M/S Narmada Travels Bus Service ... vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh
2022 Latest Caselaw 8232 MP

                             (1)

       IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH,
                    AT GWALIOR

                      BEFORE
          HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ROHIT ARYA
                         &
     HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE MILIND RAMESH PHADKE
                ON THE 22ND JUNE 2022


             WRIT APPEAL NO. 1826 OF 2019

BETWEEN :-

M/S NARMADA TRAVELS BUS
SERVICE PROPRIETOR SMT. ASHA
KUMARI (DEAD) THROUGH LEGAL
REPRESENTATIVES :

I.      SHRI RAJKUMAR SINGH S/O
        LATE SHRI DINESH KUMAR
        SINGH, AGED - 54 YEARS, R/O
        WARD NO. 12 DEVELOPMENT
        AREA, SHADOLA, MADHYA
        PRADESH.

II.     SHRI SANJAY SINGH S/O LATE
        SHRI DINESH KUMAR SINGH,
        AGED - 50 YEARS, R/O WARD
        NO. 12 DEVELOPMENT AREA,
        SHADOLA, MADHYA PRADESH.

III.    SMT. CHANDRKALA SINGH
        JAISWAL, W/O SHRI VED
        PRAKASH JAISWAL, AGED - 60
        YEARS, R/O BARRA BHAG 2 IN
        FRONT OF KANPUR SWEET
        HOUSE, UTTAR PRADESH.
                          (2)


IV.   SMT. MANJU JAISWAL W/O
      SHRI ALOK KUMAR JAISWAL,
      AGED - 52 YEARS, R/O INDIRA
      BIHAR VILASPUR.

V.    SMT. DOLLY SINGH JAISWAL
      W/O SHRI ARVIND JAISWAL,
      AGED - 39 YEARS, R/O B-204
      JAYPURIYA      APARTMENT
      SABERI    PUL    CROSSING
      REPUBLIC, GAZIABAD, UTTAR
      PRADESH.

VI.   SHRI RAGHVENDRA SINGH S/O
      LATE SHRI DINESH KUMAR
      SINGH, AGED - 64 YEARS, R/O
      WARD NO.12 NEW WARD NO.16
      H.NO.494 SICHAI COLONY,
      NEAR POLICE LINE ROAD
      OPPOSITE TO DR.THABRANI
      SHADOLA, MADHYA PRADESH.

      ALL LEGAL HEIR THROUGH
      POWER      OF    ATTORNEY
      HOLDER SHRI RAGHVENDRA
      SINGH S/O LATE SHRI DINESH
      KUMAR SINGH, AGED - 64
      YEARS, R/O WARD NO.12 NEW
      WARD NO.16 H.NO.494 SICHAI
      COLONY, NEAR POLICE LINE
      ROAD      OPPOSITE      TO
      DR.THABRANI       SHADOLA,
      MADHYA PRADESH.

                                    .....APPELLANT

(BY SHRI N.K.GUPTA - SENIOR ADVOCATE WITH SHRI
S.D.SINGH BHADORIA - ADVOCATE)

AND
                          (3)

1.   STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
     THROUGH          PRINCIPAL
     SECRETARY,      TRANSPORT
     DEPARTMENT,       VALLABH
     BHAWAN, BHOPAL.

2.   STATE         TRANSPORT
     AUTHORITY,       MADHYA
     PRADESH GWALIOR (MADHYA
     PRADESH).

3.   MANGLANI    BUS  SERVICE,
     PROPRIETOR A.D. MANGLANI
     SHOP NO.9, NEW BUS STAND,
     SHAHDOL          (MADHYA
     PRADESHH).

4.   VIRENDRA SINGH S/O MAHESH
     KUMAR SINGH HOUSE NO.439
     BUILDING    BEHIND    JAIL
     SHAHDOL           (MADHYA
     PRADESH).

5.   PRAYAG    BUS   SERVICE,
     PROPRIETOR       MUKESH
     KUMAR, DEVELOPMENT AREA,
     DHAROLAN       MOHALLA,
     SHAHDOL         (MADHYA
     PRADESH).

6.   BHUPENDRA        TRAVELS,
     PROPRIETOR        NEELAM
     MANGLANI, LAKHERAN TOLL,
     DISTRICT SHAHDOL (MADHYA
     PRADESH).

7.   SHYAM     BUS       SERVICE,
     PROPRIETOR         LAXMIBAI
     MANGLANI (DEAD),   LAKHERA
     TOLA,  BUDHAR,      DISTRICT
     SHAHDOL             (MADHYA
                                          (4)

       PRADESH).

8.     MAHAMAYA         TRAVELS,
       PROPRIETOR ROOP CHAND
       LAKHERAN, TOLL BUDHAR,
       DISTRICT SHAHDOL (MADHYA
       PRADESH).

9.     JAI    DURGA    TRAVELS,
       PROPRIETOR DILIP KUMAR
       SINGH,    WARD     NO.12
       DEVELOPMENT        AREA,
       SHAHDOL         (MADHYA
       PRADESH).

                                                    .....RESPONDENTS

(SHRI ANKUR MODY - ADDITIONAL ADVOCATE
GENERAL FOR THE RESPONDENTS/STATE)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        This appeal coming on for orders this day, JUSTICE

ROHIT ARYA passed the following:

                                 ORDER

This intra-court appeal is directed against the order dated

12.01.2018 passed by the learned Writ Court in M.P.No.201/2018.

2. As per office report, the appeal is barred by 574 days.

3. Upon perusal of the order impugned, it appears that the

learned Writ court has non-suited the appellant on the premise

that there was unexplained delay of 38 days before the appellate

authority. Accordingly, the appellate authority has dismissed the

appeal. Consequently, Writ Petition has been dismissed.

4. Regard being had to the aforesaid factual matrix, it appears

that not only the appeal was filed belatedly but also the instant

Writ Appeal against the order passed by the Writ Court is filed

after formidable delay of 574 days with no plausible explanation

as well evident from the application filed under Section 5 of the

Limitation Act (I.A.No.462/2020) by the appellant.

5. Law as regards limitation is well settled. While dealing

with the scope of jurisdiction under section 5 of the Limitation

Act, as regards condonation of delay, the Hon'ble Apex Court in

the case of Lanka Venkateshwarlu (dead) by L.Rs., Vs. State of

Andhra Pradesh and others, (2011) 4 SCC 363 has observed as

under:

"19. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel. At the outset, it needs to be stated that generally speaking, the courts in this country, including this Court, adopt a liberal approach in considering the application for condonation of delay on the ground of sufficient cause under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. This principle is well settled and has been set out succinctly in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Ors. Vs. Katiji & Ors. (1987) 2 SCC 107.

23. The concepts of liberal approach and reasonableness in exercise of the discretion by

the Courts in condoning delay, have been again stated by this Court in the case of Balwant Singh Vs. Jagdish Singh, (2010) 8 SCC 685, as follows :-

"25. We may state that even if the term "sufficient cause" has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of "reasonableness" as it is understood in its general connotation."

26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly."

28. We are at a loss to fathom any logic or rationale, which could have impelled the High

Court to condone the delay after holding the same to be unjustifiable. The concepts such as "liberal approach", "justice oriented approach", "substantial justice" can not be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. Especially, in cases where the Court concludes that there is no justification for the delay. In our opinion, the approach adopted by the High Court tends to show the absence of judicial balance and restraint, which a Judge is required to maintain whilst adjudicating any lis between the parties. We are rather pained to notice that in this case, not being satisfied with the use of mere intemperate language, the High Court resorted to blatant sarcasms.

29. The use of unduly strong intemperate or extravagant language in a judgment has been repeatedly disapproved by this Court in a number of cases. Whilst considering applications for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Courts do not enjoy unlimited and unbridled discretionary powers. All discretionary powers, especially judicial powers, have to be exercised within reasonable bounds, known to the law. The discretion has to be exercised in a systematic manner informed by reason. Whims or fancies; prejudices or predilections can not and should not form the basis of exercising discretionary powers. "

6. Hon'ble Supreme Court in a decision Maniben Devraj

Shah Vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan, Mumbai, (2012) 5

SCC 157 has held in para 24 as under :-

"24. What colour the expression "sufficient cause" would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of

the explanation. If the Court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay."

7. Even otherwise, instant matter relates to grant of

permission, therefore, by efflux of time, no indulgence is

warranted for the relief claimed. Accordingly, Writ Appeal is

dismissed.

               (ROHIT ARYA)                 (MILIND RAMESH PHADKE)
                 JUDGE                               JUDGE
SP

 SANJEEV
 KUMAR PHANSE
 2022.06.23
 16:19:15 +05'30'