Ajay Adiwasi vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh Thr.
2022 Latest Caselaw 14038 MP

                           1

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
                    AT GWALIOR
                      BEFORE
       HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ROHIT ARYA
                           &
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE MILIND RAMESH PHADKE

       CRIMINAL APPEAL No.827 of 2015

 Between:-

 AJAY ADIWASI, S/O SHIVCHARAN,
 AGED     ABOUT       26     YEARS,       R/O
 BHEEMNAGAR,                   THATIPUR,
 MORAR,           DISTRICT     GWALIOR
 (MADHYA PRADESH)

                                      .....APPELLANT

 (BY SHRI ATUL GUPTA - ADVOCATE)

 AND

 STATE       OF    MADHYA       PRADESH
 THROUGH            POLICE      STATION
 THATIPUR,         DISTRICT    GWALIOR
 (MADHYA PRADESH)

                                      .....RESPONDENT

 (BY   SHRI       NAVAL    GUPTA      -    GOVERNMENT
                                       2

ADOVCATE )

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       Reserved on                           05.09.2022

       Delivered on                          1.11.2022

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       This appeal coming on for hearing this day, Hon'ble Shri

Justice Milind Ramesh Phadke, passed the following:

                               JUDGMENT

(1) The present appeal had been directed against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 10/07/2015 passed in Sessions Trial No.431/2013 by 5 th, Additional Sessions Judge, District Gwalior, Shri Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi, whereby the appellant had been convicted u/s 376 (2)(I), section 506 (part II) and section 450 of I.P.C. and had been sentenced to undergo life imprisonment, 7 years and 10 years respectively, with a fine of Rs.10,000/-, Rs.1,000/- and Rs.5,000/- respectively and in the event of default in depositing the fine amounts had to undergo a further period of 9 months, 3 months and 6 months R.I respectively.

(2) The case of the prosecution in nutshell is that on 16/07/2013 prosecutrix lodged a complaint with P.S. Thatipur, District Gwalior that 3 to 4 months back, when her mother had gone to her maternal home, finding her alone the

accused/appellant, who is a neighbour, at 12.00 in the night entered her house via terrace and against her will committed rape on her and threatened her for life. Even earlier to this incident, the accused/appellant had subjected her to rape for 3 to 4 times and as she was frightened due to threatening of the appellant she didn't report the matter to anybody, but when she became pregnant, she told the incident to her mother and the matter was then reported to the Police. Vide Crime no. 288/2013 the matter was registered u/s 376(2) and 506 of I.P.C. read with sections 3 & 4 of Prevention of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 against the accused/appellant and the Police started the investigation.

(4) During investigation on 16/07/2013 itself the prosecutrix was send for her medical examination (Ex.P/3), spot map (Ex. P/2) was prepared at the behest of (PW/2) Rajkumari, mother of the prosecutrix, Original mark sheet of Class III (Ex. P/4) issued by Principal, Government Girls Primary School, Dullpur Rapat, Bhimnagar, Morar, Gwalior and mark sheet of Class VIII (Ex. P/5), of Kopal High School, Indra Nagar, Morar, Gwalior were procured, along with Ex.P-9(c) admission register of Government Girls Primary School, Dullpur Rapat, Bhimnagar, Morar, Gwalior, certificate issued by Principal of the said school (Ex, P/10), admission application (Ex. P/11-c) of Government Girls Primary School, Dullpur Rapat, Bhimnagar, Morar, Gwalior, transfer certificate of the said school (Ex.P/12(c)), another admission

register of the Government School (Ex. P/13(c) and another certificate issued by Head Master of Kopal High School (Ex.P/14). After completion of investigation, challan was submitted before the concerned Magistrate. Later since the matter was triable by Sessions, it was committed to Sessions Court and the Session was put to trial.

(5) Learned Trial Court after detailed scrutiny, convicted the appellant u/s 376 (2)(I), 506 (part II) and 450 I.P.C. for the aforementioned period as mentioned above. Aggrieved this appeal had been preferred.

ARGUMENTS (6) Learned counsel for the appellant with vehemence argued that from bare reading of the statements of the prosecutrix (PW/1), she appears to be a consenting party, as she kept quiet for more than 3 to 4 months of the incident, never told anyone including her mother (PW/2) Rajkumari and only when she became pregnant and could not hide it that she narrated the incident to her mother and thereafter a complaint was made to the Police. It was also argued that the prosecutrix herself had admitted that earlier she had gone along with the accused to Agra, where she had lived with him for 3 to 4 days and thereafter upon insistence of present appellant she had lodged a complaint against one Vijay and Rinku on the basis of which Crime no. 293/2013 was registered against them. Further placing reliance on the statements of prosecutrix u/s 161 Cr.P.C. recorded in Crime no.

292/2013 on 23/07/2013, which though was not exhibited in the present matter, but since is a part of the record, it was contended that the circumstances reflects that she was a consenting party, as therein she had admitted that she was in love with the present appellant and would had married him and nobody had sexually exploited her. In furtherance of his arguments learned counsel for the appellant contended that Dr. Sushma Bhargava (PW/9), who had done the MLC of prosecutrix marked as Ex. P/3 and had initially examined the prosecutrix had deposed in her Court statement that there were no injuries on the private parts of the prosecutrix, one finger was easily being inserted in her vagina, her secondary sexual characters were well developed and no definite opinion could be given about rape, which indicated the fact that she was major and was not subjected to rape by the appellant. It was also argued that except for the solitary statement of prosecutrix, there is no corroborative evidence including medical evidence to support the prosecution case, thus, the innocence of the appellant is explicitly evident and he deserves acquittal.

(7) It was further brought to the notice of this Court that though Dr. Sushma Bhargava (PW/9) had opined to go for pregnancy test and ossification, to prove whether prosecutrix was pregnant at the time of her MLC and also as to ascertain her age respectively, but neither the prosecution got the prosecutrix medically examined for the purpose of ascertaining her pregnancy

nor any report as to her pregnancy was submitted before the court or was she send for ossification test for age determination and only on the basis of the statement of prosecutrix and her mother, it was held that prosecutrix was subjected to sexual harassment by the appellant which made her pregnant, which is not correct. The prosecution story also gets falsified as in their statements PW/1 prosecutrix and PW/2, mother of prosecutrix had specifically stated that prosecutrix was pregnant at the time when the matter was reported to the Police, but it automatically got aborted, when medically this fact was not proved by the prosecution.

(8) With regard to age of the prosecutrix it was submitted by the counsel for the appellant that the prosecution utterly failed to prove the factum of age of the prosecutrix as PW/8 Amar Singh Mathur, Principal, Government Girls Primary School, Dullapur, Bhimnagar, who had proved Ex.P/4 the mark-sheet of Class-III, P/9-C the admission register, Ex. P/10 the certificate, regarding age issued by him, Ex. P/11 application form for admission, Ex. P/12 the transfer certificate, Ex. P/13, the attendance register, wherein the age of the prosecutrix had been mentioned as 10/08/2000, had admitted in para 5 of his cross examination that at the time of admission no document regarding age was furnished by the parents of the prosecutrix, which belies the prosecution story that the prosecutrix was aged 13 years at the time of incident and when the age of prosecutrix itself was not

proved, Learned Trial Court should had given benefit of doubt to the appellant and should had held her to be major. (9) Further attack was made by the counsel for the appellant over the testimony of PW/2 Rajkumari, who is mother of the prosecutrix, who in para 3 of her court statement had admitted that prosecutrix is daughter of her brother-in-law (Dewar) and she is not aware of date of birth of prosecutrix and since when the mother herself is not knowing the age, how she could have given the exact date of birth at the time of admission in school? Thus, the counsel on the basis of the above arguments tried to create a canvas of innocence of the appellant and prayed for his acquittal. (10) Counsel for the appellant further placing reliance on the statements of DW.1 Lakhan, the biological father of the prosecutrix contended that the date of birth of prosecutrix is 26.1.1994 and when she was of 6 years of age she was given in adoption to his sister-in-law PW/2 Rajkumari and Late Totaram, thus, the age of prosecutrix was more than 19 years and his statements also falsify the version of PW/2 Rajkumari, who had stated that prosecutrix was given in adoption when she was 15 days old, which creates dent in the prosecution version, the benefit of which should be given to the appellant. (11) Thus, summing up the arguments learned counsel for the appellant submitted that version of the prosecutrix since is in contradiction to the medical evidence and in absence of any explanation by the prosecution as to the delay of 3-4 months in

lodging the FIR, no explanation as to her admissions in her statements in Crime no.292/2013 and in the light of the statements of defense witness DW/1 Lakhan, biological father of prosecutrix, the prosecutrix being major and consenting party, the benefit of doubt should go to the appellant and therefore his conviction being bad, deserves to be set aside. (12) To bolster his submissions he placed reliance in the matter of T. Barai Vs. Henry Ah Hoe and another, AIR 1983 SC 150, Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit, AIR 1988 SC 1796, Soni Devrajbhai Babubhai Vs. State of Gujarat and others, (1991) 4 SCC 298, Hitendra Vishnu Thakur Vs. State of Maharashtra, (1994) 4 SCC 602, Md. Abdul SufanLaskar Vs. State of Assam, (2008)9 SCC 333, State of M.P. Vs. Munna, (2016) 1 SCC 696, Rabiya Bano Vs. Rashid Khan and another, 2017 (3) MPLJ Cri. 649 and Parvat Singh and others Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2020) 4 SCC 33. (13) Per contra learned Government Advocate appearing for the respondent/State submitted that the prosecutrix was about 13 years at the time of the incident, which was duly proved by the statements of PW/8 Amar Singh Mathur vide Ex.4, Ex. 9-C, Ex. P/10, Ex. P/11 and Ex. 12-C the mark sheet of Class-III, admission register, certificate, admission form and Transfer certificate respectively and by no stretch of imagination it could be said that she was a consenting party and even if she is assumed to be a consenting party, it assumes no importance, as

she was minor and therefore benefit of doubt whereof could not be given to the appellant. It was further submitted that once the statement of prosecutrix inspires confidence, conviction can be based only on the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix and no corroboration further would be required. Corroboration of testimony of the prosecutrix as a condition for judicial reliance is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence. Reliance was placed on the celebrated observations of Justice Vivian Bose in the case of Rameshwar Vs. State of Rajasthan AIR 1952 SC 54, which is quoted below:

"The rule, which according to the cases has hardened into one of law, is not that corroboration is essential before there can be a conviction but that the necessity of corroboration, as a matter of prudence, except where the circumstances make it safe to dispense with it, must be present to the mind of the judge", it was contended that prosecutrix was consistent throughout her testimony and supported the case of the prosecution and it is a settled law that once the statement of prosecutrix inspires confidence, no other corroboration is required."

(13) It was further submitted that once it is found that the prosecutrix is reliable and trustworthy, in that case, there can be a conviction for the offence of rape, relying upon the deposition of the sole witness/victim. Further reliance is placed on the decisions of Supreme Court in the cases of Ganesan v. State,

(2020) 10 SCC 573; Santosh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2020) 3 SCC 443; State of H.P. v. Manga Singh, (2019) 16 SCC 759; and State (NCT of Delhi) v. Pankaj Chaudhary, (2019) 11 SCC 575.

(14) In furtherance of his arguments it was contended that so far as the statements of DW/1 Lakhan, biological father of prosecutrix, is concerned, it does no stir confidence as in his statements u/s 161 Cr.P.C. he had stated that prosecutrix had told him that appellant had committed rape on her and since he had threatened her, she didn't tell about the incident to anybody. He had also stated that appellant was married and had children, but when he was confronted with it in cross in his court statement, which were recorded on 16/06/2015, after approximately 2 years of the incident, he took a somersault and denied that prosecutrix had never informed him about the incident, appellant is not married and he is not having children, thus, he appears not to be a reliable witness.

(15) Thus, on the basis of the above submissions it was prayed that the conviction and sentence of the appellant is based upon critical evaluation of the material evidence on record and needs no interference and the appeal deserves to be dismissed. (16) Heard the counsel for the parties in extenso and perused the evidence on record.

DISCUSSION (17) At the outset, it is required to be noted that in the present

case, the prosecutrix has fully supported the case of the prosecution. She has been consistent right from the very beginning. Nothing has been specifically pointed out by the counsel for the appellant as to why the sole testimony of the prosecutrix should not be believed? Even after thorough cross- examination, she has stood by what she has stated and has fully supported the case of the prosecution. We see no reason to doubt the credibility and/or trustworthiness of the prosecutrix. The submission on behalf of the accused that no other independent witnesses have been examined and/or supported the case of the prosecution and the conviction on the basis of the sole testimony of the prosecutrix cannot be sustained is concerned, the aforesaid submissions has no substance.

(18) In the case of Ganesan (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed and held that there can be a conviction on the sole testimony of the victim/prosecutrix when the deposition of the prosecutrix is found to be trustworthy, unblemished, credible and her evidence is of sterling quality. In the aforesaid case, Hon'ble Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the series of its judgments on conviction on the sole evidence of the prosecutrix. In paragraphs 10.1 to 10.3, it is observed and held as under:

"10.1. Whether, in the case involving sexual harassment, molestation, etc., can there be conviction on the sole evidence of the prosecutrix, in Vijay [Vijay v. State of M.P., (2010) 8 SCC 191], it is observed in paras 9 to 14 as under: (SCC pp. 195-98)

"9. In State of Maharashtra v.

Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain [State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain, (1990) 1 SCC 550] this Court held that a woman, who is the victim of sexual assault, is not an accomplice to the crime but is a victim of another person's lust and, therefore, her evidence need not be tested with the same amount of suspicion as that of an accomplice. The Court observed as under: (SCC p. 559, para 16) '16. A prosecutrix of a sex offence cannot be put on a par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. What is necessary is that the court must be alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her. If the court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule of law or practice incorporated in the Evidence Act similar to Illustration (b) to Section 114 which requires it to look for corroboration. If for some reason the court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look

for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. But if a prosecutrix is an adult and of full understanding the court is entitled to base a conviction on her evidence unless the same is shown to be infirm and not trustworthy. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case disclose that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence.' (19) In State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh [State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384], this Court held that in cases involving sexual harassment, molestation, etc. the court is duty- bound to deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity. Minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of a prosecutrix should not be a ground for throwing out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. Evidence of the victim of sexual assault is enough for conviction and it does not require any corroboration unless there are compelling reasons for seeking corroboration. The court may look for some assurances of her statement to satisfy judicial conscience. The statement of the prosecutrix is more reliable than that of an injured witness as she is not an accomplice. The Court further held that the delay in filing FIR for

sexual offence may not be even properly explained, but if found natural, the accused cannot be given any benefit thereof. (20) The fact situation of the present case cannot be overlooked in which a poor helpless girl, with no male member in the family had found herself in the company of a desperate young men who threatened her and prevented her from raising any alarm for number of days. The courts must, while evaluating evidence, remain alive to the fact that in a case of rape, no self-respecting girl/woman would come forward in a court just to make a humiliating statement against her honour such as is involved in the commission of rape on her. In cases involving sexual molestation, supposed considerations which have no material effect on the veracity of the prosecution case or even discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix should not be given undue weightage, unless the discrepancies are such which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. Thus, seeking corroboration of statement of prosecutrix before relying upon the same, as a rule, in the present case would amount to adding insult to injury. As it is held in catena of Judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court, corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under given circumstances.

(21) Thus, keeping in view the above law which emerges on the issue we find the statements of prosecutrix worthy of credence

and reliable and holds that it requires no corroboration and conviction of the accused can be based on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix and can be sustained.

(22) With regard to the contention advanced on behalf of the Appellant about delay of 3-4 months in lodging the F.I.R., it is trite to mention that the delay in lodging an FIR in a rape case is not of much "significance" as the victim has to muster courage to come out in open and expose herself in a "conservative social milieu". In rape cases the delay in filing the FIR by the prosecutrix or by the parents in all circumstance is not of much implication, it may be due to fear of social stigma and on occasions the availability of medical treatment to gain normalcy and above all psychological inner strength to undertake such a legal battle that delay occurs in lodging the F.I.R. If the present case is analysed on the above touchstone statements of PW/1 prosecutrix becomes relevant, wherein it had been specifically stated that there was continuous threatening from the appellant and since she is living alone with her mother as her father is no more, explains the situation, thus, we find that there was no delay in the lodging of the FIR either and if at all there was some delay, the same has not only been properly explained by the prosecution but also considering the facts and circumstances of the case, it was natural.

(24) Now so far as the submission on behalf of the accused, relying upon the deposition of the doctor-PW9 that there were no

external or internal injuries found in the person of the prosecutrix and therefore the prosecution case is not to be believed, as not supported by any corroborative evidence, it is found that first of all the prosecutrix has been medically examined after more than three to four months of the incident, she was consistent in her evidence right from the very beginning and even in the cross- examination, she has stood by what she has stated and she has fully supported the case of the prosecution, therefore in the facts and circumstances of the case and even in the absence of any external or internal injuries in/on the person of the prosecutrix, the conviction can be sustained.

(25) Now with regard to the age of the prosecutrix at the time of offence, the prosecutrix PW/1 stated that she was 14 years of age (at the time of deposition before Court she was 15 years of age), whereas her mother PW/2 stated that prosecutrix was 13 years of age, as per the statement of biological father of prosecutrix DW/1, she was above 18 years and as per the school record her date of birth was 10/08/2000, thus, there was a variation with regard to the age of the prosecutrix from 13 years to 18 years. (26) On the date of the incident the prevailing provisions for determining the age of the prosecutrix was under Rule 12 of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007, which governed the field. Rule 12 for ready reference is reproduced below:

            "12. Procedure to be           followed    in
            determination of Age.―


(1) In every case concerning a child or a

juvenile in conflict with law, the court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee referred to in rule 19 of these rules shall determine the age of such juvenile or child or a juvenile in conflict with law within a period of thirty days from the date of making of the application for that purpose.

(2) The court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee shall decide the juvenility or otherwise of the juvenile or the child or as the case may be the juvenile in conflict with law, prima facie on the basis of physical appearance or documents, if available, and send him to the observation home or in jail.

(3) In every case concerning a child or juvenile in conflict with law, the age determination inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee by seeking evidence by obtaining -

(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available; and in the absence whereof;

(ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof;

(iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat;

(b) and only in the absence of either (i),

(ii) or (iii) of clause (a) above, the medical opinion will be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board, which will

declare the age of the juvenile or child. In case exact assessment of the age cannot be done, the Court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee, for the reasons to be recorded by them, may, if considered necessary, give benefit to the child or juvenile by considering his/her age on lower side within the margin of one year.

and, while passing orders in such case shall, after taking into consideration such evidence as may be available, or the medical opinion, as the case may be, record a finding in respect of his age and either of the evidence specified in any of the clauses (a)(i), (ii), (iii) or in the absence whereof, clause (b) shall be the conclusive proof of the age as regards such child or the juvenile in conflict with law.

(4) If the age of a juvenile or child or the juvenile in conflict with law is found to be below 18 years on the date of offence, on the basis of any of the conclusive proof specified in sub-rule (3), the court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee shall in writing pass an order stating the age and declaring the status of juvenility or otherwise, for the purpose of the Act and these rules and a copy of the order shall be given to such juvenile or the person concerned.

(5) Save and except where, further inquiry or otherwise is required, inter alia, in terms of section 7A, section 64 of the Act and these rules, no further inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the Board after examining and obtaining the certificate or

any other documentary proof referred to in sub-rule (3) of this rule.

(6) The provisions contained in this rule shall also apply to those disposed off cases, where the status of juvenility has not been determined in accordance with the provisions contained in subrule(3) and the Act, requiring dispensation of the sentence under the Act for passing appropriate order in the interest of the juvenile in conflict with law.

(27) As per Rule 12, the matriculation or equivalent certificate is given the top most priority and in the absence thereof, the date of birth certificate from the school first attended assumes importance. Only in absence of both the above certificates, birth certificate given by Corporation or Municipal Authority has to be resorted to. In the present case in absence of any matriculation certificate Ex. P/10 which is the certificate issued by the Principal of the school first attended by the prosecutrix assumes importance, which was prepared on the basis of Ex.P.9-C, the admission register, coupled with Ex. P/4 the mark sheet of Class- III of the same school, Ex.P/9-C admission register, Ex. P/11-C application form, Ex. P/12-C school leaving transfer certificate, which were proved by PW/8, Amar Singh Mathur, the Principal of Government Girls Primary School, Dullapur, Bhimnagar, wherein the date of birth of the prosecutrix was mentioned as 10/08/2000 and which had been relied by the prosecution to prove the age of the prosecutrix, according to which her age at

the time of incident was 13 years, in the light of the admission made by PW/8 in para 5 of his cross examination as to non- submission of any supporting document with regard to proof of age at the time of admission, losses its credibility as a genuine proof of age and would not be considered as conclusive evidence to prove the date of birth of the victim as 10/08/2000. Even PW/2 Rajkumari, mother of prosecutrix, had admitted in para 3 of her cross examination that she had admitted the prosecutrix in school at Maharajpura, but she doesn't know her date of birth, as earlier there was no trend of mentioning it, thus, we find that the date of birth of prosecutrix as recorded by her mother is based on assumption and hence, could not be relied.

(28) Therefore, it is evident that the date of birth mentioned in the admission register (Ex. P/9-C) and Ex. P/10 the certificate was written on the basis of information given by mother of prosecutrix, who admitted that she doesn't know the exact date of birth and had informed such date of birth on estimation. So, the date of birth of prosecutrix mentioned in admission register (Ex. P/4) is not found proved and wholly reliable to determine her age. (29) In view of the aforesaid discussion and the fact that prosecution had miserably failed to prove that the prosecutrix was a "child" in terms of section 2(1)(d) of the POCSO Act i.e. a person below the age of eighteen years, the benefit of doubt of which is required to be extended to the Appellant and is accordingly protracted to the appellant.

(30) Now the moot question which remains to be addressed is also what age should be assessed of the prosecutrix ? In that context resort can be taken of a decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the matter of State of M.P. Vs. Munna, 2016 (1) SCC 696, wherein the Supreme Court has held as under:

"The age of the prosecutrix not proved beyond reasonable doubt to be less than 16 years of age at the time of incident therefore, the High Court was right in holding that the prosecutrix was more than 16 years of age and was competent to give her consent."

In the light of the said judgment and in the absence of any age proof of the prosecutrix, this court extend benefit thereof to the appellant and he is acquitted of the charges under section 376(2)

(i) of I.P.C. (now stood omitted by Act 22 of 2018, sec. 4(b) (w.r.e.f. 21.4.2018)) and section 4 & 6 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, but so far as the conviction of the appellant u/s 376(2)(n), 506 and section 450 of I.P.C is concerned, since we have concluded that the statement of prosecutrix is reliable and consistent, it is maintained. (31) Therefore, the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence dated 10/07/2015 passed by 5 th, Additional Sessions Judge, District Gwalior, Shri Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi in Sessions Trial No. 431/2013 is hereby modified to the above extent and sentence of the Appellant is reduced to the minimum period as prescribed u/s 376(2)(n) of I.P.C for 10 years.

(32) Consequently, the appeal is hereby partly allowed and on aforesaid terms is disposed of.

(33) A copy of the judgment be also sent to the Trial Court along with its record for information and compliance.

               (Rohit Arya)                          (Milind Ramesh Phadke)
                  Judge                                    Judge
                01/11/2022                               01/11/2022
Pawar/-


          ASHISH
          PAWAR
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