether, facts and circumstances of the case if physical possession of the appellant/plaintiff is found over the suit lands since long back despite this suit for permanent injunction can be rejected?

(3.3) Whether, the appellant/plaintiff has succeeded to prove their suit despite this both the courts below can reject the suit?"

7. Considered the submissions made by the counsel for the appellant.

8. So far as the question of issuance of decree for permanent injunction

is concerned, it is suffice to mention that the finding regarding possession is

a finding of fact. Further, the appellant herself had filed a suit for possession

also. The counsel for the appellant is right in making a submission that the

prayer for possession was an alternative prayer and it was prayed that in case

if the plaintiff is not found to be in possession of the land in dispute, then a

decree for possession be granted. However, the counsel for the appellant

could not point out any perversity in the finding recorded by the courts

below to the effect that the appellant/plaintiff is not in possession of the

property in dispute. The witnesses could not point out that when the Well

was dug. Cogent reasons have been assigned by the courts below to the

effect that the eucalyptus trees were planted by the defendant No.1. Even

the plaintiff has not filed any document to show that she was in cultivating

possession or she harvested the crop or she sold the crop in any Krishi Upaj

Mandi or to anybody else. It is well established principle of law that this

Court in exercise of power under Section 100 of CPC cannot interfere with

the finding of the fact unless and until they are perverse or based on

consideration of inadmissible evidence or in ignorance of any admissible

evidence.

9. The Supreme Court in the case of Gurnam Singh (Dead) by Legal

Representatives and others Vs. Lehna Singh (Dead) by Legal

Representatives reported in 2019 (7) SCC 641 has held as under:

"13. At the outset, it is required to be noted that the learned trial court held the will dated 17-1-1980, which was executed in favour of original Defendants 2 to 6, surrounded by suspicious circumstances and therefore did not believe the said will.

13.1. The suspicious circumstances which were considered by the learned trial court are narrated/stated hereinabove. On reappreciation of evidence on record and after dealing with each alleged suspicious circumstance, which was dealt with by the learned trial court, the first appellate court by giving cogent reasons held the will genuine and consequently did not agree with the findings recorded by the

learned trial court. However, in second appeal under Section 100 CPC, the High Court, by the impugned judgment and order has interfered with the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate court. While interfering with the judgment and order passed by the first appellate court, it appears that while upsetting the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate court, the High Court has again appreciated the entire evidence on record, which in exercise of powers under Section 100 CPC is not permissible. While passing the impugned judgment and order, it appears that the High Court has not at all appreciated the fact that the High Court was deciding the second appeal under Section 100 CPC and not first appeal under Section 96 CPC. As per the law laid down by this Court in a catena of decisions, the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain second appeal under Section 100 CPC after the 1976 Amendment, is confined only when the second appeal involves a substantial question of law. The existence of "a substantial question of law" is a sine qua non for the exercise of the jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC. As observed and held by this Court in KondibaDagadu Kadam [KondibaDagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar, (1999) 3 SCC 722] , in a second appeal under Section 100 CPC, the High Court cannot substitute its own opinion for that of the first appellate court, unless it finds that the conclusions drawn by the lower court were erroneous being:

(i) Contrary to the mandatory provisions of the applicable law;

OR

(ii) Contrary to the law as pronounced by the Supreme Court;

OR

(iii) Based on inadmissible evidence or no evidence.

It is further observed by this Court in the aforesaid decision that if the first appellate court has exercised its discretion in a judicial manner, its decision cannot be recorded as suffering from an error either of law or of procedure requiring interference in second appeal. It is further observed that the trial court could have decided differently is not a question of law justifying interference in second appeal.

14. When a substantial question of law can be said to have arisen, has been dealt with and considered by this Court in Ishwar Dass Jain [Ishwar Dass Jain v. Sohan Lal, (2000) 1 SCC 434] . In the aforesaid decision, this Court has specifically observed and held: (SCC p.

437) "Under Section 100 CPC, after the 1976 Amendment, it is essential for the High Court to formulate a substantial question of law and it is not permissible to reverse the judgment of the first appellate court without doing so. There are two situations in which interference with findings of fact is permissible. The first one is when material or relevant evidence is not considered which, if considered, would have led to an opposite conclusion. The second situation in which interference with findings of fact is permissible is where a finding has been arrived at by the appellate court by placing reliance on

inadmissible evidence which if it was omitted, an opposite conclusion was possible. In either of the above situations, a substantial question of law can arise."

15. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions to the facts of the case on hand, we are of the opinion that the High Court has erred in reappreciating the evidence on record in the second appeal under Section 100 CPC. The High Court has materially erred in interfering with the findings recorded by the first appellate court, which were on reappreciation of evidence, which was permissible by the first appellate court in exercise of powers under Section 96 CPC. Cogent reasons, on appreciation of the evidence, were given by the first appellate court. The first appellate court dealt with, in detail, the so-called suspicious circumstances which weighed with the learned trial court and thereafter it came to the conclusion that the will, which as such was a registered will, was genuine and did not suffer from any suspicious circumstances. The findings recorded by the first appellate court are reproduced hereinabove. Therefore, while passing the impugned judgment and order [Lehna Singh v. Gurnam Singh, Civil Regular Second Appeal No. 2191 of 1985, order dated 27-11-2007 (P&H)] , the High Court has exceeded in its jurisdiction while deciding the second appeal under Section 100 CPC.

15.1. As observed hereinabove and as held by this Court in a catena of decisions and even as per Section 100 CPC, the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain the second appeal under

Section 100 CPC is confined only to such appeals which involve a substantial question of law. On going through the substantial questions of law framed by the High Court, we are of the opinion that the question of law framed by the High Court while deciding the second appeal, cannot be said to be substantial questions of law at all. The substantial questions of law framed by the High Court are as under:

"(i) Whether the appellate court can reverse the findings recorded by the learned trial court without adverting to the specific finding of the trial court?

(ii) Whether the judgment passed by the learned lower appellate court is perverse and outcome of misreading of evidence?"

The aforesaid cannot be said to be substantial questions of law at all. In the circumstances, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court cannot be sustained and the same deserves to be quashed and set aside. At this stage, decision of this Court in MadamanchiRamappa v. Muthaluru Bojjappa [MadamanchiRamappa v. Mu thaluruBojjappa, AIR 1963 SC 1633] , is required to be referred to.

16. In the aforesaid decision, this Court has observed and held as under: (MadamanchiRamappa [MadamanchiR amappa v. MuthaluruBojjappa, AIR 1963 SC 1633] , AIR pp. 1637-38, para

12) "12. ... whenever this Court is satisfied that in dealing with a second appeal, the High Court has, either unwittingly and in a casual manner, or deliberately as in this case, contravened

the limits prescribed by Section 100, it becomes the duty of this Court to intervene and give effect to the said provisions. It may be that in some cases, the High Court dealing with the second appeal is inclined to take the view that what it regards to be justice or equity of the case has not been served by the findings of fact recorded by courts of fact; but on such occasions it is necessary to remember that what is administered in courts is justice according to law and considerations of fair play and equity however important they may be, must yield to clear and express provisions of the law. If in reaching its decisions in second appeals, the High Court contravenes the express provisions of Section 100, it would inevitably introduce in such decisions an element of disconcerting unpredictability which is usually associated with gambling; and that is a reproach which judicial process must constantly and scrupulously endeavour to avoid."

19. Before parting with the present judgment, we remind the High Courts that the jurisdiction of the High Court, in an appeal under Section 100 CPC, is strictly confined to the case involving substantial question of law and while deciding the second appeal under Section 100 CPC, it is not permissible for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence on record and interfere with the findings recorded by the courts below and/or the first appellate court and if the first appellate court has exercised its discretion in a judicial manner, its decision cannot be recorded as suffering from an error either of law or of procedure requiring interference in

second appeal. We have noticed and even as repeatedly observed by this Court and even in Narayanan Rajendran v. Lekshmy Sarojini [Narayanan Rajendran v. Lekshmy Sarojini, (2009) 5 SCC 264 : (2009) 2 SCC (Civ) 500] , despite the catena of decisions of this Court and even the mandate under Section 100 CPC, the High Courts under Section 100 CPC are disturbing the concurrent findings of facts and/or even the findings recorded by the first appellate court, either without formulating the substantial question of law or on framing erroneous substantial question of law."

10. Even otherwise the counsel for the appellant could not point out any

perversity in the finding that the appellant has failed to prove that the sale

deed in respect of entire land was fraudulently got executed by the defendant

No.1. The courts below have given a specific finding that before execution

of the sale deed, the Sub Registrar always gets it verified from the seller

about the transaction and only after getting satisfied, the sale deeds are

registered.

11. The Supreme Court in the case of Syeda Rahimunnisa Vs. Malan

Bi (Dead) by Legal Representatives and Another report 2016(10) SCC

315 has held as under:

"24. The scope of Section 100 CPC while deciding the second appeal by the High Court has been the subject-

matter of several decisions of this Court

and thus remains no more res integra. A reference to the two cases on this question would suffice.

25. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari [Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179] speaking through R.C. Lahoti, J. (as his Lordship then was) examined the scope of Section 100 CPC in detail and laid down the following propositions in paras 9, 10, 12 and 14 as under: (SCC pp. 185-88) "9. The High Court cannot proceed to hear a second appeal without formulating the substantial question of law involved in the appeal and if it does so it acts illegally and in abnegation or abdication of the duty cast on Court. The existence of substantial question of law is the sine qua non for the exercise of the jurisdiction under the amended Section 100 of the Code. (See Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar Purkait [Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar Purkait, (1997) 5 SCC 438], Panchugopal Barua v. Umesh Chandra Goswami [Panchugopal Barua v. Umesh Chandra Goswami, (1997) 4 SCC 713] and KondibaDagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar [KondibaDagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar, (1999) 3 SCC 722] .)

10. At the very outset we may point out that the memo of second appeal filed by the appellant-plaintiff before the High Court suffered from a serious infirmity. Section 100 of the Code, as amended in 1976, restricts the jurisdiction of the High Court to hear a second appeal only on "substantial question of law involved

in the case". An obligation is cast on the appellant to precisely state in the memorandum of appeal the substantial question of law involved in the appeal and which the appellant proposes to urge before the High Court. The High Court must be satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in the case and such question has then to be formulated by the High Court. Such questions or question may be the one proposed by the appellant or may be any other question which though not proposed by the appellant yet in the opinion of the High Court arises as involved in the case and is substantial in nature. At the hearing of the appeal, the scope of hearing is circumscribed by the question so formulated by the High Court. The respondent is at liberty to show that the question formulated by the High Court was not involved in the case. In spite of a substantial question of law determining the scope of hearing of second appeal having been formulated by the High Court, its power to hear the appeal on any other substantial question of law, not earlier formulated by it, is not taken away subject to the twin conditions being satisfied: (i) the High Court feels satisfied that the case involves such question, and (ii) the High Court records reasons for its such satisfaction.

***

12. The phrase "substantial question of law", as occurring in the amended Section 100 is not defined in the Code. The word substantial, as qualifying "question of law", means -- of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in

contradistinction with -- technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of "substantial question of law" by suffixing the words "of general importance" as has been done in many other provisions such as Section 109 of the Code or Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution. The substantial question of law on which a second appeal shall be heard need not necessarily be a substantial question of law of general importance. In GuranDitta v. T. Ram Ditta [GuranDitta v. T. Ram Ditta, AIR 1928 PC 172 : (1927-28) 55 IA 235 :

1928 SCC OnLine PC 31] , the phrase "substantial question of law" as it was employed in the last clause of the then existing Section 110 CPC (since omitted by the Amendment Act, 1973) came up for consideration and their Lordships held that it did not mean a substantial question of general importance but a substantial question of law which was involved in the case as between the parties. In Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. and Mfg. Co.

Ltd. [Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. and Mfg. Co. Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314] the Constitution Bench expressed agreement with the following view taken by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in RimmalapudiSubba Rao v. NoonyVeeraju [RimmalapudiSub ba Rao v. NoonyVeeraju, AIR 1951 Mad 969 : 1951 SCC OnLine Mad 100] :

(Chunilal V. Mehta case [Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. and Mfg. Co. Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314], AIR p. 1318, para 5)

'5. ... when a question of law is fairly arguable, where there is room for difference of opinion on it or where the Court thought it necessary to deal with that question at some length and discuss alternative views, then the question would be a substantial question of law. On the other hand if the question was practically covered by the decision of the highest court or if the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and the only question was of applying those principles to the particular facts of the case it would not be a substantial question of law.' And laid down the following test as proper test, for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial: (AIR p. 1318, para 6) '6. ... The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law.' ***

14. A point of law which admits of no two opinions may be a proposition of law but cannot be a substantial question of

law. To be "substantial" a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent,and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, insofar as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a question of law "involving in the case" there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. An entirely new point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter. It will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstances of each case whether a question of law is a substantial one and involved in the case, or not; the paramount overall consideration being the need for striking a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any lis."

26. Againin Thiagarajan v. Venugop alaswamy B.

Koil [Thiagarajan v. Venugopalaswamy B. Koil, (2004) 5 SCC 762] , a two-Judge Bench of this Court in paras 17, 24, 25 and 26 observed as under: (SCC pp. 768 & 771-72) "17. Sub-section (5) of Section 100 CPC says that the appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated and the respondent shall at the hearing of the appeal be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such a question. The

proviso states that nothing in this sub- section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law not formulated by it if it is satisfied that the case involves such question. In the instant case, the High Court at the time of final hearing formulated five more questions of law as extracted above after hearing the counsel for both sides having miserably failed to record the reasons for formulating the other substantial questions of law.

***

24. In our opinion, the High Court has erred in holding that the appellants have failed to establish their title to the suit property evidently without appreciating the evidence on record in its proper perspective by making only reference to portions of evidence having once decided to reappreciate the evidence. The High Court, in our opinion, ought to have examined the entire evidence both oral and documentary instead of only a portion thereof especially while deciding to look into and reappreciate the evidence despite the limited scope under Section 100 CPC. In our view, the learned Single Judge of the High Court has exceeded his jurisdiction in reassessing, reappreciating and making a roving enquiry by entering into the factual arena of the case which is not the one contemplated under the limited scope of jurisdiction of a second appeal under Section 100 CPC.

25. In the present case, the lower appellate court fairly appreciated the evidence and arrived at a conclusion that the appellants' suit was to be decreed and

that the appellants are entitled to the relief as prayed for. Even assuming that another view is possible on a reappreciation of the same evidence, that should not have been done by the High Court as it cannot be said that the view taken by the first appellate court was based on no material.

26. To say the least the approach of the High Court was not proper. It is the obligation of the courts of law to further the clear intendment of the legislature and not frustrate it by excluding the same. This Court in a catena of decisions held that where findings of fact by the lower appellate court are based on evidence, the High Court in second appeal cannot substitute its own findings on reappreciation of evidence merely on the ground that another view was possible."

12. The Supreme Court in the case of Nazir Mohammad Vs. J. Kamala

and others reported in 2020 (19) SCC 57 has held as under:

"33. The principles relating to Section 100 CPC relevant for this case may be summarised thus:

33.1. An inference of fact from the recitals or contents of a document is a question of fact, but the legal effect of the terms of a document is a question of law. Construction of a document, involving the application of any principle of law, is also a question of law. Therefore, when there is misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a principle of law in construing a document, it gives rise to a question of law.

33.2. The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. A question of law having a material bearing on the decision of the case (that is, a question, answer to which affects the rights of parties to the suit) will be a substantial question of law, if it is not covered by any specific provisions of law or settled legal principle emerging from binding precedents, and, involves a debatable legal issue.

33.3. A substantial question of law will also arise in a contrary situation, where the legal position is clear, either on account of express provisions of law or binding precedents, but the court below has decided the matter, either ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. In the second type of cases, the substantial question of law arises not because the law is still debatable, but because the decision rendered on a material question, violates the settled position of law.

33.4. The general rule is, that the High Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of the courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well-recognised exceptions are where : (i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. A decision based on no evidence, does not refer only to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not

reasonably capable of supporting the finding."

13. After considering submissions made by the counsel for the appellant

as well as pleadings of the appellant, this Court is of the considered opinion

that no substantial question of law is involved in the present case.

14. Accordingly, all the substantial questions of law proposed by the

appellant are answered in negative.

15. Ex consequenti, the judgment and decree dated 01.05.2018 passed by

the District Judge, Anuppur (M.P.) in Regular Civil Appeal Noa.34-A/2017

is hereby affirmed.

16. The appeal fails and is hereby dismissed in limine.

(G.S. AHLUWALIA) JUDGE Shanu

Digitally signed by SHANU RAIKWAR Date: 2023.01.05 18:25:06 +05'30'